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ABSTRACT
The general purpose of this thesis has been to study the
institutions of government in Lesotho before the establishment and
the operation of a Legislative Council in 1959-60. The effort has
been made to depict the indigenous institutions - the chieftaincy as
an institution of political leadership, the traditional counsellors
according to their various functions, the pitso (the all male public
assembly), the makhotla (courts or councils) and their functions in
the formulation of policy, law making, and dispute, settlement. An
attempt has been made, first, to analyse their character and to appraise,
from a historical viewpoint, their competence in the pre-colonial era;
second, to appraise their continuing use and competence during the period
from 1868, when Lesotho became a British dependency, to 1960, when a
Legislative Council began to operate.
The specific purpose of the thesis has been to study the Basutoland
National Council - a colonial institution which was established in
1903 as an advisory body to the colonial administration, comprising
9A chiefs and their headmen and counsellors, out of a hundred. The
National Council was conceived as an institution that in the case of
Lesotho was deemed sufficient to serve the primary political role of
a Legislative Council, while falling short of being a law-making body:
It was deemed sufficient and competent (a) to assist the colonial
administration in the development of policy affecting the internal
affairs of the Territory, (b) to bring the general views of the
people to the attention of the executive, that is the High Commissioner
and his colonial Officers, and, above all, (c) to prepare the people for
the responsibilities of self government, as of when and if self government
might seem desirable to grant and, presumably, along the lines of a
parliamentary form of government. The effort has been to analyse all
relevant historical developments that might shed light on these aspects
of the problem. The specific purpose, in the final analysis, can be
summarized in the form of two questions: Did the National Council
achieve the objectives set out for it? Was the Basotho leadership
committed in the direction of parliamentary government?
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NOTES ON THE USE OF TERMS
Lesotho, Basotho, Sesotho
When the first members of the Paris Evangelical Missionary
Society arrived in the country of this study in 1833, as the first
Europeans ever to settle therein, they found that the country was
already called "Lesotho", the inhabitants called themselves the
"Basotho", and they referred to their language as "Sesotho". As the
Bosotho had then not yet learned how "to make the paper speak" (that
is, to read and write), and the French Missionaries were the first
to initiate them into that mystery, the nineteenth century or thography
of these three terms varied. terms appear in contemporary sources
variously as "Lesuto", "Lesouto"; "Basuto", "Basutos", "Basouto";
"Sesuto", "Sesouto". For purposes of this study I have used the modern
spelling of the terms, Lesotho, Basotho(sing. Mosotho), Sesotho, except
where contemporary spellings are in quotations.
Lesotho and Basutoland
The term "Lesotho" means "the land of the Basotho". But, from
the instance that the English speaking people first established
a meaningful relationship with the Basotho, notably in the late 1830s,
they named Lesotho "Basutoland". In turn, the Basotho, obviously
presuming that Basutoland was merely the English translation for Lesotho,
they accepted the use of the anglicized term whenever English was
employed, while invariably retaining the proper term, Lesotho, in spoken
as well as written Sesotho. Upon Lesotho becoming a British dependency
in 1868, this linguistic problem was formalized. Lesotho came to be
known to the outside world as Basutoland, while toits inhabitants it
remained as Lesotho, the former being adopted for the convenience of the
English speaking public. Eventually, this confusion has led to the
acceptance among some scholars that Basutoland was the "official" name
for the country and that in historical writing that is the term that
ought to be used, additionally in the interests of historical perspective.
For purposes of this study I have elected to use the term
Lesotho. It seems to be the historically more appropriate to use.
The term "Basutoland" will be used only in quotations, or otherwise where
it was part of a specific name, for instance, the Basutoland Progressive
Association.
King, Morena e Moholo, Paramount Chief
Having established in Chapter 2 that Lesotho was a kingdom, I
have occasionally in that Chapter as well as in Chapter III, referred
to the Head of the State as The King. The preferred title, however,
has been that of Morena e Moholo, by which the Basotho called their
monarchs. The use of the title Morena e Moholo is of the additional
advantage that during the colonial era, when the use of the title "king"
might lead to terminological confusion, it distinguishes between the
ruling British from the subjected Basotho monarchs.
I have avoided the use of the title "Paramount Chief" in this
study, for the same reason that I have avoided the use of "Basutoland",
except where it is used in quotations. The title "Paramount Chief"
was applied generally to African monarchs, even before the colonial
era, because it did not seem to the English speaking observers that it
would be proper to refer to them as kings, and not so much because
it was linguistically correct. In short, it was an expression of
cultural arrogance. While it may be of academic value to examine the
term more closely on linguistic grounds, I have found it profitable
for the time being to avoid using it.
Sesotho customary law; Basotho customary law
The examination of archival materials reveals the fact that the
Basotho rather referred to their laws as the "Basotho customary law"
than as "Sesotho customary law". Legal scholars on Lesotho, however,
use the latter expression. Why this is so, it is not clear. But, as
this is not a problem that I have had the time to study, and my study
is otherwise not on customary law, I hesitate to argue to the point
and settle for the use of the expression "Sesotho customary law"
as presently accepted.
Councillor and Counsellor
The term preferred by most scholars to refer to the courtiers
of African rulers, at least in the Southern African context, is
"councillors". This reference acknowledges the fact that these courtiers
belong to the ruler's councils, or the councils of his subordinates.
While accepting fully the propriety of using the term, in this study I .
have tended to use the term "counsellors", in order generally to distinguish
the "councillors" of the indigenous institutions from the councillors of
the Basutoland National Council. The term "counsellors" is otherwise
not inappropriate, on its own value, in that the various officers in the
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Statement of the Problem
As a rule, African countries formerly under British colonial
authority, whether as Crown colonies or as protectorates, for in
practice the legal distinction between the two was often of no political
significance,-^were given independence with constitutions that were
more or less along the lines of the British constitution, popularly
styled The Westminster model. Just what, exactly, The Westminster
model is, is difficult generally to cite in a standard and agreed phrase
or statement. And as Britain does not have a written constitution, it
may not be readily located in a particular document. Even so, it is
definable.
o
According to the late Professor S. A. de Smith,
the Westminster model can be said to mean a
constitutional system in which the head of
state is not the effective head of government;
in which the effective head of government is a
Prime Minister presiding over a Cabinet composed
of Ministers over whose appointment and removal
he has at least a substantial measure of control;
in which the effective executive branch of
government is parliamentary inasmuch as Ministers
must be members of the legislature; and in which
Ministers are collectively and individually
responsible to freely elected and representative
legislature.
To this convenient and yet narrow definition we may, to good effect,
further add two basic assumptions stemming from "the spirit and practice
of British institution", again to use de Smith's phraseology: One of
these is the assumption of the Rule of Law: the doct^rine that the
rulers are equally subject to law as the governed, and that they should
exercise their authority according to the established principles of the
law of the land, deviating from which they must show that the law permits
o
them. Second, the assumption that, therefore, the judicial arm of
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government must be given the requisite independence to administer justice
free of control, pressure and influence frctn the executive and the
legislative arms of government.
In the main, the granting of independence with this model of
government was a fulfilment of British aspirations and plans, and
generally also of the potential leaders of an independent Anglophone
Africa. Thus, Margery Perham, the untiring pundit on the subject of
British administration of Africa in the second quarter of the twentieth
century, could aver in the 1940s
Although there is asyet no example of an
Asiatic or an African people having successfully
operated the Anglo-Saxon model of parliamentary
democracy, this is the model they demand and the
one, it seems, that our own faith and experience
allow us to give.
While, on the African side, at the corunencement of Africa's independence
from Britain, in 1961 the prolifically written Nigerian jurist, T.0.
Elias, found himself at pains tacitly to defend Margery Perham's
c
conviction and assessment against its detrators, who doubted the
A
African ability to adapt to Anglo-Saxon institutions. He wrote:
Both the African and the British systems
should.... be able to acconmodate each other
in the emergent parliaments of post-war British
Africa. There is no a priori reason of
political expediency why the Africans should
not be able to operate the modern institutions
of constitutional government, given the will to
succeed.
T.O,Elias' optimism was grounded on the premise that "African concept
Q
of government is not essentially dissimilar from the European."
In the final analysis, however, the transfer of the Westminster
model was determined by historical development in each African
country. Thus we find that the Gold Coast (Ghana), got its
independence as a Republic, with a Constitution that clearly provided
that "the Head of State and holder of the executive power should be an
n
elected President responsible to the people." While Uganda
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presented the paradoxical situation that it was a unitary state composed
of federal states, in addition to having a President for a Head of State,
O
even though it was not a republic.
In contrast to the above two, Lesotho, the subject of our study, was
a virtual replica of Westminster, at least in form. A British Crown
Colony (as opposed to being a protectorate) since March 12, 1868,
Lesotho was granted independence on October 4, 1966. The Independence
Constitution provided for the King of Le sotho (a hereditary office) as
a constitutional Monarch. Parliament, with a Cabinet responsible to
it, was to be the pivot of the machinery of government. The Parliament
was bicameral, with a nominated upper House of Chiefs, styled a Senate,
and an elective National Assembly. The Standing Orders of both Houses
provided that the practice to be followed in case of doubt was that of
the House of Corrmons in Westminster. Additionally, "no powers,
privileges or immunities shall exceed those of the Commons' House of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom or, as the case may be, of the
9
committees of the members thereof."
The basic structure for the Constitution had been laid down seven
years before, in 1959, when the Territory was first given a Legislative
Council. And that Legislative Council had effectively begun its work
in 1960, significantly the year that the Territory's Crown Prince, or
Khosana, Bereng Constantine Seeiso, was given the sceptre, following
an acrimonious national debate over the timing of his installation.
Coming to office in 1960, the Morena e Mohoio (or Paramount Chief, as
British colonial convention still had it), was terminating an era of a
Regency in his minority which had lasted since his father's death in
1940.
The general purpose of this thesis is to determine whether or not,
and if so, to what extent, the parliamentary form of government given
to Lesotho at the end of the colonial era was a logical outcome of its
institutional history. In other words, did the transferred Westminster
model result from an evolutionary process, and hence reflect an
understanding and conmitment, at least of the potential post-
independence political leaders. Or was it a clear case in point of an
imposed (or superimposed) foreign model of government.
As it is often the case in an academic inquiry, the objective
truth lies somewhere in the middle. The final outcome was neither
ostensibly the result of an evolutional process nor a clear cut case of
an imposed foreign model of government.
My research should reveal the following major features of
institutional change and development: When Lesotho became a British
dependency in 1868 as an executive monarchy, it had developed
identifiable institutions of government; it had a political culture -
practices and modes of behaviour that everybody knew and accepted as
given; and lines of authority between individuals and groups were
clearly defined. However, as a state, the country was of recent
origins. It was only one generation in existence. Hence its political
foundations, although built on the much older chieftainship forms, were
not yet fully tried by the new challenges of the radically increased
population, power sharing of several formerly independent chiefs under a
singie overlord - Morena e Moholo, the introduction of a cash economy,
and the cultural factors that go with it.
During the period 1868 - 1900, the nineteenth century phase of the
colonial era, when the old form of government was exposed to the full
impact of a money economy, invasion of European cultural values and
various forms of colonial rule (a laissez-faire administration from 1868
to 1871; a tight and politically disruptive "government by proxy" under
the Cape Colony from 1871 to 1884; and administration by "moral force"
for the remainder of the period characterized by virtual anarchy), the
old form of government was shaken and it practically fell apart. And
- 4 -
st
by the beginning of the twentieth century both Basotho chiefs as well as
the colonial administration were in agreement that the indigenous
government needed a life-line in the form of a new institution. This
institution was to be called a National Council.
The National Council was established in 1903, on the instruction
of the British High Commission in South Africa, in agreement with the
Morena e Moholo of Basotho. It was to be an advisory body to the
colonial administration generally on internal policy matters affecting
the Territory, and in particular to the High Commissioner, who alone had
the power of making laws. The National Council began as almost
exclusively a body of chiefs: Of the hundred of its members, 94
were nominees of the Morena e Moholo and they were invariably
either chiefs or headmen or the traditional counsellors of chiefs.
While only five, appointed by the Resident Commissioner, were
commoners (that is, people other than those born in royal families).
The Resident Commissioner was the President of the Council,
and the Morena e Moholo was styled "Chief Councillor".
The National Council was meant ostensibly to be a replacement
of the Basotho Pitso - an all male popular assembly which had virtually
lost its democratic character in the course of the colonial era. As the
Resident Commissioner, Herbert Sloiey put it at the opening of the
Council
In former years the National Pitso used
to be called for this purpose, but it was
a large gathering in which many spoke, and
it was difficult to discuss matters properly.
It was a gathering which called people from
all parts of the country, and necessitated
much travelling and loss of time. I hope
that the present Council will be a good
substitute for the former National Pitsos.
This was of course an incomplete explanation for the waning of the
National Pitso. The colonial administration partially bore the blame
for its dislocation: It had turned it into a pulpit for issuing
- 5 -
instructions, whereas it had ben a consultative body of a highly
democratic nature.
In practice the National Council held pretentions to being a
parliamentary body. A resident French missionary and historian,
D. F. Ellenberger described it as "the first attempt .... at establishing
a regime which was like the shapeless embryo of a parliamentary
system."11 Its proud members certainly referred to it as a
Parliament. And the poiiticail^minded conmoners, who resented their
exclusion from it, variously petitioned to be included; for the National
Council to be representative and elective; for legislative powers to be
granted; for a separate chamber of commoners to be established. Their
sharp critician of the composition, functions and procedures of the
Council led to their gradual inclusion into it by nomination. And by
mid-1940s it had even become partially, albeit indirectly, elective.
The National Council was an advisory body and yet, from the day
of its first Session in 1903, it assumed quasi-legislative functions.
It set up a committee to assemble all the known customary laws. It
deliberated on these, refined and cut them to size and in its view,
i
although not that of the High Commissioner, ratified them. In the view
of the High Commissioner the Councillors had put them forward "rather as
a collection of existing laws and customs which it was desirable to
12
formulate in definite terms, than as legislative enactments."
The confusion on the powers of National Council in this regard was
complicated not only by the fact that these customary laws, styled the
Laws of Lerotholi, were used in the chief's courts, but by the issue
that several times in the course of the century they were amended.
In the face of this paradoxical situation the colonial administration
13
admitted, when the "Laws" were first amended in 1922 that
This informal expansion of the functions
of the Council may serve a very useful
purpose in securing the gradual revision
- 6 -
and development of native law and custom
.... but there is the obvious danger that
the laws framed by the Council in its
capacity as interpreter of native law and
custom, may be found to cover the same
ground and to clash with laws made by the
High Commissioner.
The National Council was jealous of its role as an advisory body
and exploited it fully to determine policy and legislation. So that
in the final analysis no major decision affecting Lesotho was ever taken
unless it had been consulted and it had agreed. Operating within its
framework, chiefs and commoners alike cultivated a ke -t interest in the
parliamentary form of government. But from the start it was clear that
the less the political power in the old indigenous structure a person
had, the more he admired and was committed to parliamentary institutions.
The more power he had, the more reluctant. So that successive holders of
the high office of Morena e Moholo were the most chary, especially
as the Council changed its composition in response to commoners' agitatiort
to participate in it.
Roughly beginning in 1921 the European-educated Basotho
concentrated a barrage of criticisms against chiefs as a political
institution in the Territory. Their criticisms and barbed
condemnations arose from the worsening state of injustices and mal¬
administration in the chiefs' courts. The grievances were well founded.
Chiefs had become corrupt and politically irresponsible. Their
political bonds with commoners had snapped as they looked up to the
colonial administration for favours and privileges - a situation which
the colonial administration had deliberately cultivated and fostered in
the nineteenth century. But the onslaught went beyond a cail for courts
reforms and began to question the legitimacy and need for the institution
of chieftaincy. The result had a two-pronged effect: On the one hand,
it precipitated a head-on collision between the chiefs and those
critical cocmoners. And that head-on collision served as a glaring
illustration of the fact that chiefs were fearful of what constitutional
changes in Lesotho might bring for than, while for their critics it
meant there could be no question of going back to a fully blown monarchy
in which their welfare would predominantly be determined by chiefs.
On the other hand, the confrontation paved the way for the most radical
reformation of Basotho courts and chiefly administration in 1938.
Chiefs were drastically diminished, in numbers as well as in authority.
They were still to lose more, in both respects, before 1960. Chiefly
ive.
power was effectly broken.
Quite significantly, however, as the chiefs, as a group,
diminished in numbers and authority, they at the same time gradually
subjected the office of Morena e Moholo to the National Council. This
development, however, was as much the outcane of the concerted efforts
of chiefs as it was the result of increasing problems surrounding the
office of Morena e Moholo, which problems surfaced early upon the
establishment of the National Council. When the Morena e Moholo
Lerotholi, the last of Basotho monarchs who had been exposed to the
political traditions of the pre-colonial era, died in 1905, he was
succeeded by an exceedingly weak person, Letsie II, his eldest son.
Letsie II was not much interested in performing the responsibilities
of his office. At the same time appeal cases frcm territorial chiefs
were stockpiling in his own court in Matsieng and he needed help to
decide than. Desparate, he turned to the National Council to assist
him in resolving the problem. In turn the Council was both disappointed
in its Morena e Mohoio as well as it increasingly lost confidence in
the capacity of his office to perform its customary functions. It
began to put the office under close scrutiny.
Upon his own demise in 1913, the nation was faced with a
contentious succession problem from which his brother, Griffith
Lerotholi, emerged as the holder of office. Griffith, however, did not
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enjoy the full support of the royal family. As a consequence he
could not effectively control his territorial chiefs. Increasingly he
found himself having to apeal to the National Council, instead of the
royal Grand Council, for its backing to enforce his authority.
Although the members of the Grand Council were also members of the
National Council, he could not control them. But once he attempted to
work within the framework of the latter, it correspondingly sought to
control him.
Upon his death in 1938, he was succeeded by his son Seeiso in
yet another bitterly contested succession. But, although a ruler of
merit with a strong personality, Seeiso died in 1940, leaving an heir
only four years old. In the event the office fell under a female
Regent, his Great Wife, 'Mantsebo Seeiso. 'Mantsebo was herself
without a son. (The Khosana (Prince), was by the second wife.) The
Regency lasted for twenty years. And by the time the Khosana was
installed in 1960 the office of Morena e Moholo had been conmitted
to the principle of a constitutional monarchy. Understandably, the
colonial administration was sympathetic to that development as it was
in keeping with the model of government in which it had faith, and the
only one it was used to. And it conceivably also encouraged the
trends, although we can find no explicit evidence to support such a
conjecture. What, on the other hand, is patently clear is the fact
that the Basotho lack of confidence in a female ruler was largely
contributary, all despite the fact that 'Mantsebo seems to have had
the drive and capacity at least to stand up against colonial officers
when the need arose for her to do so. Suffice it to say the National
Council felt the need to assign advisers to her, who were members of
the Council and responsible to it. Additionally, she was required
always to "consult" with the National Council, which carried the import
of seeking approval, before she could make any major decision or
- 9 -
"rules" ( a power given by the Reforms of 1938) affecting the Territory.
And at the first constitutional talks in London in 1958, which led to
the granting of the Legislative Council in 1959, her advisers (the
members of the National Council), had obviously counselled her to
agree, on her own volition, "to be a constitutional ruler and to act in
accordance with the wishes of the Nation.""
Quite obviously, when the Prince interrupted his studies at Oxford
in order to be installed in 1960, it was out of the feeling on his part,
and evidently on the part of his supporters in the royal house, that
the Regency had lasted for too long, giving the Regent an undue exercise
of discretion to determine the fate of the office for the Prince, who
was going to have to live with the consequences.
Albeit chiefs collectively suffered loss of power, individually
they were left with a fair measure of it in their respective
jurisdictions. Of particular significance is the fact that the members
of the main lineage of royalty, styled "the sons of Moshoeshoe", grouped
themselves into factions corresponding with the order in seniority of
their grandfathers, the four sons of Moshoeshoe I, founder of the
I
Nation, by his Great Wife. And the factions worked in mutual
antagonism, with more intensity between some than with others. So
that, in so far as it could be viewed as a unit capable of governing,
chieftaincy had spent its force; but in so far as these factions and
individuals served to stimulate each other in competition for
recognition by the colonial administration, it was active and capable
of exploiting political opportunity side by side with the politically
minded coamoners, either in collaboration or in antagonisn. In this
sense, the old and the new forms and forces complemented and competed.
Scope
The scope of this thesis has been determined by the establishment
of the National Council. The focus will thus be on the period from
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1903 - 1960 - the end of the Regency. Unlike seme other typical
Crown Colonies, Lesotho did not get a Legislative Council early enough
to serve as a training ground and political mid-wife for a parliamentary
form of government. We are thus compelled to turn to the National
Council for an alternative framework of this type of study. Just as it
is the case with similar studies done through the framework of a
Legislative Council, the proceedings of the National Council reveal what
Martin Wight terms "the point of contact between colonial aspirations and
imperial control," as well as the "political capacities and character
of several groups of representatives and the relationship between
1 C
then." While, at the same time, its advent willy-nilly stimulates
external political activity in the country, which in turn further
facilitates the study of thought patterns and trends.
Although the focus of the thesis will be on the period from 1903 to
1960, it is nevertheless inherent in the nature of the study to examine
two-other aspects of the country's past which lie in the preceding
period, that is, the nineteenth century. The first of these is the
nature of government in the pre-colonial era: This is what, if we
were making analogies to contemporary British institutions, we might be
referring to as the "constitution" of the old Basotho monarchy. But
as the use of the term "constitution" had by the mid-nineteenth century
already cane to suggest such specific notions, the like of which may not
readily, if at all, be found in the Basotho forms of government, I have
eschewed the use of the term. Instead, I have opted for the less
pretentious but functional phrase: "Institutions of Government and
Control of Power." An examination of this subject is necessary if we
are to appreciate the evolutionary process in institutional development
or, as the case may be, an imposition of the aii£n on an indigenous
form of government.
The second nineteenth century historical aspect of the problem
has to do with what may be termed the experimental phase of colonial
administration. This is the period from 1868 to 1900 which earlier
I identified with the break-down of the indigenous government.
The thesis can thus be viewed in two parts, thus: The first
part will essentially be on institutional developments in the nineteenth
century. While the second part, focusing on the National Council and
the related external activities, will be in the twentieth century.
TRENDS AND PROBLEMS IN THE TRANSFER OF THE
WESTMINSTER MODEL OF GOVERNMENT
It will be useful, before we examine the problem with respect to
our case, Lesotho, to have some idea of how, generally, the transfer of
parliamentary institutions in British dependencies has been effected,
and how, specifically, that process has worked in the African situation
in the colonial era. Only that way shall we be able to locate Lesotho's
case. We need at least a general framework for reference.
Although it can not be denied that colonialian is essentialy
characterized by the control of the colonized people and that, as
i
Robert Martin puts it, "Colonial rule is the antithesis of
1 cz
democracy," in British colonial history, at least, there have
always been periods when the introduction of parliamentary democracy
has been found expedient. The degree to which the colonized people have
been permitted participation in the government machinery that affects
their welfare has been determined by both current historical developments
as well as by race - in particular on whether those people were of Anglo-
Saxon origins or not. The framework for such a participation has
been one of Anglo-Saxon institutions as they have evolved in
Westminster. The historical, racial and national factors have of
course also determined the lines along which, in the final analysis,




The transfer of the Westminster model of government in a
"transcript" form has of course never anywhere been achieved. For, as
1 7
A. F. Madden cogently puts it:
Even if Westminster had had any such
intention, it would clearly be impossible
to export 'the perfect image and transcript'
of a Westminster model in any period of its
subtly changing evolution: to freeze it for
export in one moment of time would be to
distort that image. It would be difficult
enough, recognising the inevitability of
local acclimatisation, even to transplant
such a model, so essentially appropriate
and organic is it to an idiosyncratic
British society.
Nor does the notion of the "transfer" of institutions connote an
"organic" transplant. For, after all, social phenomena do not as a
rule yield to such absolute distinctions. The term "transfer" can only
be applied in its relative sense: the sense that the distinctive
features of one system have been transported to a new social habitat
where it is hoped they will adapt or be adopted, and where it is also
reasonable to expect that they may alter their original character.
It is only if we view the problem frcm that angle, it seems to me,
that we would better be disposed to say how well colonial institutions
in given situations served the needs of a colony or protectorate, and
how well they prepared the colonized people to operate a parliamentary
form of government. We would be able, without being dogmatic, to say
that this aspect of a parliamentary form of government was effectively
adapted, while another did not take root for this or the other reason.
And at the same time, by examining which aspects were acconmodated and
which were not, we would have to examine the parallel developments in
the indigenous institutions of government. For, in the final analysis,
the notion of the "transfer" has to do with the relationship between
alien and the indigenous systems.
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The Old Colonial System: Representative Government
The first British Empire comprised colonies that were
established through private enterprize: chartered companies,
proprietary grants, independent settlements. These were the English
colonies of North America, Bermuda and the West Indies. They produced
varying types of constitutions and gave rise to several kinds of
colonial governments. In the main, however, the constitutions of these
governments reflected England's institutions during that period, which
were themselves undergoing significant changes. Specifically, they
owed their origins and development to the Governor's instructions from
the English Crown.
The Governor, as the representative of the King, had his own,
nominated Council, which was more or less a replica of the Privy
Council. He depended on it, in varying degrees, for advice, and on
SorrtG. subjects for consent. Neither the functions of the Council nor
its monbership were differentiated, in the early stages of its
establishment: It assisted the Governor in all - the executive,
administrative, legislative and judicial functions. But as time went,
it differentiated: Judicial functions came to tbe performed by a
separate monbership, and two distinct councils - a House of Assembly
and an Executive Council were established. Yet, the Executive Council,
composed of the Governor and his advisers, was not responsible to the
House of Assembly, and the Governor's tenure of office was still
dependent on the Crown in the United Kingdom, acting on the advice of
his ministers. The Governor had no powers to force.the House of
Assembly into passing the type of legislation that he wanted, but he
could veto Bills passed by the House, while, otherwise, the Sovereign
could disallow Bills to which the Governor had given his assent. This
system of rule was called "representative government".
By universal standards the system was of course not
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representative. The indigenous "Indians", the enslaved African
population, the free "Afric-Americans", as sometimes manumitted slaves
called themselves, the poor whites, were not represented in the House
of Assembly. Slaves were in fact classified under property and as such
had no civil rights. Yet, in so far as the prevailing English concepts
of equality so had it, and considering the material world of that
period, it was regarded as representative as it was rationally
conceivable.
The beneficiaries of the system were, understandably, the
English settlers: The emigrants to the various colonies saw themselves,
and were so seen from the home front, as having taken with than the
rights of Englishmen "as established by the cannon law and other
legislation then in force in England." Thus the charter of Virginia,
1Q
the first of England's early colonies, stated (18th April, 1606):
our Subjects which shall dwell and inhabit
within [any colony, and their descendants],
shall have and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises
and Immunities, within any of our other
Dominions, to all Intents and Purposes, as
if they had been abiding and born, within
our realm of England, or any other of our
Dominions.'
The notion would later, in 1765, be underscored by Sir William
20
Biackstone, who stated:
It hath been held, that if an uninhabited
country be discovered and planted by English
subjects, all the English laws then in being,
which are the birthright of every subject,
are immediately there in force.
The early establishment of colonial legislatures in those early
settlements, therefore, were in recognition of the Englishman's
"constitutional right to a parliamentary system." The idea was to
insure that the settlers enjoyed as much of the English rights as the
new soil permitted. The enjoyment of that freedom was, of course,
regulated by the overriding consideration of the empire - trade, and
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sometimes also by the occasional English sensitivity "to prevent
barbaric punitive legislation" against slaves. In respect of Bermuda,
for instance, in 1705, an Act of the local legislature was disallowed,
which provided for the castration of slaves for "bad behaviour.
With these minor constraints, the parliamentary system worked as well
as could be expected on the new soil, for those for whom it was designed
- generally the wealthiest class in a settlement.
The Old Empire was at its zenith during the twelve year period
between the seven Years War and the American Revolution. And as it
reached its peak both in power as well as in territory, so the system
of "representative government" flourished. However, the success of the
American Revolution (or War of Independence, depending on a historian's
perspective) effectively marked the end of the era. Although, of
course, the story of the end of that era is complex, and it has
voluminously been examined. It does not belong here.
The end of the era brought with it a new attitude to colonial
administration. And that attitude gave rise to a different type of
imperial control. The lessons to the new aproach were drawn from
i
recent experiences. Most significant for our purpose was perhaps a
problem that the British Crown had encountered in the island of Grenada,
acquired by conquest in 1763. As in the settled colonies, Grenada had
subsequently in 1764 been granted a constitution that provided for
representative institutions. But later, exercising the royal
prerogative, an attempt was made to impose a tax on imports from the
island. The type of tax imposed was already in force in the early
settled colonies, but the rub was that it had been passed without the
consent of the Grenada House of Assembly. A local resident, a natural
born British subject, James Campbell, whose sugar exports were affected
by the law, challenged it and the case had eventually to be settled in
English courts. Lord Mansfield, C. J. ruled that although "the King
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has a right to legislate authority over a conquered country;" once
he granted it a constitution authorizing the establishment of an elected
Assembly, "he had divested himself of that authority." This was the
op
famous Campbell v. Hall case.
This lesson, taken together with that of the loss of the North
American colonies, and other related factors, persuaded the British
government to resort to a tougher aproach towards colonial legislatures.
It led to a type of a system in which the Crown might not find itself
caught in its own snare, as in the Campbell v. Hall case, thereby
losing its final authority over a colony. That new type was to be
styled a Crown Colony. And its legislature would be called the
Legislative Council.
The Crown Colony and the Legislative Council
The term "Crown colony", according to Martin Wight, did not come
into use until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. The first
time that it entered the Oxford Dictionary was in 1845. When it thus
came into use, however, the Crown colony system had existed since
231765. What it referred to was that new type of administration
I
for conquered colonies in which the authority of the British Crown is
unimpaired. With time, however, the original meaning of "the conquerred
colony" would be broadened to include other classes of British
dependencies. These comprised the settler colonies of the New
Empire which were under Crown rule but had not yet been granted
representative government. The old West Indian colonies such as
Jamaica, a colony of conquest (1655) which had been treated as though
it had been settled, but later (1865) had been forced to surrender the
constitution that had given it a representative government, came also
to be included under the Crown Coiony system. But by far the biggest
class, over half of the dependencies under the Crown colony system,
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consisted of Protectorates. And this was an infinitely difficult
class to define. For, although in theory the jurisdiction of the Crown
in a Protectorate was limited, mainly to the control of external
affairs, while the sovereignty of its ruler was not ceded, in the end
it could be treated as though it had been conquered, and its original
control under the Foreign Office could be shifted to the Colonial Office
without any formal agreement. Hence William Edward Hall could state
in 1894:25
The term 'protectorate' is one of which the
meaning is somewhat indefinite; or rather
perhaps it may be said with more correctness
to have different meanings in different
circumstances and in the mouths of different
persons.
Founded initially under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act in 1843, and later
under the consolidated Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, this class of
dependencies was aimed at providing Britain with extraterritorial
jurisdiction over areas not yet claimed by other European powers, or
26
otherwise where African rulers had applied for British protection.
As it so happens, the first Crown colony to be established was on
the African continent. Through an Order in Council, which was to be
the familiar method for the establishment of a Crown colony, in 1765
Senegal and Gambia on the West Coast of Africa were vested in the Crown
under the new name of Senegambia. The shift in the system of
Government from the old to the new was, however, initiated half¬
heartedly. For, on the one hand, the constitution provided for a
Governor, who was to be assisted by a Council consisting of four
ex officio members (the Commandant of Troops, the Chief Justice, the
Superintendent of Trade, and the Secretary of the Province), and nine
nominated members, all Europeans. While on the other hand, on the
principle that Senegambia had no "civilized population", it was not,
unlike the old American colonies, given a House of Assembly. Instead,
the interests of the indigenous population were represented by a
European official, "conversant with the Moorish language," styled
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Secretary of Native Affairs. Nor was the Secretary of Native Affairs
a member of the Governor's Council. That early experiment, which soon
collapsed, did not produce the typical Crown colony model of government.
Another early Crown colony in Africa, which for our purposes is
significant because it was initially given self-government even though
it was a Black settler colony, is Sierra Leone. Consequent upon the
famous case of Somerset v. Stewart, which resulted in the
emancipation in England of 14,000 slaves of African origin, 400 freed
Africans, including James Somerset, who had precipitated the case,
arrived in Sierra Leone on May 9, 1787, to found a settlement on a piece
of land granted to then by the Temne Chiefs. They had come under the
auspices of the St. George's Bay Company, initially a philanthropic
Black Poor Conmittee co-founded by Granville Sharp, the champion of the
cause, who had taken the case on behalf of Somerset. The Settlement
had gained in numbers in 1792 when 1,200 African Nova Scotians arrived
and again in 1800, 800 ex-slaves from Jamaica called the
"Maroons" followed.
When initially these African settlers were given a constitution
in 1788, it was something quite unique in the colonial forms of
government. The constitution, which was the work of Granville Sharp,
provided for "the ancient English frank-pledge," an early high middle
ages form of government, supposedly dating from King Alfred's reign,
based on the divisions of administration into tithings (districts with
families of ten) and hundreds. From the start the frank-pledge did
not work. The Settlement was subsequently ruled by successive
Governors assisted by Councils of varying memberships which performed
all the functions of government. It was formally turned into a Crown
Colony model of government: The "all-purpose" Council was broken down
into a Legislative Council and an Executive Council. (Later the British
Government formally proclaimed a Protectorate in the hinteriand of the
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Colony in 1896, which was to constitute a separate administrative unit,
but with both under the same Governor, until 1951 when the two were
97
fused into one.)
The establishment of an Executive Council and a Legislative Council
were typical of the Crown Colony system of government in the early
stages of constitutional development, only after which, as a rule, an
Assembly might be granted. The timing for constitutional change, of
course, always varied and, again as a rule, European settler colonies
were granted Assemblies much earlier than African dependencies. Canada,
po
for instance, formally a Crown Colony by 1774, got it in 1791.
The Nature and Constitutional Advance of a Legislative Council
The distinctive features of a Crown Colony government were that
it had only one legislative House - the Legislative Council. In its
first phase, the Legislative Council was, however, only nominally a
legislative body. In the main, its function was to advise the Governor
to enact government sponsored legislation. The Governor was empowered
to summon it. He chaired its sittings. He could veto and suspend
Bills. And he could over-ride it and enact legislation without its
consent. The Council was not, unlike a true Parliament, a supreme or
sovereign body of government.
To facilitate the Governor's role as the supreme power in the
system, members of a Legislative Council were nominated by the Crown,
and the majority of them, styled "official members" - the heads of
administrative departments, were senior civil servants. As such, the
very nature of their appointment made them pliable to the Governor and
as a rule they supported his policies. There were no elected members
to the Council.
The Executive Council, which under the old "responsible government"
functioned as a quasi-cabi-riet was responsible to the Colonial Office,
and not to the Legislative Council. As such, it has been said that in
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fact the legislature was in essence a conmittee of the Executive Council,
pq
rather than the reverse.
It stands to reason therefore that, in particular in Africa, where
it was a priori assumed that "natives" could not operate within a
parliamentary system and so constitutional advance from this stage was
relatively more delayed than in European settled colonies, the
Legislative Council in its early stage virtually did not determine
policy. When it was assumed that African interests were represented,
it was when, typically, a Secretary of Native Affairs sat in the
Legislative Council on their behalf. And in that sense it proved true
SO
that "Colonial rule is the antithesis of democracy."
The second phase in the constitutional development in a Crown
Colony system was achieved by granting a colony "responsible government"
- by which it was meant, essentially, that the Legislative Council became
representative and partially elective, and that the Executive Council,
which was then re-styled a "Cabinet", became dependent upon it. This
stage was achieved in various ways. But basically the number of
"official" members became less than that of the "unofficial" members and
came to include spokesmen of the indigenous population. Most of the
"unofficial" members were elected, directly or indirectly, as for
instance from Provincial Councils, where such were provided, while
others were appointed by the Governor. Members of Cabinet were appointed
from the Legislative Council and their tenure of office depended on
the support of the majority of the Council.
The Governor then withdrew from the legislature. The Leader of
Government, styled Chief Minister, with his Ministers, assumed the
responsibility of running the affairs of a colony. Nevertheless, the
Governor still had certain "reserved" subjects. Crucial among these
were his powers on matters of defence and internal security, and on
legislation for external affairs.
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The final stage before independence was called "internal self-
government": The Chief Minister became "Prime Minister" and, in cases
such as Lesotho (Basutoland) where constitutional monarchy was
anticipated, the characteristic colonial title, "Paramount Chief",
reserved for African rulers, might also be replaced by a more prestigious
one - as long as it was short of being "King". In Lesotho the
preferred title was "Motlotlehi", literally meaning "The-
£
One-Replendent-of-Honour". All of the Governor's remaining fetters on
the legislature were removed, except the crucial trio reserved under
"responsible government" - defence, internal security and external
affairs. Public Service, heretofore subject to interference from
the legislature, was set up separately, and hopefully independently,
under a Civil Service Conmission. And clauses on fundamental human
rights were entrenched in the constitution.
African participation in these colonial legislatures was generally
brief, in comparison with the record of the white settler colonies.
If we exclude the early, and abortive, Sierra Leone experiment, the
earliest instances of African participation were in Nigeria and in the
Gold Coast.
In Nigeria, where in the Lagos Colony a Legislative Council had
been established as early as in 1862, it was not until in 1901 that the
first, nominated, African took a seat in the Council. The lone trail
blazer, Mr. Christopher A. Sapara-Williams, would then continuously be
renominated to that body until 1913. Between 1914 and 1922 the
Legislative Council included two Nigerians, one of whom was still
Sapara-Williams. The rest of the matbers were the Governor, as
President, seven British "officials", appointed ex officio frcm the
Government service, and two British "unofficials". It was not until
in 1922, following a strongly worded petition by the West-educated
Africans under the aegis of the "West African National Conference" in
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1920 that Africans be given more legislative responsibility, that
Nigerian participation in the legislature was significantly increased.
The new constitution introduced that year (with the Nigeria Protectorate
Order in Council, 1922, regulated by the Nigeria (Legislative Council)
Order in Council, 1922) gave a new Legislative Council to an amalgamated
Lagos Colony and the Southern Provinces which was both representative
as well as partially elective. Besides the Governor, who was President,
the Legislative Council was made up of forty-six members. Of these,
nineteen were "unofficials", the majority of them Nigerians. Yet
still, the Governor could nominate up to fifteen of them. Of the
elected four, three were returned from Lagos and one from Calabar. The
Northern Provinces remained without a Legislative Council, the Governor
legislating for them by means of proclamations, which essentially meant
applying to them legislation promulgated by the Colony and Southern
Provinces Legislative Council.
The vastness of Nigeria and the political complexity of its
peoples, as much as the British scepticism for the readiness of
Nigerians to cope with transferred Anglo-Saxon institutions of
government, delayed both the establishment of a Central Legislature as
well as a national representation. These came with the introduction of
the constitution of 1946. The constitution provided for a central
Legislative Council, with a complex formula of representation. It had
16 "official" members, with 13 of then ex officio, and 3 nominated.
There were 28 "unofficial" members appointed thus: 4 members of the
House of Chiefs, appointed by that House. The 24 remaining were either
nominated or indirectly elected. 5 were members of the Northern House
of Assembly, appointed by the "unofficial" members of that House. Two
chiefs, appointed by the Governor frcm those chiefs who were members of
the Western House of Assemby. 4 "unofficial" members from the Western
House of Assembly, appointed by the "unofficial" members of that House.
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5 "unofficial" members of the Eastern House of Assembly, apointed in the
A
same way. There was one member frcm the La9Ok Colony appointed
by the Governor following consultation with the "Native Authorities"
in the Colony. And 3 members "appointed by the Governor to represent
interests or communities which, in his opinion, are not otherwise
op
adequately represented." The 1946 constitution represented the
most radical constitutional development in Nigeria to date.
The Gold Coast (later Ghana), the other West African Colony which
earlier got a Legislative Council got it as early as in 1850. But it
was not until in 1888 that the first "unofficial" African representative
was nominated to it. The Councillor was John Sarbah, a merchant
frcm the Cape Coast. (His son, John Mensa Sarbah, would in 1897 be one
of the ccr-founders of the Gold Coast Aborigines' Rights Protection
Society, which contributed a great deal in the agitation for
constitutional advance in the region.) By 1901 the number was
increased to 4 members. And in 1916 there were six of than - 3
"Paramount Chiefs", and 3 West -educated Africans - all nominated by the
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Governor. <
As with Nigeria, the Gold Coast faced complex problems of
political differences to reconcile under a unified government. And
in this regard the constitution of 1925, which attempted to enlarge
representation in the Legislative Council, was illustrative of the
problem. The constitution, which provided for an "official" majority
of 16 members, 5 of whcm were ex officio members, had 14 "unofficial"
members appointed as follows: 6 were Provincial members - a member of
the Ga-Adangme section in the Eastern Province, one of the Ewe section
in the Eastern Province, one of the Akan section of the Eastern
Province; two members of the Central Province, and one member of the
Western Province. 3 members, all Africans, each represented the three
municipalities of Accra, Cape Coast, and Sekondi. (The 8 other
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"unofficial" members were all Europeans representing Mercantile, Mining
and Banking interests.) A unified Gold Coast did not become a reality
until in 1934 when the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti, and the Northern
Territories came under the control of one and the same Executive Council
seated in the Gold Coast Colony, and the legislature of the three
34
dependencies became one.
As in the case of Nigeria, the granting of a constitution in 1946
in the Gold Coast ushered a new era. In fact, it was a step ahead of
Nigerian development. The Gold Coast was granted "responsible
government", the first in the African continent to be the earliest to
reach that stage. "Official" majority was abolished, but, as usual,
the Governor retained his reserved powers. The legislature became
truly representative.
Elsewhere in Africa, the earliest of the African colonies to be
granted a Legislative Council (excepting, of course, Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe), which presents a special problem because of its white
settler character), and one which shared the distinction with the other
two West African examples, of being a model colony for British efforts
to perfect a style for constitutional development in Africa, was Uganda.
The British Government first announced a Protectorate over most
of Uganda (a name coined in the colonial circumstances of the time) in
1894. The same year, the Kingdom of Bunyoro had fallen under the
British Crown by conquest. And by 1901 colonial administration had
firmly been established: Through "Agreements", the African
35
understanding of which has been questioned, the Kingdoms of
Buganda and Toro in 1900, and Ankole in 1901 had effectively come under
British suzerainty. The politically less centralized societies of
Busoga and the northern part of the Territory had come under colonial
q/2
administration more or less as matter of cause.
The Executive Council and a Legislative Council were established
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in Uganda in 1920. Suffice it to say all the members of the two
Councils were Europeans, and "officials". When next the Legislative
Council decided on non-European representation in 1926, it was an
appointment of an Indian "unofficial" member, Mr. Chunibhai Jethabhai
Amin. The appointment of the Honourable Chunibhai Amin, so states
George Kanyeihamba, "was necessitated by political expediency rather
than a realization that the Indian, educated as he was, was a proper
person to sit in the Legislative Council". The exclusive
European representation in the Legislative Council had from the start
been greatly opposed by Indians as well as Africans.
African representation in the Council was to be delayed, on the
obvious assumption that "natives were still too backward" to participate
in a parliamentary system of government, until the end of the Second
World War. Even then, however, when they took their seats in the
Legislative Council in 1945, amidst "cheers and shouts of 'hear! hear!',
they were just three in number, representing an African population of
four million. Memorable as the "firsts", they were M. E. Kawalya-
Kagwa, P. Nyangabyaki and Y. Zirabamuzale. Nor were they received in
the spirit of equality by their European peers: In his speech of their
reception the Governor significantly referred to them as "our new
African Councillors" and found the need to propound a lesson in
pedagogy: "They will learn from us, and we also shall learn from
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them." Thus the relationships in the Council were in terms of
"our Africans", "they" and "us", "we" and "them": paternalistic.
In 1949, when the Legislative Council consisted of 13 ("official"
and "unofficial" European members, there were 3 Asian and 4 Africans,
all nominated. And in 1950, out of an "unofficial" membership of 16,
8 were Africans, 4 Asians, and 4 Europeans. But, at the same time,
the "official" membership had been increased to 16. It was not until
in 1954 that the Legislative Council could be said to be representative.
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For, that year it was announced that African representation would come
from all districts in the Territory (except one, Karamoja), and indirect
election, for representatives outside Buganda, was introduced. By the
end of 1955 Uganda had a fully fledged ministerial system, including a
so
first African woman representative, Mrs. Kisonkole. The state of
representative government was at last achieved. Independence was
QQ
lurking just seven years away.
It is quite significant that none of the rest of British colonies
and protectorates were granted Legislative Council, much less
"responsible government", before World War II. In fact, only two got
Legislative Councils as a preparatory stage for independence. As already
stated, Lesotho got it in 1959, independence was in 1966. Swaziland, a
Protectorate, got it in 1964, independence was in 1968: On the other hand
the white settler community of Swaziland, composed mostly of people of
Afrika ner origins, who owed two-thirds, had at least been granted an
elective European Advisory Council as early as in 1921, while the Swazi
were ruled through the indigenous institutions of government.
The others were granted internal self-government without the
Legislative Council: The "Colony and Protectorate" of the Gambia
(with an independent colonial administration since 1888), was given
universal adulthood suffrage in 1962, and internal self-government in
1965. It got its independence in 1965. Kenya, most of which was a
British Protectorate as early as in 1895, consequent upon the "Mau-Mau"
rebellion, got both internal self-government and independence the
same year, 1963. Zambia, having cane under British control when the
Barotse were extended the controversial "protection" by Cecil Rhodes
in 1890, and become the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia in 1911, was
for ten years, from 1953 to 1963 a part of the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaiand. Upon the dissolution of the Federation in 1963 it was
granted internal self-government. It became independent in 1964.
- 27 -
%
Malawi (Nyasaland), came under partial British control in 1889. In
1893 it became British Central Africa Protectorate, and in 1907, by an
Order in Council, the name was changed to Nyasaland Protectorate. Like
Zambia, it was for ten years a part of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. In 1963 it was granted internal self-government, and it
got independence in 1964 as Malawi. Tanzania, which was received as a
League of Nations Mandate in 1919, and wao aloo a part of the Federation
from 1053 to 1069*, got both internal-self government as well as
independence in 1963.^
In the African countries where Legislative Councils were early
introduced and Africans had any meaningful tenure to become a part of
its traditions, the degree of democracy in the conduct of its
proceedings depended on the temperament and whims of the Governor.
And some Governors were more tolerant of African criticism than others.
There were those, like Sir Bernard Bourdillon, Governor of Nigeria from
1935 to 1943, who believed that the best way of working with an African
"is to get his confidence, an object almost impossible if the relations
between the two parties remain entirely formal and official".41
For his attitude he left a good impression in the minds of both the
chiefs as well as the majority of the intelligentsia with whan he had
had to work in Nigeria. But perhaps this was in keeping with the times
in which he had assumed his governorship. His contemporary, Sir Alan
Burns, Governor of the Gold Coast from 1941 to 1947, had warned the
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Colonial Office upon his assumption of the office:
I believe that the rising tide of anti-British
resentment, and the disturbances which in recent
years have been symptoms of this resentment, are
due to the policy of deferring constitutional
concessions until it is too late for them to be
appreciated by the people. The Negro peoples,
both in the West Indies and in West Africa, are
learning that the colonial administrations take
no notice of popular feeling until this feeling is
manifested in disturbances.
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A previous Governor of Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford (1919 - 1925),
on the other hand, had demonstrated a ca]fous and disdainful attitude
toward Africans, which engendered that anti-British feeling. When, in
1920, the intelligentsia of the Congress of British West Africa held a
conference in the Gold Coast and drew up the demand that each of the West
African dependencies be given a Legislative Council in which at least half
of the manbers should be elected, his response, delivered before the Lagos
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Colony Legislative Council, was venomous: He referred to the
demand as
a great deal of loose and gaseous talk...which has
for the most part emanated from a self-selected
and self appointed congregation of educated African
gentlemen.. .men born and bred in British administered
towns situated on the sea-shore, who in the safety of
British protection, have peacefully pursued their studies
under British teachers, in British schools...; whose
eyes are fixed, not upon African native history or
tradition or policy, nor upon their own tribal obligations
and duties to their natural rules which inmemorial custom
should impose upon them, but upon political theories
evolved by Europeans to fit a wholly different set of
circumstances, arising out of a wholly different environment,
for the government of peoples who have arrived at a wholly
different stage of civilization.
The retort was appalling. But, stripped of its offensive
i
verbiage, it seems, on hindsight, to have been addressing a real problem
of the future, independent Africa: The belief, ostensibly by the
intelligentsia of the entire British controlled Africa, that British
parliamentary institutions would work just as well on the African soil.
And the arguable point, on the other hand, that those institutions were,
to use Sir High Clifford's words, founded "upon political theories
evolved by Europeans to fit a wholly different set of circumstances,
arising out of a wholly different environment, the government of peoples
who have arrived at a wholly different stage of civilization" or
development.
At the time, however, the Governor's trenchant attack of the
intelligentsia was motivated by an inmediate and practical
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consideration: Their demand was tantamount to an attack on the current
British policy of "indirect rule", a policy which had been adopted for
the administration of British dependencies in Africa generally since the
1870s. The policy, essentially, of ruling Africans through their own
indigenous institutions, where such existed, and where they did not
exist, such as in some parts of Tanganyika^ creating than,44
had been perfected by Sir (later Lord) Lugard for Nigeria during his
governorship of the Territory (1912 - 1919). Its blue-print was
later transferred to Uganda, and then with varying degrees of
effectiveness and success to other dependencies. But in the inter-war
years it came under heavy attack fran the intelligentsia generally
throughout Africa. The attack on the system would escalate with the
wave of nationalism that came with the Second World War. As bluntly
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put by one Ibibio member of the Nigeria Council in 1941:
At present, what is termed the "Native Authority"
is placed in the hands of men who are illiterates
... illiteracy is the marrow of our Native
administration and, therefore, a canker-worm in
"that Government.
Elsewhere in the African Continent, in Lesotho a writer to a local
^
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newpaper had, in 1921, made a total onslaught on the system:
I think it is more than a hundred years we have
been supporting this rock which is useless. Now
I advise that we should do away with birth
chieftainship, wejstiould set up a Republic and see
if we cannot make progress.
The writer, a West-educated Mosotho named James N. Phalatse,
characterized the continued rule through the chieftaincy as "the iron
bar" lock-stepping progress along the lines of parliamentary
institutions.
The problem was of course not all that simple. It was true that
the indigenous institutions of government had, for the most part,
declined in their efficiency to operate under colonial rule, the invasion
of Western cultural values and the cash economy. In one sense,
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colonialism, by its own nature as a condition that subjugates, destroys
or reconditions what it finds in its sphere of need in order best to
thrive, had either dislocated or reoriented than so as first to serve
its own ends, and that of inhabitants second. In another sense, the
inhabitants, the ruling elite as well as the subjects, and in particular
the latter, who stood individually to gain new freedoms and a new sense
of independence by adopting Western values, welcomed some aspects of the
colonial condition. Chiefs acquired new tastes and material needs,
which in turn patently distanced them from their subjects. Commoners,
through Western education and rapid private accumulation of European
goods, found new and more predictable avenues of upward social mobility
and economic independence which made them less dependent on their chiefs
for patronage and public services. All the same, on the other hand,
chiefs were not willing to forego the old obligations owed to them by
their subjects, nor were the subjects prepared fully to break the
Gordian knot with the old communal system for the uncertainties of the
novel cosmic world. The answer for both lay in a cultural syntheis -
something that can not be wished into reality: it has to unfold,
either through revolutionary conflict, or through the imperceptible
evolutionary process. But, alas! In British colonies and protectorates,
we find no revolutionary conflict that could give rise to a synthesis of
a new political culture to take the place of the old one. And as such,
we are inexorably restricted to the modest task of re-tracing the
historical path of institutional developments - for what it is worth:
something short of, yet by no means the replacement of, philosophical
speculation.
Method and Sources
As it has already been ponted out in the preceding pages, this
is a case study of institutions of government - their development, change
adoption and adaptation within the colonial experience.
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The period covered is not marked by substantial constitutional changes
as such, but rather by critical political developments, which in turn
paved the way, albeit in a complex fashion, for new constitutional forms.
The study can therefore best be approached through the historical method,
which will, as far as it will be possible and relevant, take into account
changes of a constitutional nature.
As far as we are aware, a study of this nature on Lesotho has
never been attempted. A handful of works of a political historical
nature, which are reflected in the bibliography, have been undertaken
in recent times. But none of them have attempted or purported to
fulfill the aims of the present study, helpful as some of then have been
in throwing light in sane aspects of it.
The nineteenth century pieriod of the study was undertaken
intermittently over a period of eight years, from 1975 to 1983, at a
time that the aim was to write a re-appraisal of the political history
of the country, a project which evidently has not yet materialized.
It remained to be reoriented in 1983, when the specific aim of this
study was formally thought out. It necessarily concentrated on a
<
fault-finding effort on the preceding historiography which, save for
two studies, one by John Allen Benyon, and the other by Sandra
47
Burman, was of poor or historically modest quality, where, in the
latter case, the well meaning writers were not trained historians.
The twentieth century pieriod, which is the more original part of
the study, commenced in 1983, with an examination of a modest collection
of the proceedings of the Basutoland National Council in the National
Library of Scotland at Edinburgh. In the interim I did my best to
delve into the mysteries of constitutional Law and Jurisprudence, to
which heretofore I was an academic tyro, under an able supervision in
the Faculty of Law of the University of Edinburgh.
I spent a month at Oxford, Rhodes House, where I examined
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primarily more of the Proceedings of the Basutoland National Council,
the Africa Bureau Papers, sparse copies of the first Lesotho newspaper -
Naledi(1904), deposited there by one of Lesotho's most ardent
self-trained documentalist, David Ambrose, and a modest but most
helpful collection on Lesotho's constitutional developments by
Gordon M. Hector, Lesotho's last Brilfsh Government Secretary.
I concluded my research with an intensive two months' research
in the Public Record Office, Kew Gardens, London, during the months
March and April 1985, and another three months in Lesotho, from July
through September 1985 where I studied the problem in the National
Archives housed in the Library of the National University of Lesotho
at Roma and also conducted 27 interviews with informants of varying
experiences, knowledgeable on the country's constitutional developments
of Lesotho from the early nineteen-twenties to the nineteen-sixties.
I am as equipped frcm these sources as my own academic skills
will allow me to shed light on the problem. Inched, from that vantage
point, 1 have little or no excuse not to achieve my primary objectives.
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CHAPTER II
INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND CONTROL OF POWER
Among the Basotho of the Mohokare Valley
(c.1750 ~ 1870)
The process of state formation among the Basotho of the Mohokare
Valley (the Caledon) in Southern Africa was a slow, unpredictable and
in the end a jolting experience. Up through the seventeenth century
the south and south-westerly migrations of the Basotho and other
southern "Bantu" (Abantu) language comnunities from the north of the
River Lekoa (the Vaal)^ did not render that process possible.
Although in the eighteenth century these cormiunities were more or less
settled and a strong economic base of mixed farming was giving rise to
an increasingly complex division of labour, their fissiparous nature,
itself encouraged by the abundance of land still under the less restrictive
political right of "the sphere of influence", inhibited the development
of nationhood and the establishment of territorial sovereighty. "The
tribe" J. D. Omer-Cooper states, "the unit of political life, though larger
"than "that of the Hottentots, still usually consisted of only a few thousand
members ... From other points of view, however, it had developed beyond
the stage of a kinship group and must be regarded as a simple type of
state.
Yet, instances of political consolidation were even as then evident.
Prototypes were the AbakaMtetwa under Dingiswayo, AbakaNdwandwe under
Zwide and AbakaNgwane under Sobhuza from the north of the River Tugela to
the north of the River Pongola; and south in the region of the Mohokare
valley were the Basotho under Mohlomi, the son of Monyane. This process
of political consolidation among the Basotho would be completed during that
eventful decade that marked the formative years of Moshoeshoe's accession
to power, the period which coincides with the event and consequences of
lifaqane - the military upheaval unleased and sustained by Shaka, King of
the Amazulu between 1818 and 1828. To this upheaval also Moshoeshoe owed
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the moment for the realization of his ambition, an ambition jointly
espoused with 'Nau Makoanyane, an initiation-age-mate (mphato) to whom he
had recently vouched: "Thou art my right hand .... Together we will
found a new empire.
The history of the Basotho during this period up to Moshoeshoe's death
in 1870 (two years after his kingdom, escaping military destruction from
the Orange Free State, became a British Colony) has authoritatively
been written.^ I have no cause at the moment to reappraise it. My
concern here is with the system of government that had developed during
that period - "the sort of organization," as Sidney Hartland cogently
defined a similar task in his early study of the constitution of the
non-literate polities, "which provides for the seat of authority, the
method and extent of its exercise, and the internal arrangements governing
5
the relations of its various parts."
As part of this task I hope, as far as it will be practicable, to make
a distinction between, on the one hand the more pervasive and enduring
traditional system and institutions of society which predated both
Moshoeshoe and Mohlomi, the most illustrous of its princes, on the other
hand, the adaptions and innovations owing to these two men. This is a
necessary distinction to attempt to make, in a society in which historical
writing has unduly, albeit understandably, leaned in favour of the
elevation of heroes over the social institutions upon which they rested.
For, the failure, at least to keep in mind this distinction, might
deceptively lead to the folly of attributing to our heroes the general
outcome of generations of evolutionary processes. Indeed, in so far as
the development of principles of government is concerned, in the Southern
Africa of the post-lifaqane period it is more the case that "traditional
methods of political organization were employed and simply used to cover
wider areas and larger numbers,"® than it is that individual rulers
prescribed new rules or promulgated epoch-making codes.
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THE EARLIEST KNOWN POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE BASOTHO
The Basotho of the Mohokare Valley under Monaheng, alias Kali -
the patriarch of the royal line, and his grandson Mohlomi (c.1750-15)
were divided into a number of snail chiefdoms. Eugene Casalis, the most
prolific writer of the three ministers of the Paris Evangelical Missionary
Society to join Basotho in 1833, and on whan we rely as much without
choice for this period of Basotho history as we do on Livy for the early
7
history of Rome, gathered the impression on his arrival that:
At the time of [Moshoeshoe]'s birth
[c.1786] the country of the Basutos
was very populous. The tribe
presented, on a snail scale, the
aspect of France in the Feudal times.
The supremacy of the house of Monaheng
was acknowledged, of which Moshoeshoe
is a representative, but the chief of
each town was continually striving to
gain as much independence as possible.
While his fellow minister, the Reverend Thomas Arbousset, on the basis
of the information supplied by the Basotho elders of that period, asserted
that in pre-Moshoeshoe days they had "divided themselves into ten snail
independent states, although acknowledging one principal chief of the
Q
country, called Motlume(^ic).
From the names of the locations that Arbousset was given, these
"snail independent states" would appear to have covered generally the
area on both sides of the Mohokare Valley which under Moshoeshoe came
to be known as Lesotho - the land of the Basotho. Except for the
"Nguni" (Abakuni) polity of the Baphuthi (then called Bamaru -
9 /-
people of the clouds), They were Lesotho speaking chiefdoms. All of
them "had the same form of govenment," D. F. Ellenberger and J. C.
MacGregor later concluded, "... differing, perhaps, in detail here and
there, but identical in fundamental principles....""1"0 Taking a cue from
Ellenberger and MacGregor's population estimates at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, of two of the more co-'h&sive of these polities - the
Baphuthi at 3,000 and the Makhoakhoa, somewhat suspiciously high at
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15,000,^ we can at least say each comprised only a few thousands
people. The Sesotho speakers appear not at that earlier period to have
been known by the name of Basotho; they called themselves the Batebang,
which, as Arbousset found out, signified "those from the lower parts,
1 9
or from the north-east, whence they believe they have all cane
Each of these chiefdoms was under a ruler styled a Morena - a
term with a functional meaning, as we are bound to agree with Casalis'
linguistic interpretation that "it is formed of the verb rena: to be
prosperous, to be tranquil. Morena, therefore, signifies, He who watches
1 Q
over the public safety and welfare." Each morena had under him a
hierarchy of administrative officials. He was normally expected to
govern in accordance with established traditional institutions and
principles, which might not have been intricate and strict but were
practical. He often settled disputes in a predetermined way. Depending
on the degree of his independence fran any superior, a morena might
also forge alliance. And he was expected to honour certain rules in
his relations with other independent rulers.
"Beginning perhaps in, the eighteenth century, a cluster of these
Marena (plural) began also to have what the Basotho styled a
Morena e Moholo - the Great Morena- King.^ Such, at that time,
was the office held by Mohlomi, the son of Monyane, over the ten Basotho
polities. Except, we are forced to conclude that under the son of
Monyane the office had not yet become politically functional. For,
while he was recognised by the marena as grand or supreme, he
nevertheless exercised no monopoly of coercion over them. Rather, he
is said to have made it a practice to "settle the differences of the
people" and to have "entered into treaties of aliance with the chiefs,
recommending them to cultivate peace: a subject on which he would say
with great glee, 'It pays better to fight the corn, than to whet the
spear!"' Basotho of the early nineteenth century assured Arbousset,
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moreover, that "He loved them all indiscriminately ... and he judged
according to the rules of equity. He was gentle, affable, and easy
to access...."15
But this is as vividly or vaguely as we know of political
organisation under this particular prince. Mohlomi's rule, if it can
be called that, was one of teaching and moral persuasion. And this
was only partially because of his conmitment to peace among men. In
the main, the son of Monyane's fame stemmed from his practice as a doctor
and rain-maker. In both the functions of healing and precipitation he
was fai^famed and greatly in demand all over the Southern Africa of his
day from the Mohokare Valley up to the lower fringes of the present day
Zimbabwe. He had acquired enough wealth to permit him to bequeath
lobola (the head of cattle given as a marriage guarantee) for a new
wife in virtually every polity where he stayed long enough to cure a
patient; he would then leave her with any lover who consented
to beget royal seed in his name. Through these marriages he formed
political alliances, the first Mosotho to use, systematically, the
1
institution of polygamy as an instrument of government. (A paternal
great uncle of his named Ratlali, who was otherwise the greatest poet
and innovator of the curriculum of initiation schools Basotho had ever
known, had only stopped at practising a peculiar, if fatal, hobby of
raiding neighbouring rulers' queens, whom he delighted in parading before
him in seasons of relaxation. As fate would have it, Ratlali who was
also commander in chief of his father Monaheng's armed forces, died in
battle in pursuit of this passion, sacrificing thereby to the spear his
brothers Motloheloa and Motloang, the latter being Moshoeshoe's great
grandfather. Ratlali was dismembered, his covetous eyes gouged out and
the combined enemy of Makhoakhoa, whose queen was to have been the prize,
and their Basia allies denied the bereaved Monaheng the international
right to bury his son. The aged patriarch died of a broken heart soon
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after the tragedy.)
Mohiomi was a philosopher and a mystic. While he was at the
mophato (school) for his lebollo (initiation), we are informed, one
auspicious night he had been transported to heaven, "where he saw many
different people and nations," and where he was instructed: "Go, govern
with love; see always in thy subjects men and brethen." And when he
was a certain age, he began to observe total continence from all his
wives, including the stateswomaniike 'Maliepollo, his first and favourite
wife, "in accordance with the religious usage of the wisest of their
1 1chiefs .... The doctor's disposition ill-fitted him for the hussling
and josling of the real political life of his times, and indeed he had no
taste for it. He thus created no strong and enduring bonds between his
chiefdoms. The title of Morena e Moholo for him was more
honorific than functional. When he died in or about 1815 his experiment
went with him.
GOVERNMENT IN THE POST-LIFAQANE PERIOD
Under Moshoeshoe, the son of Mokhachane, Basotho realized a genuine
state of nationhood. For the first time, at the end of lifaqane they
recognised themselves as one nation of Basotho, of the polity of
18
Lesotho, owing allegiance to one Morena e Moholo Moshoeshoe, on
whcm they had conferred sovereignty and who, within the framework of
commonly accepted traditional institutions and principles reserved the
powers of life and death over them. The marena were still in existence
but they were not sovereign and their authority was subject to Moshoeshoe' s
commands, while their functions and activities were generally defined by
traditional guidelines which in practice could be enforced or varied
at his pleasure.
Succession to the Office of Morena
Exactly when and how Moshoeshoe assumed the office initially
of morena (as distinct frcm that of morena e moholo) over his
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little chiefdom of Bakwena of Mokoteli (a fragment of Monaheng's
dynasty) before lifaqane is something we can no longer establish with
certainty. He would appear, however, to have assumed greater
responsibilities than it was usual for a youth of his age shortly after
his lebollo (initiation), which would have been around the age of
eighteen years, presumably just a few years before Mohlomi's demise in
1815. It was around that time that he enlisted the support of 'Nau
Makoanyane, the son of a Nguni subject named Ntseke, in the mission to
"found a new empire."
Within a diort space of time he had at that age raided five
chiefdoms on both sides of the Mohokare Valley, bringing back some two
thousand and five hundred cattle to Menkhoaneng, the seat of his father
Mokhachane's chiefdom, at the upper reaches of Hlotse River."*"®
Mokhachane, the son of Motsoane, alias Peete, was then still fully in
charge of the affairs of the chiefdom for we are told that had it not
been for the intercession of his father Peete, he would on one occasion
have taken the young Makoanyane's life, as capital punishment for
negligently exposing "a number of calves" to an enemy raid. (And if
the sanction may seem to us to have been rash and out of proportion to the
offence, the fact that Makoanyane's father '"Ntseke gave his consent,"
would suggest that negligence of that description to early nineteenth
20
century pastoral Basotho was considered criminal.)
By 1833, however, when the French missionaries of the Paris
Evangelical Missionary Society arrived in Lesotho, Moshoeshoe was the
acknowledged Morena e Moholo of a new kingdom forged during the
lifaqane turbulence. And at the latest he had probably received this
recognition as Morena e Moholo in 1824, when the Basotho were
harried by the lady-warrior 'Manthatisi of Batlokoa from Butha Buthe in
the north to Thaba-Bosiu in the centre of the country. For it is settled
that the son was in full authority of the affairs of state then, and the
- 40 -
father, who does not even get a mention in connection with the great-
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migration, had been overshadowed.
Yet, one thing still leaves us with a puzzle: Whenever literary
sources have permitted Mokhachane to speak to this own cause, we find
that even after lifaqane he regarded himself as the Morena e
Moholo and saw Moshoeshoe as only his "eyes, ears and arms", in the
running of the state. So had Moshoeshoe acceded to office by sheer
power of resolve and his accomplishments on the battle ground, thereby
relegating a disenchanted old Mokhachane to the background? Or had
he initially been installed in an office of morena but was fated to
rule under the eye of a father who awkwardly demanded filial piety?
We cannot say.
Nevertheless, in former days sane procedure of succession to the
office of morena had been observed. In principle the heir, in the
polygamous Basotho society, was the eldest son of a morena's "great
wife".. This great wife needed not to have been a morena's first wife,
although she often was. She might also be anywhere in the number of his
wives, provided the royal house had so designated her and, ideally, if her
lobola had been commissioned in the form of sethaba-batha - a cattle
levy on the subjects, and not, as otherwise it would be, frcm a ruler's
father and uncles. Through sethaba-thaba the great wife was
symbolically made the mother of a nationality and ties of obligation
22
between herself and the subjects were forged. But, as Ashton points
out, "the law [of succession] was sometimes modified by extraneous
23
considerations, such as the popularity or ability of the claimants."
A pertinent illustration of the point is in fact to be found in
Moshoeshoe's own lineage. For although this lineage came to be
recognized as the royal line of the Basotho of Mohokare Valley, it
descends from the patriarch Monaheng's third son in the line of
succession. (See genealogical table).
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The Club of the Rhinoceros Horn
However it was that Moshoeshoe came to the ordinary office of
morena, he and his contemporary marena of Basotho, as well as his
successors to the high office of morena e moholo under the kingdom,
carried the staff of office called molamu oa tsukulu - "the rod
of the rhinoceros horn." F. Laydevant, to whom we are indebted for
94
notes on this subject, informs us:
The rhinoceros rod or sceptre is, as the name
indicates, a sort of rod or club carved out
of a rhinoceros horn. It is generally black or
dark brown in colour .. To-day no-one knows where
the sceptre which Moshesh possessed came from. We
only know that all young Basuto receive at the end
of the initiation ceremonies a rod which is similar
to that one and which is called a "rhinoceros rod or
horn" even if it is made from a piece of hardwood...
It is therefore possible that Moshesh's rhinoceros
horn is the one which his father Mokhachane provided
him with at the end of the initiation ceremonies;
but it is also very probable that this horn or sceptre
was bought by Moshesh himself when his power was
beginning to be consolidated.
As we can see from this quotation, the origins, and implicitly the
universality of the possession of a real rhinoceros sceptre among
Basotho have become a matter of pure speculation. Frcm the information
that the initiation school was, at least symbolically, associated with
a horn from the ferocious beast, and considering the apparent static
nature of the latter institution, we may surmise that the association
goes at least as far back as Ratlali, the ill-fated poet son of Monaheng
(late 17th or early 18th century). Beyond that epoch we have to reckon
with the fact that Ratlali leavened the institution, at least with a
chanted curriculum (likoma), the first and last instance of interference
with the institution borne by literary and oral sources. It is plausible
that the idea of the rhinoceros either survived that era of innovations,
or possibly it was a part of it. That the idea of the rhinoceros could
have been introduced into the initiation school anytime thereafter has
no immediate and plausible basis.
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Then comes the problem of the procurement of the article.
According to oral evidence, a prince's sceptre was hewn by warriors
from a live rhinoceros. The warriors wrestled with the beast as a
doctor procured the horn and subsequently speedily fashioned it in the
form of a club fortified with potent herbal medicines. The procedure
was all to take place and be completed before life completely departed
from the animal.
This method of procurement is significant only because of the
credence that those associated with the sceptre, or to whom others defer
for authority, place upon it. The method underscores the recognition of
the rhinoceros horn as the symbol of power. Not only had the sceptre
to be associated with a beast universally known for power and ferocity,
but it had to be believed that warriors sacrificed their lives in its
procurement for their ruler. And so their bravery and the animal's
well known properties were bound together by medicine and the final
product entrusted to a morena.
Viewed from the point of view of detached reasoning, however, this
method of procurement seems a trifle outside the realm of reality.
(
First, as Laydevant has also pointed out, by 1833 "the rhinoceros had
long since disappeared from Lesotho." The closest that they might have
been found was in Natal, and the breed that was in that area was much
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known for its ferocity, speed and thickness of skin. Second, in
that age, when cattle raiding and defence of country were the two
essential preoccupations for warriors, wrestling with any, much less with
the Natal breed of a rhinoceros, might always have led to excessive human
sacrifice. It is more probable that at some time inmemorial a
rhinoceros had been killed in adversity, its horn was used as a sceptre,
and so a custom was established. And then later, rhinoceros horns
could have been procured through trade.
According to Laydevant, Moshoeshoe's rhinoceros club was handed
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down through all his successors - Letsie, Lerotholi, Letsie II, Griffith
up at least to Seeiso Griffith, the present King's father, in connection
97
with whc«i:
in the year 1924-25 the great chief
Griffith wishing to make his son
Bereng his heir at the expense of
another of his sons called Seeiso,
one day gave the sceptre of Moshesh
to the first, and to the second the
one owned by Makhabane the brother
of Moshesh. The protests of Seeiso,
backed up by many supporters, obliged
Griffith to go back on his decision,
and the sceptre of Moshesh was given
to Seeiso.
There is every reason to believe that the rest of the principal marena
of Basotho had their rhinoceros clubs similarly handed down frcm heir to
heir. Assuming, that is, that Laydevant's submission was universal, that
"the sceptres of the chiefs, instead of being made of precious wood, as is
the case with those given to the children of ordinary people, are always,
when it is a question of chiefs' sons and of an heir to the royal power,
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carved out of a rhinoceros horn." For, this information may need
to be handled with caution, as it does not permit a distinction (in the
custom of keeping a sceptre) between the dominant royal line of
Monaheng-Moshoeshoe on the one hand, and the various other subordinate
clans and chiefdoms in Lesotho such as, in particular, those of Baphuthi
and Bataung on the other, who had slightly different histories and
customs.
Eugene Casalis noted that the marena generally carried the sceptre
"as a mark of their rank." In the event that a morena lost patience
with unruly subjects, it was sufficient for him to throw the sceptre at
some distance saying: "It is enough there is my rhinoceros: let us
see who will pick it up." Terrified by the club the subjects would take
off helter-skelter: "if any one were bold enough to pick it up, he would
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be guilty of a crime which would expose him to capital punishment."
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The Installation of a Morena
It does appear that when things had -gone normally, it was customary
for a morena to be formally installed. The Sesotho term for the custom
was ho bea - literally, to place. The formality, which has up to
today been adhered to, took place at a pitso (a public assembly of
all adult male) where, as Ashton has noted, "the senior authority's
representative or the person who has been acting in the deceased's place
presents the heir to the people. He calls upon him to rule wisely, firmly
OQ
and fairly, and to heed the advice of his kinsmen and councillors."
The custom of installation among the Bantu polities of South
Africa was, as Professor Schapera's study revealed, the same and the
attributes expected of a good ruler were commonly assumed. Hence,
in the absence of any surviving Basotho text of the bolao ba puso
(the exhortation of government), such as it was called, the following,
from the neighbouring AmaXhosa, is a safe borrowing. The exhortation was
made at the installation ceremony of the AmaXhosa Nkosi Ngqika around
1797: 32
Son of Mlawu, grandson of Rarabe, this day you are
invested with the Cheiftainship of your countrymen.
May your conduct be reputable. Let worthiness become
you, and may you be just. These are your people, be
a father to than, and rule them with wisdom. May your
hand be beautiful (literally be generous) and not seek
out a person's body (literally, lift up the hand against
another), for as your country's proverb has it, "The
stick has no kraal"(i.e. misuse of power destroys the
heme).
There would, of course, have been no fixed text as such of the bolao
ba puso. Although the theme would have been maintained, the
wording would have depended much on the inclination of a chosen speaker
and his powers of oratory.
As it may be inferred from the way he acceded to power, Moshoeshoe
is likely not to have been formally installed. However, he had, at an
earlier special and seemingly equally political occasion,
received his bolao ba puso. Apparently when he was only a
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lekoloane (a young man fresh from the initiation school), his grandfather
Motsoane, alias Peete, who doted on him, had taken him to the aged
Mohlomi to be taught principles of government. (Peete and the seer were
grandchildren of the same patriarch, Kali Monaheng, through different
grandmothers duly married to him. See genealogical table). The point
has elsewhere been argued that the young initiate would have paid his
tutor in government several visits before the seer awarded him symbols
QO
of graduation. Sources, literary and oral alike, deny us the
benefit of details as to the lessons received. The most that we are
told is that Moshoeshoe was instructed on the effective use of polygamy:
for purposes of forging alliance with neighbouring rulers, and for
fostering the loyalty of clients (bahlanka). He was impressed of the
superiority of peace over the wielding of the spear.
A Zulu writen traditional account, Umhlomi (1938) by
N. S. Luthango, according to which Moshoeshoe "stayed a number of nights
conversing" with his tutor, has Mohiomi giving the following words of
admonishment to his young student at the end of their
34"conversations":
<
My child, you will be a Icing and govern people
with ideas and wishes like your own - you should
govern then well. When you have begun to rule,
you should remember all my words and remember also
that it is better to thrash the corn than to sharpen
the spear.
According to Arbousset's much earlier version (1836) the seer had
admonished the ambitious young prince: "When thou shalt sit in judgement,
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let thy decisions be just. The law knows no one as a poor man."
While George Tlali, one of Moshoeshoe's educated sons, .gave us the
version in 1858:36
You should govern only by peace; and
the one who will govern in your stead
[your successor] should continue to
rule by peace only. This is the command
that I give you. Now, return to your
brethern and govern them by peace. It is
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for this that I had called you, to give
you this commandment of peace.
Moshoeshoe's tutelage was concluded with a ceremony in which
"the errant king" did something quite formal, and upon closer examination
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probably also as much customary:
The famous son of Monyane received him
[Moshoeshoe] with benevolence, blessed
him after their manner by brushing his
forehead against his own [ho iphahloetsa],
and, detaching one of his own long earrings,
fastened it in the ear of the youth, saying,
"Ke Lesala (sic) la muso (sic)" [It is the
earring of governance]. He also presented
him with an ox, a shield, and a spear, and even
had a beast slaughtered for him.
The ritual of the brushing of the forehead, called ho iphahloetsa,
achieved the same purpose among the Basotho of the Mohokare Valley as
OQ
the Reman augurum: the transformation of supernatural powers.
And, in living memory it seems to have still been performed by those
men in society who were presumed, as with the Roman augur, to embody
supernatural power in its plenitude. However, even without this
conceivably hazardous analogy, a guess can safely be made that following
the entire ceremony as above described, the son of Mokhachane perhaps
needed no installation dr inauguration. Both had been carried out, but
by "the wisest" of the princes of his people.
Divine Right of Chiefs: Indigenous, or Borrowed?
One decade after Moshoeshoe's death, in 1880, a literary source
suggests a notion on the imperium of the marena of Basotho which
immediately strikes one as very fascinating. In the wake of the Gun
War, which Basotho had had to wage against the Cape Colony disarmament
Act during the period that the British Crown was administering over
Lesotho through that Colony, a tense pitso (public assembly of all
adult males) had been held in August that year to review the development.
It was at that pitso that, probably for the first time on record, a
Mosotho alluded to the notion of the divine right of chiefs. Seoehia
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Jonathan Molapo, the Chief of the District of Leribe and nephew to the
then Morena e Moholo Mohato Letsie, Moshoeshoe's son and heir,
stated:
Mogato (Letsie) is the only one who has
the right to speak; he is Moshesh's son;
what he will do will be truth for me,
because he is Moshesh. Even if he wants
us to do what is painful for us we will
follow him, because his will is the will
of God. (My emphasis)
And a while later, a commoner named Ramatseatsana, "favourite councillor"
of Moshoeshoe's third son by his great wife, Morena David Masopha,
seeking to support his own splinter of an argument interjected: "All
chiefs are from God."^ In both instances the speakers made their
interjections as to the divine right of marena axiomatically, seeking
only to give authority to their arguments. How old was this notion
among the Basotho?
Aside from what may be inferred from Mohlomi's apparent powers
of auguration, there seems to be no firm basis for any speculation
that the marena of Basotho and their morena e moholo made claims
to the right of divine imperium before Christian intrusion in 1833.
Indeed, judging from the relations between rulers and their subjects at
that time, as well as generally after, it would seem that there were no
social circumstances to nurture such an idea. The marena generally
approached their subjects with deference. "The chiefs," Ellenberger
and MacGregor point out, "often addressed their subjects as marena
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('chiefs'), benghali ('my masters')." While Eugene Casalis found
that "everyone approaches the most powerful chiefs with the least
ceremony;" the potentates were "interrupted and contradicted" and they
were "merely addressed with their names, pompous titles being reserved
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for state occasions."
An episode involving the Morena e Mohoio Moshoeshoe serves
poignantly to illustrate the point. The undated drama was witnessed by
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Eugene Casalis presumably sometime in the 1830s. Seme time in the past
the Monarch "had allowed an officer, distinguished for his valour," to
keep some cattle for use under a custom called mafisa: a loan of
stock to a subject or vassal, the service and produce of which he
received the benefit of, except the stock might not be slaughtered.
Moshoeshoe had then later seen fit to recall his mafisa from the
"officer" for the purpose of passing it on "as a present to Lephoi, chief
of the Bahlaping ..." It was a form of political aid. The valorous
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officer was furious and, in his public confrontation told the King:
Is it thus that a just man must behave?
You deprive me of all my food, of all
the sustenance of my wives and children
to send it to strangers? Have you no
other cattle to give, and must you
leave those to whom you owe your salvation
to want? Behold my body, it is covered
with wounds. I have fought against the
Batlokoa, the Zulus, and the Korannas, let
the enemy come again, we shall see whether
Moshoeshoe will expose himself to his
assegais. No, he will remain on his
mountain [fort] with his wives, and will
not dare follow me. It is I who will
fight, who will suffer hunger, thirst,
fatigue, while my chief eats, drinks, and
slumbers peacefully.
If it may be suggested that this officer was probably sufficiently
close to power, by virtue of his office, to take liberties on his King,
it needs quickly to be added that his was not an isolated incident.
There were other less highly placed subjects who stood up to the Monarch
on personal matters and he sought not to throw the rhinoceros club at
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than. And if, as it would be reasonable to deduce, Moshoeshoe's
demeanour can be credited to Mohlomi's teachings, that in itself would
lead us to the view that his example over the subordinate marena might
be an inhibiting factor to pretences to the notion of divine right.
The claim of divine right for the marena of Basotho must therefore be
sought elsewhere: The most plausible source is Christianity.
Ever since the arrival in Lesotho of the French missionaries,
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literary sources reveal the Basotho as being quite fond of quoting the
Bible in support of their arguments. Moshoeshoe, as can be seen frcm his
biographies by Leonard Thompson and Peter Sanders had, probably above most
others, acquired a penchant in this connection. Further to the point,
at the same pitso in August 1880 at which Jonathan and Ramatseatsana
made their striking interjections, one Thomas Sethlaba (probably
Sehlabaka), in his appeal that Basotho should be pardoned for taking
arms against the Cape Colony, had borrowed from the story of the Prodigal
Son, pleading: "What I ask for is that a fat lamb may be killed ...."
Jonathan and Ramatseatsana might therefore, as others who shared their
views, have put great stock in the Bible as an exotic source of
legitimation - to wit, Proverbs 9: 15, 16:
By me kings reign, and princes decree justice.
By me princes rule, and nobles, even all the
judges of the earth.
This point may be more than simply one of academic interest.
As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the marena of Basotho after
Moshoeshoe's death became generally and increasingly heavy handed on
their subjects. They demanded more services from them, while giving
hardly anything back in return. A point was finally reached when some
subjects complained that the marena had turned subjects into "slaves".
The reasons for this development were many and varied. And it is
conceivable that as a post facto justification the marena also
cultivated the view of themselves, supported by selective passages from
the Bible, that they owed their disproportionate reserves of power to God.
Responsibilities of a Morena
Before, as after lifaqane, the responsibilities of a morena
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were established and they were well understood by subjects. He
provided justice for the injured and the oppressed, punished wrongdoers
and generally protected the rights of his subjects. As a rule the
royal village had lekhotla - the court, where public affairs were
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discussed and settled, disputes were resolved, and when there were no
problems, men's public works - softening cowhides for blankets and
dresses, sandal-making, and so on, were undertaken. A morena exercised
the executive, administrative and judicial functions of his domain, yet,
as it will be shown later, that did not mean that he was dictatorial in
his relationship with his subjects. He fulfilled his responsibilities
within guidelines provided by custom, struck by which the observant Eugene
Casalis said in 1838:^®
Whatever reproach one may level against the
ancient social system of the natives, it was
nevertheless an order of real value. It
was the product of that instinct of preservation
which is found among nations and individuals
alike and which prompts them to adopt, quite
naturally, the customs, the laws, the institutions
most conformable with their genius, and therefore
the best calculated to perpetuate the national life,
and to shelter it against the injurious influences
to which it may be exposed.
A morena, in the final analysis assured the economic survival
of his society. On him and him alone fell the responsibility to organize
the national hunt - letsolo. When necessary and prudent he organized
cattle raids (ho hapa likhomo) which, as we will already have noted,
Moshoeshoe and his right hand Mokoanyane engaged in heavily in their early
days. The captured cattle were re-distributed to the needy or deserving
of society in the form of mafisa. In times of drought subjects looked
up to their ruler to ensure precipitation. It thus made sense for him
to keep a rainmaker at his lekhotla. Among Moshoeshoe's rainmakers, for
instance, was Makara, who had inherited the art from his mother, the great
wife of Morena 'Mope of a segment of Bafokeng. A morena regulated
the use of natural products - raw materials for fire and for building,
and pasturage, to name a few. He held all land in trust for his subjects
and controlled its distribution and use. The health of his people was
also in the final analysis, albeit indirectly, his responsibility.
Ellenberger and MacGregor inform us that "accredited doctors were under
his special protection, in the event of the death of a patient ... or
any ... mishap which might occur to than in the exercise of their
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profession." ' This meant at least that no healer (doctor) might
walk into a morena's jurisdiction and begin his practice without first
reporting to the lekhotla to present his credentials. For in the
event of a dispute arising between a patient and a healer, the credentials
of the latter ought to have been known. There was a molao - law,.
according to Jobo Mokhacbane, one of Moshoeshoe's half brothers, to the
effect that "except a cure is effected [a healer] is not entitled to
his fees."
An independent morena was the principal spokesman and
representative of his people in external relations. However, he
delegated his authority to his counsellors and to his maqosa
(messengers/ambassadors). At the same time he ensured the preservation
of certain commonly observed inter-polity rules. According to Casalis
there were "general principles which should form the foundation of
intercourse with other nations": In war, wcmen, children and travellers
were respected. Those who surrendered had their lives spared and they
might be ransomed. A warrior was deprived of instruments of combat
but generally allowed to keep his shield. In keeping with the code that
leqosa ha le m molato (a messenger/ambassador is blameless):
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the person of a messenger/ambassador was inviolable. The person
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of a stranger was under the protection of his host. Mohato Letsie,
Moshoeshoe's heir and successor further informed us, on the occasion of
his brother Morena Jeremiah Molapo's betrayal of the AmaHlubi potentate
to British colonial officers in 1873 that "a chief must be killed out in
the country and not in a village ... it would be wrong to kill him after
calling him home [i.e., inviting him on the pretence that he was granted
asylum]."5"1- An independent morena waged war and concluded
agreements with other rulers on behalf of his polity.
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A morena saw to it that boys were formally initiated into
adulthood and joined the affairs of men. (The corresponding role over
girls fell on the great wife.) The institution through which the
initiation was undertaken was called leboilo, often misleadingly called
circumcision in literary sources: True enough, the boys were circumcised.
But this was only a snail part, albeit a symbolic one, of the institution.
Generally in the months of February and March a morena authorized the
erection of a mophato (initiation lodge). This mophato, as a rule,
was secluded from the rest of the comnunity. There, for a
period ideally of six months, a son or sons of a morena remained with
their age-mates. The ruler provided the doctor to consecrate the
mophato. Medicine for the purpose came from the royal medicine horn.
The initiation was superintended by men called mesue ("those who
render supple").
Under the mesue the initiates were given the lore of their
people. Instruction was in part carried through the medium of chanted
poems called likoma, characteristically preserved in an archaic
language. These poems are generally said to be the genius of Tlali,
(
our Mosotho poet with a mixed legacy, although it is doubtful that he was
responsible for all of them. The institution is otherwise named after
him as ha Tlali - i.e., at Tlali's place.
The initiates or bashemane received daily instructions on warfare:
learning to throw the traditional javelin (lerumo) with swiftness and
precision, "to whirl round in the air a formidable club, and to ward off,"
by means of the Basotho shield, "the blows of the enemy, from whichever
side they may proceed." Corporal punishment was frequently and liberally
administered to produce Spartan discipline. The bashemane were
forced to march long distances at a time throughout their country, to
familiarize then with its topography, for purposes of warfare, as well
as "to drive vice from their hearts." And they were frequently
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admonished: '"Amend your ways! Be men! Fear theft! Fear adultery!
Honour your parents! Obey your chiefs!" (My emphasis.) When
the training had cane to an end the initiates shed their attire of boyhood
for that of adulthood, got annointed, and, as their mophato was set
RO
to flames, ran back to society without ever once looking back.
None might convene a mophato within a morena's jurisdiction
without his express permission. Even in Moshoeshoe's new kingdom, with
several marena still administering their people under himself,
permission to convene a mophato had to be secured from the Morena e
Moholo, who then supplied medicine from the royal horn. Convening a
mophato without this permission was tantamount to a declaration of
independence.
To receive the loyalty and love of his people a ruler made
hospitality a virtue. He used his milk cows to provide food for the poor
and for visitors. Subjects were required to give service three times
a year in the breaking of the soil, the cultivation and harvest of a
ruler's principal field called tsimo ea lira and in the fields of
his .first three high ranking wives, including the great wife, but they
were also to be abundantly fed as they did so. Whenever they were
at the royal court for business they expected to be shown an open hand.
It was in part to this end that the institution of polygamy was geared.
As explained by one of its greatest practitioners, Moshoeshoe, aside from
its function as "a means of contracting alliance with the heads of other
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nations, which helps to preserve peace":
we receive many travellers and strangers;
how could we lodge them and what could we
feed them on, if we did not have several
wives?... I have warriors not servants.
These men, these youths whom you see
around me, acknowledge my right to punish
them in the event of their refusing to
obey me when I order them to watch over
my herds, to deliver a message, or to take
up arms, but there is not one among them who
would not laugh me to scorn if I sought to
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compel him to draw water for me, to grind
corn, to sweep my huts.
To Eugene Casalis, who on this occasion was attacking polygamy,
Moshoeshoe added:
Oh! polygamy, that is a proud rock which
you are challenging there; I am very
much afraid that you will not succeed
in shaking it, at least not in our time.
Perhaps our children will be more
favourably situated.
Territorial Sovereignty
As Professor Schapera has shown in his comparative study, the
political communities of pre-colonial South Africa might have had vaguely
defined boundaries, but that does not mean that they did not subscribe to
the notion of "our country." To the contrary, each political community
claimed "exclusive rights to the land" that it occupied. Everyone living
on that patch of land was subject to its ruler, allegiance to wham could
54be rendered nugatory only by banishment or voluntary removal.
Hartland, in his work on "primitive law"' was indeed the wiser for
admitting that, generally speaking, in non-literate societies "each tribe
occupies and hunts over a certain territory whose limits, however ill-
i ^
defined they may seem to us, are well understood by the natives."
For, as history repeatedly demonstrated in the case of the Bantu
societies of South Africa, each political community knew where its
territorial jurisdiction stopped and that of its neighbour began. The
spoor law, universal among the Bantu of South Africa, was enforced in
recognition of this territorial principle. As The Reverend
Mr. Mackenzie, a Wesleyan missionary with a lot of experience working
56
among the Batswana, stated in an interview in 1881:
When the spoor of stolen cattle crosses
a boundary line between two tribes, or
reaches the grazing ground of their
first cattle post, the men on the spoor
return and inform the chief: Then it is
either a simple theft, or it is a
declaration of war, on the part of the
chief into whose country the cattle have
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gone.
That these political communities had a functional idea of the
territorial jurisdiction of their polities explains why the AmaPondcmise
Counsellors, Gangelizwe, Nyanga, Sangoni ... and twelve others,
in their own coaments at the self same interview as the Reverend
Mackenzie's advised:^
any magistrate coming into this country
[of theirs] is supposed to act according
to the law of the country, and the chief
and the councillors let the magistrate
know the boundaries.
In short, if magistrates could not identify boundaries, it might have
been to a large measure because they did not know how the Africans
understood their boundaries, and not because boundaries did not exist.
Although, of course, I should not wish to suggest another extreme, namely,
that the boundaries were never in dispute, for that would not bear
examination.
It was that sense of territoriality, no matter how precariously
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defined, which prompted Casaiis to state:
The obstinate resistance which the
[AmaXhosa] the [AbaThembu], and the
Basutos made to the encroachments of
the colonists, proves how strong is
the attachment of these tribes to the
countries they inhabit. In speaking
of them they use expressions which
touch the heart and waken enthusiasm;
'Heme', 'our land', 'the land of our
fathers'. Something like superstitious
respect for the soil has even been
observed among them.
Among the Basotho in times of war, a morena's official doctors charmed
major paths and passes "to peg down the country" and keep the enemy
outside its boundaries. Before the Morena e Moholo Moshoeshoe
released his warriors for combat, we are informed, he always concluded
with the exhortation: "Let us die for our country!" And on that call
"The whole assembly was electrified; and nothing was heard but the
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words repeated a thousand times, - 'Let us die for our country!'
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If we adhere to Sir Henry Arthur Maine's definition of territorial
sovereignty, namely, that the notion is "associated with the proprietorship
of a limited portion of the earth's surface" and that that proprietorship
ought to be "inter se ... not paramount, but absolute," we are bound to
conclude, on the forgoing examination that Lesotho under Moshoeshoe was
CT)
a state with the full enjoyment of territorial sovereignty. However,
the ruler was called the Morena e Moholo of the Basotho (the people)
and not of Lesotho (their land). The situation may be said to have been
analogous to that of the kings of the Franks under the Merovingian line of
the descendants of Clovis, who were known as the kings of the Franks and
not France. the difference between the two, and this was a major
difference, was the one that whereas among the Franks the concept of
"individual title to land" was developing, in Lesotho political
circumstances militated against that tendency.
The Court of Counsellors
A morena, whether as a morena e moholo and therefore
sovereign, or whether as the latter's dependent, wielded a lot of power
(
within a polity. This power, however, was shared with and controlled
by the members of his lekhotla (court). These courtiers fell into a
number of categories, but for the sake of convenience we can divide them
into four groups, albeit not discrete.
First there were, from the pre-lifaqane days of snail chiefdoms,
a ruler's matona. T. Arbousset is in agreement with Casalis that they
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were described as "the eyes, ears, and arms, of the chief." As
the metaphorical description suggests, the minimum number of these
matona for each morena were two. The numbers increased in relation
to the size and complexity of a political comnunity. Ideally, these
"eyes and ears" were senior members of the royal family - principally a
ruler's maternal uncles (from among whan his deputy was conventionally
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designated), Ms principal sons (from the first three Mgh ranking
wives), and in Moshoeshoe's case Ms own father. But merit was also
recogMzed.
Odds are very much in favour of the view that the Mstorically
disfavoured 'Muaile, the "Nguni" consort who sired Moshoeshoe's grandfather
Motsoane Peete, to the immortal embarrassment of the royal line, was a
Mghly placed officer who had attracted the royal widow, Motsoane's
mother from her late husband's brothers because of Ms status in
Mohaheng's court. The very fact that the royal family bore the "Nguni' s"
presence and continMng affair with the royal widow until Peete was an
initiated young man would seem to lead to that conclusion. Indeed,
'Muaile, whose own clan was just five miles across the Mohokare Valley
from the Basotho headquarters (then near the present Levi's Nek in the
Leribe District), only left the royal family to escape an assassination
attempt by Mokoteli, one of Peete's uncles whcm the Nguni had bested in
the duel of affections for the Queen.
We need not, however, be confined to tMs specMative evidence.
We know that Moshoeshoe certainly had at Ms court distingMshed matona
of commoner's origins, such as Ramatseatsana, later baptized under the
name of Abraham, and that Ms principal sons likewise gave merit a Mgh
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priority in their choice of courtiers. To these matona by merit
Leonard Thompson and Peter Sanders have added Eugene Casalis, who, at
least up to 1848, advised Moshoeshoe in his relations with wMte
governments as well as by attending to Ms correspondence. After 1848,
Thompson qualifies his point, Moshoeshoe had gained sufficient experience
in this area to assume full responsibility, (with the aid, no doubt,
66
of Ms educated sons).
Second were the military conmanders (balaoli, sing.molaoli)
of the armed forces. In Moshoeshoe's time some stratification of these
officials had developed. The stratification was in relation to the rank
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of a ruler's houses (wives), to which they were attached. 'Nau
Makoanyane, for instance, the "Generalissimo", was attached to the great
house of Mofumahali (Queen) 'Mamohato. Thafeng was in the second house
of 'MaNneko, called the house of Tlokotsing. Letele, Mohlomi's son,
was of 'MaSekhonyana's house - the third ranking, called the house of
Maebeng (of the cattle of dove colours.)®7 On Mokolokolo, conmander
of the mollo (fire) regiment, said by Thomson to have been second in
coranand to Makoanyane and also a "composer of praise songs and an
ambassador", we have no information as to the house of attachment. But
it is almost certain that his illicit and uncondoned affair with one of the
King's principal wives, which almost cost him his life, cost him his rank
and house attachment, at the minimum. Until Thompson rescued him from
historical quarantine Mokolokolo was thus, as with 'Mualle, more dubiously
known in oral history as a man who had fallen from grace for abusing the
CO
privileges of his office.
Third were the maqosa - probably best translated to English as
diplomatic agents. These were the men that an independent morena sent
to other countries to convey messages, sometimes with his authority to
negotiate and coamit his'government, most of the time without such an
authority. "To prevent the endless denials and contradictions which
would arise from the absence of written treaties," Casalis informs us,
"the international conmunications are usually entrusted to the same men."
Thus a man named Seetane was accredited to the AmaZulu
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Kingdom, at least during Mpande's reign. Nathanael Makotoko,
besides being the chief letona to Moshoeshoe's second son Morena
Jeremiah Molapo (probably the third most powerful chief) to the north of
the country, he was, at the national level, the primary ieqosa (sing.)
to the British Colony of Natal at least in the 1860s. Ntho Mokeke,
otherwise Morena Letsie's chief counsellor, who was familiar with the
affairs of the British High Commission in Cape Town to the point of
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citing old correspondence in that connection from memory, is likely at
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the national level to have specialized on the Cape Colony.
Depending on their reliability and political acumen, sane of these
diplomatic agents served as heads of high powered deputations in times
of national crises. Nathanael Makotoko, for instance, in 1869, was to
have been deputized to London, in the company of the King's educated, if
controversial son, Tsekelo, to attempt to reverse a South African High
Comnissioner's Lesotho-Orange Free State boundry arranganent made with
the Boers that year. That mission, unfortunately, ran into difficulties
when the High Commissioner, Sir Philip Wodehouse, threatened to
withdraw British protection of Lesotho against Boer military destruction.
The more experienced Makotoko then responded quickly to the King's
stealthy withdrawal of him, while the adventurist Tsekelo charged
ahead both to London and Paris, where he had hoped to woo the French
Emperor's support. At the end of it all the King denied all knowledge
of the mission. The High Conmissioner then discredited it at the Hone




Ntho Mokeke provides another example of a senior ambassador with wide
responsibilities. As principal agent under Morena e Moholo
Letsie, following his accession in 1870, Ntho Mokeke seems to have
covered a broad range of assignments. Letsie made this point clear when
he said that Mokeke was "like my own book, and knows about everything
belonging to me, and he has always been a man I trusted and sent anywhere
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to the white people or to others...."
Fourth, there was a morena's official doctors. Perhaps the most
important of these would have been the war doctor. This official was,
according to G. Tylden, "responsible for intelligence, propaganda,
security, and the due performance of ritual." The war doctor, as it
may be guessed, could easily be the single most powerful official in a
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morena's court if a motive was supplied and an opportunity was enhanced.
In such circumstances he could indeed be more dangerous than helpful to a
ruler. A classic case in point is one of a doctor named Tsapi, described
by Leonard Thompson as "Moshoeshoe's favourite diviner." Obviously
fearful (and rightly so) that the French missionaries' continued presence
in the country would destroy his career, Tsapi took advantage of an
epidemic of measles in 1839 to frighten the Morena e Moholo into
casting them adrift. It is said that he approached the King's residence
with one side of his body painted in white, the other in black, and with
only a panther skin over his shoulder he shouted, before a curious
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audience:
Son of Mokhachane, your grandfather Peete
and the mother of Letsie [both deceased]
have appeared to me, I saw than this
morning seated before my door. I said,
'Tsapi, your eyes lie,' but to dissipate
my doubts Peete threw himself on me and
almost crushed me under his weight. I
tried ineffectively to disengage myself
from him, but he agreed to move away only
when he had given me a message for you:
'The children of Thaba Bosiu die because
Moshoeshoe is polluted and because the
school of the Moruti [missionary] and
the evening prayers offend the barimo
[ancestral shades].
All these men were a morena's counsellors and members of his
court. The regularity with which they convened, as well as the extent
of their attendance were dictated by the cause. For daily, routine
matters, relating to the settlement of minor disputes or sorting out
harmless administrative responsibilities, only those residing at the
royal village met, as and when the need arose. We surmise that important
personages such as the general conmander of the armed forces, the war
doctor and, under Moshoeshoe, his father, might not on such routine
instances even attend and, a morena himself probably deputized. But
we have no evidence here besides one instance that suggests that the old
Mokhachane, at least, attended to the son's calls only at will and that
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the son nevertheless felt obliged to address him by name even in his
absence, in keeping with the Basotho notion that morena ha a ete
(a ruler is never on a journey): i.e. in his absence there is a
deputee.7^
When mcmentous issues involving major policy decisions or major
judicial matters were at stake, all the men of the court convened as a
Grand Council. This Grand Council was called Lekhotla la Mahosana
(council of princes). Under Moshoeshoe it was on such occasions that
the allegiance of his territorial chiefs was also tested. Unexplained
failure to attend the King's court constituted an act of disloyalty.
Under Moshoeshoe the grand council was even attended by ambassadors
from other polities. In February 1862, for instance, when 150 Basotho
notables assembled to adumbrate a treaty of alliance with Great Britain,
ambassadors from Moshoeshoe's AmaZuiu overlord, Mpande, and from
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the AmaMpondo Faku were in attendance. And again in July
O
1866, in the wake of the last Basoth-Boer war, which almost destroyed
Lesotho, the same polities had sent their ambassadors to the Lekbotla
la Mahosana that sat for five days at Thaba Bosiu discussing terms
i
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and modalities of getting the British Government to intercede.
Although in theory it convened on a morena's pleasure, a council
in practice expected a morena to consult with it on all major matters
affecting the polity. A morena depended on it for general advice and
it was the primary institution for the formulation of policy, but it
also existed to control his power. As George McCall Theal put it,
"with agreement with [his counsellors] he was strong, in opposition
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powerless." A morena who habitually overruled or side-stepped
his council risked unpopularity and the consequent loss of individual
subjects to neighbouring polities, or segmentation by powerful members of
the royal family.
The Pitso (Popular Assembly)
- 62 -
A ruler and his council might agree on a major issue of policy, but,
ideally, and often in practice, he needed next to put the matter before a
pitso (a popular, all adult male assembly), before implementing it.
79The Basotho pitso was of pre-lifaqane origins. Moshoeshoe
continued its use and rather upheld its sanctity. True enough, as
Peter Sanders points out, "there are times when Moshoeshoe, accompanied
by some of his councillors, relations and missionaries, travelled away
from Thaba Bosiu to meet European officials, and then entered into
covenants with them without consulting the people at all."80 But
this apparent tendency of arbitrariness needs to be understood in its
proper perspective. As Sanders hastily adds, on the authority of Eugene
Casalis, "the Colonial Government seldom gave a chief time to consult
his people, and in this way promoted 'despotic tendencies' and often
Ol
involved him in 'insurmountable difficulties'."
The pitso in Moshoeshoe's times, according to Casalis, was a
remarkably democratic institution. And it was conducted with a
discernible degree of order: A subject of discussion was normally put to
the people by one of the King's courtiers, "taking care to let his own
personal opinion appear as little as possible." That done, the pitso
was open to any one to speak. Those with the gift of speech aired their
views "with the greatest freedom and plainness of speech." It was
expected on such an occasion that the Sovereign "must bear the most
cutting remarks without a frown." There were always those who were in
support and others who were against the government. At the end the King
summarized the arguments, presented his own, and then created consensus.
And if the pitso was in agreement with his summary, it signified it
on
with an applause. While elsewhere the white letona informs us
that, indeed:88
Freedom of thought and freedom of speech are
the foundations and the guarantee of the
national rights of [Moshoeshoe's] subjects.
They are allowed to express their opinion on
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the Chief's conduct quite openly; if they
disapprove of it, they say so with a virile
and eloquent boldness which the most fiery Roman
tribune would have envied.
A comparative examination on the question of freedom of speech in
contemporary Southern African governments leads us to the conclusion
that Casalis' florid statement was in fact no exaggeration. As, for
instance, the Cape Colony "Commission on Native Laws and Customs" - on
Batswana, the various branches of AmaXhosa, the AmaZulu and Basotho (in
so far as Lesotho's Governor's Agent, Joseph Orpen was also interviewed)
in 1881 concluded:^
It seems to be a marked feature in the Kafir
[Bantu] character that if matters in
dispute can only be well 'talked over' (which
corresponds with our liberty of debate), changes
can be made with much less fear of opposition or
of exciting disaffection than if these changes
are thrust upon the people. The art of discussion
is one which has long been practised in Kaffirland,
and the gifts of the people in this respect are
beyond the average; indeed, ....they must be
considered as remarkable and unique.
Law, Legislation and Royal Prerogatives
The question of whether or not African political organizations
in the pre-colonial period had "law" is positively settled, albeit
(
jurisprudentially it has still remained difficult to provide a precise
definition. Jurists tend to approach it differently from legal
anthropologists. In the main the difficulty is one of distinguishing
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between "law" and "custom". For the limited purpose in this section,
of alluding to law as an instrument of control in pre-colonial Lesotho,
I offer the definition, quoted mutatis mutandis from the Gold Coast
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Native Administration Ordinance 1927, s.2:
'Native customary law' means a rule or a
body of rules regulating rights and imposing
correlative duties, being a rule or a body
of rules which obtains and is fortified by
established native usage and which is
appropriate and applicable to any particular
cause, action, suite, matter, dispute, issue,
or question, and includes also any customary
law recorded as such in a statement which shall
have been ... declared to be a true and accurate
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statement of such native customary law.
It is quite probable that the Basotho of the Mohokare Valley,
like their neighbours, the Abatembu, referred to their melao, that is,
laws, not as the laws of the nation, but rather, as the laws of a reigning
monarch. The AbaTembu Counsellors under Gangelizwe, in 1881, spoke of
the people as being "under the laws of Gangelizwe, the chief of the
country." While at the same time pointing out that they, the people,
OO
"put the chief right, if the chief wants any law they do not like."
Although I have found nothing as explicit in connection with Lesotho,
the notion can clearly be inferred from some social context. In one of
these, for instance, in 1872 when certain distinguished Basotho Chiefs and
Counsellors.first formally interviewed on customary law in their Territory,A»
they referred to all laws in existence during Moshoeshoe's reign as his
laws. Struck by this point, although evidently not by its real significance,
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a senior British administrative officer, John Austin, remarked:
no reference was made by the chiefs who gave
evidence to chiefs prior to Moshesh's advent,
such as Mokhachane...Motlomi, Monaheng, and
other great hereditary chiefs as to what ancient
Basuto customs were in those days. Frcm the
evidence it -is made to appear that the Basuto...
had no established laws prior to Moshesh... who
gave them a code.
The answer to Austin's puzzle, in my view, lay in the tendency for
monarchies to identify law during a particular period with a reigning
monarch. Indeed, in the same way, when the French Missionaries arrived
in Lesotho in 1833 finding Moshoeshoe as the King of a new Kingdom,
they still spoke of cherished laws and legal maxims in relation to the
late philosopher "king" Mohlomi.
The marena of the pre-lifaqane days had had "the right of making
laws and publishing regulations required by the necessities of the
time."®® But those laws and regulations needed the approval, either
of a ruler's grand council, or the pitso, or both: As a rule, it
appears, the procedure was for proposed legislation first to be discussed
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and agreed in the council, and then brought before the pitso. But
whether or not both the council and the pitso were required has been
difficult to establish. The following of Moshoeshoe's laws, for instance,
were discussed at a pitso: (a) The law removing the customary spoor
law, stated by Mohato Letsie as "a law forbidding any person from being
punished simply on the evidence of a spoor or of slaughtered meat being
found at a village."^ The date is not given, (b) Moshoeshoe's first
qplaw against witchcraft (1843). Both of these were proclaimed orally
at the pitso, probably but not necessarily following a discussion before
council.
Moshoeshoe had at least three laws that have survived for
examination which were proclaimed in writing, through the printing
facilities of his missionaries. All three reveal the fact that they were
the work of the King's Council, but they did not necessarily come before
a pitso. (a) The second law against witchcraft (1855) considered by
a Council which held a long debate on it, concludes with the statement:
"assented to by Letsie, by all my brothers, and by all the men in the
tribe, who spit on the lie of witchcraft, and cover its face with the
spittle." The sanction was that "when anyone is killed in a case of
witchcraft, the murderer will be most severely judged, and sentenced to
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death." (b) The law against spirituous liquor (1854), was "Given
with the advice and concurrence of the great men of our Tribe, by us the
Chief of Basutos," in recognition of the fact that "surely the spiritual
liquors of the whites are nothing else but fire." In punishment:
"provided any person, whether white or coloured, contravenes this order,
the spirits shall be taken from him and poured out on the ground, without
excuse or indemnification. The law of trade does not reveal the
involvement of the Council, but it has been attested that in fact it was
the work of that institution. The law, while permitting trade, stressed
the fact that "there is no place belonging to the whites in my land..."
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"The trader who fancies that the place he is sojourning in belongs to him,
must dismiss the thought, if not, he is to quit."
Judging frcm at least one case during Moshoeshoe's reign, one
is tempted to conclude that under the Kingdom it had become a requirement
that only the King had the power over life and death. Dating to 1847,
the case involved Moshoeshoe's heir, Letsie, who had just instructed his
court to stone a subject to death for contempt of his court. The
subject, a Nguni speaker named Soula, had refused to appear before Letsie's
court, where the relatives of the elder of his two wives had entered a
case of property settlement against him, arguing that as a Nguni he did
not owe allegiance to the Chief, nor to the Morena e Moholo.
Moshoeshoe, on the other hand, seems to have felt that Letsie had, as
Leonard Thompson put it, committed a "judicial murder." The heir
apparent was accordingly sunmoned to the King's court to be thoroughly
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rebuked for exceeding the limits of the law.
The case, nevertheless, needs to be viewed with caution. For, on
the other hand, the background to Moshoeshoe's second law against
witchcraft reveals that apparently subsequent to his 1847 "judicial
murder", Letsie had carried out capital punishment for which he was not
called to the book. In this latter case, a man named Ramothibela had
been killed by another named Mpatsi, on the word of a witch.
Subsequently, according to the Rev. T. Arbousset's translation, "the
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murderer Mpatsi [was] sentenced to death by Chief Letsie. The
second case may suggest, at least, that the King did not have the
exclusive right to try blood cases, although at the same time it seems
difficult to say which were and which were not reserved for his special
attention.
The apparent conflict or confusion, in a first generation kingdom
such as Lesotho is perhaps understandable. Some pre-lifaqane
prerogatives of the marena, notably, military conscription, had
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effectively been transferee! to the Morena e Moholo as his exclusive
domain. While some others, notably the letsema - compulsory labour in
the cultivation of a ruler's main field - his tsimo ea lira, as it
is called, and the requirement to attend the pitso, still remained as
shared prerogatives between territorial chiefs and their Morena e
Moholo. The right to capital punishment probably fell in the second
category of royal prerogatives, except, so it appears, the Morena e
Moholo reserved the right, in this regard, to intervene and territorial
chief^s deferred to him when he did so.
We can therefore say, in conclusion to the foregoing discussion:
(a) Pre-colonial Lesotho was a kingdom with fairly clearly defined
institutions of government, distribution and control of authority, a
legal system and territorial integrity. It was a state, with ail the
major characteristics of the modern definition of a state - a permanent
population, a defined territory (much as this is not an absolute
requirement at international law), a Government, and the capacity to enter
into relations with other States. (b) As such, however, it was a first
generation kingdom. Its institutions, laws and traditions were a carry¬
over from the previous, less complex chiefdoms and clans of the eighteenth
century. These had yet to be fully adapted and tested under the more
complex monarchy. But, quite clearly, such adaptation and testing, that
is, the maturation of a political tradition, is something that normally
requires more than one generation to be achieved. Yet, Moshoeshoe's
Lesotho did not have such a breathing space before it became a British
Colony. A study of the transfer of a parliamentary form of government
as an alternative to an executive monarchy in Lesotho will need,
therefore, to take this historical developnent into account.
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THE SUBJUGATION OF LESOTHO AND THE BREAKDOWN OF ITS GOVERNMENT
(1S43 - 1903)
On March 12, 1868, the British High Commissioner for South Africa,
Sir Philip Wodehouse, proclaimed Lesotho, anglicized as Basutoland, one
of Her Majesty's dominions. Crucial in the Proclamation was the
clause:"'"
...I do hereby proclaim and declare that from and after
the publication hereof, the said Tribe of the Basuto
shall be and shall be taken to be for all intents and
purposes, British Subjects; and the Territory of the
said Tribe shall be and shall be taken to be British
Territory.
I will attempt in this chapter to achieve three objectives,
relative to the High Commissioner's Proclamation: First, I will show
that Lesotho's subjugation through that Proclamation was not an abrupt
event; it was, instead, a culmination of decades of treaty relations
between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the British Government (through the 'oou-tk
African High Commission) which had begun in 1843 and gradually
deteriorated into the subordination of the former. An examination of
the background to the Proclamation will reveal why Lesotho was in the
end unwilling to accept the status of a Crown Colony by cession which
attached to the wording of the Proclamation. Additionally, it should
be instructive of Basotho's early familiarity with some of the British
political and legal practices, as well as the contrasting Sesotho views.
Second, I will show that, although authorities in British and
3
Commonwealth Constitutional Law have classified Lesotho as a Crown
Colony, the circumstances within which the Proclamation was drawn - in
particular, an oral agreement between the High Commissioner and the
King of Basotho at that time suggest strongiy the view that Lesotho
had rather been intended to be a Protectorate (or protected state, as
the differentiation in meaning between the two terms had not as then
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been established),4 than as a Crown Colony. So that the insistence
on the part of the indigenous government of Lesotho on a protectorate
status, a somewhat sustained thane throughout the period of colonial
rule, and the expectation that policy formulation should be in keeping
with that status, were not totally without a basis. An examination of
this problem at this juncture is crucial to the understanding of the
approaches that the colonial administration subsequently adopted' in
introducing new political and legal ideas into the Territory, and the
responses of the indigenous government to those approaches.
Lack of clarity in the purpose for subjugating the Kingdom of
Lesotho resulted in parallel rule: the colonial administration and the
indigenous government seemed to be sharing power, more so than the
former clearly delegating responsibility to the latter, at least in
form. So, third, I will show how the indigenous government in essence
broke down under this type of rule, thus making way for the introduction
of parliamentary institutions.
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE KINGDOM
t
Lesotho's Treaty Relations with the British Government
Through a Treaty with the British Governor, Sir George Napier, in
1843, the British Government recognized the Morena e Moholo
Moshoeshoe as the "faithful ally of the [Cape of Good Hope] Colony."
The Morena e Moholo Moshoeshoe was entrusted with the
responsibility of guarding the Cape Coiony borders against Boer Trekker
violations, in the wake of the Great Trek, in lieu of which he received
( ti q
an annual gift of f 75, in money or in muni^ons of war.
Only two years later, in 1845, another Treaty was signed between
Moshoeshoe and Sir Peregrine Maitland, also British Governor for the
Cape Colony. That time the object was to sort out the problems of
the strife-torn North Eastern frontier of the Cape Colony and settle
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the conflicting territorial claims of African sovereigns, one against
the other, and with the Boer settlers in that area. As a result
of that Treaty, Moshoeshoe lost both his annual gift, which Maitland
regarded as superfluous, as well as a tract of land. The King of
Basotho signed the Treaty under protest. And subsequently the London
Missionary Society, lobbied by the Lesotho based Paris Evangelical
Missionary Society on the King's behalf, petitioned the Secretary of
State in the Home Government in London for the return of the lost tract
7
of land, but without success.
Then in 1848, Sir Harry Smith, the second Governor of the Cape of
Good Hope to get the joint appointment as also High Commissioner for
O
South Africa, fairly much hectored Moshoeshoe into signing an
"agreement" in the main for the purpose of maintaining order and good
9
government in the region generally north of the Orange River.
(Sir Harry Smith had a thoroughly disagreeable personality to Africans
in the region and carried the odium for having once compelled sane
AmaXhosa sovereigns at the conclusion of a war to show their submission
to the British Crown by kissing his feet.)^ The "agreement"
{
obligated Moshoeshoe to recognize the paramount authority of the British
Crown in the region, while "at the same time maintaining inviolable"
his "hereditary rights"."'""'" It stressed the necessity of keeping
him "in strict alliance with Her Majesty of England." And, notably,
as I shall later show, it was textualiy referred to as "this day's
12
cemented alliance." On its basis, and on the basis of similar
and similarly extracted "agreements" signed by other African sovereigns
in the affected area, on February 3, 1848 Sir Harry Smith established
13
a territorial entity called the Orange River Sovereignty.
The Orange River Sovereignty was a constitutional chimera: (a)
It included, on the one hand, Boer settlers - British subjects, whose
allegiance to the British Crown required, in the view of the Crown Law
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Officers in London, an Act of Parliament to be severed, which had not
been done.^ While, on the other hand, it included African polities
such as Lesotho, whose sovereignty had not clearly been ceded by the
Harry Smith "agreements". As a contemporary obser-ver later noted:
"Many people found it difficult to understand how the same country could
1 ^
simultaneously obey two Sovereigns." It was clear from the start
that the High Conmissioner's creation would not last.
As the most powerful African monarch under the Orange River
Sovereignty, Moshoeshoe found his authority constantly challenged by the
British Resident, Major Warden, who administered over that creation.
Efforts at subjecting the Basotho King under British authority, on the
pretext that Basotho had raided cattle belonging to Boer settlers,
resulted in an armed conflict with Smith's successor, Sir George Cathcart
in 1852 in which Sir George was vanquished. In the end it was concluded
that the establishment of the Orange River Sovereignty had been an
Impractical solution to the problems of that region and accordingly it
was abandoned in 1854. On its ruins, through the Bioemfontain
Convention, the Boer settler component of the defunct Sovereignty was
i
reconstituted as the Republic of the Orange Free State - onc^nore
without an Act of Imperial Parliament to sever the settlers' allegiance
1.0
to the British Crown. While for his part the Basotho King was
informed, clearly as an afterthought, that since "a war between two
persons breaks all pre-existing treaties," his encounter with Cathcart
17
in 1852 had broken his alliance with Queen Victoria.
Assuming, however, as both the Kingdom of Lesotho and the British
Government appear to have done so in 1854, that the two states were
still in treaty relations and allies to each other up at least to 1852,
the Moshoeshoe-Cathcart fracas of that year had not itself broken the
alliance, thanks to the political genius of the Mosotho King. For,
fearing that he might not withstand the redoubled wrath of Cathcart's
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forces, which had been certain to descent! upon him, the King of Basotho
and close men of his Council had, at midnight on December 20, 1852 -
following the day of the battle, written the High Conmisioner a letter
which undoubtedly safeguarded his relations with the British Government.
Penned by Nehemiah Sekhonyana, one of the King's sons, the letter had
stated:
You have this day fought against my people and
taken possession of many cattle. You have thereby
achieved the object which you had in view, which was
to obtain compensation for the Boers. I pray you
to content yourself with what you have taken. I
beg peace of you. You have revealed your might.
You have chastised. Let it be enough, I pray you,
and may I cease to be considered an enemy of the Queen.
I will henceforth endeavour to maintain order among my
people.
Grateful for the ingenious mending of his prestige, and probably
also conscious not to be up-staged in stateananship by the African
Monarch, the High Conroissioner had in turn, on December 21, seized the
golden opportunity to show his magnanimity. He informed King
Moshoeshoe:
I am a man who never breaks his word, otherwise
the Queen would not have sent me here. I have
taken the jrine by force, and I am satisfied.
I am not angry with your people for fighting in
defence of their property; ... I now desire not
to consider you, Chief, as an enemy of the Queen
... Now therefore, Chief Moshoeshoe, I consider your
past obligations fulfilled, and hope that you will
take measures for preventing such abuses in future.
In the meantime, as the Queen's Representative, I
subscribe myself, Your Friend... I shall be glad to
see either yourself or your sons, in the same friendly
manner and in the same good faith as before the fight
....(My emphasis).
On February 3 the following year, in a letter to King Moshoeshoe
by the British Resident of the Orange River Sovereignty, Mr. Green,
officially approved by Cathcart, the theme was pursued more explicitly:
"You, yourself, Moshesh, now that peace has been made, are ... an ally
of the Queen ..." While Sir George Cathcart, personally writing to the
Secretary of State for Colonies ten days later, on January 13, drove the
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point further by styling the King of Basotho "a valuable ally of no
small power.""'"®
On the basis of the foregoing correspondence alone, therefore, it
would appear that Lesotho was still in treaty relations with the British
Government. But what might have been the case on other grounds,
namely, on the grounds of the principles of International Law then
observed? For, as already mentioned, Lesotho was belatedly, and on
hindsight, informed in 1854 that the "war" had broken the alliance
with the British Government.
As a starting point in this regard it may be helpful to consider
the technical meaning of the word "war". Sir Arnold Duncan MacNair
(1894) states:®®
An examination of the cases will show us (a) that
fighting can take place without war, (b) that war can
exist without fighting, and (c) that, at any rate when
Great Britain is one of the ccmbatant parties, it is
for the Government to say whether we are at war or not.
So, setting aside, for the moment, the fact that Harry Smith's
Orange River Sovereignty was iegaliy a convoluted affair, and accepting
it as a tenable argument that his "agreement" of February 3, 1848,
(
described as "this day's cemented aiiiance," constituted a Treaty
between Lesotho and the British Government, what might be the effect of
the hostilities on that status? From the examination of the
Moshoeshoe-Cathcart correspondence it seems to me clear that the
hostilities were not accepted as constituting "war". In his expression
of magnanimity Sir George Cathcart, on behaif of the British Government,
eschewed from giving the "fighting" the requisite "recognition of
belii-'gerency" and wished his adversary merely to know that, frcm the
start, all he had sought to achieve was to exact his "fine" - a sanction
for civil disorder within the Sovereignty: "I have taken the fine by
force, and I am satisfied.... I am not angry with your people for
fighting in defence of their property..." In short, fighting had taken
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place, but without war.
The problem can also be examined from another angle: If, for the
sake of the argument we assume that Lesotho had lost its sovereignty
under the Orange River Sovereingty (which it had not), we then have to
determine whether or not it was in a state of a rebellion: Again,
according to MacNair, a rebellion or "proper civil war" is such only
if it has been so recognized, to distinguish it from the less serious
PI
forms of aggression such as "disturbance." Cathcart had given no
such recognition to the 1852 hostilities.
We can, therefore, it seems to me, safely conclude that neither
Lesotho's encounter with Her Majesty's forces in 1852, nor the
dissolution of the Orange River Sovereignty and its corollary - the
creation of the Orange Free State in 1854, discharged Moshoeshoe's
"agreement" or Treaty of alliance of 1848. For that Treaty to be
discharged and for the parties to it to remit to the status quo
ante foedus, it ideally required "a fresh agreement as to the effect
22
of the abrogation upon the position of the parties...." In the
least it required mutual consent: Neither ever came under consideration.
The above legal niceties notwithstanding (for after ail, British
officials were often ignorant of the full legal implications of their
actions, and even when they were not, they seldom took their African
counterparts seriously), the most disconcerting aspect of the 1854
debacie was the effect of the legal instrument that set up the Orange
Free State - the Bioemfontein Convention. The Convention had one
article - Article 2, which had two noxious clauses to the interests of
%
the Kingdom of Lesotho: (a) The first of these was to the effect that
"no treaty might be signed unilaterally by the British Government, which
might be detrimental to the interests and well being of the Orange
Free State" with "natives of surrounding states." (b) The second was
that British controlled sources of guns and munitions of war were
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preferentially closed to those "natives of surrounding states", in
favour of the Boers of the Orange Free State.
Lesotho Attempts to Resuscitate Its Relations with Britain
Following the first major boundary war with the Orange Free State
in 1858, from which the British Government, through its High Commissioner
for South Africa, had rescu>ed it from probable destruction in the hands
of Basotho, Moshoeshoe and his government must have concluded that, given
a few more years of preferential access to guns, the new Republic would
become formidable. Hence, a few days after Marthinus Wessels Pretorius
(the son of Andries Pretorius, the voortrekker) of the Transvaal became
the President of the Orange Free State in February 1860, thereby uniting
the two Boer Republics (in a union that lasted but three and a half
years), Moshoeshoe had shown great anxiety for a permanent peace with
his irksome neighbour. A meeting of the two heads of states had been
arranged on MdPcli 30, at which Moshoeshoe spoke for three hours on
the need for peace, and Pretorius corroborated that "I must have security
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and peace for my people also." The King of Basotho had spent the
night in the President's tent, "and the next morning he and
Mr. Pretorius reviewed a portion of the Basuto army, numbering about
six thousand cavalry .... Moshoeshoe danced like mad, and thus the
conference broke up.'
Even before the end of the conference, however, it was clear that
there could be no peace between the two nations. Supposedly,
Moshoeshoe and Pretorius signed a Treaty on k, 30. (The Treaty
remains untraceable, to date.) Supposedly, that Treaty "dealt mainly
with the necessity of a border police, but avoided the main issue: the
disputed northern frontier." Moshoeshoe solemnized that day by
planting a white flag, saying: "Let this be a remembrance to all, White
and Black, that peace is now for evermore." But when he proposed the
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toast, in Dutch, "alie oude questies tot niet [let all old questions
be forgotten, liquidated], "Pretorious queried:
Old father Moshoeshoe that won't do.
Everlasting friendship if you like, from
henceforth, but all the old questions we
can't settle in this way....
The test of wills and settlement of old scores between Basotho and the
Boers were certain to come, sooner or later.
So, on the occasion of a visit to South Africa of Prince Aif&ej^
in August the same year, 1860, the King of Basotho had placed in his
hand a letter to his illustrous mother, Queen Victoria. In that letter
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he submitted and appealed:
I am the oldest of the Queen's Ministers in
this country from Napier, Maitland, H. Smith,
down to Sir George Clarke [succeeded Cathcart
in 1853], and in spite of everything that has
happened to me, ... I have been faithful in my
allegiance to Her Majesty. My prayer to-day
is that I may be restored to the same position
among the Queen's servants that I first held, for
I am become as the least of them.... I have come
to have the peace which I enjoy increased and
confirmed.
As that letter produced no results, the following year, 1861, the
Morena e Moholo wrote a detailed and argued letter of application,
this time to the British High Coimisioner for South Africa in Cape
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Town. For ease of its discussion the letter can be divided into
three parts.
In the first part he reviewed the status of his treaty relations
with the British Government thus: In 1845, Maitland had "proposed to
me an additional treaty founded on the first" - the Napier Treaty of
1843. As a matter of fact, he pointed out, he had bought the Maitland
%
Treaty with land (in reference to the tract of land that Lesotho had
thereby lost), "and the land has not been returned to me." Therefore,
Moshoeshoe argued, instead of one taking the place of the other, the
two treaties of 1843 and 1845 re-enforced each other. Following the
same line of reasoning, he put it to the High Commissioner that his
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"agreement" of 1848 with Sir Harry Smith, the one textually referred to
as "this day's cemented alliance," had not discharged the former two
treaties. As he put it, that which had been cemented "cannot be said
to have destroyed that which it had cemented." With reference to his
encounter with Cathcart in 1852, he agreed that, indeed, "war is a flood
which destroys the traces of the past." Nevertheless, he denied that
he had been at war with the Governor and cited all the correspondence
between the two of them which had a bearing on the question. Finally,
he referred to the abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty in 1854
as "merely the removal of a superstructure" and "asserted that the old
foundation, which were my original treaties, remained firm."
In the second part, the Morena e Moholo registered his
protest against Article 2 of the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 on
the question of guns:
Though I desire peace and much and above all things,
yet, after it, I do desire also that powder and such
supplies should be allowed to reach us in such measure
as our conduct showed us to be deserving of confidence.
I beg this favour, because when these things are
prohibited my position is difficult, for it gives power
to the arguments of those who say it is the fixed
determinatibn of Government to give the native tribes
no protection, and to deprive them of the means of self
protection.... I beg it also because my treaties give
it to me.
Moshoeshoe, in the third part of his letter, wished the High
Commissioner, the newly arrived Sir Philip Wodehouse, to support his
petition and "to lay this letter before the Queen," in view of the fact
that "there is still sane doubt as to the precise nature of ... my past
relations with Her Majesty's Government and my wishes for the future."
In response, Sir Philip Wodehouse followed his predecessor's
suggestion and sent a Cormission to Lesotho in 1862. The Coimission,
composed of Messrs Joseph Orpen and John Burnet, was to establish, not
the soundness of Moshoeshoe's argument, which the High Conmissioner
thought to be obscured by the embroidery of his metaphors, but rather,
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what kind of status "under the Sovereignty of Her Majesty the Queen" he
OQ
desired. The next effect would be to detract the Morena e
Moholo away frail holding the British Government to old treaties, into
applying for a status that would be negotiated afresh.
At the conclusion of the convention of his Grand Council held at
the capital, Thaba Bosiu, in 1862, and which had been attended by a
delegation from the King of AmaZulu - his overlord, the Morena e
Moholo Moshoeshoe then put his application in the following
words:
I am like a man who has a house, the man rules the
house and all that is in it, and the Government rules
him. My "house" is Basutoiand. So that the
Queen rules my people only through me.... I shall be
like a blind man, but when [a British Agent] directs
me I shall be considered wise.... I wish to govern
my own people by native law, by our own laws, but
if the Queen wishes after this to introduce other laws
into my country, I would be willing, but I should
wish such laws to be submitted to the Council of the
Basutos, and when they are accepted by my Council, I
will send to the Queen and infonn her that they have
become law. [My emphasis]
Wodehouse grasped the point clearly that Moshoeshoe did not wish
to cede his sovereignty. As he pointed out to the Secretary of State:
Moshoeshoe did not wish to be "substancially a British subject...;"
he was not prepared to submit to British laws. He essentially
sought to place himself under the British Government as a vassal - a
status which he enjoyed under the King of AmaZulu, and one which the
AmaPondo Chief Faku held under him.
Between 1862 and 1863 the High Commissioner was apparently
weighing the prospects of honouring Lesotho's application.
Unfortunately, however, sometime in 1863 the President of the Orange
Free State, John Brand, got wind of the development. And, according
to the High Ccmnissioner, the President received the news of the pending
British offer to his arch-enemy with "much apprehension". As a
consequence, the High Commissioner "allowed it to fall to the
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ground."^
Lesotho Negotiates for British Protection under the Pressure of War
In June 1865 the second war between Lesotho and the Orange Free
State broke out. The Boers were far better armed that time than they
had been in 1858 and Basotho fared badly. By the end of August 1865 the
King of Basotho was pinned to his mountain fortress and capital, Thaba
Bosiu. Having asked the Orange Free State for an armistice, the King
was faced with demands frcm its President for 40,000 cattle, 5,000
horses, 60,000 sheep and the submssion of two of his sons as hostages
until all demands had been met. The Orange Free State demanded also the
evacuation of Thaba Bosiu, the handing up of guns, and the Kingdom's
sovereignty - all in four days.
But as the Morena e Moholo felt certain that "I will never
do so," he turned to Philip Wodehouse, "giving myself and my country up
to Her Majesty's Government under certain conditions which we may agree
upon....
The High Conmissioner, on the other hand, felt it was
"impracticable" for Her Majesty's Government "to interpose in any
manner" at that juncture. The irrmediate cause of the war had been an
unauthorized raid on Boers by an ungovernable nephew of the
Morena e Moholo named Lesaoana (alias, Ramanehella), and the High
Conmissioner felt that before that "troubled spirit" was punished, "you
cannot justly expect me to piace faith in your professions of desire to
fulfil ail obligations of a faithful ally of the British Government."
35
[My emphasis] In October 1865 the High Conmissioner assured his
Secretary of State that he had "no intention of accepting him and his
people as British subjects." Lesotho was thus left on its"own to
reverse the tide of the war over the subsequent three years of its
duration.
As the war dragged on, however, it became clear to the Colonial
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Government that, independently of Lesotho's need for protection, a
number of factors pointed to the necessity of bringing that Kingdom
under some type of formal control: In his correspondence with the
Imperial Government, the High Commissioner remarked on the embarrassment
caused by the protracted war with the Orange Free State - "a ana11
independent state, peopled by the nearest kinsmen of the Cape Colonists,
possessing their warmest sympathies, ...excessively weak in
37itself." In the event that the fortunes of Basotho in the battle
field changed for the better, the High Commissioner dreaded the prospect
of the Boers' defeat in the hands of their darker adversaries.
At the same time, the prospect of a Boer conquest of Lesotho
inspired the fear in him, which fear he shared with the Lieutenant
Governor of Natal, Robert W. Keate, that such an outcome might lead to
"important changes in the political position of the several powers" in
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South Africa which could not be permitted. One of those
"important changes" was, in the High Caimissioner's view, that the
Orange Free State might gain access to, and control the Indian Ocean
port of St. Johns. Frantically attempting to forestall such a
possibility, the High Commissioner had even begun secret negotiations
with the AmaMpondo sovereign, Nkosi Faku, Moshoeshoe's vassal with
jurisdiction in that area, to make "without any delay, a cession of
the navigable part of the St. John's River, with a certain portion of
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land adjoining to the British Government."0
Then too, there were commercial interests to consider.
Lieutenant Governor Keate counselled Wodehouse that the unending border
conflicts between the Boers and Basotho would affect immigration from
Europe, ruin the Overberg trade, "which is of such paramount importance
to us." It would freeze the injection of capital for railway
construction, affect the exploitation of coal fields and, in general,
debilitate "the development... of the latent resources of the colony."
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For this and other reasons of a political nature, the Lieutenant
Governor favoured a decisive and effective control of the Kingdom of
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Lesotho. Cormercial interests in the Cape of Good Hope were
similarly severely affected by the war. The Cape businessnen thus
stood ready to support any move, such as that of Robert Keate, to
bring the Basotho-Boer hostilities to an end.
Against this background, Lesotho's repeated plea to be placed
under "the power and protection" of Queen Victoria had to be reviewed.
Wodehouse forwarded a persuasive despatch to the Secretary of State,
Edward Cardweil, on January 13, 1866, vouching for the sincerity of
Basotho in their pledges of "allegiance" to the British Crown. He
was convinced, he said, that accepting Basotho as British subjects
would be for the good, not only of themselves, but of all of South
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Africa. He regretted the "embarrassment" created by the
existence in the proximity of British colonies of the "excessively weak"
Orange Free State, unequal to the task of settling its quarrels with
"natives around". He reviewed the effects of the war on conmerce.
He registered his view( that accepting responsibility over Lesotho had
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become "our duty".
Notwithstanding his sympathies toward the Orange
Free State, and also his duty to his own country, the High Commissioner
was a great admirer of the King of Basotho. He marvelled at his
political dexterity, and also feared it. As he had earlier in 1862
indicated to his Secretary of State: "Moshesh's great ability and skill
in negotiations have never been denied.... He makes it almost
impracticable for me to take extreme steps against [him]".^ He
saw him as a statesman and "diplomatist" always bent on keeping good
relations with the British Government, which often put British
functionaries like himself in an ungainly position.
More due to this disposition, perhaps, than to other factors, in
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the January 1866 despatch to Edward Cardweii he proposed how Lesotho
couid be ruled: There should be as little an interference as possible,
he said, on "the rights and customs [of the Basotho] now existing."
The Kingdom of Lesotho was to be administered through the indigenous
government, with only "two or three" magistrates. It was to be placed
directly under the High Commissioner, who would rule it on behalf of
the Crown, and not annexed to either of Her British Majesty's South
African colonies. The financial responsibility for administration
was to be borne by Basotho themselves. Finally, the chiefs and the
people were clearly to understand that British authority was "for their
benefit," so that should they in future fail to provide the necessary
financial support for their administration, "our protection would at
once be withdrawn...."[My emphasis]
In his response to the High Conmissioner, March 9, 1866, the
Secretary of State, however, expressed his amazement at the latter's
apparent volte-face. In his view, British expansion in South Africa
could not at that point be contemplated "without sane overriding
necessity" and that, as far as he was concerned, had not yet arisen.
i
While appreciating Moshoeshoe's plight, he said, he feared that once
the imminent danger was over, especially after Moshoeshoe's death, the
Kingdom might challenge British Sovereignty. As well, in the unwelcome
event of British annexation of the Kingdom, he disapproved of the High
Conmissioner's mooted policy of non-interference, charging that seme of
the customs of Basotho were "repugnant to Christianity, and...
inconsistent with the free institutions of British rule." The best way
of avoiding conflict in this regard was, he felt, abstention, in the
first instance, from "unnecessary extension of sovereignty." For,
once entered into, "Sovereignty involves correlative obligations under
which public and personal rights grow up, such as it is difficult, if
not dishonourable, to compromise for the sake of some political
- 84 -
convenience arising at the time."
Meantime, the Lesotho Government lost faith in Wodehouse's
abilities and bona fides and began to look for an alternative
"door to the Queen's Cave." This other door would be Lieutenant
Governor Robert Keate of Natal: In July 1866 the Morena £ Moholo
of Basotho convened a Council for five days at Thaba Bosiu to thrash
out the modalities of this alternative course of action. The result
was that a high powered delegation, carrying a brief letter penned by
one of Moshoeshoe's sons, was dispatched to Natal for negotiations
regarding Lesotho's possible annexation to that Colony. The delegation
was instructed to point out that, while Lesotho was perfectly equal to
the task of vanquishing the Orange Free State, the current situation of
questionable British neutrality, made worse by the fact that some Cape
and Natal levies were busy supporting the enemy, had made the war
unfair and a bid for British protection an unavoidable step. In the
circumstances, annexation to Natal seemed the more sensible move than
going through the High Conmissioner, thereby risking annexation to the
factious Cape Colony, with its Boer-Briton quarrels. The prospect of
being subjected to further Boer harrassments under the Cape, the
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delegation was to emphasize, was quite disagreeable.
Quickly upon the heels of the first one, a second, one-man
delegation was sent to Natal to emphasize that really, Lesotho's
predicament was essentially one of lack of access to guns. As Lesotho's
most trusted ambassador, Nathanael Makotoko put it, in an oral
despatch:^
The Orange Free State and Basuto nation are both
on friendly terms with the British Government....
Our enemies in time of war are supplied with arms
and amnunition to any extent they may require and
may be able to purchase any either in time of peace
or war; surely this is not neutrality. If the
British Government will not receive us and our
country,.... if it looks upon us and the Orange Free
State equally as friends and children, .... and that
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therefore we should be left to punish each other, let
it not supply arms and ammunition to one side and
withoid them from the other but let both have an equal
chance, and if the Basutos must perish let them
perish defending themselves with means to procure which
they are allowed the same facilities as their enemies
from neutral source.
Here the Lesotho Government was going to full lengths to compromise
the High Commissioner's role as the chief spokesman in South Africa
for the British Government: He was no longer getting Lesotho's
thoughts directly; he was having to rely on Lieutenant Keate, whose
personal designs on the Kingdom were at variance with his own. And
through Keate the High Conmissioner was tacitly being made a part of
Lesotho's problems: The decision to negotiate the reversal of the
obnoxious clause of the Bloemfontein Convention, on guns, lay ultimately
on him.
Just as the Natal Legislative Council prepared to accept Lesotho's
offer made by the first delegation, the High Commissioner moved quickly
to salvage his image. On May 3, 1867 he wrote the new Secretary of
State, the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos a terse letter by which he
warned that Lesotho's overture to Natal was an expression of loss of
confidence in his office "as the paramount British functionary
representing Her Majesty in South Africa." He felt strongly that it
was not desirable to encourage this decline in the image of his Office.
He recommended the acceptance of Lesotho at the earliest convenient
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moment.
Buckingham and Chandos then responded favourably. He informed
the High Commissioner on December 9, 1867 that permission had been
granted to receive Basotho as British subjects for the sake of "the
peace and welfare of Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa...."
It stood to reason, Buckingham and Chandos remarked, that this step




The Annexation of the Kingdom
As a preliminary step to annexation, therefore, on January 13,
1868 Sir Philip Wodehouse wrote letters to King Moshoeshoe and
President Brand on the subject. To Moshoeshoe he indicated his
"satisfaction" that at last Her Majesty's Government had agreed to
receive him and his people as British subjects and that the modalities
e:o
of annexation had been left to the High Carmissioner's Office.
To Brand he said he had been authorized to "take steps" to receive
Basotho under the British Crown and advised him to apply to the
Volksraad (parliament), due to convene the following month, for authority
3
to negotiate the boundry question with him. Simultaneously, he
A
stationed a Cape Police force near Lesotho's capital under Sir Walter
Curry, to underline his intention.
This development was evidently seen by the Orange Free State as
Lesotho's diplomatic victory. The Boer Republic was at this point
insolvent and on the verge of economic ruin. Public opinion on the
continuation of the war was highly divided. The urban and English
population for instance, together with a snail section of Dutch
colonists, had always lamented the abandonment of the Orange River
Sovereignty and the subsequent establishment of the Orange Free State.
In the meantime, the vicissitudes of the war had seemed to confirm their
worse fears. Their reaction to Wodehouse's letters of January 13 was,
therefore, one of a deep seated disappointment. The Editor of the
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Bloemfontein Friend lashed out:
NO: We are to be 'left out' in the cold while
the old nigger MOSHESH is to be received into
the Colonial family of Great Britain, and taken
to the warm embrace of our still beloved QUEEN.
MOSHESH... is to be petted and pampered, while
we are to continue to be treated as castaways.
President Brand expressed his own disappointment from another
vantage point. He protested that, after ail, "our armies are, under
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God's blessing, everywhere successful...." In the circumstances the
High Commissioner's intervention snatched frcm his grasp a well nigh
honestly won prize. Above all, he reminded the High Commissioner,
intervention was in breach of Article 2 of the Bloemfontein Convention,
in so far as a treaty was about to be entered into with an African
state.^
Had President Brand stopped the hostilities upon receipt of the
High Commissioner's letter and stuck to his argument that the
Bloemfontein Convention was being breached, he might legally have placed
the latter in an awkward position. As he did not do so, however, he
gave the High Corrmisioner a badly needed loophole, albeit a flimsy one.
The High Commissioner was then able to write him a letter saying his
continued hostilities against Basotho, a people in principle already
accepted as British subjects, constituted "an unfriendly feeling towards
the British Government, quite sufficient to absolve me from all
observance of the terms of the Convention of the 23rd February
1854."56
So on March 12, 1868 he duly proclaimed Basotho "British subjects,
and the territory of the said tribe ... British territory." However,
there was more to the terms of annexation than was reflected in the
Proclamation.
Evidently because the Morena e Moholo Moshoeshoe had still
not given up the idea of vassalage, as opposed to ceding his sovereignty
to British Crown, he subsequently wrote the High Commissioner a letter
on April 21, 1868 requesting that Lesotho should be treated as a
"special Territory" - "a Native reserve where natives' alone should be
allowed to dwell and which would be dependent from the High
C57Commissioner." Moshoeshoe was, after all, conscious of the fact
that Wodehouse still held him in high esteem. Besides, he had, up to
that point, repeatedly rubbed it on him that his predicament with the
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Boers had been the making of the British Government: Directly and
indirectly he had been indicting the British Government for racial
discrimination. Directly and indirectly he had been pointing out the
fact that were it not for Article 2 of the Bloemfontein Convention - a
British piece of legislation - he could have settled his quarrel with the
Orange Free State. In the circumstance, therefore, it seems he was
putting the British Government to the test: Was its interest the
protection of his Kingdom, or was it in fact subjugation.
Suffice it to say, Sir Philip Wodehouse granted the King his
wish. And although the High Conmissioner seems then to have only
conmunicated his agreement verbally, twelve years later when he was
called from retirement by the Home Office to say whether or not he had
agreed to reserve "Basutoland for Basutos only"' he responded:
I can only reply, that such was the very thing to
the attainment of which all my efforts were directed
- it was for the purpose of putting an end to Border
disputes, and for removing doubts as to the true
limits of the Territory to which the claim of that
Tribe, and that alone, should be admitted for the
future, that these .,. negotiations were carried
on ... The object was to secure peace and comfort
for the Basutos in the future....
t
As we can see, from 1842 to 1868 Lesotho's relationship with the
British Government was a progression of treaty relations - never quite
clear for legal classification. It is a subject of debate well worth a
separate treatment to determine whether or not the status of treaty
relations really ended with the Bloemfontein Convention in 1854 or
whether peremptorily British officials in South Africa decided on
political convenience and racial consideration for the Orange Free State
to abandon strict adherence to British legal practices in getting out of
treaty relations with the Kingdom of Lesotho. The Proclamation of
1868 came as a negotiated settlement in circumstances that were dictated
by the British conmitment to the continued existence of the Orange Free
State, further aggravated by British conmercial interests, the balance
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of power in South Africa, and only marginally the security of the
Kingdom of Lesotho. So that, in the final analysis it was mainly the
Kingdom's diplomacy that dictated the modality of British intervention
and the survival of the Basotho Nation.
CONSTITUTIONAL ANOMALIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
The outcome of this negotiated settlement for the future was that
the British Government at heme, as well as its officials in South Africa
and in Lesotho vacillated in their designation of Lesotho between
calling it a Crown Colony on the one band, and calling it a Protectorate
on the other hand. Between 1868 and 1884 Lesotho was variously
referred to by the Colonial Office as "a kind of outlaying territory
with a High Carmission constitution;"^® "an inchoate Crown colony
waiting for annexation to one of its neighbours;" "the protectorate
tinder Imperial Government." In 1883, the Secretary of State for
Colonies, the Earl of Derby, speaking in the House of Commons could
still state: "We don't propose to make Basutoland a Crown Colony, or
introduce the costly machinery of European officers. We wish the
60
Basutos to enjoy Home Rule in the strictest sense of the word."
t
To the indigenous government the constitutional status of Lesotho
was one of political convenience. In the main, the Morena e
Moholo and his chiefs regarded their Kingdom as having merely entered
"the covenant of the alliance and protection between ... Moshesh the
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Wise and Victoria the Good...." The basis of this view, as the
Morena e Mohoio Letsie, Moshoeshoe's successor put it, was that:
"We were told that the Government leaves a man to govern his country,
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with his sheep, his cattle, and his gun." And in this
understanding he was backed by the spokesnan of the Paris Evangelical
Missionary Society, who had been with Basotho since 1833, who affirmed
that Sir Philip Wodehouse had said that "the land would be kept for the
Basotho, their children and their children's children" and that not even
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magistrates would be allowed the ownership of land in Basutoland.63
When there were greater benefits to be reaped by claiming British
citizenship, however, with equal facility Basotho asserted that they
were the loyal subjects of the British Empire.
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S ARRANGEMENT IS PUT TO THE TEST
The peculiar and confusing constitutional status of Lesotho under
Britain allowed the indigenous government constantly to challenge any
efforts by the High Commissioner or his officers to take major decisions
or assert authority without consultations with it. In fact, it is more
to the point to say it expected that its consent should be sought,
rather than that it should merely be consulted.
The Tsekelo-Buchanan Affair
The first such challenge to the High Commissioner's authority
came only a year after his Proclamation. It was over the boundary
question: For nine days, between February 4th and 12th, 1869, the High
Commissioner had alone and on his own been negotiating Lesotho's
boundary with the Orange Free State with President Brand and his
i
officers. In the process, the Boers had driven such a hard bargain on
him that he lost about one third of Lesotho's most valuable agrarian
land to the Republic. Understandably, Basotho were indignant at this
development. As one observer put it, they came to feel that "the
English have not cane here to help them but to take their land and
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hinder their chiefs from marrying."
Accordingly, when an ambitious Natalian lawyer named D.D. Buchanan
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offered his services to him, Moshoeshoe seized the opportunity,
protesting that he had been "covered with shame... and I feel great
grief" at the fact that despite his earlier promise to restore all his
country back to him, the High Commissioner had it "handed to the Free
State" and "I have no one who will go to the Queen for me and bring her
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my tears....
In clear disregard of Wodehouse's authority, Moshoeshoe deputized
Tsekelo, an educated junior son of his, to accompany Buchanan to Queen
Victoria and duly "clothed him with all the power to act for me."
From London Tsekelo was to leave for France, in the company of the
French missionary, the Rev. Daumas who, having lost his mission station
to the Orange Free State in the war, had his own axe to grind, to
represent the matter to the French Emperor, Napoleon III. (Tsekelo spoke
both English and French fluently.)
When the High Commissioner was informed of the plan, already in
progress, just a few days before the delegation was to board in Cape
Town for the high seas, he was furious and he vowed not "to give in an
inch" to it. He dismissed the mooted mission to France as "all
rubbish" that had to be put a stop to. And he accused the Paris
Evangelical Missionary Society of "trying to create confusion" in
Lesotho and threatened to encourage "the operations of the Catholic
68mission" against it. (The Obiates of Mary Immaculate had just
arrived in Lesotho in 1862 from the AmaZulu Kingdom, where they had
spent ten unrewarding years. The French missionaries, who had carved
their place in the hearts of Basotho, saw them as intruders and great
rivalry raged between the two.)
As the stakes got high, Moshoeshoe must have read in Wodehouse
the despondency of a man who might throw his kingdom in a worse disaster
if he did not abandon his scheme: The High Commissioner might renege on
his "protection". For he quickly, through his second son, Jeremiah
Molapo, whom the colonial administration had already discovered to have
had "a finger in the affair", attempted to recall the delegation. In
consequence, Lesotho's most trusted ambassador, Nathanael Makotoko, put
the interests of the state above adventure and returned; Tsekelo,
Buchanan and Daumas ignored the King's messengers and sailed, with their
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varying motives to London: the centre of power.
Simultaneously, all the major actors in the plot on the home front,
jointly and severally, washed their hands of the entire affair.
Moshoeshoe, Letsie and George Tlali - another educated son of the
Morena _e Moholo co-signed a letter to Lesotho's High
Conmissioner's Agent by which Moshoeshoe pointed out: "I have said that
all is right, and still say so, and I am very sorry that such a matter
or a thing as this expedition of Tsekelo's should have happened." So
as not to invite reprisals on Tsekelo, however, the Morena e
70
Moholo skilfully qualified his statement of disassociation:
I do not forbid anyone to speak as he thinks
right, as I myself will speak or write to the
Governor or to the Hone Government at any time
when I find it necessary to do so.
Molapo made a separate letter of denial. Letsie and George Tlali
also made additional separate denials to the High Commissioner' s
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Agent. While, the Conference of the French Missionaries wrote
their own letter, apologizing for Rev. Daumas' participation.
Armed with these letters of denials, the High Conmissioner was
able to send a lengthy,communication to London effectively destroying
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the delegation's credibility. The delegation had otherwise been
given a sympathetic reception: The Permanent Under Secretary for
Colonies had believed that Wodehouse still had the opportunity to arm-
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twist the Boers to disgorge more of Basotho land. In the House
of Commons, some fifty M.Ps supported the delegation's petition that the
Convention of Aliwal North, as it was called, on the boundary question
had illegally ceded "British territory." While, significantly, others
questioned the very assumption that the Kingdom of Lesotho was British
74
territory. The question, however, had eventually to be dropped
because it had no bona fide petitioner, either from Thaba Bosiu or
Cape Town.
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The High Commissioner' s Laissez-faire
Administration and the Authority of the Chiefs
Sir Philip Wodehouse had drawn up a set of Regulations for the
governance of Lesotho. These Regulations provided, in the extreme, for
the division of the Territory into 3 districts, each with a magistrate
and a senior chief, as well as arrogated to the High Commissioner the
authority for land allocation, heretofore the prerogative of the
Morena e Moholo. (The territory would actually be divided into
four districts in 1871. By 1900 there were seven districts). This
transfer of authority was, nevertheless, without prejudice to the notion
of "Basutoland for Basutos only". Magistrates' courts were placed above
chiefs' courts, with people having the right of appeal to magistrates.
Other than that, the court system remained in the hands of the
chiefs.75
According to John Allen Benyon, once Sir Philip Wodehouse was
back in London in May, 1870, having completed his term of office, he
further75
Significantly recommended that the High Conmissioner's
competence to govern the Basuto should be based upon
the authority which Moshesh, as paramount chief, had
ceded, and not upon those legal instruments of Royal
Prerogative, Letters Patent or Orders-in-Counci1, by
which British 'Colonies of cession' were customarily
ruled from the metropolis.
Unfortunately for the High Conmissioner, his draft Regulations
took a considerably long time before they were confirmed and came into
77
force in December, 1871. (And that would be in a drastically
modified form.) In the circumstances he had to be satisfied with
asking his Agent on the spot, James Henry Bowker, to "make the best of
this abominable hash which the Secretary of State is mischievously
70
prolonging."
The consequence of this delay was that Lesotho remained
effectively under the authority of the indigenous government of the
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chiefs. It was as if the old Kingdom had regained its independence,
or that indeed the British Government was only an ally cane to assist a
friend in time of peril. That spirit of independence would die hard.
At the age of 84, tired, sick and done, Moshoeshoe handed the
sceptre to his already 57 years old heir Letsie, at a pitso on
January 18, 1870. Significantly, the installation was exclusively in
the hands of the royal family of Lesotho. The British Government
played no part whatsoever to symbolize its authority in the new
relationship. On March 11 Moshoeshoe died and was buried at Thaba
Bosiu. Wodehouse left South Africa in May, having at least succeeded in
appointing two magistrates, John Austen and Inspector Surmon to assist
Bowker in his administration of the Territory. There was also a small
police force of one hundred officers. And on December 31, Wodehouse's
successor, Sir Henry Barkly arrived in Cape Town. A shift in the
already unsteady constitutional position of Lesotho was about to be made.
Lesotho is Annexed to the Cape of Good Hope Colony
For some time before Wodehouse's last return to London, the idea
of giving the Cape Colony Responsible Government had been under
i
discussion. In South Africa Wodehouse opposed the idea on the grounds
that the Imperial Government would implicitly be abdicating its
responsibility as the guardian of the rights of the "native" population
under the Colony. This responsibility would devolve upon the cabinet
of the Responsible Government, and he feared that the cabinet, being
unsympathetic to the rights of the "coloured race", a lot of mischief
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and gross injustices were sure to foilow. While the Imperial
Parliament generally shared this concern, there were those in it who
feared that Responsible Government would in fact work to the detriment
of the white community. The Marquis of Salisbury, for instance, chief
exponent of this view, argued that "The surrender of all the power, both
legislative and administrative, of the Colony into the hands of a
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majority elected by a coloured race is an experiment that has never been
tried yet...."^
By the time Sir Henry Barkly arrived in South Africa, however,
humanitarian fears regarding the "native problem" had given way to
political realities. A way around "coloured franchise" had also been
found. As the Permanent Under-Secretary for Colonies, Robert Herbet
said: "...it could be culpable to allow the establishment of Responsible
Government without at the same time expressly disfranchising all persons
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not being three parts, or at least one half, of white blood." The
Cape Colony was certain to get Responsible Government.
In the meantime Sir Henry Barkly, who was less keen on High
Commission rule for Lesotho than Wodehouse had been, had decided that the
Territory ought to be annexed to the Cape Colony. Hence, as early as in
May he had visited the Morena e Moholo Letsie to broach the subject
to him. Yet it does not appear that enough time and effort was taken
to allow the Morena e Moholo to consult with his Council and bring
"the matter "to a pitso for full discussion and commitment to "the
constitutional change.
i
At the same time, Barkly's rationale and justification for
annexation seemed fairly harmless on the surface. For he assured the
Morena e Moholo that annexation would be without prejudice to the
current arrangement under which Lesotho was being administered by the
High Commissioner's Agent. The only thing that seemed to necessitate
annexation, as Barkly explained to the Secretary of State, was the
financial burden currently borne by the Cape toward the Territory.
He stated:^
the immediate annexation to the Cape Colony was
the only measure which could avert the anarchy which
seemed to impend whenever the police force, the
return of which to its ordinary duties had been
repeatedly demanded by the Cape Parliament, should
be withdrawn.
A Bill for annexation was hurriedly introduced in the Legislative
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Assembly. One of its chief critics in the advisory Executive Council,
the Attorney General, was pressured by his boss, the High Comnissioner
to help rush it through. There was a great deal of concern within and
outside the Legislative Assembly about the rush. But after the Bill had
been discussed by a special Connittee, which reasoned, among other
things, that "Basutoland offers a wide field for conmercial enterprise,"
it was passed on August 11, 1871 and confirmed by an Order-in-Council in
OO
November that same year.00
The "Basutoland Annexation Act", or Act No. 12, 1871, provided, in
a sense, that the Cape of Good Hope Governor (and not the High
Commissioner for South Africa) would be the chief executive of the
Territory. The Governor retained the prerogative power to legislate of
his own motion, as the High Commissioner had. Cape laws were not to be
applied to Lesotho, unless specifically made for that purpose. But,
whether or not in the latter case an Order-in-Council was required, it
was not clear. In any event, quite significantly, clause 2 of the Act
gave such Cape Acts as might be passed for the Territory precedence over
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the Governor's prerogative.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE GUN WAR AND PISANNEXATION
The Establishment of Responsible Government and Lesotho's Response
The following year, 1872, the Cape Colony was granted Responsible
Government. And with this change Lesotho, clearly without appreciating
it, underwent a crucial constitutional change. The Governor's
prerogative devolved on the Cape Government. As Joseph Orpen, the Cape
M.P. from Aliwal North and a Basotho sympathiser would on a later
occasion put it: "by a mere sidewind, necessarily but disastrously, it
85
transferred legislative power... to the ministry of the day."
According to the Reverend Eugene Casalis, who gave his testimony in the
wake of the Gun War in 1880, Basotho were neither consulted on nor
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advised of this change. Casalis was corroborated by Lord
Kimberley, Secretary of Colonies at the time, who conmented later in
1881 that "the Basutos received no formal notification of any change
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in their relations with the Governor...."
In 1872, however, Lesotho had responded to annexation by
88
petitioning to be represented in the Cape Parliament. Both the
Governor, Sir Henry Barkly and the Colonial Secretary, Richard Southey
had been disagreeably surprised and anbarrassed by this petition. And
whether their suspicions were well founded or not, they blamed it on the
tireless Basothophils - Joseph Orpen and D. D. Buchanan. Having
successfully circumvented the "coloured franchise" problem, Cape
colonists could ill afford allowing representation to a still stoutly
proud and essentially unconquered population of "natives". They had to
parry the petition.
In parrying the petition, Southey explained to Basotho that
representation in the Cape Parliament carried with it, in the main, the
obligation fully to accept Cape laws. Whereas non-representation
carried the advantage that Lesotho would retain the privileged position
as a "special Territory", that is, it would be governed through Basotho
laws and customs. As Basotho feared losing their relative independence
89
under Cape laws, they withdrew their petition.
Between 1872 and 1876 the Morena e Moholo and his now
"Governor's Agent", Colonel Griffith, wrestled for authority. In an
effort to assert his power and establish British authority, or the
Cape's, as it were, Griffith issued a circular on December 17, 1872 to
"chiefs; petty chiefs, headmen" reminding them that "the Supreme chief
in this Territory is the Governor representing the Queen of E
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England." Apparently the Morena e Moholo Letsie challenged
the circular, in regards to its implications on the supremacy of
magistrates over the Basotho courts, and the right of the Governor's
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Agent to allocate land. For, two days later Griffith was at pains to
explain, with regard to the judiciary, that the judicial procedure
"is to your interest... for the good of the whole country." (He did
not assert that he was within his constitutional right, rather, he tried
to appeal to the Monarch's reason.) On the question of land
allocation, on the other hand, Griffith asked the question,
rhetorically: "If these rights are not to belong to the Government,
how can the Government be said to govern you at all?"^ By October
1874 the question of land allocation had still not been resolved and
Griffith had to bring it to the attention of the Governor. The
Governor was to hand back the right of land allocation to the Morena
e Moholo in "patronage as a privilege" and to emphasize the fact
Qp
that land was held "from the Government."
By the middle of October 1876 the Cape Government was drawing
near to a conflict with its appended "special Territory". Griffith
reported to the Secretary of Native Affairs in the Cape that the
situation in Lesotho was deteriorating: "Basotho had come to know that
there was a project in the hatching for the establishment of a
(
confederation of white governments in South Africa and that, in
furtherance to its objectives, a part of Lesotho was to be ceded to the
Orange Free State. At a recently held pitso, a major part of the
discussions had been on this subject and the Territory was quite
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agitated. It was not until the Colonial Government officially
denied the existence of such a plan (of ceding their land) that Basotho
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regained their composure. The existence of the project of
confederation could not, however, be denied. It was a project to which
the new Governor, Sir Bartle Frere, Barkly's successor, was heavily
conmitted. And in his frantic efforts to realize it, the Governor
would cause the Colony to precipitate an irreconcilable conflict with
Lesotho.
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The cornerstone of this conflict was first laid in 1878, when the
Governor whisked through the Cape Legislative Assembly an Act to disarm
the African population under the Cape Colony. Ironically styled the
Peace Preservation Act, this piece of legislation passed through
Parliament only because it was disguised as an enabling Act, for
application in disaffected areas, as and when the situation warranted it.
Notwithstanding the fact that Lesotho was an awkward and cantankerous
appendage to rule, it was not then disaffected toward the Colonial
Government. So, there had been no apparent need for Basotho to be
apprehensive about its passage.
A year later, however, the outbreak of a war in Lesotho seemed to
have provided the Governor and his cabinet an opportune moment. An old
tributary chief (or subject) of Moshoeshoe, Nkosi Moorosi of the
qci
chiefdom of Baphuthi had, in June, 1868 cast his lot with his
overlord and thereby retained his ance. stral lands in Quthing to the
north of the Territory. But, as an old and valiant warrior, and head
of a people with a distinct sense of nationhood, culturally and
linguistically, from the rest of Basotho, he much rather preferred the
{
Colonial Government to treat him as a vassal. For this reason he
utterly and overtly resisted the presence of a magistrate in his
jurisdiction; while the indigenous government of Lesotho kept its
distance from the fermenting trouble, chary of exercising control or
exerting influence over the old warrior Nkosi (the Baphuthi title
for ruler).
In an effort to protect the magistracy in Moorosi's jurisdiction
against potential attacks, and obviously also as a show of force, a
coterie of Lesotho Police was established in Quthing at the end of
March, 1878. And then in April, Letsie's heir, Chief Lerothoii, was
ordered to get 600 of his men ready to discipline the Baphuthi
potentate. For a few months these moves had the desired effect of
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dampening the old warrior's pugnacity.
But in the end, the magistracy's arrest of Moorosi's heir,
Doda, for stealing a horse, precipitated armed conflict. The Cape
Premier, Mr. Gordon Sprigg, decided that the old warrior must be
disarmed. The result was a war between Baphuthi and the Colonial
forces, sheepishly assisted by the Morena e Moholo who, with the
Peace Preservation Act in mind, wished to impress the Colonial
Government of his loyalty. After fighting courageously, for several
days pinned to his mountain fortress - Mount Moorosi, under siege, on
November 20, 1879 Moorosi was crushed, and to Letsie's horror and
disbelief, decapitated and his head sent to King William's Town in
the Cape.
But, even before the end of that war, Letsie had already been
shown the folly of his loyalty. At a pitso held on October 16,
Sprigg had announced to Basotho that the Peace Preservation Act would
soon be generally applied to Lesotho. A few days later he would let
them know that Quthing would be confiscated.
Following futile efforts by Lesotho's Governor's Agent, Griffith,
(
and the French missionaries to intercede on their behalf, in June, 1880
when the Cape Colony Parliament was to discuss both the disarmament
question and the confiscation of Quthing, Basotho sent a delegation to
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Cape Town. The delegation, led by Nathaniel Makotoko, Ntho Mokeke
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(whan Letsie regarded as "my own book"), and the Reverend
Mr. Cochet of the French Missionary Society, was armed with two
petitions: One was against the confiscation of Quthing, the other
against disarmament. It had been hoped that the delegation would be
allowed to participate in the debates in Parliament. It was not
allowed.
The Quthing petition first recapitulated the Moshoeshoe-Wodehouse
agreement of Lesotho for Basotho only. Second, it maintained that
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Quthing was "the property of Basuto Nation" in which Moorosi had only
been allowed to sojourn. Third, it characterized the Moorosi war as
merely an act of disobedience by "a small band of people" which was
crushed by the combined "large bodies of Basutos" and "colonial forces".
As such, it legally did not follow that Quthing could be
confiscated.^
As the delegation could not speak to its own cause, that task was
performed by the M.P. sympathizers in the House of Assembly. In the
vanguard among these was none other than Joseph Orpen, M.P. from
Aliwal North and Wodehouse's menber of the 1862 Corrmission to Thaba
Bosiu. Orpen said he knew the exact nature of the understanding
reached between Wodehouse and Moshoeshoe on the occasion of the
Proclamation of 1868. It had been agreed, he affirmed, that Lesotho
would not be Crown land. He was minuted as having said: "It was
the most monstrous doctrine he had ever heard of, that all the property
of the people of Basutoland was handed over to the Crown." He was one
of the people who had persuaded Basotho to give themselves up to the
British Government, he said. And that was on his understanding that
i
Basotho would be protected, and not that their property would be taken
away frcm then. In the current circumstances, only an Act of the
Imperial Parliament could alter the situation. As for the admissibilty
of the Moorosi rebellion as justification for the confiscation of
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Quthing, that was "purely a question for a court of law."
The Legislative Assembly was far from being in agreement on
what, exactly, the constitutional position of Lesotho had been in
1868, and what the current jurisdiction of the Colonial Government was.
The Attorney-General, for instance, in his challenge of the notion that
Lesotho had ben reserved for Basotho only, said he had searched through
all relevant documents and could not "find one particle of authority
for the allegation....""'"^ (As it has been shown earlier, such
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information existed, but it was in the form of oral evidence.)
To Mr. Vincent, a somewhat uncommitted M.P., the debate suggested that:
"If the Annexation Act, as it now stood, was not all that it ought to
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be, the time had come...when it should be revised." The motion
for the confiscation of Quthing had at the end to be dropped.
The petition on disarmament, on the other hand, met with a
different fate. Basotho had grounded the petition on two arguments:
First, they had argued that they did not deserve to have their guns
taken away from them as they had not, as a nation, rebelled against
the Colonial Government. Second, while, interestingly, acknowledging
"the right of the Parliament to make laws to preserve the peace," they
considered the Peace Preservation Act "harsh and humiliating" and felt
that if it were applied on them they would be "no longer free men, and
we weep to think of being thus reduced to servitude.""'"^
Unfortunately, however, the Legislative Assembly debate on this
issue could not be carried to its logical conclusion, which, in the
light of a strong opposition against the precipitate action of the
Government to it, seemed likely to be decided in favour of the
(
Territory. For, promptly upon the arrival of the Makotoko-Ntho
delegation in Cape Town, Sir Bartle Frere had dispatched an urgent
message to Morena e Moholo Letsie to the effect that he should
order his people to hand over their guns immediately. Losing his nerve,
r
the Morena e Mohoio had sent a circular thoughout the Territory
for immediate disarmament, even before the return of his delegation from
Cape Town. Sane sections of the Territory had obeyed the order. But
the majority of the population, under the inspiration and leadership of
the warrior Chief David Masopha, Letsie's brother, supported by
Lerothoii, the heir apparent, and one of Molapo's sons named Joel, had
challenged the order. Masopha had charged that Letsie had acted
ultra vires in issuing his circular before the return of the
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delegation and the sitting of a pitso to discuss the question of
disarmament and decide on the proper course of action next to be
taken.
The Legislative Assembly debate on disarmament was abruptly
interrupted by a report of this turn of events. Using the turn of
events to justify the Government's position, the Colonial Secretary
pointed to the dangers that lay ahead of the Colonial Government as
long as chiefs such as Masopha were "allowed to possess power which
they could use against the Government." Masopha's disposition was
1
clear evidence, in his view, that Basotho ought to be disarmed.
The Basotho M.P. supporters on the other hand felt that, to the
contrary, the internal opposition to the Morena e Moholo's
directive illustrated the fact that the Basotho government rested on
the will of the people and not on the dictates of their ruler: The
)
Morena e Moholo had acted unconstitutionally and bypassed the
o
decision making process, while Masopha, in Sol Sohnon's words, had
107"acted in a more constitutional way than we had ourselves."
The quickened pace of events in Lesotho, and the posture of
defiance to colonial authority, fostered unity within the Cape
Legislative Assembly in favour of disarmament (for better or for worse).
So, in the end the Lesotho delegation had to carry the message home that
disarmament had been upheld.
As it might have been expected, when the Makotoko-Ntho delegation
formally reported to a pitso on July 3, the more radical Masopha-
inspired elements rejected the decision. Disarmament was to than
"a load too heavy to carry." They preferred war to what they
108
considered as losing their manhood.
Hostilities conmenced in Septanber 1880. The colonial officers
on the spot were embarrassingly compelled to return guns to the loyals,
who had then become the targets of Masopha's front of the rebels, so
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that they might fight alongside the Colonial forces. The Morena
£ Moholo found himself in an awkward position in this war:
Officially he sought to impress the Colonial Government of his loyalty
and obedience to the Peace Preservation Act. But all parties concerned
were aware that he was secretly supportive of the rebels: for instance,
confiscated property fran the loyals, and even a decapitated head
(Moorosi's style) of a magistrate, John Austin, were traced to his royal
residence.
The Gun War was over in seven months and the rebels had won.
All efforts by the Colonial Government such as, at first, a call for
the surrender of the leaders of the rebellion and, second, the return
of the property of loyals, calculated to make the close of hostilities
seem like a negotiated peace, failed. In the end the rebels, who were
then seen as the saviours of the nation against disarmament, emerged
>
frcxn the struggle with their guns and personal liberties.
Basotho Views on the Constitutional Position of Lesotho After
the Gun War
Throughout the period from 1881 to 1884, in lipitso(pl.),
interviews with Colonial officials, and in correspondence, the indigenous
government of Lesotho expressed the view that the Cape Colonial
Government had undermined Britain's covenant with the late "Moshoeshoe
the Wise." Morena e Moholo Letsie asked on one occcasion
"why Mr. Sprigg the Colonial Premier [from the advent of disarmament]
was allowed by the Queen to change everything." He advised the Cape
Colony Government that, in the circumstances, his people had lost faith
in Britain; they considered its Crown as "a cave which has fallen
upon those who took refuge in it and is full of graves...."*^
Looking back for precedents in Lesotho's history, the Monarch cited his
father's vassalage under the AmaZulu Kings, and briefly under the
Batlokoa of Sekonyela, and others, who before British overlordship
"took us, and none of than took our shields" (that is,
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independence)."*"^ Indeed, even with Queen Victoria's Government,
Letsie maintained: "We were told that the Government leaves a man to
govern his country, with his sheep, his cattle, and his gun.''"*""*""^
The Morena e Moholo's was a moderate voice. He merely
queried the apparent change in the constitutional position of his
country, but beyond that he was not for change - at least not overtly.
There were others in the country who felt that in fact time was right
to fight for complete independence. On June 23, 1881 for instance,
a conmoner named Ramabiiikoe stated at a pitso: "This is what we
would like when - if this affair can be arranged amicably and peace
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restored - the hand of the Queen returns where it came from."
This view would be militantly championed by David Masopha after the
war. Masopha became utterly uncooperative with both the Colonial
Government as well as with his brother, the Morena e Moholo,
whose allegiance to the British Crown he read as a sign of
weakness.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF LESOTHO GETS REVIEWED
General Gordon's Convention
As a last effort to bring Lesotho under some type of control, the
Colonial Office in London appointed Conmandant General C. G. Gordon to
come to the Cape in May 1882, specifically to devise a workable plan
for the governance of the Territory. It is interesting to note that,
after reviewing the Territory's past relations with Britain to date,
Gordon came to the conclusion that it was a co-treaty power with the
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Cape Colony. So that, basing himself on that view, in June, 1882
the Commandant General drafted a "Convention", to be ratified by the
Colonial Government, on the one hand, and by the Morena e Moholo
Letsie and, in recognition of his independentist position, the Chief
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Masopha on the other hand, as high contracting parties. The
"Convention" provided that thenceforth Lesotho would be recognized as
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co-equal with the Cape of Good Hope Colony. Magistrates would
accordingly be withdrawn from the Territory. The indigenous government
of Lesotho would rule in consultation with a "Resident" of the Cape
Government, assisted by two Sub-Residents. Two consultative councils,
one major, the other minor, would serve as administrative bridges
between the Resident and the government of Lesotho.11^
A Draft Constitution Offered
The Colonial Government, however, would hear nothing of Gordon's
"Convention". It was scrapped even before Basotho could hear of it.
Instead, the Colonial Government sponsored its own plan. Not
significantly different frem Gordon's "Convention" in principle, the
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plan was a "Draft Constitution" for Lesotho.
Presented at a pitso in Lesotho on April 2, 1883, the "Draft
Constitution" provided for the following: Article one recognized"
the Annexation Act No. 12, 1871, but, significantly, conceded that
Lesotho "shall remain intact for the Basuto people," the District .of
Quthing inclusive. (This Article was obviously meant to recognize
the Basotho claim of the Moshoeshoe-Wodehouse "Covenant".) Articles
11, III and IV provided for the appointment of a Governor's Agent:
The Agent's jurisdiction on judicial matters was to try all civil and
criminal cases in the Territory not involving Basotho. Cases where
Europeans and Basotho were party to dispute would be tried by the
Governor's Agent, or his representative, assisted or advised by a
principal chief of a district where an infraction of the law would have
taken place, or as the Morena e Moholo might decide. Article V
provided that cases of treason and sedition would be tried before
supreme courts of the Cape Colony.
Articles X, XI and XII provided for the establishment of "A
Council of Advice," to comprise chiefs and headmen - one half of
them nominated by the Paramount Chief, the other half by the Governor's
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Agent. The life of the Council was to be three years. It was to
convene at least once a year on the authority of the Governor to
discuss the financial and other matters of public concern and give
advice to the Colonial Government. The Council could draw up
resolutions suggesting changes in the laws governing the Territory.
Article XVI reserved "the management of the internal affairs" of the
Territory to the Paramount Chief. The "Draft Constitution" had,
altogether, XX Articles.
The Cape Colonial Government clearly saw its scheme as a supreme
political gift and accordingly expected Basotho to show an expression
of gratitude. Thus, introducing the "Draft Constitution" at a
11 Q
national pitso the Secretary for Native Affairs remarked:
I am sure when you have heard it you will say,
what is the fact, that never in South Africa
has so liberal and so generous a Constitution
been submited to a native tribe, because it is
really governing the Basutos through themselves
and by themselves, the same as we white people
govern ourselves.
The Basotho response to the "liberal and... generous" document,
however, was a complete disappointment to the Colonial Government. In
the first place, the pitso was poorly attended, especially at the
level of the chiefs: Only two of the numerous sons of Molapo-
Jonathan and Leabua - were present. Chief Lesaoana, the turbulent
spirit who triggered the Basotho-Boer war in 1865, still a figure to
be reckoned with, was absent. Chief Masopha could logically not be
expected to grace the colonial occasion by his presence.
Strikingly, the Morena e Moholo, who had had some
involvement in the preparation of the "Draft Constitution", albeit
without consultation with his Grand Council, was also not at the pitso:
He had, characteristically, invoked a diplomatic illness. Nor had he
sent the experienced and sound ambassador, Ntho Mokeke in his place.
Instead, he had sent a messenger named Shoaepane - a novice with a
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tortuous manner of speech. Although Nathanael Makotoko, the other
renowned Mosotho ambassador, was there, he had attended the pitso
in his own right as a representative frcm the District of Leribe, and
not on behalf of the Morena e Moholo.
In the second place, the "Draft Constitution" was seen by the
pitso as not a "liberal and generous" gift but, rather, as another
of the white man's wiles laid for Basotho chiefs. The scheme was
technically discredited on grounds of procedure, following Makotoko's
delicately posed query:
It was my duty to ask whether these rules which
have been read to us have been fixed or not, so
as to be able to let the people know because
the chiefs always first commence to speak about
things, and after that they lay than before the
people for consideration, and in the same way it
is the duty of the Chief Letsie to tell his people
what is going on.
>
The response from the Secretary of Native Affairs to the query had
not been satisfactory. He pointed out that the Articles of the "Draft
Constitution had been the subject of discussion in Matsieng, with the
Morena e Moholo Letsie for two and a half days, Although he
sought to establish that Letsie was with "his sons, seme other chiefs,
and headmen and people," it turned out that the meeting was neither a
Grand Council nor a pitso - those in attendance had come mainly from
Letsie's District. While, at the same time, the Colonial Government
seemed to have been appropriately represented. Both the Secretary of
Native Affairs and his new Premier, Thomas Scanlen were present.
Further, had it not been for the insistence on the part of those in
attendance that a question of that magnitude ought to be brought before
a pitso, the Colonial Government would have concluded the matter with
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the Morena e Moholo without reference to public opinion. As
Tsita Mofoka, one of Letsie's Counsellors, pointed out, the Matsieng
meeting had been disquieting because "these matters are not [i.e. should
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not be] dealt with by you Ministers and by Letsie as [if] it is a kind
1 91
of secret meeting....' Finally, it appeared clear from the mood
of the pitso that the Morena e Moholo was not committed to the
plan and the rumour was rife that he had indicated at Matsieng that
"he does not like to have a chief over him;" a fact which
Shoaepane attempted unconvincingly to deny.
An unassailable point, however, had been made by one Rampa, who
had warned of the dangers attendant to taking any major decisions in a
pitso where interest groups in the Territory were not all
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represented:
I heard one amongst us say that this meeting
was good, but I am sorry that all the sons of
Molapo are not here. Ramaneella is not here...
Besides Jonathan other heads of Leribe are absent...
It won't do any good if we take all the rules which
have been said, and tell than. They will say we
have nothing to do with that; that belongs to the
loyals, and we have nothing to do with the loyals'
business.
The Secretary of Native Affairs did not miss the point at that pitso
that Lesotho was not interested in his ministry's plan. As the Paris
Evangelical Missionary Society had said, in an official communication
to General Gordon, earlier in 1882: "Basutos have become suspicious,
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and do not enter readily into plans made for their welfare."
Disannexation from the Cape and the Return to Crown Rule
The Colonial Government had come to believe at this period that
Lesotho was "a very disagreeably hot potato." Neither the Colonial
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not the Imperial Government was eager to touch it. At the same
time, it was a charming potato. As Lord Emily said in the House of
Commons in June 1, 1883: "it would be little short of madness to
1 OR
abandon Basutoland." He was supported in his view by the
"1
Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, who remarked:
It holds a central position as regards the
British Possessions in South Africa, having
the Cape Colony on the West, the Orange Free
State on the north, Natal on the East, and
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a large number of protected semi-independent
native chiefs on the south.
Lord Derby felt that, in view of the Colonial Government's late and
ardent wish "to get rid of this dependency, which has cost them so much
(over j= 3,000,000 on the war) without bringing any compensating
i 07
advantage...." the alternative was to "renew the Protectorate
1 no
under Imperial Government." (my emphasis)
The question to "renew the Protectorate under the Imperial
Government", however, was presented to Basotho in the form of a threat.
The task had been given to Captain Blyth, a man who knew, and apparently
enjoyed intimidating Basotho. Captain Biyth, Griffith's successor in
the Governor's Agentship of Lesotho, was well known to Basotho for
his abrasiveness, even before his arrival in the Territory. Letsie
had twice unsuccessfully tried to get his appointment nullified, on
the grounds both that he had been appointed without his approval; as
well as, of course, for his hatred and fear of The Governor's Agent.
On the occasion of the presentation of the "Draft Constitution", where
Blyth had chaired the pitso, the last unsuccessful effort had been
attempted, by challenging his chairmanship, and he had spent
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excruciating moments trying to justify his authority. This
embarrassing experience probably added to the Governor's Agent's
truculence, in particular against the Morena e Moholo who,
undoubtedly, had engineered the schane to discredit him.
Blyth had been instructed to ensure that (a) Basotho chiefs were
united and unequivocal in their expression of consent to the British
offer. (b) In the event of their consent, they had to agree to be
taxed, for the purpose of supporting the administration of the
Territory. But Blyth added his personality to the offer. When the
question was presented to the pitso on November 29, 1883 he
1 QQ
menacingly warned the Morena e Moholo Letsie:
These are the two roads Paramount Chief, the
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one right and the other wrong; and the Queen
in her greatness and goodness has at the last
moment had pity upon you misguided people -
not because she is afraid of you, but because
she is good and loves Christianity.... It must
be a plain answer to a plain question. Remember
this - H.M. Govt, come with no cringing to you,
they are not afraid of you - They cane to you in
their greatness and goodness and fullness of
heart.... May God guide you to a good decision
on this matter.... No playing around with the
Imperial Government.
Repeatedly throughout the pitso Blyth rudely interrupted Letsie
whenever he spoke, instructing him that he wanted "straightforward
answers - yes or no," "no ifs, or buts". Still insisting on a
modicum of discussion, the Morena e Moholo tried to point out
that ''When a person says he wants peace, it is because he wants to
live and not die": He wished the entire question of Lesotho's past
relations with the British Government to be discussed before the
nation was pressured into dealing with one alternative. But Blyth
silenced him with xhe admonishment that "we are not talking of the
past."
Browbeaten and humiliated, in the presence of his juniors, the
Morena e Mohoio broke under Blyth's iron hand and gave him a
symbolic, self effacing submission. Repeatedly he said of himself:
"I am a coward, I am stupid;" "Don't be deceived when people advise
you to throw away the Govt, listen to them(sic) - of all cowards we
know a coward breeds a coward...;" "He who is a coward is not left
in the chair." He could not on the other hand, opt for independence
without British protection. The experience of the last war with the
Orange Free State was still fresh in his mind. And so were British
sympathies for that Republic.
When the pitso ended, the Morena e Moholo had lost his
political image and authority in the eyes of his people. Indeed, a
little over a month before the pitso, when he had felt himself
staggering under Blyth's political weight, Letsie had suggested to the
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Goven-nor' s Agent that owing to his loss of influence in the Territory
he had considered it best to abdicate from the office of Morena e
Moholo. In turn Blyth, far from placating the Monarch, had
impetuously told him that it was up to himself to decide the
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question. Letsie had then remained in office. Yet,
symbolically, at least, at the end of the November 29th pitso he was
%
as good as having abdicated.
THE WANING OF THE MONARCHY
The Introduction of Alien Legal Principles and the Authority of Chiefs
Albeit the Annexation Act of 1871 had specifically provided that
Cape Colony laws would not apply in the Territory (unless where
specifically made for that purpose), and the Colonial Secretary, Richard
Southey had, in parrying the Basotho petition for representation in
Parliament in 1872, given the assurance that'the Territory would "be
ruled through Basotho laws and customs, the revised version of
Wodehouse's Regulations, which came into effect in December, 1871,
contained a lot in it that was alien and in effect a reflection of
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Cape laws. The Regulations were calculated to warp Sesotho
customary law and customs considerably, and to whittle away the
authority of chiefs in their courts.
The revised Regulations had been the work of Cape Colony officers.
They had been, significantly, presented to chiefs and headmen on the
occasion of their gathering at Thaba Bosiu where formally the nation was
going to be told of Moshoeshoe's death. Clearly without giving much
thought to their long term effect, Morena e Moholo Letsie
had quashed his senior chiefs' strong opposition to them and ordered
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their acceptance. The inspiration and rationale behind the
Regulations, however, had come from a member of the French Missionary
Society, Bnile Roiland. Born and bred in Lesotho, Rolland spoke fluent
Sesotho and was well versed in Sesotho customary law and customs. His
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authority and bona fides to the Cape Colony Government were
undoubted.
Hardly two weeks after Philip Wodehouse's Proclamation, Emile
Rolland had, on March 30, 1868 written a thirty five page memorandum
advising Her Majesty's Government on Basotho customs and the powers of
chiefs, and recommending ways of pulling down the political scaffolding
of the indigenous government. Obviously chary of offending Moshoeshoe,
so soon after a delicately handled annexation to the British Government,
Wodehouse had only modestly tapped Emile Roliand's wisdom. But those
whcm he left behind when he returned to London later decided that
virtually the entire memorandum was good material to ground Regulations
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on. The memorandum, therefore, deserves our attention here.
Rolland opened his remarks with a shrewd observation: The power
of the chiefs, he said, "was never as systematically or as firmly-
established... as that of the Zulus or Amaxosa." Moreover, "especially
the power of the great chiefs has been considerably weakened by the
enormous number of headmen and petty chiefs" who increasingly sought
a greater measure of independence from their seniors "and have
acknowledged a merely nominal supremacy on the part of the principal
IOC
chief." And so he was correct: the political organization of
the Basotho monarchy was only one generation old; most of the
principles and institutions of government, borrowed from the old chiefly
principalities, were still being tested; the Kingdom sat on precarious
ground.
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That fact notwithstanding, Rolland remarked:
It is evident however that notwithstanding this
weakening of the power and influence of the great
chiefs, that power of chiefs great and small will
be the principal obstacle which Her Majesty's
Government will have to encounter in ruling the
Basutos and rendering than obedient to British law.
It would be necessary, he said, for the British Government "to supersede
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and diminish" the authority of the chiefs "by all the means at its
disposal;" but without embittering the people and arousing their
jealousy. He then corrmenced to point out the "roots" of the chiefs'
power - "the ground and foundation of the power of native chiefs" that
ought to be knocked down.
First, he pointed out, aside from his birthright and personal
qualities, "the great secret of his power consists in his wealth,"
which he uses as the means of patronage to strengthen his ties with
those who serve him. That wealth consisted of cattle, part of which is
a chief's inheritance, but which, critically, is increased through
"occasional fines, and by bribes" generated by his court. But by far
the principal source of chiefs' revenue was the payment of bohali
(marriage cattle) for their daughters - which seldom numbered less than
1S730 head of cattle per marriage.
/
Second, the power of chiefs rested on the plurality of their
wives:
The possession of a large number of women is
a great source of wealth and influence to a
Basuto chief. Each wife or concubine [ngoetsi
- a woman married to serve under a senior wife]
has her own hut and establishment, and enriches
her husband by the produce of her gardens and labour,
and by her children, the boys being servants and
cattl^^erds and the girls being available for
sale. A polygamist is thus able, from the
abundance of food which he possesses, to exercise
hospitality to a great extent, without any expense.
Through polygamy, Rolland theorized, people were bound to a chief in
either of two ways: through ties of marriage, or in consequence of the
hospitality and material sustenance flowing from his polygamous
household.
Third, on which Rolland was conceptually in error: "The land is
the inalienable property of the chief. (As a matter of fact,
the chief, in principle, only holds land in trust for the people.)
Otherwise correct, he pointed out that a chief's right on land
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allocation "is a powerful lever in the hands of an astute man": He in
effect determined where subjects could build houses and where they might
cultivate their crops. He could either dispossess them of the lands
or expel them altogether from his jurisdiction if he grew weary of
than.
Emiie Rolland therefore sponsored a series of recommendations for
dismantling the indigenous government through the law: (a) All land
%
should belong to the Queen. And (a) "Private individuals ^iould be
encouraged to possess property" and to purchase land, to offset the
comparative wealth and power of chiefs. (The introduction of the
notion of individual title to land was a direct attack on the religiously
held Basotho notion of "Lesotho for Basotho only". It could lead to
land purchase by Europeans. The Colonial Government therefore thought
the wiser about adopting it.) (b) The individual should be protected
)
from the chief - a practice such as "eating up", that is, the chief's
confiscation of a subject's entire property (for a real or contrived
crime), should be forbidden. (c) Plurality of wives should be
abolished, by "recognizing only the great wife as legally such," and
depriving all the others of any legal status as wives. The British
Government should take every possible means to "discredit" individuals
with more than one wife and "countenance such as remain faithful to
one wife." (d) Christian marriages should be protected by legal
principles adopted "in ail civilized and Christian countries" and a
law against bigamy should be introduced. (e) Married adult males
should be made to pay a "hut tax", which shall be applied differentially
as between Christians (numbering 10,000) and polygamists, "say 10/-
for a single hut and 15/- for every additional wife." (f) Contrary
to customary law, whereby widows could only resolve their problem of
male companionship through levirate, while remaining within the
deceased husband's extended family, widows would be allowed "to marry
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whom they choose without cattle; - let them be entirely free..."141
The last two recommendations were essentially a plea for the
British Government to protect missionaries from their main enemy
institutions. He recommended legislation against witchcraft (something
which Moshoeshoe had twice attempted to eradicate in his society, but
without success), and the demolition of initiation schools.
Emile Rolland's programme was in essence calculated to transform
the Basotho society into a Western oriented entity. The type of
legislation that he recommended was culturally biased; acknowledging
which he stated:"^
It may be remarked that all the preceding opinions
and suggestions savour of the principle of "class
legislation." I neither deny nor seek to avoid
such a conclusion. Class legislation is not only
necessary, but best in the present circumstances of
the natives. It would be impossible all at once to
introduce colonial law amongst them. All that can
be done therefore is to frame temporary regulations,
conceived in the spirit of our laws....
As already pointed out, Sir Philip Wodehouse had already
embodied some of Rolland's ideas in his set of Regulations. For
instance, Basotho were already paying a hut tax of 10/- "for each hut
or wife's residence." And then, to make the proposition easy to
swallow, the principal chiefs were awarded 10% of the net hut tax
collected, as inducement for collecting it. According to Sandra
Burman, an authority on the imposition of alien law on Basotho society
during the period of Cape rule, it was the resultant success in the
collection of this tax that encouraged the officials (after Wodehouse's
departure) to take the more radical step of espousing Rolland's
reconmerjations in their virtual totality. In the new Regulations
"the attack on the chiefs' powers were fully spelt out and various
14S
time-honoured customs were challenged."
The new Regulations introduced the death penalty for certain
offences - murder and arson with intent to kill - for which in customary
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law punishment was in the form of fines. (Heretofore, the death penalty
had been used in Lesotho on a spy, in 1829, on whose information the
state had been attacked by the enemy.It could otherwise be
imposed on a person guilty of an illicit affair with a chief's great
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wife.) Three (and later four) principal chiefs, could try minor
criminal cases, and of course any civil cases not involving a European;
nonetheless, disputants could appeal to district magistrates' courts
against chiefs' judgments and loopholes were left open to them to evade
their fines. The chiefs' customary practice of "eating up" subjects
was construed as theft. All men, including chiefs, were declared equal
before the law - a new principle in Sesotho customary law which weighed
heavily on the chiefs, especially as the Morena e Moholo also
came under its general application.
Then there were other alien legal principles, which offended not
)
only the chiefs, but conmoners as well: Marriage of women without their
consent was made illegal. Boys and girls might not be initiated
against their consent or that of their parents. Christian marriages
were declared valid without bohali. Christian as well as customary
marriages were to be registered, at two shillings and six pence, or else
litigation arising frcm them could not be heard before magistrates'
courts. Widows were given the right to marry; they were given custody
of their children until they were of a certain age - fifteen for girls
and eighteen for boys; and a widow's eldest son could be recognized
as his mother's guardian once he was married. (In Sesotho customary
law custody over children always belonged to the extended family that
provided the bohali and a widow raised than subject to its discretion
and on conditions dictated by it. Children born outside marriage
belonged to their mother's extended family.) The killing of witches,
still practiced in society despite Moshoeshoe's early legislation
against it, was construed as murder. The practice of flogging - for
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rape - was introduced.
The Effect of the Regulations on Society
The resultant effect of the application of the new Regulations
under Cape rule was a conflict of the juxtaposed legal systems. Yet,
it was a conflict in which chiefs were to a great measure the losers,
conmoners trading for advantages between the two. And none other than
Ehiile Rolland, who had been favoured with an appointment as a
magistrate, found himself presiding over the legal medley. One case
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from his court serves as a good illustration of the problem:
Motseko v. Adriaan Maphathe and 'Makubutu (November 8, 1876)
On November 8, 1876, a man named Motseko brought a case
before the Resident Assistant Magistrate of Mafeteng,
Emile Samuel Rolland, against his nephew, Adriaan Maphathe,
and the latter's widowed mother, 'Makubutu, Motseko's
sister. Motseko claimed the custody of Makubutu's
three daughters by an illicit union with one Makolometse,
as well as part of the bohali cattle, called litsoa,
entitled to him as the senior malome (maternal uncle), *
which 'Makubutu had already received for the marriage of
two of than.
'Makubutu had twice before been married. Her first
marriage, to Nganga, had been a Christian marriage; bohali
had not been issued. Nganga died, leaving a son named
Adriaan. Then, subsequently, 'Makubutu got married to
Maphathe under customary law, apparently in her own father's
life time and, according to Adriaan, not only was bohali
issued but, "Maphathe gave cattle for me. So by cattle I
am also Maphathe's son." No children were born of that
marriage. Meantime, Maphathe and Makubutu were divorced,
and subsequently she lived with Makoiometse, who gave her
the three daughters, before their relationship went sour
and she went to live with her son Adriaan (apparently then
married).
In May 1876 'Makubutu went to the Chief Magistrate's
Court (Governor's Agent, Griffith's) at the capital, in
Maseru, on appeal against the decision of the Assistant
Resident Magistrate's Court, in the District of Mafeteng:
The President of the Court, Emile Rolland, had upheld
Makolometse's claim "of the cattle for seholoholo" -
literally, "cattle for the pelvis bone" (that is, for the
conjugal labours of giving 'Makubutu the three daughters).
According to Adriaan's uncontroverted account, "Mr. Griffith
decided that the children belonged to my mother alone and
that no one else had anything to say to them, because they
were children of an illicit connection." At the same time,
the account goes on: "My Mother introduced me to the Court -
she said she pointed me out because the right to the children
was disputed by Motseko - and she pointed me as her heir.
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She declared that I was her guardian and heir. This is why
I say I have a right to these children of my mother's by
Makoiometse because I have been given them in the Queen' s
court by my mother."
In a trenchant onslaught against the Assistant Magistrate, in
open court, whereby she "addressed the Magistrate by name
calling him the persecutor of widows etc. - and boasting of
her having obtained a reversal of his judgment before,"
' Makubutu corroborated her son Adriaan's evidence and went
further:
I refuse to give up my children - Motseko has
his own. I am as good as he and have a right
to mine. - I also deny that he is the malome
of these children. I myself am both father and
maiome to them. Kia gana - kia gana [I
refuse - I refuse.
' Makubutu's peppery language incensed the President of the
Court who, in his own unmitigated language, in open court,
not only threatened to punish her for contempt of court but
also harangued her: "It is highly unbecoming of her to
crow in the manner she did at the fact of the decision in
a former case being reversed... She should remember that she
is a miserable harlot and her own acts have in each case
brought her into court." The President's decision followed
his mixed emotions (based on a mixed legal system) about
the widow:
Certainly as between 'Makubutu and Makoiometse
the children may have been said to belong to
'Makubutu - but only as subject to Motseko's
claims. The Court is bound to decide this case
according to Sesuto law - and these children have
always been acknowledged as belonging to Motseko -
not to speak of Motseko's claims as Malome....
The court therefore rules that the plaintiff
Motseko on the double ground of his being the
heir of 'Makubutu's father - i.e. the father of
an unamrried woman - and of 2ndly his being the
Malome entitled to ditsuoa(sic) - is entitled to
the father's share of the dowry cattle. The
guardianship of the girls remains of cause with
'Makubutu and her son Adriaan.
So, here was a case in which a Mosotho woman had entered into two
marriages, the first, regulated by Western legal principles, the second
by Sesotho customary law. The first marriage allowed her, following
the death of her husband, to marry again. In the second marriage the
law allowed her the application of the customary principle of child
adoption by cattle, albeit the child in question, Adriaan, was a product
of a Western type of marriage. The woman's daughters by an illicit
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union came under her own and that of the son's custody, and not, as it
should have been under customary law, under their malome as in
loco patris. And when that happened, their biological father,
Makolometse had already been compensated for his "seholoholo" - hip
bone, under customary law in the Assistant Magistrates court, a decision
which the Chief Magistrat's court overturned on appeal.
The woman, 'Makubutu, enjoyed more freedom than she ever could
have dreamed under either system of law. By shopping between the
chief's court and that of the magistrates she aimed to get the best
advantage, and in her case that could be obtained in the latter, where
she could even go as far as to give the President of the court a piece
of her mind. Her brother, as well as her chief, had definitely no
control over her family plans. And she was one of many.
As it gave advantages to seme, the juxtaposition of the two
legal systems produced convulsions for others. To those men, for
instance, who might initially have been lured into Christian marriages
and then later wished to have more wives, found themselves indicted
for bigamy, and then they felt that the matter was utterly absur d.
As George Tlali, one of Moshoeshoe's sons put it to the Cape Premier
in 1883:148
According to Basuto customs plurality of wives is
not objectionable.... The Basuto say, "But why are
Government interfering in such matters? - If they
are God's matters God will punish them. People
need not fight for God, God will fight for
himself."... These laws are just thrown amongst us,
we are expected to receive them like the Gospel.
The Disannexation Act and the High Conmission Regulations
On February 2nd, 1884, by an Order in Council,44^ Lesotho
was disannexed frcm the Cape of Good Hope Colony and returned "under
the direct authority of Her Majesty." As before 1871, the High
Commissioner for South Africa was authorized to "exercise, in the name
and on behalf of Her Majesty, all the legislative and executive
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authority in andover the Territory." And he was empowered "to make by
Proclamation, such laws as may to him appear necessary for peace, order,
to
and good government of the Territory," as well as appoint ail officersA
to serve in its administration.
The new High Conmissioner for South Africa, Sir Hercules George
Robert Robinson, then issued a Proclamation on May 29, 1884, embodying
a new set of Regulations (under Proclamation 2B, as it famously or
infamously came to be known in the Territory). The Regulations were
for the most part clearly meant to be conciliatory to the inhabitants.
Most of the harsh sections of the Cape Regulations had been removed.
Most notable in this regard were sections on bigamy, initiation
(circumcision), witchcraft - most likely because it had fallen into
disuse, "eating up", and guardianship over widows and children. Most
important for chiefs, the provision vesting "the right of allocating
land" on the Governor was dropped.
What was either retained or added, however, could still have a
heavy impact on the reduction of the powers of chiefs and generally on
the transformation of social values. Worthy of attention in this
respect were the following: The Resident Conmissioner (new title for
Governor's Agent after 1884) was empowered and authorized to hold a
Court with jurisdiction on all civil and criminal cases in the Territory,
and, similarly, his assistants, now styled Assistant Commissioners, in
their respective districts. He was empowered to appoint chiefs,
who could then exercise judicial powers in jurisdictions determined by
himself. He was empowered to make rules "and to amend, alter, or
cancel the same as he may think fit." It was made lawful for any
litigant to appeal from the decision of a chief's Court to a Court, in
the first instance, "composed of an Assistant Conmissioner and of such
Chief, and in the event of their disagreeing then the Resident
Conmissioner shall decide."
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In the area of family law, it remained still unlawful to compel a
woman into a contract of marriage. Marriages contracted according to
Christian rites, "or by any civil marriage officer, duly appointed by
the High Commissioner" (which might include any minister of the Gospel)
were declared "in all respects as valid and binding, and to have the
same effect upon the parties to the same and their issue and property as
*
a marriage contracted under the marriage laws of the Cape Colony." All
marriages, Christian (civil) and customary, were still to be registered.
Hut-tax, of course, remained in the Regulations. Tax collection
was still through the chiefs, on allowance, although the allowance
feature was not written into the law.
The general effect of these Regulations was the same as before.
Chiefs (and their headmen) gradually lost their grip on the indigenous
court system. They lost their grip on commoners, who no longer depended
totally on them for justice. Their income, in the form of court fines,
was frustrated, and in turn they reacted with more and more acts of
intimidation and vindictiveness. By the end of Cape rule they had
already grown significantly oppressive. As one Headman, Nkau, who,
significantly fell under the inmediate jurisdiction of the Morena
e Moholo in Matsieng, put it in 1883:15*"1
among us cattle has(sic) been taken away without
any cause by the chiefs, even a garden or field
which is under cultivation, or a piece of ground
allocated to a headman. If on any occasion a
chief's son should be placed alongside a poor man,
the chief's son can take away the field or garden.
I am talking about property, but even to a man's
wife, a chief's son can take her and you have
nowhere to go to. The country is in tears.
This style of rule, or misrule, by the chiefs would grow worse as the
century progressed, until the 1920s, when commoners would appeal to
the colonial administration for intercesion. Until then, the colonial
administration had been in too weak a position to address itself to the
situation. So soon after a war in which the Cape had lost to Basotho,
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it had been found imprudent to pull a tight rope on the chiefs. And
so , the critical provisions in the Regulations - the one on the
appointment of chiefs, and the other on the Resident Commissioner's
powers of making rules for chief's courts, had not been made use of.
They were, in fact, forgotten, until 1928 when they were, as chiefs
r
then said, "res urected" as instruments of a drastic reform of the
A
administrative and judicial functions of the indigenous government.
A New Colonial Administration Begins: The Territory Falls
under Anarchy
The fact is, the era of direct Crown rule of Lesotho (1884-)
began on very shaky ground: The Colonial Office had no clear plans
on the Territory. So, it could devise no clear policy. Its policy,
therefore, such as it may be called, was "an experiment".
The first Resident CommLsioner, an Irishman named Marshal James'
>
Clarke, arrived in Lesotho on March 17, 1884 armed with the following
terms of reference: The financial up-keep of the Territory would
comprise tax locally collected, plus a sum of \20,000 contributed
151
by the Cape Colony in lieu of custom duties:
The expenditure should not be allowed to exceed
the revenue. H.M. Govt, consider that for the
present their efforts should be mainly directed
to the protection of property and the maintenance
of order on the border. The Basutos should be
encouraged and assisted as far as practicable, to
establish a system of internal government sufficiently
stable to enable them to suppress crime and settle
intertribal disputes.
Accordingly, therefore, the colonial administration was very
skeletal. It comprised thirteen Officers and a police force of 159,
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of whom nineteen were Europeans. (By 1900 the staff comprised
the Resident Commissioner, Government Secretary, seven District
Assistant Commissioners, each in charge of a District, four medical
Officers and a Police force of 259 - for a population of about
264,000 inhabitants.) This would hardly be equal to the task at hand.
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As I shall soon show, the Territory would be riddled with dynastic
disputes, most of them culminating in bloodshed. Neither the
Morena e Mohoio Letsie, nor his son and heir Lerotholi (1871-1905)
conmanded sufficient moral force to bring the country under control.
Troubled by the tentative, or "experimental nature" of British
rule over the Territory, which neither gave him leave to assert Imperial
control, nor meaningful leverage to give the Morena e Mohoio a
helping hand in the period of political reconstruction, Sir Marshal
Clarke registered his protest in his annual report on the Territory in
1885, pointing out:^*
in justice to the people of this country and
those of the neighbouring territories, it is
now most advisable to define a limit to the
experimental government, and decide as to the
future.
But the Resident Comnisioner got nothing morp committal from the
Colonial Office than the feeble remark: "Her Majesty's Government
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contemplate no change in their relations with the Basutos."
The question is: To what end was the experiment?
The first, explicit, answer to the puzzling question was first
given by the South African High Comnisioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, in
1889. Speaking as an echo chamber for the Heme Government, the High
Conmissioner made it clear that there could be no place for "direct
Imperial rule on any large scale" in the Southern African region.
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The role of the Imperial Government was only:
...by means of spheres of influence, protectorates
and Crown Colonies, to gradually prepare the way
for handing native territories over to the Cape
and Natal as soon as such transfer can be made with
j last ice to the natives and advantages to all
concerned.
The second answer was in the form of a minute to one other High
Comnissioner, Sir (later Lord) Alfred Milner (1898-1902), who had made
it quite awkward for the Colonial Office by insisting, in contrast to
Hercules Robinson, that the Imperial Government should either exert its
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authority in Lesotho, or else get out. His strong stand on Imperial
1 56
control invited a minute from an officer in the Colonial Office:
It seems to me that Sir A. Miner is perhaps
a little too anxious to attain finality in
the Basuto question and chafes at the
insolubility of the problem - 'How to establish
the Government of the Basutos upon an absolutely
secure basis, without having to leave a great
deal to risk and chance' - The Government is and
must remain, I feel, a makeshift Government, a
Government from hand to mouth, for a long time
to come.
Meantime Lesotho, under this "Government from hand to mouth",
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had fallen into anarchy. Resulting from the differences of
the Gun War, Chief Masopha had eternally parted ways with his brother,
the Morena e Moholo Letsie. Until his death in 1891, a decade
after the war, Letsie could not bring the war hero under his authority.
Masopha was only eventually subdued by Letsie's heir Lerotholi in 1898,
)
just a year before he (Masopha) died at the advanced age of seventy
eight. In his defiant posture to the high office of Morena e
Moholo he had taken Chief Maama, a pretender to that office, with him.
(Chief Maama was twice related to him by marriage: He had married two
of Masopha's daughters, and in turn one of Maama's daughters was married
to Masopha's heir.)
Chief Lerotholi, Letsie's eldest son and rightful heir to the
throne, had also cast his lot with Masopha in the war. But soon
afterward he returned to his father's fold - clearly to nurse his fate
as his successor. For, although he was Letsie's eldest son, he was
twice at a disadvantage as heir apparent: First, his grandfather, the
late Moshoeshoe, had cast doubt on his birth, subsequently arranging
an ar tificial union (with no marriage) between two of his grandchildren
(Letsie's eldest daughter, named Senate, and Molapo's eldest son
Josefa), to beget an heir to succeed Letsie. The product of that
union, Motsoene Moiapo Moshoeshoe, was waiting for the premise to come
- 126 -
true. Second, his own father Letsie, for no other reason than
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favouritism, wished his younger son, Chief Maama, to succeed.
Although the Grand Council had followed custom and advanced
Lerotholi as the heir and successor at Letsie's death in 1891, that had
left the new Morena e Moholo with two bitter enemies, in the
persons of Chiefs Maama and Motsoene. Far from supporting him, they
1 59
constantly goaded him into a conflict.
In Molapo's house (Moshoeshoe's second son), in the largest and
most powerful District of Leribe in the north, the situation was worse.
In the event of the madness of Molapo's heir - Senate's suitor, Josefa,
the District had been left in the charge of his younger brother,
Jonathan, after their father's death in 1880. But one other of
Molapo's sons named Joel, older in years than Jonathan, yet from the
deceased's second wife, argued, not that he should have been the heir, but
>
that Jonathan was not. Moiapo's death coinciding with the outbreak
of the Gun War,, the two brothers made use of the armed conflict to
dignify their family quarrel - Jonathan fighting as a "loyal" to the
Cape Government, and Joel as a "rebel". The duel between the two was
to be dignified again by the Anglo-Boer War, with Jonathan honouring
British orders not to join the Boers, while Joel, "to promote a tumult
in Basutoland by raking up the anbers of the old feud between the
children of Molapo," joined the enemy. Consequently Joel got tried for
treason, by a joint Court of the Resident Corrmissioner and the Morena
e Moholo and was fined |2,000 in lieu of 500 head of cattle, on top
of a jail sentence of one year. As it was often the case
in those days, when a chief got injured, his people bled on his behalf:
The ^2,000 that Joel paid came from his subjects.
Partly in response to the dynastic feuds, but also due to other
factors - the economic and social, the indigenous institutions of
government, the Grand Council and the pitso were also breaking down.
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It stands to reason that with so many factions within the "Sons of
Moshoeshoe", the scions of the royal house, there were very few
instances when they could all assemble together and agree on matters
of policy affecting the welfare of their subjects. And, basically,
the only issues that forced them to unite were those which constituted
a common threat to them as a ruling class. In 1900, for instance, they
agreed to the, imprisonment of 16 members of the royal house of the
Baphuthi chiefdom because that chiefdan resented the then popular
1 £?"1
super imposition of Moshoeshoe's lineage over then. The issues
in the twentieth century which would unite than would be the question
of incorporation of Lesotho to the Union of South Africa, and the
ccranoners' challenge to their rule.
By the year 1900 the national pitso had also degenerated
considerably. Its degeneration had begun during the Cape Colony
rule, and the offenders were the colonial officers. They had turned
it into a forum for introducing colonial guests, announcing policy
matters, and reading unpopular Regulations. As they were used to
government by consultation and consensus, Basotho began at this
period to encounter a type of government whereby the ruled simply had
to accept things as they were given. More often than not, it was their
understanding that was expected, and not their consent.
They of course resented this type of rule and seme of their
expressions of resentment are instructive of what was left of their
views of an ideal type of government. In 1883, for instance, when
the Basothophil Governor's Agent, Joseph Orpen, was replaced with
the much hated and feared Captain Blyth, chiefs found it quite odd
when the Cape Premier and the Secretary of Native Affairs flatly told
them that they were going to have Blyth, whether they liked him or
not. They were not being asked they were being told. Chief Seeiso
Maama's reaction, as reported in the third person, was:
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When the meeting was called it was not for
oxen to cane together, but for men. He
supposed that on the day of the meeting
there would be important matters spoken and
these matters would be discussed with them
because they were men, and he only asked
whether they might not hesitate to cone to the
meeting when it was fixed upon if they knew that
their rulers decided things without letting
then know about then....According to their
custom, when a meeting took place, one matter was
spoken of, and when that was a nice matter, then
the whole meeting joined together and said that
it was a good thing, and when the meeting thought
it was a bad matter, then the whole meeting united
together and said it was a bad thing....It might
be difficult for then to receive any communication
which came from their rulers, if decided in that
way, because a man who was a subject ought to be
told in what way he would be ruled.
As a matter of fact, Seeiso Maama's fear that men would be loath to
attend meetings if their purpose was merely to announce decisions had
already ccane true. As the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society in
Lesotho had pointed out the previous year, 1882: "The Chiefs have
never much liked the yearly meetings held by the Government," and if
1 fV3
they could, they avoided attending them.
We thus conclude that by the end of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902,
the indigenous government of Lesotho, never quite on solid ground, had
for all intents and purposes broken down. Dramatic changes in
society had taken place: Under the impact of Christianity, Western
legal principles, the change of economy from subsistence to marketing
and, of course, migrant labour, the outlook of cautioners to chiefs had
changed in proportion to the deteriorating sense of responsibility
(and lack of accountability) on the part of the latter. Factionalism
among chiefs had virtually reduced the position of the Morena e
Moholo into one of a primus inter pares. In the circumstances,
if the colonial administration introduced a new institution that might
bind the old order together, this might be the time to do it.
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CHAPTER IV
The Establishment of the National Council, Its Constitutional
Status and Challenges During the First Two Decades
Of Its Existence (1903 - 1920)
As shown in Chapter three, the British Government throughout the
nineteenth century colonial phase had no fixed plan for governing
Lesotho. From Disannexation onward, the Territory was ruled
experimentally, if not haphazardly. Always at the back of the High
Conmission as well as the Colonial Office mind was the thought that in
the final analysis it would have to be attached to one of Her Majesty's
European settler colonies in South Africa. Hence, the prospect of
granting it a Legislative Council, in keeping with the policy that
obtained in the Crown Colony system was, on those grounds of uncertainty
alone, out of the question. Meantime, however, in the face of the
disintegration of the indigenous government, which in the long run might
necessitate a costly expansion of the colonial administration, it was
found desirable to create an alternative institution.
NEGOTIATIONS FOR A COUNCIL OF ADVICE
So, the idea of a "Council of Advice" which, as it will be
recalled, had been contained in the Cape Colony "Draft Constitution" of
1883, which Basotho had rejected, was revived. The history of the
negotiations between the colonial administration and Basotho chiefs on
that Council is in itself significant. For not only does it reveal the
chiefs' fears and suspicions that the Council was aimed at reducing the
power of the chieftaincy but, perhaps more significantly, it tells us
something about their views on government.
Early upon his appointment in 1884 as the first Resident
Commissioner since Disannexation, Sir Marshal Clarke wrote a letter to
the High Conmissioner on June 11 recommending the establishment of a
Council of Advice, "a proposition to be submitted to a National Pitso
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of Basuto, to be held at Maseru on the 8th of July next.""'"
If accepted, the Council would be composed of chiefs and headmen,
the former to be nominated by the Morena e Moholo but approved by
the Resident Commissioner, while as to the latter, half would be
appointed by the Resident Commissioner and the other half by the
Morena e Moholo. The proposal stated that: "Every headman shall
hold his position for three years, unless his seat shall become vacant
by death, or removed by the joint action of the Resident Commissioner
and the Paramount Chief." The tenure of chiefs, at least by inference
from the preceding proviso, was to be on a permanent basis. Sir Marshal
Clarke seemed to be under no apprehension whatsoever that the idea of a
Council of Advice might be identified with the much hated Cape Colony
rule, from whence it was conceived, and thereby be rejected on grounds
of association solely. To the contrary, he remarked to the High
Commissioner in the form of a post-script: "This is identical with a
proposal made by Sir Thomas Scanlen during his visit to Basutoland last
o
year. It appears to me to meet the exigencies of the occasion."
Subsequent to this proposal, however, we are unable to say what,
exactly, happened. The records are silent. We know neither what the
High Commissioner's response was, notwhether or not the Morena e
Moholo was communicated with. But a national pitso was certainly
3
not held.
Be that as it may, the subject next came under discussion on March
11, 1886, at the first national pitso held under the new colonial
administration, where Sir Marshal Clarke "invited the views of the
people." Clarke advised the High Conmisioner that "should there be a
strong popular desire for it, a definite scheme will be drafted and
submitted to the High Commissioner for consideration of Her Majesty's
Government."^ Consequent upon the pitso, the Morena e
Moholo, who apparently thought he had both the understanding and the
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mandate of the chiefs, wrote Clarke a letter accepting the idea on behalf
of his people. He was mistaken on both counts.
Suspecting, or perhaps having found out, that the Monarch and his
chiefs were not of one mind on his proposal, the Resident hesitated to
take action on the letter and instead, when the next national pitso
was held on April 6, 1887, for the purpose of announcing the new
colonial Regulations, he took the opportunity to refer to it. The
upshot of this strategy was two-fold: First, the Monarch was tacitly
told that by responding to the Resident Commissioner on his own
authority he had acted ultra vires. Chief Masopha, the Monarch's
fiery brother was the first to register his protest, stating: "As for
Letsie he last year sent his answer outside of us. Now we wish to go
aside with him and talk of these matters."
Second, when the chiefs returned frcm their caucus, as it were,
the majority of them seemed to have adopted the view that, as with the
Regulations, the Council was aimed at destroying chieftainship. They
would not, however, make their charge explicitly, they preferred rather
for Marshal Clarke to read their views in the sentiment they held
toward his Regulations, concerning which the veteran diplomat, Nathanael
7
Makotoko rhetorically enquired of Clarke.
....I want to know clearly are the laws to add
to his (Letsie) Chieftainship. We will be glad
if these laws were to raise him and praise him
.... Truly, you Queen's Government, we love you
like a girl chooses a husband. On the other
hand we know the law.
The minority view in favour of the Council was, nevertheless
significantly expressed. It generally portrayed the idea of a Council
as a progressive step from indigenous institutions, and the one best
suited for the times. Chief Jonathan, the old "loyalist" of the
Gun War stated:
We want to be advanced. If the Chiefs
know that the Council is for our good,
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let them form the Council. I say I also
wish for it from my heart. We should be
animals without a Council. I with Letsie
say so. Bad men work in the dark. The
Council is the light of the Nations.
One Tsolo Mopeli, apparently a minor chief, or perhaps a headman,
expressed the view that: "This Council will be our eyes. It will
provide us with laws to protect us from the Chiefs."^ And Tsekelo
Moshoeshoe, whom, as it will be recalled had early, in 1869, gone on
an adventure to London and Paris, provided what he clearly meant to
be an authoritative lecture:^
I thank Letsie for the letter he wrote about
the Council. I say it will be a good thing
to have a Council to be a help and the eyes
of the Resident Commissioner and the Chiefs
and people... As I know the Basuto don't
understand about the Council I will explain.
It is not a new thing. We want a Council in
the same way as these laws come to us finished.
We have to obey than but they are already
written. What can we do if we find any of the
laws heavy as regard Sesuto customs. I do not
find fault with those who made the laws, but about
Sesuto customs I am still learning. I don't
know our own customs and much less those who
only hear than. Why we wanted the Council is
because old men can come in their karosses and
help to make laws...At the Council we could all
speak and, follow enlightened people. Those who
are weak could be helped by Council. Sometimes
a man is oppressed by Chiefs and he could appeal
to the Council.
For all his wisdom on the Council, however, Tsekelo failed to tip the
weight in favour of the Morena e Moholo and the Resident
Commissioner. And that was to be his last speech at a pitso.
He died on August 7, 1888.
In a letter written to the Morena e Mohoio two years later,
in 1889, the Resident Conmissioner made yet another effort to revive
discussions on the Council of Advice, but only as "my own suggestion...
not from the Government." And then he provided a kind of constitution
for it: The Resident Commissioner and the Morena e Moholo would
nominate a majority of the membership of the Council, anticipated to
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have between 60 and 70 men altogether. The Resident Commissioner
reserved 8 seats for his own nominees, all of whan would be Basotho,
"to give representation in case people are left out or forgotten."
Both he and the Morena e Moholo would be members of the Council.
The Council would meet once a year, with the Resident Carmissioner as
its convener, to consider any fresh laws which are submitted to it, in
so far as such laws purely affected Basotho. In addition, it would
consider questions connected with local affairs; receive an account of
the hut tax expenditures; and at the discretion of the Resident
Conmisioner hear "serious national cases." In order clearly to make
a distinction between the Council of Advice and a Legislative Council,
Sir Marshal Clarke underscored the fact that it "cannot make laws, this
can alone be done by the Queen's Government, but it is to give advice
1 ?
and suggestions as to what it thinks best for the nation."
As in 1886, Letsie responded positively, albeit adhering to
procedure on this occasion. Following a meeting "with my sons and
brothers and the men belonging to the country," held in December the
same year, Letsie consented to the establishment of the Council, but
with two provisos: One, that the "members of the Council be elected
by me together with the Nation" that the councillors "are to be people
13
with whan we will understand with."
It appeared as though on this occasion the Council was certain
to be established. In April 1890 the Resident Conmissioner refined
its constitution, fixing the membership at 40 and extending the tenure
of office holders to two years. And the Secretary of State gave his
14
approval. But, clearly because of certain critical clauses in
the final version of the constitution, the Morena e Moholo and,
in particular his chiefs, became nervous. The objectionable clauses
were: One, the Council was to have a component within it whereby the
Resident Commissioner and the Morena e Moholo, acting jointly,
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"shall have power" to select sane members of the Council to form "a
Court of Appeal, to take cognisance of native disputes and question."
Obviously the Morena e Moholo did not wish to share his authority
on cases of appeal with the Resident Cannissioner. For, although
Proclamation 2B of 1884 had already given the Resident Cannissioner
the discretion to decide cases on appeal, that discretion had for the
most part not been used. In the circumstances, the envisaged Court
of Appeal might serve effectively to bring his own court of appeal under
strict scrutiny. Albeit his chiefs, for their part, had heretofore
frustrated all efforts for appeals to senior courts, including that
of their Monarch. The joint Court of Appeal seemed potentially to be
coercive. Two, the Morena e Moholo had not been granted the
unqualified right to appoint people with whan, as he had put it, "we
1 K
will understand with."
Letsie died in 1891 having failed to see the inauguration of the
Council of Advice. For the last time in October of that year, he and
Lerothoii had attempted to convince the chiefs that the Council had
become necessary: "...it is a long time that this matter has been in
discussion, and its end has not been seen yet. I say now, let it be
1 £?
worked and let there be no further vacillating." But the majority
of the chiefs had baulked. Disgusted by their intransigence, the
Paris Evangelical Misionary Society newspaper, Leseiinyana la Lesotho
17
issued the censorious statement on January 1, 1892:
Does the Lesotho Cheftainship not realise that as
long as the Council is not established it is
disgracing itself?... This Council would be one
of the agencies for progress; without it there
will be retrogression. And as Lesotho is
surrounded by progressive countries, it must
go forward with than; otherwise they will
destroy it.
The chiefs' resistance to the establishment of the Council had,
however, centred around one man - the independentist Chief Masopha.
His military subjugation by Morena e Mohoio Lerothoii in 1898,
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and subsequent death in 1899, shattered the last ditch resistance.
Indeed, Masopha's death was symbolic of the passing of an era. And
it was of more than passing interest to the colonial administration,
1 P>whose new Resident Coomissioner observed with mixed feelings:
The Chief Masupha, who had failed to succeed
in resisting constitutional orders and defying
the Paramount Chief, soon lost the prestige
which tradition had associated with his name,
and sank into oblivion as a political factor....
So mortifying was this to his arrogant nature
that he broke down and died in July under
humiliating circumstances, no chiefs of
consequence being present to witness his last
moments. His own children only were present,
and the obsequities were performed in a hurried
and unceremonious way....with all his faults....
he had the merit of struggling gamely for
independence of control.
The surviving chiefs fell behind their Morena e Moholo in
most of his efforts to satisfy the colonial administration. Regarding
the Council of Advice, the Assistant Resident Commissioner, Herbert
Sloley (soon to be confirmed as Resident Commissioner), observed "the
support in the matter of most of the leading chiefs and councillors"
and considered it possible in 1902 "to shape definitely the proposals for
19the constitution and functions of a representative assembly...."
In 1902, when the Resident Conmissioner did commence the oft-repeated
exercise of drafting a constitution for the Council, the Morena e
Moholo was badly needing it to perform some of the functions of
administration that custom bound him to perform. His health had
20
deteriorated and was "such as to cause consideration anxiety."
In his son and heir, Letsie II, he had an exceedingly weak successor.
21
Letsie II indulged excessively in brandy. His interest in the
affairs of the state was feeble. According to one account, he was
"weak, mentally and physically, mean, cowardly and idle - influential
22
on account of his birth, but not popular. - Drinks heavily."
He could certainly not be counted upon to maintain even a semblance
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of power over the indigenous government.
Against this immediate background, then, the colonial
administration received an unequivocal consent on the part of the
chiefs to establish the Council of Advice. It was established in
1903, under the name, Basutoland National Council - in Sesotho:
Lekhotla La Lesotho La Sechaba.
THE PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
The National Council was not established with a "constitution"
as such. In fact, it had no statutory force. It would not be until
1910 that a Proclamation establishing it would be promulgated. Until
then it operated under the Resident Conmissioner's "Regulations",
no
approved by the High Commissioner.
The Regulations provided for an advisory Council of "not more than"
100 members, of whcm the Resident Conmissioner had the power to appoint
5. (In practice these 5 would all be commoners, appointed on the
advice of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society.) The names of the
rest of the members, "Chiefs and Headmen", were to be submitted by the
Morena e Moholo to the Resident Commissioner, who before
<
confirming the appointments would satisfy himseif that "all sections"
of the Nation received "their fair share of representation." The
Morena e Moholo and his "Principal Chiefs" (then numbering about
24
20 by my count) were automatically to be members of the Council.
As a tentative measure, the tenure of councillors would be for
one year. The Resident Commissioner, acting with the Morena e
Moholo, could dispense with the services of any councillor, while
the High Commissioner reserved the right on his sole motion to dismiss
any of them. The Resident Commissioner was the President of the
Council, but at his discretion he might appoint "an Assistant
Commissioner or other Officer to preside as his substitute at any
time." He was the Convener of the Council.
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The status of the Morena e Moholo in the Council was not
clearly defined in the Regulations. However, when the Council did
convene for the first time in July, he was styled "Chief Councillor".
An account of the Revenue and Expenditures of the previous year
would be submitted to the Council for its scrutiny at each annual
sitting. The Council might be consulted on any proposed laws "of a
domestic nature" and its expression of opinion thereon be submitted to
the High Commissioner for his consideration. It might, when it
deemed it fit, propose changes in legislation "having local
application", in which case the Resident Conmissioner shall sutmit to
the High Conmissioner, "who alone has the right to make laws." Such
submissions would be accompanied by the Resident Conmissioner's remarks.
The proposal for a Court of Appeal, earlier made in 1890, was
carried forward in the formulation:
The Resident Conmissioner acting with the
Paramount Chief shall have power to form
the Council, or such members of the Council,
as may be selected, into a court of Appeal
to take cognisance of native disputes and
questions.
This provision was essentially meant to handle the increased and bloody
conflicts of chiefs over territorial jurisdiction and seniority, which
the office of Morena e Moholo could not longer handle.
Cases involving Europeans, or Europeans and Basotho, as well as
all other cases originating outside the Territory, fell outside the
jurisdiction of the "Court of Appeal". They would lie in the
Commissioner^
Resident Commissioner's or Assistant Courts. External affairs,
A
questions relating to extradition, the Crown prerogative, were all
specifically stipulated as falling outside the jurisdiction of the
Council.
THE CONDUCT OF THE COUNCIL
The Regulations laying out the constitutional features of the
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Council were accompanied by Regulations for its Conduct. The
Council was to conmence its annual proceedings with a prayer, to be
followed by "an address" by the President. Once again, the
responsibility of the Morena e Mohoio in the latter regard was
not spelled out. However, from the conmencement of the first session
of the Council, a convention was established whereby he would always
respond to the President's Address. As they began, the proceedings
were to close with a prayer "read by the Native Secretary." The
attire of the Council was specified as "European Clothing."
The proceedings were to be in Sesotho, subject to interpretation
"when desired by the Presiding Officer." The record of the
proceedings would nevertheless be in the English language. Councillors
could address the President either frcm their seats or "in the body of
the Council Room." Should it become necessary, the President could
put a question under discussion to a vote, and councillors would
signify their view "by holding up their right hands." The Council was
open to the Public, however, if the President deemed it "desirable"
he could "direct all strangers to leave the meetings."
In other words, 'the National Council could be viewed as a
chrysalis of a parliament. Thus the resident French missionary and
historian D. F. Ellenberger characterized it as "the first attempt...




THE PRESIDENT AND THE CHIEF COUNCILLOR
EXPRESS CONFLICT IN THE PURPOSE OF THE COUNCIL
The National Council opened on July 6, 1903, in great pomp.
The ceremonial opening was fully attended. Full attendance for the
rest of the Session was broken only once, significantly by the most
powerful Councillor in the land, Chief Jonathan Molapo, the Chief of
Leribe.
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The High Cotrmissioner's Address, read on his behalf by the
President of the Council, was to set the tone. Although brief, it was
to the point: He conveyed his wishes to the "Paramount Chief" and his
councillors for the success of "the scheme'' and hoped that it might be
useful in the discussion of "matters of local interest" as well as in
advising him. He would be pleased to see the chiefs use the Council
as a forum for "settling on a friendly and enduring basis their local
difficulties," while leaving him to deal with "the greater questions"
affecting the Territory.28
The responsibility for filling in the critical details was left
to the President of the Council Herbert C. Sloley. Getting straight
to the point, the President warned the chiefs that "the opening of this
Council does not mean the alteration of the system of Government and
Chieftainship": The High Coomissioner, as representative of the British
Crown, remained as the sole authority empowered to make the laws of
the Territory. The National Council, he said, was only "a good
substitute" for the national pitso, which had fallen into disuse.
The pitso had become unwieldly in numbers and made efficient discussion
of issues difficult. ' And besides, in his view too much time was lost
travelling to attend it. (As a member of the colonial administration
the President could not appreciate, or perhaps admit the responsibility
for, the fact that colonial rule per se had contributed greatly to
29
the deterioration of the pitso.)
The President's last major point before he tabled the account
of Revenue and Expenditure was an invitation to the councillors to
re-appraise Sesotho customary law and reduce it to writing. The point
was of course not new: As we shall recall, the late Tsekelo Moshoeshoe
had already, in the April 1887 national pitso, called for its




I know you have your laws as to the
property of dead persons, and to inheritance
of children and widows; you have laws as to
marriage, as to punishments for seduction,
adultery, theft. You have laws as to
disobedience to the Chiefs, and as to the way
people get their gardens, and are deprived of
them. It will be well for you to consider
whether these laws are being kept, or whether
in sane cases, they are not departed from.
If it might seem that the President of the Council was simply
tossing examples of Sesotho customary law at randan, the contrary was
the case. He was in fact providing an outline along which he wished
that law to be re-apraised. He was not generally interested in a
complete body of Sesotho law. Rather, he wanted a corpus that could
meet the current problems plaguing the indigenous government:
the lawlessness of chiefs, and injustices in their courts.
His invitation in this regard was otherwise timely. The
chiefs were themselves abundantly aware of the fact that their laws
were falling into disuse, and much as they benefitted from that
situation individually, they were generally embarrassed by it. As
Chief Jonathan, the Chief of Leribe, would put it a year later, in
September 1904: "Moshesh's laws were good, but after his death his
(
laws were spoilt, because there were too many chiefs, and too many
children."^"
The statement of Revenue and Expenditures was of more than
passing interest: The Revenue was 1100,180, of which £62,200 came
from Hut Tax, £28,000 from Customs, and only j=110 from Court Fees.
Expenditures consisted of Emoluments of ^10,254 toward the support of
the colonial administration, j=5,494 for the Allowances of Chiefs
(virtually all of which would have been paid to principal chiefs),
[=15,745 for the payments and clothing of the Mounted Police Force, and
j= 6,600 toward Education. There was a sum of £90,000 in the bank.
Quite clearly the Territory was solvent. But what was more, it could
be deduced that chiefs were frustrating the efforts for appeals to the
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Resident Commissioner's and Assistant Conmissioners' Courts. Most
of the money was expended on administration - the European officers,
chiefs and law enforcement. Only 4,652 had gone for Agriculture.
The use of funds underscored the Imperial Government's comnitment to
the maintenance of law and order, and not so much to the development of
a sound economy: a holding operation.
Be that as it may, the speech by Morena e Moholo Lerotholi
revealed a divergence of views from the colonial administration on the
purpose of the National Council. Having acknowledged the fact that the
establishment of the Council had been delayed by the reluctance of his
chiefs, the Morena e Moholo suggested that the colonial
administration had heretofore been deaf to complaints of his Nation,
"for we had no Council nor laws." Contrary to the High Conmissioner's
and the Resident Commissioner's declarations, he asked that the
National Council be recognized as "the King's Council in reality."
Accordingly, he made his own declaration that "it shall be a Council of
32Laws as I have already stated." And as if to make it clear
that his Opening Speech was not simply a piece of rhetoric, he wrote
the Resident Commissioner a letter about two and half weeks later
33
putting his point succinctly:
When I asked for this Council, which my
late father wanted to have during his
lifetime, I wanted it to be a Council
which will speak out the Laws of the
Government we are under, so that we may
be governed by the Laws of that Government
which rules us; and then may be released
from slavery.
Lerotholi was ready to take a giant leap. He wanted a "Parliament";
although it was not clear that he was ready for a popular election.
He expressed his conviction that the British constitution was more
advanced and efficient than indigenous institutions of government,
and he wished Lesotho to espouse it all the way. However, the
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colonial administration denied him his wish.
Throughout the first two decades of the establishment of the
Council chiefs held the same vision as Lerotholi in this regard. So
convinced were they of the wisdom of adopting a parliamentary form of
government that one of them in 1906, upon the visit to Lesotho of the
High Commissioner, Lord Selborne, wished the colonial government to
accept the fact that Basotho subscribed equally to the Rule of Law as
OA
Britons. As cited in the High Commissioner's report of the visit:
Chief Maama pointed out that in all
civilised countries where they had one
King over them, as in England, they had
one King above that, and that was the law.
They had agreed to be governed by the law.
(Chief Maama, as it will be recalled, is the pretender to the throne
who during the reign of Letsie I had sought to wrest the sceptre from
his brother Lerotholi.)
Only one of the prominent principal chiefs in this period had
attempted to strike a note of discordance on the constitutional status
of the National Council. And that was Chief Jonathan Molapo. The
Chief's note of discordance had otherwise been a characteristic
i
volte-face: Like Lerothoii, he had expressed his full support for the
establishment of the Council, attesting that "you have obtained at last
what your grandfather Moshesh had long desired...," and what remained
35
was to revise the laws. Yet, a year later, Chief Jonathan was
to write a letter of recriminations to the High Commissioner, generally
criticizing the Council's Regulations and accusing the Morena e
Mohoio of using favouritism in his appointments, the tone and
substance of which the High Commissioner rejected. And then he
concluded his criticisms with this indicting petition:^®
I would humbly pray Your Excellency to
abolish the Council as it is at present
constituted and either revert to
Government by Proclamations or appoint
a Council similar to that of the Orange
River Colony, to consist of Officials of
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the Government and representatives of
Basuto Nation with a casting vote to the
Resident Commissioner....The present
Council is a weapon given to the Basutos
which they do not understand the use of,
and with which they will do themselves
harm before they have found out the way
to handle it properly. And I hope Your
Excellency will take the weapon away and
teach them the proper way to use it before
you give it back.
Had Jonathan's sentiments been motivated by altruism, they might
have passed as perceptive and perhaps even noble. As the history of
his political activities will show, however, the contrary was the case.
The Chief was more anxious to gain an advantage for himself than to
consider whether he was trying to get it by means beneficial to the
Nation at large: He was motivated by the fear that the Morena e
Moholo might use the Council to curb his increasing tendency to
establish himself as an independent monarch. Jonathan was at the time
the most powerful chief in the Territory, heading the second house in
the royal lineage. His relations with the senior house were far from
cordial, and his dealings with Lerotholi were only tenuously held
together by the colonial administration. As the Resident
Commissioner's annual'report for 1901-1902 put it: Affairs in the
District of Leribe were vexatious and yet most difficult to resolve,
on account of "the jealousy existing between the Paramount Chief and
Jonathan Molapo." The report expressed regret at the fact that
whatever "arrangement... is satisfactory to one does not please the
other, and the intrigues carried on by two such influential Chiefs
are the main factors in perpetuating the unrest among the Leribe
37
people." As an af'terthought, and with hindsight, the Chief of
Leribe must have decided that his acceptance of the National Council
was tantamount to signing his own death warrant.
Always loyal to the colonial administration, with which he
enjoyed mutual trust, Jonathan had actually confided his fears to the
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High Conmissioner to that effect. In a separate letter bearing the
same date, he had disclosed his worry over the fact that "a number
of my brother chiefs hate me... they dislike me... because I am and
have always been loyal to His Majesty's Government." He believed
that the time would eventually come when "direct rule by Chiefs"
would have to give way in favour of "central national rule", but at that
juncture chiefs were all too often still guided by "their private aims
and quarrels when making laws for the nation." In the current
situation, therefore, he pleaded with the High Caimissioner "not to
ask me to resign power or authority" over to the National Council, "whose
first action will be to punish me" for the unbroken record of loyalty
OO
to the British Crown. "I am no longer a young man."
The High Comnisioner did not, of course, abolish the Council.
He simply gave him the assurance that he would be protected from his
brother chiefs and that no one would be allowed to deprive him of his
"legitimate position as one of the leading Chiefs of Basutoland, and
second only to the Paramount Chief."
THE LAWS OF LEROTHOLI: HOW THEY WERE MADE
AND THEIR POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE
If members of the National Council did not generally comprehend
its constitutional status, they must be forgiven. In reality, it was
difficult to understand. This was more so the case as its first
major task in 1903, and the most important achievement before its battle
against incorporation to the Union of South Africa beginning in 1908,
was to draw up and approve a body of customary laws. In so doing, its
members considered themselves to be exercising the function of
legislation. And each and every President of the Council could never
clearly explain why it was that they were making laws and yet they were
said not to be legislating.
On July 8, 1903, Councillor Dichaba Labane of Mafeteng, one of
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the Resident Commissioner's appointees,^1 moved "that the Sons of
Moshesh be instructed to write the old laws of Moshesh." And Josias
Mopeli, an appointee of the Morena e Moholo from the colonial
capital, Maseru, suggested that a Committee be formed "to write these
old laws... and submit to the Council." A Committee was duly formed,
consisting of 24 men, some of whom claimed acquaintance with the revered
Moshoeshoe and the workings of his councils, to dust off their memories
and present the National Council with a version of his laws.4^"
There were no written samples of Sesotho laws to start from.
Although in his Address the Resident Commissioner referred to the
existence of the Cape Colony Report of the Commission on Laws and
Customs of the Basutos of 1872, either it was not available or it was
discarded as an unhelpful guide. No further reference was made to it,
and certainly the Committee's draft of laws does not reflect its use.
Otherwise, it was mentioned that there were written laws made by
Moshoeshoe which, from Chief Nehemiah Sekhonyana's synopsis, can be
surmised to be the published laws on Trade, Brandy, Circumcision and
Witchcraft. But, even these were not helpful as "all trace of them
AO
was lost during the wars with the Orange Free State."
Nevertheless, the drafting Committee sat for three days, from July 11
to July 13 - a very brief period, and on the 14th of the month it
tabled its report to the full Council.
Areas Covered by the Laws
In all, the Conmittee had prepared twenty one Laws. At the end
of their discusion by the full Council they had been reduced to
eighteen, a reflection of the fact that some had overlapped with others.
Briefly, and in their numerical sequence, the Laws covered the
following problems: 1. Succession to chieftainship. 2. The
supremacy of the Morena e Moholo over his territorial chiefs.
3. The right of appeal from chiefs' courts, and the extent of the
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Morena e Moholo's authority in the process. 4. The chiefs'
rights and limits to subjects free labour. 5. Appeals from the
Morena e Moholo to the Assistant Commissioners' and Resident
Commissioner's courts. 6. The application of due process of law to
the custcm of "eating up". 7. Debtors' right to due process of law.
8. Just and equitable allocation of land . 9. Grounds for
forfeiture of land use. 10. Administrative procedure for sunmonses in
chiefs' courts. 11. The disposal of inmovable property upon permanent
removal from a chief's jurisdiction. 12. Re-stating Moshoeshoe's law
for theft, "to wit a beast for a beast, a second beast as compensation
and a third as a fine to defray the costs of the court." 13. Seduction
and abduction of unmarried women. 14. Inheritance and the heir's
rights, limits and responsibilities. 15. Estates, property and the
rights of widows without male children. 16. Compensation for physical
injuries. 17. The jurisdiction of the Assistant Conmissioner's and
43
Resident Commissioner's courts. 18. Belligerent use of firearms.
Politics, Social Issues and the
Problems of Re-Stating the Laws
Quite clearly, not all of the eighteen could be said to be the
(
Laws of ancient origin. The colonial situation, in no less a manner
than change in social values and the impact of South African neighbours
on Lesotho had given rise to new kinds of problems that called for a
readjustment of the old laws, and in some instances an introduction of
new ones. All the Laws having to do with the jurisdiction of Assistant
Conmissioners and the Resident Conmisioner in the indigenous court
system were a reflection of the colonial political order. The Law on
the taking up of firearms in the settlement of personal quarrels sought
to address the negative aspects of the otherwise patriotic Gun War.
The end of the era of wars with external enemies, coupled with the
increasingly shrinking arable land, created tensions and the subsequent
resort to violence, but this time by means of guns and not spears and
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stones.
Another problem that went hand in hand with the free use of guns,
but to meet w hich no Law was made, was the alarming consumption of
whisky. The reason why no Law was made in this connection was not
too far to find. As with gun-toting, the chiefs were the greatest
offenders. In contrast to gun-toting, however, they had lost the
will to resist whisky. Letsie I, Lerotholi, Letsie II, Chief Masopha,
despite their varying degrees of personal constitution, were so
regularly inebriated that they often failed to attend to their
responsibilities as a consequence. Letsie I could figuratively
describe his brave son and heir Lerotholi in 1880 as having "gone mad
from drinking."44 Masopha's heir, Lepoqo, by his own father's
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admission, died in 1886 from the effects of the drink. And in
the twentieth century, in 1909 an intelligence Report by the South
African Government, which was preparing for a potential rebellion from
Lesotho in the probable event of its incorporation, were confident of
a quick military solution on the reasoning that the chiefs' leadership
was as divided as it was dipped in whisky: "Out of the sixteen Chiefs..
i
the principal ones are drunkards..."46 In order more easily to
support their habit, as well as also to make profit, chiefs were in
partnership with white traders across the borders pumping liquor into
the Territory. In the circumstances, therefore, it would appear that
the colonial administration preferred to keep the responsibility for
the control of liquor in its own hands.
Four of the Laws that owed their origins to Sesotho custom or law
merit close attention, in so far as they reveal the background of the
socio-economic and political problems that prompted their formulation,
and at the same time they are instructive of the way in which customary
law during Lesotho's colonial era developed.
The Law of Succession
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As it was pointed out in Chapter 11, succession to chieftaincy
in Sesotho society was fairly straight forward. The heir was the
first born son of a chief by his "great wife". The application of the
principle, however, was highly problematic: The growth of polygamy
in the nineteenth century, marriages for alliances, and the establishment
of a custom within Moshoeshoe's lineage for first-cousin marriages, had
complicated the definition of just what a "great wife" was. It had
become increasingly conmon for the first and supposedly "great wife"
to lose her status in favour of a second or third wife who might be a
chief's first-cousin, if she herself had come from outside the royal
lineage. This had been the root of Lerotholi's problem. His mother,
the daughter of Chief Khoabane, who was not of Moshoeshoe's lineage,
had been the first wife of Letsie I. She came not to be recognized
as the great wife, however. Instead, a woman who had been betrothed
in her minority, and who was brought to Letsie' house a few years later
behind Lerotholi's mother, was the one recognized as "great wife".
She was the daughter of Moshoeshoe's first-cousin.
The latter was unable to provide Letsie with an heir, and it
t
followed, from custom, that Lerotholi, as the first born son by a woman
who had then been relegated to a second house should succeed. But
favouritism oncemore prevailed. First, Moshoeshoe personally arranged
a union, outside marriage, between the only daughter of the "great
wife" - a daughter named Senate, and Moiapo's eldest son, Josefa, to
beget an heir for Letsie I. The product of that union, Chief Motsoene,
47
was duly proclaimed the successor while yet a toddler, about 1867.
%
Moshoeshoe's proclamation was unpopular and it was generally regarded
by his chiefs as ultra vires. It was thus, after his death, not
implemented. Yet, even at that point Lerotholi was not favoured for
succession. Both Letsie I as well as Masopha favoured Maama, whose
mother was the third wife, but was Moshoeshoe's own daughter conceived by
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somebody else's wife, legitimized by payment of cattle. The farce
was only finally disentangled by Letsie's Council on his death, when
the colonial administration had also sought to bring its influence to
bear in his favour. Simultaneously, Princess Senate withdrew her son
Motsoene from the contest.^
Law 1, on succession, was obviously made to prevent any such a
situation from ever repeating itself. Besides, both Chiefs Motsoene
and Masopha were still living, and they both still hoped to seize the
opportunity to make their old claims good. It therefore explains why
the Law carefully provided that
The succession of chieftainship in Basuto-
land shall be by right of birth. That is
the first born male of the first wife.
If the first wife has no male issue, then
the first born male child of the next
wife in succession shall be heir to the
chieftainship, (my emphasis).
The Law on the Grounds for
Forfeiting the Use of Land
A close scrutiny of discussions on Law 9, laying the grounds on
which subjects might lose lands allocated to them for cultivation, and
suggesting remedy theteto, is instructive in two ways: Firstly, it
illustrates the tenacity of the National Council generally to cling
fast to the old notion of the inalienability of land. Secondly, it
reveals the anxiety on the part of Moshoeshoe's lineage, in particular,
to use that old notion for its own immediate purpose of maintaining
its political supremacy over the other royal lineages, some ten of them
50
in number, in the Territory.
In the drafting stage of the Law, as it turned- out, the focus
of the drafting Comnittee had been on the subjects' right to own land,
and not on the chiefs' authority as custodians of land. In its original
draft (numbered Law 10), the Law had emphasized the subjects' "rightful
authority" to a piece of ground allocated to them and specifically
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provided that "a person [can] not be deprived of his ground without
proper trial." (My emphasis). When the Law came before the full
Council, conflict of opinion centred around the phrases "his ground",
and "rightful authority."^"
The chiefs did not wish the Law to hold any promise, no matter
how vague and qualified, that subjects could have permanent rights to
patches of ground allocated to them for any purpose. Their fears
and motives were crisply put forward by the Morena e Moholo
CO
himself, using Philip Molise as his bugle:
if the Law were passed as submitted by the
Committee there would be trouble, because
it would cause bad feelings to spring up
between Chiefs and their men because the
men would say that the ground belonged to
them in full and would refuse the authority
of the Chiefs. Also Headmen would refuse
to have Chiefs' sons placed at their villages.
In order to lend credence to their argument, the principal chiefs,
in particular that core that styled itself "the Sons of Moshoeshoe",
introduced a new element into the discussions, which had the effect of
shifting the focus from the "rightful authority" to land and enphasized,
instead, the chiefs' absolute control over land use. The new element
was the chiefs' complaint concerning the increasing tendency on the part
of their people toward "turning the door of the house" - which meant,
paying homage to one chief while at the same time residing in another's
administrative jurisdiction. Needless to say, "turning the door of the
house" was symptomatic of the breakdown in chiefly rule: The more a
chief became oppressive, the more his conmoners turned the doors of
their houses, in part seeking for better services from neighbouring
chiefs, in part as a bargaining device calculated to embarrass their
own chief into restoring good government. As such, the practice was
both a political safety valve, as well as a check on arbitrary use of
authority.
In an effort to allay the chiefs' fears on this question, and at
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the same time give commoners security of tenure in their land holdings,
the commoner Councillor, Josias Mopedi offered the following compromise
w
statement:
It shall be lawful that a man where placed
by a Chief shall be his, and he under the
Chief's command, and that the Chief has the
right to remove him from there especially
when he sees that he is creating friction
between the Chiefs. (My emphasis).
Much as it seemed that Josias Mopedi's compromise statement was
reasonable, as far as the chiefs were concerned it had not gone far
enough. It put a stop to the "turning of the door of the house", but
it still gave commoners security of tenure to land. It was rejected.
The Law was only approved upon the Morena e Moholo' s own
Cy±
amendment, which in substance became the core of the Law:
It shall be lawful that no one shall be
deprived of place or garden without good
reason. If any one be deprived without
good reason he has the right to appeal, but
if any man living under one chief should look
up to another, he shall be removed.
The importance of the Law to "the sons of Moshoeshoe" was underscored
by the fact that among the principal supporters of the Morena e
Moholo's amendment was his principal political rival, Chief Jonathan
CC
Molapo of the District of Leribe.
The discussion on Law 9 was thus significant in this regard: When,
foresightedly, Moshoeshoe promulgated his written Law of Trade in
1859, by which he settled the question of the inalienability of land,
his target was the European settler. He had explicitly let it be known
that land in Lesotho was not for sale, and that any white person who
thought that his sojourn in Lesotho gave him title to land ought either
to disabuse himself of such a notion, or else leave the country. In
the context of events in 1903, however, the objectives of "the sons of
Moshoeshoe" in the National Council were different. First, on the
pretext of providing a remedy against the admittedly frustrating
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commoners' practice of "the turning of the door of the house", they
sought to deny commoners of security of tenure to land and, as a
corollary, to re-consolidate their power over them - an admission of
the fact that they were losing that power. Second, their purpose
for keeping land inalienable was generally to guarantee themselves the
ultimate right to resolve the increasingly irksome problem of "placing":
The agrarian bocm of the 1870s had aggravated the chiefs' propensity
for polygamy. As a consequence more sons had been produced, each
frcm the senior wives wishing to be given a place where he could have
his own court, domain, and commoners to lord over. In the circumstances
it became necessary formally to divest those chiefs and headmen who
were outside Moshoeshoe's lineage of customary rights over their
ancestral lands, in order to make way for the sons of the ruling
lineage.
The Law on Seduction and Abduction
It is interesting to see the degree to which contemporary
Basotho, including jurists, attach the authority of timelessness on
some aspects of customary law which, in the form in which they have
cane to us, are of recent origin, and owe their substance to arguments
of men the memory of wham is still fresh in our minds. This problem
is well illustrated by Law 13 - on seduction and abduction, which
, 56
read:
Any person who shall seduce or abduct
any unmarried woman shall be liable to a
fine not exceeding six head of cattle or
the equivalent.
An aspect of interest in this Law lies in the phrase "six head of
cattle." To contemporary Basotho, generally, this is a very ancient
and to some, a sacrosanct, aspect of the Law. Yet, the contrary is the
truth. According to Chief Seeiso, Moshoeshoe "used to fine one beast
for seduction." And according to Chief Maiebanye, he used "not to fine
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a man if he married the girl after seduction." There is of course no
reliable way of ascertaining these two chiefs' source of authority.
For, they would both have been mere boys when Moshoeshoe died in 1870.
Yet their authority was accepted. Neither Nehemiah Sekhonyana, who
had been Moshoeshoe's secretary, nor Jonathan Molapo, who had
occasionally served his own father as a deputee to Moshoeshoe's grand
councils challenged their statements. So, we can safely conclude
57
that the Chief' statements were valid.
The figure of "six" was arrived at purely through the process of
a debate that revolved around definite and concrete abuses of the Law
which recent experience revealed. Presumably as a consequence of the
rinderpest epizootic which had broken out in Lesotho in 1896 and
tr o
severely decreased the Nation's wealth of cattle, young suitors
whose parents lacked economic means found their marriage prospects
frustrated. Young men, therefore, increasingly resorted to seduction
and abduction to resolve their economic difficulties for bohali. The
parents of seduced or abducted women negotiated bohali under the
pressure and embarrassnent of expediting the marriages of their
disgraced daughters. ' Prospective sons-in-law thus got away with easy
terms of marriage. Provided they married them, they did not have to
pay for seduced women, under Moshoeshoe's old Law. With a payment
of two, instead of the customary ten to twenty cattle they got their
brides. So, the idea was at least to raise the seduction/abduction
fine. The Conmittee had submitted a draft requiring a fine of six
head of cattle if the guilty male party did not marry the woman, and
only three if he married her. It was the full Council which fixed
the magic figure of six, regardless of whether marriage took place or
not.
The Law on the Rights of Widows to Estates and Property
Law 15, on the rights of widows to estate and property was the
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most agonizing to its drafters. It was passed with the greatest
reluctance. Councillors seemed to regret that any effort should
at all have been taken clearly to define the rights of widows as to
estates and property, much less to reduce the Law to writing. They
feared that reducing it to writing was tantamount to opening a Pandora's
box. It read:
If a man dies leaving only female
children, the widow shall be heiress
to his estate and property, but she
must work in conformity with the wishes of
her husband's people, who shall in all
matters be deemed to be her guardians.
But if a man during his life time has
disposed of his property by Will or Gift,
his intentions must be carried
(My emphasis).
As it may be guessed, the first part of the Law represented the
customary position. The second, underlined, was a reflection of the
Christian position. The Reverends N. Mpiti, C. M. Sebeta and
Tsepinare, all three appointed to the Council by the Resident
Ccmnissioner and reconmended by the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society,
were there to guard Christian interests. It was that part of the Law
which got the majority of the chiefs into difficulties.
Chiefs were at that point in time faced with a great problem of
junior wives who were deserting them and running ac ross the boundary
to the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony with their lovers. So
bad was the situation that a significant part of the discussions at
the same Session of the Council were to be spent on it. If they
had the authority to legislate on inter-state matters, they would
rather have spent their time and energies on a Law aimed at
repatriating those, rather than defining the rights of widows to estates
and property. As it was, however, they could only ask the Resident
Commissioner to do something about it. And then, it would take twelve
years before that request would be honoured: Through Proclamation No. 3
of 1915, the High Corrmissioner agreed "to prohibit native women residing
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in the Territory of Basutoland from leaving the Territory against the
will of their husbands, fathers or natural guardians as the case may be,"
60
on the pain of imprisonment or a fine of five pounds.
The chiefs' fears regarding Law 15 was that it would accelerate
this trend of women's desertions, which hit them the hardest as
polygamists. As Philip Molise, Lerotholi's spokesman, put it, "if
this Law were passed the widows of Chiefs would hear of it and would
run away to their parents and great disturbance would occur."
Additionally and as a corollary, it was argued, widows would take
advantage of the Law to remarry, instead of sutmitting to the custom
of levirate. In consequence, relations between the extended families
involved in the first marriages, as well as the question of the custody
of children, would be greatly complicated. That the Law was
passed in the circumstances, is indicative of the influence of the
missionaries, who were fully behind it, bent on extricating Christian
women frcm customary ties to their "heathen" relatives.
The fears of chiefs that the Law would open the gates to
remarriages of widows was real. In just a few years to come, a Mosotho
Minister of the Gospel John Mohapeioa, would put that principle to the
test: A woman named Rosetta Mohapeioa, who had been married to Josiele
Lefothane, of the District of MaFeteng, by Christian rites in 1894, had
lost her husband in 1914. There were no children in the marriage. She
was desirous of marrying "a well-to-do native Minister" of the Gospel and,
with the aid of her brother, the Reverend John Mohapeioa, she defied
the wishes of her late husband's extended family, who maintained that
"a married woman is never brought away frcm the relatives of her
husband by her own people," and sought sanctuary from her Reverend
brother. The Reverend Mohapeioa duly arranged the new marriage for
her without consultation with the Lefothane family. The Lefothane
family then instituted a court case for her recovery.
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The then Morena e Moholo Griffith Lerotholi, who had
participated in the discussions when Law 15 was made, declined to hear
the case when it was brought to his court on appeal, saying to the
Assistant Conmissioner of Mafeteng that "I found it does not fit me, it
suits you, therefore I return Rosetta with Bethuele to your Court.
The Assistant Conmissioner took up the case and found in the widow's
favour stating: "Plaintiff is a free woman and is free to do as she
likes and is not bound to go back to her husband's brothers." As he
pointed out to his Government Secretary, however, the Assistant
Commissioner, Gordon Murray, was under no illusion as to the fact that
"the case was put forward as a test case by the Reverend John Mohapeioa
to prove the independence of widows who had been married by Christian
rites.There would be many similar cases to follow, some of
them involving chiefs.
The National Council "approved" the 18 Laws and, in keeping with
custom, it named them after the reigning Monarch as The Laws of
Lerotholi. Indeed, the title was fitting, in more ways than one:
Lerotholi had played a direct role in their formulation and left his
print on them. The following year, 1904, the Laws were published under
a green cover, from which they got their nickname, Matalenyane, which
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means The Little Green Book.
The National Council had performed a historic task. And it had
done so with a clear understanding that it was attempting to give the
indigenous government the lease of life. It had attempted to restore
the Nation's faith in the indigenous government. And by bringing the
chiefs under the law, it had sought to keep that institution in its
place of leadership. Even so, in this second objective, of bringing
the chiefs under some semblance of order and unity, the Council should
have been left in no doubt as to the fact that the battle had been lost
from the start. The most powerful chief in the land, Chief Jonathan
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Moiapo of Leribe had been the most uncooperative. Had he had the
capacity to do so, he would have wrecked the entire project.
Chief Jonathan's Role in the
Formulation of the Laws
When the National Council convened on the agenda of formulating
the laws and accordingly set up its drafting Committee on July 8,
Chief Jonathan had asked "my Chief, Lerotholi" permission to return
hone to attend to scxne family business. Permission was denied,
"except with the Resident Commissioner's consent." Jonathan then
defied Lerotholi and left for Leribe anyway. When the National Council
re-convened to discuss the Committee's draft Laws on July 14, and the
Chief of Leribe was not in his seat, the rest of the councillors had
cause to worry, and they quickly predicted the consequence. As
Councillor Setha Matete put it, "if these laws are passed in Jonathan's
absence and were found distasteful to him he will say he had no voice in
making them." In order to avoid such potential embarrassment, there¬
fore, the Morena e Moholo personally, supported by the Chairman of
the drafting Committee, Chief Theko Makhaola, moved that a telegram be
<
sent to Chief Jonathan summoning him back to the Council, and meantime
discussions on the Laws be postponed until he arrived. Lerotholi and
Theko Makhaola were at one with the President of the National Council,
to whan the ugly truth had then struck that he could "not write to the
High Conmissioner and say that the Nation was unanimous when Jonathan
was absent." Both the President and his Chief Adviser (Lerotholi)
were perturbed by Jonathan's "irregularities". The Council supported
07
Lerotholi's motion unanimously.
When he did arrive, the Chief of Leribe performed exactly as
predicted: He was absent when the Laws were drafted, he protested,
and now he returned "as a man to be tried for some fault." He wished
to know whether the National Council's Laws would not "clash with those
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of the Government," to which the President replied that in the event
of any such conflict the Government would inform the Council. But
Jonathan still pressed ahead. He requested his name to be struck from
the record in consequence of having gone home without leave. He
complained that his own position in the National Council was not clearly
defined, presumably in the same way as the position of the Morena e
Moholo was. He therefore declined to be recognized as a member of
the Council altogether.
Chief Jonathan was overpowered and his filibustering was
effectively quashed. Chiefs Leshoboro Majara and Theko Makhaola
pointedly counselled him "to desist" from his obstructionist behaviour.
But they could not dissuade him from his sentiments against the Laws, in
particular against Law 2, "that the Paramount Chief of Basutoland shall
have full power and authority over every Chief in the Territory." Thus
on September 26, 1904, when he was interviewed by the South African
Native Affairs Conmission to give his account of the nature of the
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National Council, he responded, in Lerotholi's presence:
It has to speak on Basutoland matters, and
there are certain Native laws which are made
in this Council; although I was not asked
my opinion about the laws formed by the Council.
Lerotholi was irate, with that as well as with others of Jonathan's
disagreeable surprises. And as he was still unnerved and could not
lucidly put his thoughts together, he asked Philip Molise to respond,
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and Philip said:
It was the wish of the nation to ask the
Resident Commissioner and the Paramount
Chief to draw up seme written laws for the
guidance of the Basutos, and those laws were
discussed and passed in the presence of all
these Chiefs, and we, as a nation, were
satisfied with those laws, which were passed
in this Council, because that was our wish.
We wanted to have the law, and if we were wrong
we would be fined. Before those laws were
made there were different decisions, and this is
the reason why we are now satisfied with those
laws.
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Because Chief Jonathan did not wish to be bound by The Laws of
Lerotholi, he would for the most part ignore them. He would
constantly defy the instructions of every Morena e Moholo until
his death in 1929. And when pressure was brought to bear to bring
/
him under control, he would petition the High Conmissioner to proclaim
his District a separate country, with himself as the Morena e
Moholo. Those developments will be examined later.
THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE LAWS OF LEROTHOLI
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
The role of the National Council in the making of The Laws of
Lerotholi gave it an ambiguous character. The process had involved
not merely the reduction of customary law to writing but, as already
illustrated, virtually drawing up new Laws to meet current problems.
It was not the first time that Basotho had sat down to formulate similar
rules. They had done the same within the framework of their traditional
Grand Council (Lekhotla la Mahosana) and the pitso in the colonial
period. And we have established (In Chapter 2) that the process that
they had gone through then could properly be described as one of
t
legislation, and that was how they themselves viewed it. But now they
were engaged in the same exercise under a colonial institution, the
National Council, and within a political order in which only one man
was said to be the legislator. In the circumstances, what were they
to consider to be the status of the Laws they had just made, and what
were they to understand of the constitutional status of the institution
under which they had made them? It was difficult for members of the
National Council to understand the thinking of the colonial
administration on this problem.
Aware of the problem, although not appreciating fully its
magnitude, the Resident Conmissioner explained to the High Commissioner
when he forwarded the Laws to him in 1903 that "I was careful to point
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out that the Council was an advisory body, and that legislative
authority" was the sole prerogative of the High Corrmissioner.^
I therefore forward these "Laws" merely
as an expression of national opinion in
the direction of regulating certain tribal
customs and procedure in Native Courts.
What is known as Native Law consists of the
tribal custom, and judgments, and opinions of
important and respected Chiefs; such laws are
preserved and handed down by oral tradition,
and the suggestions made by the Council are not
intended to be a complete collection of such
Basuto laws....
Indeed, he was correct on the former. The latter, however, was a
prevarication. He had not explained to the councillors that their
Laws were "merely ... an expression of national opinion." He had not
instructed them on the distinction that he made between "law" and
"custom", so as to convince them that their Laws fell in the latter
category. Had he done so, they might well have instructed him on
their own distinction between the two, thereby leaving a debate of
sane academic value. And he most certainly had not given them the
impression that they had merely made "suggestions." To the contrary,
he had acknowledged to them, as earlier cited, that "You have laws...,"
t
and consequently exhorted them to reduce them to writing.
The reason why the Resident Commissioner had not disclosed his
opinion on the status of the Laws of Lerotholi is not too far to find,
and it can fully be appreciated. Had he told the councillors that they
had merely made "suggestions", "merely... an expression of national
opinion," they might have formally declared that in that event there
was no sense in requiring the indigenous courts to enforce than. And
that was something that he could ill afford putting to the test. So,
he chose to say the councillors had made Laws, but not legislated. They
had made Laws, but within the framework of an advisory body. That was
ambiguous, and it made the constitutional role of the National Council
in the eyes of the councillors paradoxical.
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In just a few years' time, this unsatisfactory situation would
cane back to haunt the Resident Commissioner. At the Third Session of
The Council in 1908, there having been no meetings in 1906 and 1907 for
no sound reasons, Philip Molise, the spokesman of the Morena e
Moholo, posed the inevitable question to the President of the
Council:72
I wish to draw attention to something that
was said in the Resident Commissioner's
address - that this Council is not a
legislative body, but only an advisory one.
Now this Council passed sane laws and I would
ask whether these are to be considered as
really being laws or not.
The President of the Council had his second chance to say the
things to the councillors that he had originally said to the High
Carmissioner. But he did not do so. Instead he dithered and chose
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the easy way out:
I wished to remind you in my address that
the Council had no power to make laws, but
was intended to be a means whereby you could
express your wants. There is nothing new in
the laws that you speak of, they were only
written out by the Council and your Paramount
Chief signed them and they were printed and
circulated.
This was a very unhelpful answer, particularly in the
circumstances in which the new Morena e Moholo Letsie II was
finding himself since his father's death in 1905. The situation was
that the chiefs were generally not obeying these Laws, which after all
were made to curb their own abuses of power. They flagrantly
disregarded them, and the Morena e Moholo was in no position to
enforce them. So desperate was the new Monarch that the previous
day, in the same Session, on January 28, he had committed the folly,
in the eyes of his chiefs in the Council, of pleading with the
Resident Commissioner to ask the High Coimissioner to confirm the
Laws by Proclamation, as it seemed that they were not being obeyed
- 162 -
because they were not "Government laws", having been made by a mere
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advisory body. The situation was only reversed by his uncle,
Chief Alexander Maama who, determined to keep Sesotho customary law
S
under Baotho, censoriously remarked that "it wDuld be very bad if
[we] had the Resident Conmissioner [here] to listen to what he had
nothing to do with." Subsequently, on January 30, Letsie II
found himself in the unregal position of having to eat his own
words:
I wish to apologize for what I said the
other day asking that the laws should be
confirmed by the High Conmissioner. After
consulting with the other chiefs I now ask
that the Resident Commissioner and the
Paramount Chief may be given power by the
High Commissioner to carry out these laws.
The person who came to the President's aid by giving Philip
Molise a straightforward answer on the status of the Laws, and the
only one that the councillors could understand, was the Reverend
C. M. Sebeta who said that "there are two kinds of law in Basutoland,
the laws of Moshesh and the High Conmissioner." In his view, if only
77Letsie II enforced the latter, "there would be no complaints."
The confusion over the legal status of The Laws of Lerotholi
and, consequentially, the constitutional status of the National
Council, was not simply a product of misunderstandings between the
colonial administration and the Basotho councillors, wilful or
unintended. A fair measure of it resulted from genuine want of
knowledge or sophistication on the part of the colonial officers
involved. When faced with technical issues over which they had no
expertise, they were loath to admit uncertainty to the "native",
preferring rather to leave him thinking that he was the victim of
ignorance. The Resident Conmissioner, H. C. Sloley, had this
problem. And, as I will illustrate, the problem could sometimes
manifest itself in an embarrassing fashion.
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Upon the death of King Edward VII on May 6, 1910, H. C. Sloley
and his High Commissioner, Lord Selborne, entertained no thought that
his successor might require a formal announcement to His Basotho
subjects. Having completed his tenure of office, Lord Selborne left
South Africa for England on April 18. And then, a comedy of errors
began: The new High Corrmissioner, Lord Gladstone, noticing only on
his way to Cape Town that the new Monarch had not formally been
announced in Lesotho, and thinking it was necessary to do so, instructed
rie.
Sloley immediately to take action. What pe o* action^ was supposed
to take, it was not clear. Sloley, however, decided on a Proclamation,
strangely enough, a joint Proclamation of himself as Resident
Conmissioner, and Morena e Moholo Letsie II. With the full
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flourish of legal draftsmanship, the Proclamation declared:
We... Herbert Cecil Sloley, Resident
Conmissioner of Basutoland and Letsie
Lerotholi Moshesh, Paramount Chief of
the Basuto, do now hereby with one full
voice and consent of tongue and Heart,
Publish and Proclaim that the High and
Mighty Prince George Frederick Ernest
Albert is now ... our only and rightful
Liege Lord George Fifth, by the Grace
of God, King of the British Dominions
beyond the' Seas, Supreme Lord in and over
Basutoland and the Basuto...
(My emphasis.)
As Letsie II was not available to sign his Proclamation personally,
having recently suffered "a slight paralytic stroke," his uncle,
Chief Maama signed it. Except, he did not sign it on Letsie II's
behalf, but rather, as "Alexander Maama Letsie on behalf of the
Basuto." (My emphasis.) Herbert Sloley did not detect the material
flaw in the signature - which Chief Maama might well have committed on
purpose: He was still sore about losing the contest for succession
to Lerotholi and apparently hopeful of regaining it from the weakling
that Letsie II was, especially following his "paralytic stroke."
The Proclamation was not referred to the High Commissioner' s
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Legal Adviser until it was published. The Legal Adviser, Mr. A. E.
Balfour, scanned Chief Maama's signature with evident discomfort and
anbarrassment regarding its potential danger, only expressing the
hope that the Resident Commissioner had satisfied himself that Maama
had duly been delegated by Letsie II so to sign. There was something
else more embarrassing than the question of the signature: The Legal
Adviser pointed out that the Proclamation "has no binding force - the
King is King over all his dominions (which include Basutoland) and
all his subjects (including the Basutos) owe him allegiance
independently" of the Basutoland Proclamation. The entire legal muddle
was then dismissed with only a minute by the Imperial Secretary in the
High Commission: "The proclamation has no legal effect and no harm
79
has been done and nothing need be done."
It may have been correct to say the Proclamation was of no legal
80force. But not so to say that no harm had been done: What were
the Basotho to think of British perceptions on issues of legislation?
Already they had a Council that they were informed was only advisory,
and not legislative. This Council had made Laws, and not merely
recorded them. But the Resident Commissioner was
saying that only the High Conmissioner could legislate. And now the
Resident Commissioner and the Morena e Moholo had jointly made
a Proclamation. The irregularity of the Proclamation was not
explained to Letsie II. Nor was Letsie II ever informed that his
Proclamation was not worth the paper it was written on.
The psychological effect of the "Proclamation" on Letsie II and
Chief Maama, nevertheless, would likely have been that the colonial
administration and the indigenous government were partners in
government. Together they ruled Lesotho. Together they promulgated
laws.
THE COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION CHANGES ITS POLICY
AND DYNASTIC DISPUTES ARE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL
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It is no mere coincidence that the meeting of the minds between
the colonial administration and the chiefs of Lesotho on the establish¬
ment of the National Council took place in 1902, the year of the
conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War. Just as the end of that War meant
the beginning of a serious preparation for the forging of a Union of
the South African settler colonies of Natal and the Cape with the
Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, it meant a change of policy on
the part of the colonial administration in Lesotho in its style of
governing the Territory, in response to that development. In the
first place, the colonial administration was compelled by developments
in the post-war period to define the Territory's place within the
context of the pending Union, and that possibility was greatly in favour
of its incorporation into the Union. In the second place, it was found
desirable, in the event of incorporation, that the Union should inherit
a more tractable and orderly chieftaincy. In order to achieve these
objectives, a more interventionist policy in the affairs and conduct of
chiefs was adopted. The drafting of The Laws of Lerotholi can be
seen as one illustration of that change in policy. The second was to
t
be a direct intervention in the dynastic disputes of the chiefs, as well
as the effort to resolve its succession problem.
In this section we shall examine the problem of dynastic disputes
ard succession. And in the next, we shall devote a few pages to the
issue of the transfer of the Territory to the Union - its effects on
the role of the National Council and on the institution of chieftaincy.
The Baphuthi Chiefdom is Dianembered
The first direct, and remarkably ruthless twentieth century
intervention in the chiefs' dynastic disputes began, significantly, as
a joint effort between the colonial administration and Moshoeshoe's
royal lineage. It was the passionate effort to strip the Nguni
Chiefdom of Baphuthi of its power and political role in Lesotho. The
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scheme of its destruction which had begun in collaboration in 1879,
when the Chief of Baphuthi, Moorosi, was disarmed and decapitated, was
to be completed.
This second and last phase of collaboration had actually begun
in May 1899, when Morena e Moholo Lerotholi placed his second son,
Chief Griffith, at the ancestral home of Baphuthi at Phamong, in the
Mohale's Hoek District. According to the then Resident Commissioner,
Godfrey Y. Lagden, Griffith's placing had followed upon "the earnest
request by the Paramount Chief, extending over several years, that his
second son, Griffith, should be recognized by Government in a ward
o-j
appointed for him."OJ- At the placing, the then Chief of Baphuthi
and grandson of Moorosi, Mocheko Moorosi had challenged the placing,
which was to be at the expense of his own authority, and "attempted to
disorganize the pitso by calling upon all Baphuti(sic) to rise. But
Mocheko was promptly suppressed by the Resident Commissioner, who
82
ordered him to sit down." And so the Chief did.
Before the year was at an end, however, the Morena e Moholo
sought to test Mocheko's allegiance to him: For no other reason than
to see whether or not the Chief would obey, he sent his counsellors
to Phamong to sunmon Mocheko and his principal men to the royal court
at Matsieng. According to the leader of the royal counsellors, "If
they do not obey, I was to call than through their Goats" - that is,
83
"eat up" their animal flock. As it was expected, Mocheko defied
the sunmons. In the effort to "eat up" his flock, an affray ensued:
gun shots were fired from both sides. One of Mocheko's brothers was
killed. Losing his nerve, Mocheko took his principal men and sane
warriors and fled to the nearby District of Hershel, in the Cape Colony.
This situation was sufficient for the colonial administration to
press for the Chief's extradition from the Cape Colony. Mocheko and
eighteen of his principal men, all members of the Baphuthi royal lineage,
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were put in prison, without trial, for the duration of the Anglo-Boer
War, while the Morena e Moholo and the colonial administration
considered what to do with them. In the meantime, the Resident
Qzt
Commissioner advised the High Commissioner:
the location of this troublesome person
will have to be defined. Mocheko claims
land rights and chieftainship to a pre¬
posterous and inadmissible extent, and
in view of his personal character it will
be necessary to strictly limit his sphere
of influence.
Early in April, 1902, a national pitso, constituted in the form
of a supreme court, was held at the colonial capital, Maseru, to try
Mocheko and his men. The Resident Commissioner presided over the
pitso. All the principal chiefs of Lesotho were present. Charges
were "Contempt of Court of the Paramount Chief. Resistance to Lawful
Authority. Breach of Peace. Endangering the Peace of the Neighbouring
Territories by Entering the Cape Colony with Armed men."^
Chief Mocheko's defence was to be his own undoing. He shifted the
focus of the trial from the relatively lighter charges that lay before
the pitso to the more serious, and potentially treasonable question
t
of territorial sovereignty: "I understand, I am in jail for the
country," he said. Mocheko renounced, or perhaps denounced, the
generally accepted view that he was Lerotholi's vassal and argued,
instead, that he was his ally. He promised his argument on the
allegation that his grandfather Moorosi had been Moshoeshoe's friend and
ally, a position the contrary of which we have already established.
Hence, he challenged Chief Griffith's placing at Phamong, expressing
%
unhappiness on the fact that Griffith "was sent to my place without my
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knowledge." In his current circumstances that was a fatal form of
defence. He had played too daringly into the noose. His liege lord,
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Lerotholi, pulled it remor -selessly:
I received Mocheko and his wife from Mata-
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tiele [after the Moorosi Rebellion] against
my father's wish....If Mocheko remains here
he will endanger me. Give him a letter
Chief to remove from this country.
Mocheko was deprived of his chieftaincy. And in order to make
sure that his chiefdom remained under Griffith directly, and not through
its own head, Mocheko and the eighteen other members of his royal
lineage were kept in Maseru for another fourteen years, while alternative
plans for their re-settlement were being considered. Both the -colonial
administration and the Sons of Moshoeshoe contended that their presence
in Lesotho constituted "a danger". Subsequently Mocheko had recanted
and begged for pardon from the Morena e Moholo and the National
Council. But in March 1914 a decision was reached that they should
be banished to Matebeleland on the tribalist reasoning that the
Matebele of Mzilikaze were their kith and kin and they would fare
better there. They were to be banished under a Proclamation passed
in 1907 for the removal of "undesirable persons", a piece of
legislation which when it was promulgated, the chiefs had challenged
through the National Council, dreading that it might be used against
than. Following assurances to the contrary, their fears had
(
been allayed. But now they thought it was appropriate if
OO
used against the Baphuthi royal house. Fortunately
for the Baphuthi, however, when the matter was referred to a Legal
Adviser, the Resident Commisioner was advised that only an Act of the
British Parliament might achieve the objective. So the project was
89abandoned. The next extreme alternative, proposed by the
Morena e Moholo, was to settle them on top of the mountain of
Qeme, not far from colonial capital, to which Mocheko rightly complained
Of)
when he was told of it:
Many chiefs have shed blood and have been
imprisoned, but after serving their time
they have been allowed to go to their homes.
No one has been sent to Qeme, though they
had shed blood... I do not agree to go to
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Qeme Mountain....
It was not until in 1916 that the saga ended: The Baphuthi royal
lineage was permitted to return to its ancestral home, but utterly
shorn of power. As a political unit, it would never again be permitted
a political role in Lesotho.
In the meantime, Moshoeshoe's royal lineage was engaged in more
virulent and politically enervating dynastic disputes. Its factionalism
shattered what was left of the commoners' faith in its leadership.
It virtually destroyed the indigenous judicial structure. It rendered
the office of Morena e Moholo politically more vulnerable than it
was in the nineteenth century, and consequently subject to increasing
manipulation by the colonial administration.
Colonial Policy and Letsie II's Succession
Morena e Moholo Lerotholi died at his capital at Matsieng
early on the morning of August 19, 1905, following a chronic illness
that had lasted for six years. He had carried his people through a
difficult period and in the course of it proved himself a worthy
grandson of Moshoeshoe. Despite their challenges to his authority, his
chiefs saw him as a sound ruler, and certainly the last of their great
monarchs. The colonial administration was giving him a fair and just
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tribute when it said:
For 14 years he occupied his difficult
position, dexterously strengthening himself
by playing off one chief against another....
He know to an ounce the breaking strain of
the bonds which attached the people to the
chiefs, and the chiefs to each other and to
himself. Though shrewd and highly diplomatic
on occasion, he was naturally bold and
masterful and completely fearless.
He was succeeded by his eldest son, Letsie II, then a man of
about 34 years of age who, in the view of the Resident Commissioner,
Herbert Sloley, "has never displayed any remarkable ability or force
of character." Herbert Sioley was doubtful whether he would receive
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"undisputed support of his kinsmen and other Chiefs." But of
course, Lerotholi had started out with the same disability: His
succession had been disputed. Yet, the difference between father and
son would be that whereas the father had had the capacity to deal with
the consequences of that fact, the son would be a total failure in
that regard.
Until Letsie II came to power, the colonial administration
had not developed a clear policy on the question of succession to the
office of Morena e Moholo. As we have already seen, when
Letsie I came to power in 1870, it had had no involvement in it. When
Lerotholi came to power in 1891, however, the disputed nature of his
succession had invited its involvement: In the event that Letsie I
had previously sought to apoint Chief Maama as his successor, and
meantime he had died leaving the colonial administration uncertain as
to whether his Grand Council had subsequently agreed unanimously on
Lerotholi as the rightful heir, the then Resident Conmissioner, Sir
Marshal Clarke, had intervened: As later recounted in the case of
Bereng Griffith v. 'Mantsebo Seeiso Griffith, in 1943,
Sir Marshal Clarke had' advised "that the Chiefs-in-Council should send
through him a message to the High Commissioner giving their views
as to who was entitled to succeed, whereupon Her Majesty's Government
could say if it agreed or not and the decision could be published to
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the nation." Except, it must not have been so clear to "the
Chiefs-in-Councii" that that procedure was taken as a matter of policy,
and indeed, when Lerotholi had challenged the procedure, Sir Marshal
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Clarke had fallen short of taking a stand on it, stating:
Your brothers are, I think, wrong in
saying that I am inaugurating a new way
of acting in Basutoland. Moshesh introduced
Letsie to the nation during his lifetime as
his successor, though no one could question
Letsie's birthright. I myself urged Letsie
to similarly introduce his successor. Masupha
told me he did the same, but Letsie replied
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that there was time enough, and died before
he did so.
In other words, Lerotholi had been made to understand, not that his
recognition derived frcm the High Coamissioner's approval, but rather,
from the fact of an announcement, which in his case had not been
carried out, and which was necessitated by the disputed nature of his
birthright.
The colonial administration at that point had clearly only
manipulated the succession and not asserted official control. And this
came out clearly in the High Conmissioner' s message of congratulations
to the Resident Conmissioner for his role in influencing the final
of.
outcome of the succession:
[It] is greatly due to the tact and
judgment with which you have for some
time past been preparing the minds of the
principal chiefs to accept this result as
the best security against intertribal
quarrelling and as the most likely course
to conduce to the peace of the country.
With Letsie II's succession, however, the colonial administration would
take a firmer position and establish a policy.
To begin with, the Resident Conmissioner did not permit the
i
nomination of Lerotholi's successor to be made by the chiefs in their
customary Council at the royal capital at Matsieng. The nomination
was done in the National Council in Maseru. And then, once the chiefs
had agreed, in keeping with Law I of The Laws of Lerotholi on
succession, that Letsie II was the rightful heir, thirty "Chiefs and
Members of the Basutoland National Council," headed by the heir's uncle
Chief Theko Makhaola, were required to write a letter to the High
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Conmissioner to the effect that
We ask, with respect, that His Majesty
the King and the High Conmissioner, may
recognise Letsie as the Paramount Chief
of the Basuto....
Letsie II was nominated on August 28 and appointed "provisionally"
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on September 18, 1905, pending the High Conmissioners confirmation. The
High Commissioner subsequently had him officially announced at a pitso
in February 1906. The point was not to be missed that in the final
analysis he owed his legitimacy to the High Conmisioner, only after
whose approval he could consider himself a Morena e Moholo of
Basotho. His successor would be treated in like manner.
LETS IE II SURRENDERS HIS POWERS TO THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
The new Monarch's problems of authority began promptly with his
provisional appointment in August 1905. Still determined to reduce
the powers of the office of Morena e Moholo so as to attain his
relative independence in the country, Chief Jonathan proposed that
Letsie II should "sign a document binding himself to respect the rights
and property of other." And in order to give that motion the image of
constitutional advancement, albeit incongruent with his role in the 1903
Session, he additionally suggested that the National Council be broken
into two Chambers, one representing Chiefs, the other Commoners. As
such he was the first chief to advocate bicameralism in the
Council.^8
Jonathan lost on both points. Chiefs were not prepared to share
power with commoners along the lines of a Bicameral House as he proposed.
The majority of them opposed the idea. And it can be surmised that the
Resident Conmisioner was pleased with the outcome. For had the idea
enjoyed majority support, the next logical step might have been a
request that the Council be given legislative powers, a step which the
colonial administration was not, at that point, prepared to entertain.
On the question of requiring Letsie II to sign an oath to respect the
"rights and property of others," it turned out that Jonathan was
opening a hole in the indigenous form of government bigger than he had
intended. For, Councillors Molise and Abiatara, obviously expressing
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the commoners sentiments, then went on record as having said:
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If an oath had to be taken, it should not
be confined to the Paramount Chief, but
that all Chiefs should be pledged to observe
justice in dealing with junior chiefs and
people.
Finding his proposal thus converted to a Basotho Magna Carta, which he
had not intended, Jonathan would not argue it further. It was dropped.
But the p. posal had been significant. As the Resident Commissioner
said to the High Commissioner:100
P
The Clause as suggested, appears innocent
enough, but Jonathan's intention is probably
to impose limitations upon the Paramount
Chief's constitutional power to redress
wrongs in, and to listen to complaints from
....Districts...Jonathan's intention in
introducing this clause, was to limit the
Paramount Chief's right of action in the
Leribe, and Berea Districts....It would reduce
the Paramount to the position of a Chief merely
' primus inter pares,' and might lead to an
unworkable position.
Actually, Letsie II did not require Jonathan's oath to become
a primus inter pares. His own personal weaknesses were sufficient
to reduce him to that position. He neither ruled nor reigned. He was
not interested in the affairs of government, leaving those to his uncles,
principally Chiefs Alexander Maama and Theko Makhaola.
His chiefs had little respect for him. His full brother, Griffith
Lerotholi, who was under his direct control as a territorial chief, would
provoke a needless attack on a Chieftainess named 'Masefabatho in
December 1907, attempting in arms to denude her of her territorial
caretaking. Letsie II was helpless, or uninterested, in the
development. Griffith was at the end brought under control by the
Resident Conmissioner and principal chiefs in the country, who convened
%
a national pitso to look into his provocation and to instruct him to
desist from his belligerence. The Morena e Moholo was present
at the pitso. But he appears not to have uttered any significant
statement to assert his authority. And perhaps it was understandable
that he did not: It was privately hinted to the Resident Conmissioner
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"that Griffith's intention was to provoke a conflict with Letsie
himself.""'"^"'" Letsie II was not one to hold his own in conflict.
Letsie's weakness was of course very much to Chief Jonathan's
liking. His own District was torn by political conflicts between
his sons, Mathealira and Motsarapane, who were fighting for seniority
with each other. The situation was made complex by a third party,
Chief Tau, whom Jonathan had sired for his mentally demented brother
Josefa, Princess Senate's suitor, who considered himself as the senior
to both Mathearira and Motsarapane. And it was made unbearable by
Chief Motsoene, a prodigious man in physique, weighing over
360 lbs., who felt that having given his rigfrhil place as
A
Morena e Moholo to Lerotholi in 1891, Jonathan ought at least
to yield to him and let him rule Leribe in the place of his biological
father. And then too, there was a grandson of Chief Lesaoana
Ramanehella, Chief Mitchel, who in 1906 burned down a local chief's
village, fighting to expand his own caretaking in Mapoteng, to the
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south of the District. Just the same, Jonathan seemed contented
as long as Matsieng did not interfere. The High Commissioner,
Gladstone, who had just paid a visit to Lesotho, would comment warmly
on his status in a despatch to the Colonial Office in June 1911:^^
The personality of Jonathan gives him an
ascendency over his people which the
paramount Chief is unable to claim, and
the success of his endeavour to eclipse
the latter in the impressiveness of his
demonstration of welcome was materially
aided by... superior discipline and
spontaneity.
It was during the Monarch's reign that the office of Morena e
Moholo first manifested serious signs of total inability to cope
with the problems of the indigenous court system. Appeal cases from
lower courts piled up at Matsieng. The blame was of course placed
fully on Letsie II, by the territorial chiefs, in no less a manner than
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by the colonial administration. But this was only partially correct.
There were two other factors that accounted for the situation. The
first was that the implementation of The Laws of Lerotholi, in so
far as the question of appeals was concerned, was yielding some results,
unsatisfactory though they still were. Hence, Matsieng was handling
relatively more cases than it had previously done. The second was that
the traditional machinery for clearing such cases, which was basically
still the local court serving the iirmediate jurisdiction around the royal
capital, could no longer cope with the new volume of work. The old
Grand Council had always been reserved for "big" cases, and it was
impractical to call all its members - the principal chiefs throughout
the land, to reside permanently at Matsieng for cases "big" and "small",
just because they were of the nature of appeals.
Thus, at the Fifth Session of the National Council in 1910,
Letsie II made a request that the Council should appoint men to help him
try cases at Matsieng so that he may be left only with the
responsibi l±ty -to pronounce judgments. He repeated this request to the
Council at its Seventh Session in 1912, through Philip Moiise who said:
t
"On this matter people are speaking badly about him by saying, he delays
their cases, and I say he is correct in asking for help because maybe
this blight on his person will disappear." Letsie believed that if at
least he was given men to assist him for just two to three months he
would be able to clear the cases. His health was failing. He was
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desperate.
On both occasions the request was met with dismay. The majority
of the chiefs in the Council asked: "why is there a need for people
today, whereas cases had always been settled in Moshoeshoe's days" with
the same set-up as Letsie II was given. But Philip Moiise was
perceptive: "Times have changed." While, Chief Motsoene was
outrightly hostile to the Morena e Moholo. As he said to Chief
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Makhaola, who had deputized for him:
You should look after this seat of
Moshoeshoe... If you do not hold your
blanket firmly, somebody will per chance
step on it, and tear it up.... I will not
work for Letsie, nor will I take away his
chieftainship from him. I have resolved
never to go to Letsie's place.
Motsoene's hostility toward Letsie II was of course personal:
He still believed that he should have been the Morena e Moholo, •
and in Letsie II he saw someone much less worthy of the Office. But
the hostility was by no means confined to himself: the Council in
general was cool toward the Monarch. And this was so because of the
Monarch's hostility toward it. He seemed to feel that it was replacing
his own authority. And he had gone so far on one occasion in 1909 as
to swear that he would "wipe it out" if it did not comply with his
wishes.
In the end, however, the National Council was convinced that there
was "undoubtedly a great pressure of work in the Paramount Chief's
Court." Except, ironically, the agreement was reached at a Session
held four months after Letsie II died, in 1913:^"°^ Some members of
the Council were appointed to serve at a special Court of Appeals at
Matsieng, which convened for periods of a few weeks at a time, on the
call of the Morena e Moholo. The members of the Court were not
paid for their services. In the course of the decade it would gain
additional responsibility as a roving Court, settling both the judicial
and administrative problems in the several districts, in particular
those that were badly hit by internal strife. This role was distinct
from the one served by the combined Court of the Resident Commissioner
and the Morena e Moholo.
Thus a steady shift in authority from Matsieng to the National
Council at Maseru began. Frcm that point on, there would be an
increasing contest for authority between the two.
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GRIFFITH LEROTHOLI COMES TO POWER: A CONTEST FOR
AUTHORITY BETWEEN MATSIENG AND LERIBE CCNTINUES
As he had lived, a rather unimpressive royal life, Letsie II
met on January 28, 1913 a rather unimpressive death. He had strayed
due South West of the country into the neighbouring Orange Free State
in the Union of South Africa, steering a Scotch cart, practically
unattended by courtiers. In circumstances heavily shro ded in mystery
and unsavoury gossip he took ill. His uncles, Chiefs Maama and Mojela
were suffered to fetch him at the little farm of Runnymede, where he
had wandered. There he died in their hands. He was bur ied beside
his ancestors on Mount Thaba Bosiu, on January 31, "with customary
ceremonial in the presence of an immense concourse.
Letsie II had left a complex succession problem behind. He had
no heir and this was so because throughout his adulthood he had lived
with one of the younger wives of his grandfather Letsie I, Bokholane
('Mamojela) by whom he had even sired a male child, named Mojela.
Mojela was 14 years of age, but as his mother was the wife of Letsie I,
he was viewed rather as Letsie II's uncle than as his son and heir.
Meantime, Letsie II had shunned the company of his own wives, keeping
them for the entertainment of important and favoured persons. His
father Lerotholi had even tried in 1898 to involve the colonial
administration to return him to his first wife, Mahaii, in 1898.
"Letsie however became violent and nothing could be done with
him.""'""'""'' Mahaii had herself been reduced to begging the High
Commissioner, H. C. Gladstone, in 1912" to grant my case a hearing as
the principal wife of Paramount Chief Letsie" who had "for several years
been denied the privileges of my rank...." The High Commisioner had
been unable to help, as "the matter is one in which I am unable to
interfere." And she had been referred to the National Council, which
112
recourse she had declined to pursue. Thus, unto the death
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Letsie II had remained in the affectionate throes of his grandmother,
as it were, thereby frustrating a anooth succession.
The last remaining hope, in the person of a toddler named Tau, by
one of the Monarch's highly placed wives, was crushed by a mysterious
death shortly after the royal burial. True, his paternity was already
a subject of debate. But in Sesotho custom he might have been accepted
as Letsie's son, in that his mother's Bohali had been negotiated and
and Sesotho says "Ngoana Ke oa likhomo" - "A child derives its
legitimacy from its mother's bohali cattle."
In the bewildering circumstances, Chief Griffith, as the full
brother to the deceased Morena e Moholo, was approached to fulfil
the custom of levirate and raise seed for his brother by his senior
wives, and meantime to accept the role of Regent. But Griffith, who
was by then a staunch member of the Reman Catholic Church, albeit with
28 wives, declined the invitations. First, he argued that his faith
did not permit him to raise seed for the deceased. Second, however,
he was adamant that the throne had naturally devolved upon him and lie
meant, in his quotable phrase, "to sit on the throne with both
buttocks."1"^
The majority of "the Sons of Moshoeshoe" finally yielded and gave
Griffith his wish. Among the opponents to his recognition was none
other than the Chief of Leribe. In the main, Chief Jonathan's
opposition was based on an understandable, if arguable, point of custom.
He believed that Griffith should be required to honour custom and only
raise seed for the royal house, failing which he should yield to another
member of Moshoeshoe's lineage to do so. Behind his argument, however,
another factor was apparent: He probably hoped that the impasse might
give him the opportunity to propose Chief Motsoene as the successor.
As Herbert Sloley had pointed out five years earlier in 1908, Motsoene's
presence in Leribe was "a source of great embarrassment to Jonathan and
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a great relief to the house of Letsie. "11'1 The Resident
Commissioner would once more observe at the conclusion of Griffith's
1 1 cx
appointment in July 1913:
Motsoeni(sic) has in addition to his
claims in Leribe a very serious claim to
the Paramount Chieftainship and were it
not for the fact that he has at times
displayed a certain mental inability (perhaps
inherited frcm his father) he might have
proved a formidable rival claimant to the
late Letsie and to Griffith.
It is indeed probable that Chief Motsoene might have personally tried
his luck for the high office in 1913, but the Resident Commissioner
promised to better his material condition to offset his political
loss. For, as he made the above observation to the High Cotrmissioner,
the Resident Commissioner commented with a sense of achievement that
"I have had a private meeting with Motsoeni" at which he had given him
"a substantial increase to his allowance" to the end of taking "the edge
"1 "1
from his discontent for the present."
Against this background then, Griffith Lerotholi was duly
recognized as the Morena e Moholo of Basotho in April, 1913. The
High Commissioner came to Lesotho especially to install him, "In the name
of the King."117
The consequence of Jonathan's opposition to Griffith's appointment
was an irreconcilable difference between the two members of the royal
lineage. Unlike Letsie II, Griffith was determined to bring Jonathan
under control. In turn, the latter redoubled his efforts to maintain
his independence. The general outcome of the struggle for power
between the two was that divisions within the royal lineage were
%
intensified. Whilst the commoners caught within the conflict,
particularly those in Leribe, suffered.
The contest of wills began only a few months following Griffith's
installation. In December 1913, the Resident Commissioner advised the
Morena e Moholo to call Chief Jonathan to the royal residence at
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Matsieng "to discuss in a friendly way sane long outstanding difficulties"
still pending in the District of Leribe. Pleading old age and infirmity
the Chief, then 61 years of age, offered to meet the Morena e
Moholo half way, significantly, either at Moshoeshoe's historic
1 "I O
Mountain Fort Thaba Bosiu, or at the colonial capital in Maseru.
Unofficial^ though, the Cape Times credibly reported that the Chief
had otherwise intended not to honour the call, saying he would not "talk
to a boy."11® Following a caucus with his uncles, the Morena e
Moholo declined the Resident Commissioner's advice that a special
Session of the National Council be called to discuss the old Chief's
conduct and resorted, instead, to a more direct approach. According
to the Cape Times he sent "several Chiefs" to Leribe with a command.
"Their visit was also bootless, the recalcitrant chief again refusing
to obey." It was not until Griffith had personally decided to descend
upon old Jonathan, "riding at the head of a large force," that he went
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to Maseru and not Matsieng. The Chief, however, denied any
allegations that his delay had ben actuated by defiance. He was fined
20 head of cattle for .contempt. (In March 1914, as it will be recalled,
Chief Mocheko L. Moorosi of Baphuthi would tentatively be made an offer
to settle on top of Mount Qeme for his own act of defiance.)
His age notwithstanding, in August 1914 Chief Jonathan set out
to rake up the embers of the old feud between himself and his half-
brother Joel. Employing his sons as commanders for the purpose, he
raided Joel's flock, burned his subjects' houses and returned with
1,716 cattle, 7,942 goats, 5,794 sheep and 418 horses, mostly the
property of the common people, and three men lost their lives. The
attack was totally unprovoked and, except as a retaliation to Joel's
offensive during the Anglo-Boer War, unjustifiable. In August 1915, a
combined Court of the Morena e Moholo and the Resident Commissioner
tried the Chief of Leribe for manslaughter and disturbing the peace. He
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was fined (=3,341, in lieu of 1,000 head of cattle which, although he was
the wealthiest Mosotho in hard cash as in cattle in the land, he
extracted from the conmon people by imposing an extraordinary cattle
levy (morohane) on then - then a conmon practice among chiefs. The
Morena e Moholo kept f634 of the fine, the rest of it going to the
central treasury of the Territory. In addition, Jonathan was required
to pay j:8,000 to Joel in damages. But he also kept all the Morohane
cattle in excess of his fine. So that at the end he came out the
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richer from it all.
The colonial custom of sharing fines accruing from judgments in
chiefs' disputes had the positive effect of motivating the successive
holders of the Office of Morena e Mohoio to be active in the joint '
Court system with the Resident Conmissioner. But it also had very
negative effects: First, it whetted Matsieng's appetite for money.
Second, it stimulated or, as in the case of Jonathan, reinforced chiefs'
resentment of Morena e Moholo for his monopoly on the privilege
of big fines. Third, as cormoners in the end paid the fines for their
chiefs, it meant that the Morena e Moholo and the colonial
administration were indirectly bleeding the conmon man for the
aggression of chiefs.
In this regard, 1915 was a good year for Griffith. He had sat
at three joint Court sessions got between 18 to 21% for each, and made
a clean 1859 for the year, excluding his annual allowance of £l,680,
thus: he had sat at the judgment of Chief Masopha Masopha in April,
getting his share of j=200 out of a total fine of £ 1,109.16.6. In
August he got £25 out of Chief Seeiso Maama's total fine of 118.12.
Then, the same month it had been Jonathan's case, for which initially
n 1 OO
he got |k334. But he protested to the Resident Cannissioner:
However, Chief, I pray that I may be given
a share that becomes me and my chieftainship,
and my position in the country and my position
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as Government servant.
And so the share was raised by another £.300.
Jonathan was perceivably as disenchanted with Griffith's assertion
of authority as he was with his financial gain. He would not comply
with the requirement to pay damages to Joel until 1918, when Joel got
the services of a lawyer to recover his losses. Meantime, in September
1915 he tried to smuggle a huge consignment of rifles into the Territory,
obviously positioning himself for a last ditch resistance against
Griffith. But the plan backfired very badly. He lost £ 1,311 in hard
cash to a European anuggler who, he found later, had procured him
123"nine large cases" of salt, instead of rifles and ammunition.
The Chief made his last desperate attempt to rule independently
of the Morena e Moholo in 1916, when he petitioned the High
Conmissioner to recognize his District as an independent state, to
redress the situation that "Griffith... constantly trespasses and
unlawfully interferes in your Petitioner's inherited rights in
124Leribe.To entertain such a petition was, to the High
Conmissioner, out of the question. Jonathan was thus forced to accept
Griffith's authority.'
It must be said, in the final analysis, that the new colonial
policy toward dynastic disputes achieved its main purpose: It tamed
the chiefs and made them more manageable by both the colonial
administration as well as by the Morena e Moholo. Although
imprisonment had been introduced into the Territory since Cape rule,
chiefs did not generally serve jail sentences for breaking the law
until the start of the century when Joel was incarcerated during the
Anglo-Boer War. Thereafter it was used more regularly. Used in
combination with the heavy fines imposed by the Joint Court, it had a
dampening effect on the chiefs' pugnacity.
To this we may add the fact that by the end of the second decade
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of the twentieth century most of the veterans of the Gun War were
either dead or tired. Chief Maama died in 1916. Joel died in 1919.
Both Jonathan and Motsoene survived the decade. But Jonathan was so
tired that about March in 1920 he requested Griffith to allow him to
abdicate in favour of Motsoene. A pitso was duly called at Matsieng
at which, on Griffith's evidence, "The sons of Moshesh have agreed to
19S
this matter and I have confirmed." But the Chief later changed
his mind, apparently because of Griffith's warning that Motsoene was
not clearly sound of mind and he just might "require him to hold the
1
reins of his horse when he rides."
THE QUESTION OF LESOTHO'S INCORPORATION TO THE UNION
OF SOUTH AFRICA: BASOTHO'S RESPONSE TO IT, AND ITS
EFFECT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
Divided as they were individually, and generally unable to acquit
themselves as effectively as they had done in the pre-colonial period
as an institution, chiefs were united against the proposal that their
country be Incorporated into the Union of South Africa. They feared the
prospect. And they did all in their power to forestall or delay it.
The basis of their fears, generally speaking, was the memory of
the Basotho-Boer War of 1865-58, which drove them to seek British
protection. They feared that the Boer element of a united South
Africa might be still eager for a conclusive victory over them. They
loathed the idea.
More recently, since the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War, when
discussions on the unification of South African began in earnest, these
fears had been confirmed. European settlers, English and Boer alike,
were making clear in the press and other media that they were not
prepared to share power with Africans. Perhaps expressing a
representative view of Europeans' basic fears in regard to giving
Africans franchise, the Honourable J. G. Fraser, a Solicitor and former
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member of the Orange River Colony volksraad stated, when interviewed by
the South African Native Affairs Commission on September 21, 1904
I should be very chary of giving the
Native the franchise in this country
at all, for the simple reason that
numerically it would eventually become
a black Government. They outnumber,
and they are so much more prolific than
the white populations, that, if they
got the franchise, it must eventually
culminate in the whole country being
under a black Government.
C. H. Hobson, a merchant resident in Lesotho, echoed a sentiment to the
same Commissioner which was only a variation of Fraser's argument, and
I OQ
equally widely shared by the European comnunity:
I think they are utterly unfit for it,
either by education or by public spirit.
At the present time they are almost in
the power of their Chiefs and would vote
as their Chiefs told them. You cannot
have a feudal system and the franchise
together: they are diametrically opposed.
Basotho chiefs were certainly aware of these sentiments. Besides,
they were participants in, and the focus of, the Commission.
Lesotho's response to political developments in South Africa at
this point in history took two forms. The first, by the intelligentsia,
was the newpaper. The second, by the chiefs, was the National Council.
The Reaction of the Educated Elite
Until 1904 the educated elite, by which I mean teachers, clergymen,
writers, and the employees of the colonial administration, had only one
local paper through which they expressed their views, and that was the
missionary controlled Leselinyana la Lesotho. Coincidentally with
the establishment of the National Council, a new and more political
weekly newspaper called Naledi ea Lesotho or Basutoland Star was
founded by the family of N. M. Tlale and E. N. Tlale, with Simon
Phamotse as its first Editor. Unlike Leselinyana, which published
in Sesotho only, Naledi published both in Sesotho as well as in
English. About 1910, apparently marking the event of "Halley's"
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Comet, which appeared that year, another activist paper called
Mochochonono or The Comet, appeared. Started by E. Monyakoane,
by 1920 it had been overtaken by the proprietors of Naledi. Both
Naledi and Mochochonono began with a weekly circulation of about
400, and in 1929, when Naledi closed down, the weekly circulation was
658 and 800, respectively, compared with Leselinyana at 1120 per
week.^®
Early in June 1908, just as the colonial parliaments closed their
special sessions devoted to the question of "a closer union", and a
National Convention was to be held in Durban in October, Naledi entered
the debate with two lengthy articles. Its primary aim was to educate
its readers on the issue of unification itself, and then to make its
own proposals. First, it explained the difference between the two
types of constitutions under discussion - one for a federation, the
other for a unitary government. The difference between the two, it
said, was that under a federation "each of the colonies is a family,
where federal interference is limited." Whereas under a unitary
constitution, the central government gets into the family. Quite
(
clearly, it said, the former was to be preferred because "little
countries such as Lesotho will remain as they are today." Second,
whereas European newspapers were saying that the various South African
colonies should first unite, and then deal with "the Native Question"
later, Naledi proposed that the procedure be reversed. As it was,
only the Cape Colony was known to have taken a step favourable to the
rights of Africans. Naledi feared that if the question were
%
addressed later, it would be easy to strip Africans of whatever rights
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they brought with them from their respective territories.
It was of course clear by the time the white colonies held their
parliamentary sessions that they themselves preferred a unified
government, and Naledi was not in favour of Lesotho's incorporation
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in that event. On "the Native Question" also it was clear to Naiedi
that the Orange River Colony, in particular, "judging fran the remarks
of several of its manbers... natives must look elsewhere for protection
from Colonial tyranny." The newspaper expressed dismay at the
suggestion by the Orange River Colony that under a united South Africa
Africans would have to be lumped together in "Native States" and
1 31
remarked, ironically:
The suggestion of establishing Native
States in the already crowded Colonies
in which Natives will be given local
government, and which has been harped on
from time to time by the Bloemfontein
Friend, is Utopian. Such a thing can
never happen and is impossible of fulfilment.
Were(sic) will such a land come from that
will be set aside for the segregation of
Natives.
The irony lay in the fact that "utopian" as it seemed the Union of South
Africa did eventually implement it. Unlike their chiefs, however,
the educated elite had one point on which they were in perfect agreement
with Europeans, and that was the view that franchise and "civilization"
go hand in hand. As Naiedi said, "we do not believe in the
indiscriminate grant df political right to our people most of whom
have not as yet any knowledge of how to make use of it...." The paper
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subscribed to the view that
the test of civilization should be a real
one, the man who can only sign his name is
not civilised [he must not only] have thrown
off his native blanket but also the heathen
influence of native law and custom, and is
leading a truly civilised life. That is
the kind of test which ought to be acceptable
to all enlightened and intelligent Natives and
which we in our humble opinion, accept as a true
test.
Needless to say, this "true test" left the majority of the chiefs
outside the political calculations of the educated elite. It was a
challenge to their authority. And the chiefs viewed it with
resentment and hostility.
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The Reaction of the Chiefs and the National Council
Alarmed by the increasing tempo of discussions on unification,
and dreading its consequences on themselves and their country, chiefs
convened their Lekhotla la Mahosana (Court of Princes) in May
1908 to decide on a course of action to be taken in the circumstances.
Consequent upon the meeting, Morena e Moholo Letsie II wrote a
letter to the Resident Commissioner seeking further information:- He
saw in the newspapers "a scheme'' to unify the white South African
Governments, he said. "I do not understand the nature of this matter."
He wished to be advised on the reasons for unification and how it was
to be achieved. More specifically, he wished to know just how "the
preservation of us Basuto differs from that of other colonies. Are
1 QQ
we of Basutoland also thought of in this unification?"
The Resident Commissioner's response was brief: "I know nothing
beyond what I have seen in the newspapers." He promised, however, to
forward the Monarch's letter to the High Commissioner and await further
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instructions.
The High Commissioner's response was exactly what the chiefs had
dreaded: It was desirable in his view, he said, to have "the control of
the Protectorates" (Swaziland, Bechuanaland, and Lesotho inclusive)
transferred to the planned union because "I much fear that, if the
Protectorates remained as it were 'islands' under the Imperial
administration in the midst of a United South Africa there will be
friction between the South African and Imperial Governments." Such
friction, he feared, would be bad for all three parties in the long run.
Nonetheless, as "an absolute obligation of honour" upon the Imperial
Government, specific provisions would be embodied in the South African
Constitution to guarantee chiefs and their people in the respective
"Protectorates" to continue with the types of government they already
enjoyed.-^
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The Colonial Office was evidently uneasy about the High
Commissioner's posture on the question. A minute was penned next to
1 QC
the relevant paragraph on his report:
Lord Selborne is in too great a hurry in
this matter. Basutoland is a very prickly
hedgehog and it is not at all certain that
the S.A. Union when it is made will be anxious
to handle it. The Basutos are already
asking questions, they are warlike and armed.
(My emphasis.)
On their part, chiefs panicked and decided to take up the matter more
actively through the National Council at its Third Session in 1908.
Quite obviously, the chiefs concluded when they were advised of
Lord Selborne's response that, not only was he bent on transferring
their country to the planned union but, he was actually committed to
breaking their power altogether. Just a year preceding the political
conflagration of unification, he had passed a Proclamation reserving
for the High Commisioner the power to remove what might be deemed
"undesirable persons" from the Territory. This was the infamous
Proclamation No. 46 of 1907 under which Chief Mocheko "L. Moorosi would
be nearly banished to Matebeleland. The chiefs now thought it should
be treated in the same way as the question of unification: It should be
formulated in the form of a Petition to be taken personally to the
"great white father and protector," His Majesty King Edward VII by a
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high powered delegation. The Petition, in part, read:
[The removal] may be done sunmarily and
without notice and without fair trial, a
fact which...[is] like a great sword
overhanding us...the Proclamation ignores
our existing tribunals which are presided
over by Your Majesty's representatives...
We feel that it places us in a position
of great degradation and must be looked
upon with suspicion and distrust.
The Petition on the question of unification submitted a strong
plea that Lesotho should not be incorporated into the planned union
of the South African Governments but should remain, "as far as possible,
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independent as now." The Petition expressed the fear that if Lesotho
was incorporated, "our national existence will cease." In the
unfortunate event that the Imperial Government insisted on Lesotho's
incorporation, the Petition sutmitted a plea that at least "our present
form of Government, our ancient customs and our ancient laws" should
1
be preserved.
The Lesotho Petitions to King Edward VII were based as much on
Basotho disdain and fear of potential Boer domination as on the
suspicion that, as they had proved with the Bloemfontein Convention of
1854, the white people of South Africa, including the High Conmissioner,
were united in a scheme to sacrifice Basotho to their own political
expediency. One unfortunate fact, however, was that in drafting the
Petitions, the members of the National Council were as good as making
bricks without straw: They were being systematically short-changed of
crucial information necessary for them to build a strong case to the
Imperial Government. The most they could do in the circumstances was
to Tall back on diplomacy - a legacy that Moshoeshoe had bequeathed
them, and one which they sought to turn into a national heritage. They
flattered and wooed tfie British King, addressed him as the "great ■white
father and protector," and assured him that if he did not intercede on
their behalf, "our whole constitution, as granted us by Your August
Mother, Queen Victoria, and continued by your gracious Majesty, will
be shattered."
The Views of the South African Colonies and
the High Commissioner on "The Native Question"
As the chiefs consulted on the Petitions and made preparations
during the latter part of 1908 to proceed to London in the new year,
across the border a Union was being forged. A Convention of the white
South African colonies, including Rhodesia (which took no part in the
discussions or the divisions) was held in Durban from October 12 to
November 5, and at Cape Town from November 23, 1908 until February 3,
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1909 when it produced a draft Act of the Union. Of relevance to the
South African High Conmission Territories (Lesotho, Bechuanaiand and
Swaziland) were two points. The first was that, right at the start of
the proceedings, an agreement was reached, on the motion of the Prime-
Minister of the Cape Colony, that the debates would be absolutely secret,
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and that no records of speakers would be made. That meant that
the National Council of Lesotho was barred from knowing the facts
necessary in the preparation of its own position in relation to the
framers of the Union Constitution.
The second fact was that, as a consequence of the secrecy of the
debates of the Convention, the National Council was denied of at least
one crucial evidence on the posture of the framers of the Union
Constitution, the knowledge of which should greatly have fortified
its contention against incorporation. For we now know, from what
little came to light from the Conventions's debates, that frcm the start
the Convention did not, generally, intend to come to terms with the
fears and hopes of the African population in the future Union of South
Africa. This view was stated lucidly by the Chairman of the Convention,
Sir Henry de Villiers in his opening speech when he remarked:
There appears to be an impression abroad
that this Convention is going to lay down
the lines to be followed upon such questions
as the future native policy of South Africa,
but I think you will agree with me that
questions of that nature can only be dealt
with by us in so far as they bear upon the
immediate matters submitted to us for
consideration.
Indeed such was to be the general posture of the Convention. In
%
a situation at the time when Africans outnumbered Europeans by a ratio
of five to one, the fathers of the Union Constitution would not consider
it expedient to give Africans franchise. Only the Cape Colony, whose
African population was already enjoying a franchise (based on property
and wage qualification) put up the struggle. The Transvaal and the
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Orange River Colony refused to extend African franchise northward.
In the end, both the solutions to adopt the Cape franchise, and to fix
a civilization test for all electors, were ruled out.*4-1- By the
time that the draft of the South Africa Bill was brought to London in
the middle of 1909, all that had been agreed was to vest the
administration of "native affairs" in the Governoi^-General.142
Lord Selborne, the High Commissioner for South Africa, in whose
care the welfare of Basotho was vested, was not less negative in his
view of the African ability to participate in parliamentary institutions.
He made this clear to the Colonial Office in February 1909, the very
week that the Lesotho Deputation submitted its Petitions at the centre
of power in London. On the eve of the delegation's departure for
London on January 29, 1909 the Conference of the Paris Evangelical
Missionary Society had submitted a proposal to the High Commissioner
associating themselves with the stand of the National Council and
adding that, in the event of incorporation, Lesotho should be given "the
right... to a large amount of self-government...." I*n regard to the
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National Council it had proposed:
t
The continues(sic) existence of that
Council should be secured in the Charter,
and means found to give it a more
representative character and to gradually
increase its powers so as to lead eventually
to representative institutions.
In his reaction to the proposal the High Commissioner made it clear to
the Secretary for Colonies, The Earl of Crewe, that he was totally
opposed to the idea.^^
H.M. Govt, are the trustees and at all
times will be far better judges of what
is really to be to the advantage of the
Basuto people than the Chiefs and Council
ever can be. These uncivilized natives
have not the knowledge or the education
to form a sound judgement under the
complicated conditions of modern civilization
and politics.
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A Visit to the Centre of Power
Against this background, then, the Lesotho Deputation set out
to England to see the white Lord Paramount in person. The Deputation
was to have been led by Morena e Moholo Letsie II himself.
Indeed, his chiefs and headmen did all they could to show him that it
was essential and fitting for him to do so. But he pleaded ill-health
and could not be moved out of Lesotho. The point of fact was that the
Morena e Moholo had an almost pathological aversion to official
trips outside his country. He had never even as much as taken the
opportunity to go to Cape Town, the only Mosotho Monarch in Lesotho
history to distinguish himself with such a sedentary life. Nonetheless
his representatives were well picked: They consisted of four chiefs,
Seeiso Letsie, Mojela Letsie, Masopha L. Maopha and Leshoboro,
representing the families of three of the four prominent sons of the
house of Moshoeshoe. Chief Jonathan, the son of Molapo, the second
son of Moshoeshoe, declined to complete the dynastic quartet of the
Deputation. While in complete agreement with the objects of the
Deputation, and while attaching his signature to both of the Petitions
to be submitted to Kiqg Edward VII, he refused to go himself or to
provide a representative, owing to what he claimed to be his grievances
against Letsie II - an allusion to a perennial claim for grazing ground
for his cattle in the mountain areas. The Chiefs were accompanied by
two Government Interpreters, Bernard Matete and Manama Molapo, and
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two Secretaries, Philip Mochekoane and Dyke Mabitso.
The Deputation arrived in London on February 6, 1909, and it was
well received: It was housed in a first-class hotel at 29 Inverness
%
Terrace, with a special cook assigned to it. It was clothed with new
suits and saturated with activities of pleasure - bus riding, sight¬
seeing and dinners. And for its objects it saw the Secretary for
Colonies, the Earl of Crewr., twice, and even got an audience with "the
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white father and protector," the King.
The Imperial Response to Petitions
By the time it got to see the Secretary for Colonies and the King,
however, one of its objects, the Petition against Proclamation No. 46,
1907, had already been greatly undermined. The High Carmissioner had
sent a lengthy telegram to the Colonial Office on January 11, ahead of
its arrival, justifying the need for the Proclamation, and recommending
the nature of the response that the Deputation was to be given: The
most immediate cause for the Proclamation, he said, was "a most
undesirable class of white men" resident in Lesotho, living among
Basotho, "conforming to their customs to a large extent, and in seme
cases intermarrying with than by cattle in native fashion." This class
of low white men was a source of "considerable embarrassment" to
colonial Officers in the performance of their duties. He needed the
Proclamation to sweep it out of the Territory.
In so far as chiefs feared that the Proclamation might be used
against them, he said, their fears were not misplaced. He had intended
it to be the sword of Damocles over their heads. This he found to be
necessary all the more as he anticipated a bitter struggle for
succession after Letsie II, who had no son. In the event the claimants
to the sceptre resorted to arms, all of which was in their tradition, "it
would mean for many years to come a state of unrest and friction,
manifesting itself in continuous internal tribal disorder and constant
faction fights accompanied by loss of life." Against that background,
therefore, and although he had studiously avoided being explicit to
Letsie II, he intended to remove any such belligerent chiefs or confine
them to such places in the Territory as might seem convenient. Besides,
he said, such action had already recently been taken among the Batswana
where, for a similar offence, Chief Sekgome Letsholathebe had been
removed from his ancestral place at Tsau and "detained against his will
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at Gaberones for two and half years...." Nonetheless, when the
Deputation presents the Petition on the matter,
I suggest...that your Lordship [the Secretary
for Colonies], in advising His Majesty as to
the answer..., should state quite clearly that
you regard such a power as a justifiable power
in the hands of the High Conmissioner and
necessary for him to fulfil his responsibilities,
and that you should express surprise that...
the paramount chief should not show more
confidence in the manner in which such a reserve
power is likely to be exercised... under the
direct supervision of His Majesty's Government.
The High Commisioner concluded his telegram by stressing the point
that the Deputation should be told "quite definitely" that the
Proclamation would not be repealed. And so that was the response
that the Deputation was given.
The Petition against incorporation got a slightly encouraging
response, albeit still failing in its ultimate objective. The
Delegation was informed, as already suggested by the High Conmissioner
in his communication of February 15, that as it always had, the Imperial
Government would safeguard the interests of Basotho. It could not be
guaranteed that Lesotho would not be incorporated to the South African
Union. But if and when it happened, it would be under terms favourable
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to the Territory. Thus, the Deputation returned from the centre
of power, three weeks later, with an epic of adventure, but intangible
political results.
The visit, however, had left an impact in London: The Colonial
Office might have dismissed the Deputation with empty gestures, but
it did not deceive itself into thinking that it had cleared the road
to Lesotho's incorporation. More than anything else, the visit had
vindicated its long held view that Lesotho was "a prickly hedgehog".
It would not be prudent as yet to make plans for its incorporation.
It were better to delay such a prospect, and hope that in the course
of time the political circumstances of South Africa would acconmodate
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it without spines flying in the face of the Imperial Government.
The National Council Requests Guarantees
For the Survival of the Nation and for a
Change in its Own Constitutional Status
Be that as it may, when the National Council met at its Fourth
Session in March 1909, Basotho's attitudes on the home front had taken
a new turn. All the while the Deputation was in England, various
interest groups in the Territory were making preparations in
anticipation of incorporation. The various Church denominations,
with the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society at the vanguard, mounted
pressure on the colonial administration to give Basotho reasonable
guarantees: 1) Special treatment in regard to "a large amount of
self-government," in recognition of the fact that the nation was more
"civilized" and politically more sophisticated than the Swazi and the
Batswana. 2) The right to exclusive use of the Territory, such as to
"make impossible for any South African Ministry of Parliament to ever
confiscate it, or any portion of it, under any pretext whatever or
for any pretext whatever or for any reason whatever." 3) Laws
governing the Council were to continue to be promulgated by the High
Ccmnissioner, on the advice of the National Council. 4) "No
alterations should be made in the Charter granted to Basutoland without
the free consent of the Basuto tribe represented by its Chiefs and
Council and of the Imperial Parliament." 5) Appropriate disposal of
revenue by the Resident Commissioner, under reserve of the approval of
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the High Conmissioner on the advice of the National Council.
The Basutoland Chamber of Conmerce, under the chairmanship of Geo. R.
Hobson, whose views on African franchise in 1904 were earlier cited,
associated itself with the Church denominations, with two major
exceptions: It urged for an inmediate review of the land tenure of
trading Stations, residences and buildings of Europeans. And it
wished to be represented in the National Council, "with a vote if
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possible.""*"^ These were to be the major items in the agenda
of the Fourth Session. Stakes were high. The High Commissioner
had come in person.
The general attitude of the National Council, and likely of the
Nation at large at that juncture, was that Lesotho was being made a
sacrificial lamb to an essentially wicked government, and all that the
Nation could do was to plead for guarantees. The Daily Mail of
South Africa cited the view of the Morena e Moholo as
follows:"*"^
Letsie declared himself afraid of the
Union of South Africa Government, which
he compared with a snake trying to kill
his people. "If," he said, "the snake
tries to kill me, others may try to kill
the snake. I am frightened of the Union."
In the event, then, that no one came forth "to kill the snake", the
National Council drew up a list of twenty guarantees, headed by the
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four crucial questions:
1. Land should remain inalienable.
2. "The Paramount Chief, Chiefs and National
Council to be recognised as the mouthpiece
of the Basuto Nation. That the Council be
allowed to jmprove until its members shall be
elected by the Nation."
3. "Succession of the Chieftainship of
Basutoland to follow the laws and
customs of the Basuto, and the rights
and privile ges of the Basuto people
to be respected in accordance with the law."
4. Proclamations intended for Basutoland be first
laid before the National Council by the
Governor-General, before being put for discussion
by the Union Parliament.
Virtually all the recoranendations of the Church denominations and of
the Chamber of Conmerce were adopted. Of those that were excluded,
the most significant were a) the inclusion of Europeans in the National
Council, and b) individual title to land.
By the time in June 1909 that the white colonial governments of
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South Africa approved the final draft of the Convention's work, they
sensed a mood of war from Lesotho. There were rumours in Lesotho,
most of then deliberately put into circulation by chiefs themselves,
that Lesotho was soon to be seized by the Boers and carved up into farms.
As a consequence, the people generally were getting aroused. In
preparation for a possible uprising, the General Commanding the Forces
in South Africa had prepared an intelligence report spotting the
weaknesses of the chiefs and assessing the probabilities of a quick
1 ^9
military conquest. In a secret memorandum written on June 4,
the Cape Colony Prime Minister, John X. Merriman, recorded his
Ministers' disappointment at "the result of a generation of direct
Imperial rule" which had erected a system of government through chiefs,
instead of breaking down and minimizing their power. As a consequence
1 EjQ
of that policy, the Ministers felt,
Basutoland must be considered the Storm
Centre of South Africa, a condition of
things which is all the more remarkable
from the fact that the position of these
people has evolved in less than a hundred
years out of the scattered remnants of
broken fugitives and some cases of canibals.
i
The net gain of all these developments to Lesotho was that the
National Council was established on a permanent footing: A special
building for the Council was built in 1908 and completed in 1911. A
Proclamation was promulgated in 1910 giving the Council statutory
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force, still as an advisory body, and the Counsellors began
to get a special attendance allowance, for the start as f:10. The
Council was allowed to discuss external matters, provided they affected
the Territory. And it was written into the Schedule to Section 151
of the Union of South Africa Act that in case of transfer, "It shall
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not be lawful to alienate any land in Basutoland...."
LESOTHO'S ROLE IN THE FOUNDING
OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
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The homogeneity of Basotho, their early exposure to Western
civilization, and the fact that they were an unconquered Nation, had
always given than a distinctive place in the eyes of the majority of
Africans in South Africa. Their persistence against incorporation
elevated that image even higher. Lesotho was seen as having a role
to play in the politics of wider South Africa. And, with all its
limitations, it responded.
A distinctive illustration of this point was the role that it
played in the founding of the African National Congress in 1912.
It is significant to note that when the idea for the Congress matured
in 1911, the Morena e Moholo of Basotho was appointed Honorary
Vice President of the Convention that was to be held the following
year, in Bloemfontein. It is further significant that when that
Convention was held, on January 1912, it was a Mosotho of Lesotho who
chaired it. However, this was consequent upon a logistical difficulty:
The man who had formerly been given the chair, a Mr. Mocher, otherwise
Chairman of the association's Orange River State Branch, could not keep
order and the chair had to be rescu ed from him. Letsie II had
deputized his uncle Chief Alexander Maama to the Convention, who was
then given the honour. Although Maama declined it, "on the grounds that
he did not think his Chief would wish him to accept", a member of his
entourage, Philip Mochekoane, one of the secretaries to the 1909
Deputation to London, assumed the responsibility "and kept good order
throughout.
The Chairmanship notwithstanding, Lesotho maintained a sense of
political balance and pragmatism in its involvement. . Thus, when the
Convention called for "unity" and "sympathy", Chief Maama was quick to
lay down Lesotho's policy: "he was quite at one with the speaker as
long as sympathy meant sympathy, but if by sympathy, rebellion was
meant, he on behalf of the Basuto would have none of it." All assured
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him that by sympathy they meant sympathy - "moral support and no more."
Similarly, the Basotho representatives would not join in the discussion
of "Union Laws" lest they be accused of "interfering in another man's
house."^57
THE QUESTION OF INCORPORATION THREATENS LESOTHO ONCE MORE.
MCRENA E MCHOLO GRIFFITH GOES TO THE CENTRE OF POWER
The long range effects of the question of incorporation were two¬
fold: First, it made the chiefs permanently vulnerable to the colonial
administration. Their life-line from incorporation was the Imperial
Government. The Imperial Government got its reconmendations frcm the
High Commissioner and the Officers on the spot in Lesotho. It became
necessary not to ruffle the feathers of these Officers without
compelling reasons, lest they became unresponsive or negative when and
if South Africa should continue to press for the transfer of their
country. Second, it provided justification for the colonial
administration and the Imperial Government to resist constitutional
advance. For it apeared antithetical to the prospect of incorporation
to do so, especially as the Union of South Africa kept a vigilant eye
on any such move. 1
Meantime, the Union of South Africa intermittently raised the
question of having the High Carmission Territories, keeping the chiefs
constantly on their haunches. The first major one of these occasions
was in June .1919, when the Prime Minister of South Africa, General Botha,
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expressed his readiness to incorporate Swaziland. But by the
time that he made such an explicit pronouncement, suspicions in
Lesotho had been aroused two years previously when, in 1917, the Union
of South Africa proposed the Natives Administration Bill, segregating
black people from the white. (The Bill would become law in 1920).
Morena e Moholo Griffith had then anxiously enquired of his
Resident Conmissioner, R. T. Coryndon: "I ask you Chief to explain
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to me the reference to black people, as to place from which it starts
i czq
and how far it goes. I ask for an answer by letter."
Although he was answered by letter and informed that the Bill
would not affect the High Conmission Territories, as long as they were
not a part of the Union of South AFrica, Griffith remained anxious.
By early 1918 rumours were rife in Lesotho that the country was about
to be seized. One junior chief in particular, a grandson of the late
rebel Chief Masopha, himself named Thakampholo Masopha, was on a
propaganda campaign among Basotho in the Kimberley mines, alerting
miners that word was out from Cape Town to the effect that Lesotho
"must cane under the Union Government." He said a part or perhaps the
whole of it was due to be appropriated and carved out into farms for
white people. Those removed frcm their land holdings would in
exchange be given land strewn all over Southern Africa, from Thaba Nchu
and Matatiele in the Orange Free State and the Cape, respectively, to
1
Bechuanaland, Natal, the Transvaal, and even in Rhodesia. Early
in 19.19, when The Morena e Moholo requested a trip to London, to
renew his loyalty to His Majesty King George V, and "to rejoice over
this Peace" terminating World War 1 with him, the National Council
thought the primary objects of the trip might as well include another
Petition against incorporation. The Fourteenth Session of the Council,
held from May 12 to May 30, was hence devoted predominently to the
subject of incorporation and the draft Petition. Time was ripe, the
Council generally agreed, to draw the attention of King George V to the
fact that, just as it had predicted, the Union of South Africa had begun
to deprive Africans of land and to harrass them. In a brilliant feat of
diplomacy, the Council agreed to carmemorate the day on which Lesotho
came under Queen Victoria, March 12, 1868, as Moshoeshoe's Day. And
in October Morena e Moholo Griffith was in London - the first
Mosotho Monarch to go to the centre of power.
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On that occasion, the response frcm His Majesty was more
explicit, more encouraging, and more flattering than the one given to
the 1909 Deputation. Fittingly so, perhaps: this time it was one
monarch to the other - or liege lord and his vassal, as it seemed.
His Majesty King George V expressed the hope that"'"61
between Britain and Basutoland and between
the Basuto nation and the King and his
successors there will remain the silken
but enduring fetters of today.
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CHAPTER V
COMMONERS' POLITICAL AGITATION AND
THE DILEMMA OF THE CHIEFTAINCY
By the end of the nineteenth century the structure of the
indigenous government had loosened and virtually broken down. Thus,
with the collapse, in the main, of the pitso and the decline of its
traditions, commoners' general criticism of chiefs no longer produced
the same salutary effects as they had in Moshoeshoe's times. Commoners'
political role in the management of their own affairs diminished. Yet,
at the same time, their grievances mounted. They had at the end to find
new avenues to redress those grievances.
The establishment of the National Council served to release their
frustrations. Initially, the handful of commoners in the National
Council seized the opportunity to speak out on behalf of the majority
outside. But, simultane ously, they discovered the press as a
complementary and, sometimes, a more effective weapon.
As already ponted out in the previous Chapter, this role of
A
political agitation was taken up first by the educated elite - persons
who had a greater measure of economic and political independence than
those who were still tied to the soil or else were finding their escape
in migrant labour. In the nineteen twenties, however, these "educated"
men would enter into a competition with a political movement that was
more agrarian based, but less co-ordinated, in organization as well as
in its aims. The combined effect of both was to expose the weaknesses
of the chieftaincy, and to ensure its reform. This Chapter will
examine the activities of these two sectors of commoners, their conflict
%
with chiefs, and how that conflict was resolved.
As the educated elite were the first to get into the political
arena and to make impact fully felt, it will be useful at this jucture
to describe just who they were. How educated were they? And what can
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be said of their numbers?
The Educated Elite: Their Training and Numbers
Although the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society introduced
literacy among the Basotho quite early in 1833, university education
in Lesotho did not begin until after World War 2. Nor were
opportunities provided for Basotho to undertake university education
abroad - in Britain, continental Europe and the Americas any time in the
nineteenth century, by which opportunities West Africans were so greatly
favoured. Thus, at the turn of the century, Lesotho had no medical
doctors, lawyers and jounalists, such as were to be found in such
significant numbers in the Lagos Colony and the Gold Coast. Such as
were styled "educated" men in Lesotho, however, deemed themselves equal
to the political task they had set for themselves, and, judging by
their activities, it seems fair to conclude that they were.
They were the products, for the most part, of the protestant
education introduced by the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society: By
1903 the P.E.M. S. had 150 schools in Lesotho providing education for
11,338 pupils in primary education up through Standard VI, and it had
a Normal School (for the training of teachers), with an enrolment of
125 pupils.1 All told, there were 224 primary schools in the
Territory in 1906and in 1907 they were issuing 752 Standard V
3
certificates. In 1906 an Industrial School (Lerotholi Technical
School) was opened in Maseru which would soon be competing in enrolment
4
with the Normal School.
In addition to the Normal School at Morija and the Industrial
School in Maseru for the post-primary education, Basotho youngsters
pursued comparable education in South Africa, in Lovedaie, Tiger Kloof,
ana' in liatal
Adams College and Ohlange Institute — in the Cape Colony. Beginning
in February 1916, when Fort Hare University College for "natives" opened,
with an annual contribution from Lesotho of ^300, they began for the
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first time to pursue university education. And by 1927 there were
even two medical doctors, Calvin Motebang and W. M. T. Sebeta, both
graduates of Edinburgh.®
The majority of those who went to the Normal School and the South
African schools found their professions in teaching and in the colonial
administration, while a few, but very influential, became clergymen.
By 1903 the Conference of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society,
under the presidency of the historian D. Fred. Eilenberger, was beginning
to complain to the Resident commisioner that it was losing its teachers
to the South African colonies, owing to the teachers' "natural desire
to receive a higher salary," and requesting financial aid to retain
7
them. Altogether there were 900 teachers in the Territory in
1925, with the highest paid - the head teachers, earning £ 50 per annum,
and senior teachers earning 40.® While in the employment of the
colonial administration there were 258 Basotho (alongside 50 European
counterparts) serving as interpreters, clerks, dispensers, nurses,
postal assistants and school supervisors. Those In senior scales of
emolument, and the most highly regarded - interpreters, clerks and
school supervisors were earning between ^60 and f144 per annum.®
These were the educated elite of Lesotho during the first forty years
of the twentieth century.
Generally speaking, clergymen, writers - most of whom would have
been employed at the Morija Printing Depot as editors, and interpreters
were the ones who carried the torch for political agitation. And
perhaps the most outstanding of these, before as after retirement, were
the interpreters. The most influential were Simon M. Phamotse, the
Editor of Naledi (styled by himself as "the recognised press organ of
the Basuto Nation"),"'"® Abimaei Tiale, George Masiu, J. Molibeli,
Philip Mochekoane, D. Mochochoko, Benard Matete, and Manama Molapo -
the last two despite the fact that they were members of royalty.^
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The most influential among the clergy were the Reverends John Mohapeloa,
Edward Motsamai, and Cranmer Sebeta. School Inspectors (or Supervisors
- as they were sometimes called, to distinguish them from their European
counterparts), were Elias Letele, S. Pinda, A. J. Mofubetsoana,
E. B. Ramaqabe, H. Tshiki, C. D. Mokhehle and F. Mapetla ("Senior Clerk",
19
Lerotholi Technical School). The writers were Azariel Sekese, an
"eaten-up" and persecuted former secretary of Chief Jonathan, who in
1928 paid him back with a satire - Pitso ea Linonyana(The General
Assembly of Birds), in which the smallest bird (Motinyane) accuses the
1 Q
bigger birds, especially the vulture (Jonathan), of tyranny.
E. Segoete, the author of Bophelo ba Basotho ba Khale (The Life of
Ancient Basotho), 1913, and Z. D. Mangoaela, the author, among other
books, of Lithoko tea Marena a Basuto (The Praise Poetry of Basotho
Chiefs), 1928, while greatly under the influence and control of the Paris
Evangelical Missionary Society, by which they were employed, were
intolerant of the abuses of chiefs and enlisted their support in all
fora for the correction of those abuses. Thomas Mofolo, Lesotho's
most powerful novelist, the author of Moeti oa Bochabela, 1925,
and his most famous Chaka, was once also an employee of the P.E.M.S.
at Morija but he fell out with the missionaries and thereafter combined
his writing with business."^ He was the most political of the
writers in the 1920s and 1930s. The rest of the educated elite who
carried the political torch in this period were the unflinching Labane
F. Chokobane, a pairing front-ox with Simon Phamotse in the National
Council, E. N. and N. M. Tiale, James R. Makepe, the two junior sons
of the royalty - Josias Mopeli and Abraham Moletsane., and the first
proprietor of Mochochonono, Mr. Monyakoane. (By 1919 the paper had
been taken over by "S. Tiale & Sons"). Quietly backing up these men
with moral support and material assistance were the successful
businessmen of Mohales' Hoek and Mafeteng - George Kou and his brother
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Rantsatsaile Serobanyane, and the flamboyant "Willie" Mafoso, who in
the inter-war years already had a fashionable house with a bar counter
in it, where the bahlalefi (men of learning) converged and
conversed.
The Formation of the Progressive Association
These bahlalefi, as they saw themselves and their educationally
less fortunate commoner brethern called than, felt a closeness and a
conmon destiny in history. They saw thanselves as the future leaders
of a Nation of "educated" Basotho - educated in missionary schools and
not at the lebollo - and they took up the challenge to point the way.
In order more effectively to pursue their general goal, therefore, on
November 28, 1907 the bahlalefi founded an organization called the
Basutoland Progressive Association. The Association was to function
under the motto "Not for us, but for our country and humanity." Its
17first President was Reverend Cranmer Sebeta. Cranmer Sebeta was
fated not to live long thereafter. He died in 1913.
"The stated objects of the B-P-A., as reiterated by its new
President, Abraham Moletsane, in 1914, were "to pay particular attention
i
to questions relating to the progress of the Basuto, and to work in
harmony with the Government, the Chiefs and the Missionaries." It aimed
to do nothing itself "without being supported by some authoritative body,"
a path from which it regularly departed, especially in regard to
chieftaincy, which it often accused of abuses and sometimes even
18
condemned. Its regard for the chieftaincy would increasingly
wear thin, until by the early 1930s the aim was virtually reversed.
Nonetheless, in 1914, before it thus revised its general aim
toward chiefs, the B.P.A. was granted the representation of one
councillor, in its own right, in the National Council. As the chiefs
did not then perceive it to be a real danger, they did not oppose the
representation. But the Resident Conmissioner, Sir Herbert Sioley,
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predicted its political future in the affairs of the Territory
[The Progressive Association] has not at
present a great deal of influence nor does
it include among its members many men of
importance by reason of their birth or
intelligence. However it does represent a
section of the people who probably will in
the future acquire more influence in tribal
affairs. It is regarded with same suspicion
by the older and more conservative members of
Council who appear to think that the Council
itself is quite sufficiently progressive for
the present.
In 1914, according to its President, Abraham Moletsane, the B.P.A.
had "200 active members." (The total population of Lesotho was 402,
434 in 1911.) While in 1924, according to the then President, Z. D.
Mangoaela, it was 1,500 (without any qualification as to the active as
differentiated from the non-active members.) About 30 of these were
90
women.
Initial Conflict with Chiefs Over the
Composition of the National Council
The chieftaincy's suspicion of bahlalefi (a term used
interchangeably with matsoelopele- "progressive persons") was well
founded: Early upon the founding of the National Council these
t
bahlalefi had commenced publicly to challenge its place and utility
as an institution. The first public criticism came in the middle of
1904 in Naledi, when a critic under the nom de plume "Mohlori" -
"One-whcr-feels-persecuted" - indicted the National Council as being
merely "a Parliament" of chiefs, without a mandate from the people.
"Mohlori" asked, rhetorically, "have they been chosen by the Nation by
21vote?" Further elaborating on his criticism he stated:
Now these men who have not been chosen by
the Nation go to Parliament [Paramente] at
the end of the year, to say what? Only
they know, as even in the course of the
year they never convene meetings with men of
the Districts from which they come(,) so that
they may hear what they say and what [those men]
wish to be brought to the attention of Parliament.
There they go, these men who have been appointed
by one person to speak at this Council(,) which
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is said to be respectable,(.) [A]s some of us
know(,)... it is the foundation of a strong
government, when it is run properly.
The National Council and its composition became a subject of regular
editorials in Naledi thereafter. The theme was the same: The Chiefs
in the National Council represented themselves and not the people. Then
in 1907 one of the bahlalefi came up with a suggestion for redressing
the situation. In an article that appeared in Naledi on June 4 that
Op
year, F. Seele counselled his readers:
This is, indeed, a Council of chiefs. It
is they who asked for it and it was given
to them and it is to be attended by them
as also to run it. If the nation wishes
that it should hear (be informed) on matters
of government it should ask for a council
which will be attended by these (who) are
called bahlalefi who will be chosen (elected)
by the nation in the districts of Lesotho.
The elected members of Seele's proposed council would hold meetings
in the Districts from which they were returned, to get the views of their
constituents on issues which they ought to present to the National
Council when ±t meets, to be deliberated on by that body .first, and only
then be passed on to "the council of chiefs".
Even in England, Seele pointed out, "from where we are governed,
there is a council (lekhotla) of chiefs and a council (lekhotla) of
the nation" which stood as he had described, "in order that the nation
too may have a voice in matters of government.... The nation should think
in terms of advancing its own country." There were issues such as those
of the jobs in the country which were given to foreigners whilst
qualified Basotho stood by, Seele said. It was doubtful that chiefs
could bring such a matter before the National Council, "they not having
this grievance which we poor people have."
Reading F. Seeie's article, one is inclined to conclude that it
must have been around this time, May-June 1907, that the bahlalefi
adumbrated the idea of founding the B.P.A. Indeed, it is tempting
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to suggest that the Editor of Naiedi, Simon Majakathata Phamotse and
Seele had put their minds together on the article, intending to use it
as a feeler, or perhaps an announcement on the idea. For, Seele's
entire article seemed in the final analysis to be building an argument
primarily to that end. Concluding his argument he stated:
Now you who are learned, what disables
you from having your own meeting (gathering)
to discuss a request for that council....
Ask the Resident Commissioner to ask from
Morena e Moholo and his council for
you. When the council of Morena e Moholo
agrees it shall instruct the Resident Commissioner
to present its deliberations to Morena Edward's
High Conmissioner. Or else we should not keep
on speaking contemptuously of the council of
chiefs.
The "meeting (gathering)" referred to here may have meant only that -
an assembly of the bahlalefi for the sole purpose of discussing the
request for a Council of Conmoners. But, in view of the fact that
the B.P.A. would be founded just six months later, on November 28, it
is reasonable to think that in June it was already under discussion.
Be that as it may, by the time that the B.P.A. was founded, a
more urgent matter than that of a Council of Commoners was pressing.
It was the matter of Lesotho's incorporation into the mooted Union of
South AFrica. As it has already been shown, Naiedi expressed the
view in July 1908 that in the event of incorporation, when the question
of franchise would need to have been settled, "the test of civilization
should be a real one" and people (such as the majority of principal
Basotho chiefs) who could only sign their names, were not yet fit for
franchise. To qualify, a person must not only "have thrown off his
%
native blanket but also the heathen influence of native law and custom,
OO
and [be] leading a civilised life." Nevertheless, in 1909 and
1910, when the peril of incorporation was imminent, the bahlalefi
rallied behind the chiefs in a conmon cause to make the National Council
a legislative body. And although that corrmon aim was not realized, at
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least the National Council was established on a more regular basis and
it was established by a Proclamation.
Only two years later, however, on February 23, 1912, Naledi
reactivated its critician of the National Council. In an editorial
entitled "Basutoland Council and Free Speech", Naledi referred
nostalgically to the old national pitso, the place of which had been
04
taken by the Basutoland National Council:
At this abolished Pitso the people had
freedom of speech which they indulged
without being interfered. Whatever was
passed by this Pitso was in consequence
of the nation's opinion. At any rate the
Basuto public Pitso resembled the European
constitutional meetings in attitude.
The editorial nevertheless acknowledged and accepted the rationale
for the establishment of the National Council: The National Council had
been "considered and approved" by the late Morena e Moholo
Lerotholi as an expedient substitute for the pitso because it was
regarded as "a constitutional council where the matters affecting the
affairs of Basutoland should be dealt with." And as it had been
assumed that it would ,be a truly representative body, where "debates
and decisions of the representatives were to be based and decided in
accordance with the general opinion of the Basuto," it was generally
welcomed, and it "received the sympathy of the people at large...."
That much the editorial considered fair to concede.
But at present there is a common but
justified cry for justice perpetuated by
the gross mistake of overlooking the most
important matter which would very well
guard the steps of the councillors in
their deliberations. The non-ascertainment
of the general opinion which all the civilized
world do is a gross mistake which should be
corrected.
Beyond these representations, the editorial was guarded: It pointed
out that it was not its intention to hamstring the machinery of
government in the Territory with "cumbersome responsibilities...but
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our simple aim is to have things run on proper and stable principles."
For otherwise, if "the people's cry for justice" on issues affecting
their lives is ignored, "we are sure of trouble."
The Resident Conmissioner, more so than the chiefs, seems to have
been the one who was embarrassed by the editorial. The chiefs, at the
Seventh Session held in May, showed no specific reaction to its content
beyond accepting a proposal by one of the councillors that the names of
appointed members should henceforth be published as soon as possible
after the first of January each year so that people might know who they
should bring their grievances to before the coamencement of the session.
Such as it was, it was a poor gesture to bahlalefi. Nonetheless,
when he submitted his report on the Session to the High Conmissioner on
May 22, The Resident Ccximissioner took the opportunity to refer to the
Naledi editorial and to assure his superior that: "This ought to
meet the complaint that is implied in Naledi article, viz: that the
mass of the people are unable to have matters affecting their interests
OR
discussed in the Council." Beyond that, the Resident Ccximissioner
put up his defence for keeping the National Council as it was currently
constituted. His defence was of course not new; he had offered it to
the High Cofrmissioner' s predecessor when the National Council opened in
1903: The national pitso was superceded because it had become "a
large and unwieldy gathering which lasted only a few hours," besides
which, "very few of the Basuto availed themselves of the privilege and
their utterances received little attention." (He might have added that,
that was principally as a consequence of the misuse pf the institution
by the colonial administration.) His preference for the National
Council was that it was small enough to allow the full exercise of
freedom of speech. "I have heard in the Council much bolder criticism
of the chiefs than was ever heard in the general pitso." The Resident
Ccximissioner's characterization of the old pitso was, of course, an
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exaggeration. For, did not Eugene Casalis observe, in 1834, that under
Morena e Moholo Moshoeshoe "Freedom of thought and freedom of
speech are the foundation and the guarantee of the national rights of
his subjects.... if they disapprove...they say so with a virile and
eloquent boldness which the most fiery Roman tribune would have
envied."^® And could not, as late as in 1891, when Letsie I
attempted to bypass Lerotholi as his heir by foisting the younger
Maama on the Nation, a councillor publicly scolded him: "Letsie,
27u'a hlanya - Letsie you are mad!" For their part, colonial
officers could not tolerate freedom of speech from Basotho to that
degree. As it shall be shown later in this Chapter, they saw freedom
of speech to that degree as a manifestation of "disrespect" and
p
"insolence" and they supressed it, with threats or with legislation.
A
The following year, 1913, the bahlalefi resorted to a different
strategy. Apparently trying to test the sincerity of the National
Council in its recent professions that it did act on the complaints
of the public, the B.P.A. presented it with a letter of national
28
grievances at its Ninth Session held in April that year. The
"Parliament of chiefs", as the bahlalefi were wont to call it, found
itself in a dilemma: If it discussed the contents of the letter, its
act would have been tantamount to givng the B.P.A. official recognition.
If it rejected the letter, it would have proved the bahlalefi's point
that it was a "mere Parliament of chiefs." They opted for the latter
and decided that "it should not be officially recognised."
But the National Council could not for long have it both ways.
So, the Resident Conmissioner, who must have sensed imminent trouble
between chiefs and bahialefi and feared being caught between the two
forces, initiated the move in preparation for the Tenth Session (1914)
to give the B.P.A. official recognition and one seat in the National
Council. The foregoing background, against which the proposal was made,
- 213 -
meant that it would be impolitic for the chiefs to do otherwise than to
accept. So, following consultations with his principal chiefs,
Morena e Moholo Griffith Lerotholi, on whose authority the
responsibility fell, made his first appointment of a B.P.A. manber, who
took his seat at the Tenth Session of the National Council.
The B.P.A. councillor increased the membership of bahialefi
in the National Council to six, including the five appointed by the
Resident Commissioner, and enhanced that group's self-confidence. But,
perhaps more importantly, it fostered a sense of collective
responsibility to the B.P.A., of which all the six were members. As
such, it meant essentially that the National Council was composed of
two formally defined interest groups: chiefs, and bahialefi; two
groups with incongruent political outlooks, and with conflicting self
perceptions: chiefs saw themselves as the natural superiors to
bahlalefi by reason of their birth. Bahialefi saw themselves as
the- intellectual superiors of chiefs by dint of their education.
It is, indeed, of more than passing interest that, no sooner than
the official B.P.A. councillor took his seat in the National Council,
the question of status surfaced. To date, some principal chiefs, on
the recoamendation of their Morena e Moholo, were being paid more
than the flO allowance which other members were getting for attending
the sessions of the National Council, in recognition of their "birth".
Several times before, the bahialefi had expressed their displeasure
over the arrangement, obviously feeling that to introduce the element of
"birth" in an institution in which all were equally entrusted with the
same responsibilities was a superfluous affectation of authority. So,
now they banded together and demanded that henceforth the practice
should be abolished and all members be given "equal payments". As the
President of the Council noted: "Some of the chiefs themselves, either
from conviction, or from a wish to be on the popular side, supported
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this view..." The principle was conceded without having to be pushed
to a division.^ Subsequently payments were set at |l5 for each
and every councillor.
The B.P.A. was nevertheless not satisfied with the grant of one
representative. But for the time being it accepted the outcome. In
1916, when its councillors sponsored a series of motions, it would
reopen the issue. Labane F. Chokobane rose on a motion requesting the
Morena e Moholo to give more than one seat to the B.P.A. That
Session of the National Council, however, turned out to be one of the
most humiliating ones for the chiefs: the bahlalefi councillors
pressed them somewhat hard against the wall, accusing then of a number of
abuses of conmoners throughout Lesotho. The chiefs were therefore not
inclined toward increasing the numbers of an interest group which was
increasingly proving to be inimical to its own interests. Chokobane's
motion for an increase of B.P.A. representatives in the National Council
QQwas-turned down." Be that as it may, during the discussion of the
motion some of the chiefs began to feel that the chieftaincy's resistence
to conmoners' greater representation was untenable and in the
circumstances they questioned the worth of the National Council as an
institution of government. Chief Motsoene, in particular, whose own
sympathies with the point of view of bahlalefi probably stemmed from
his political frustrations within the royal lineage, recorded his
31
discomfort as follows:
I should like to know whether this Council
is doing any good to the nation - whether
it be only a Council for discussing matters
or saving people. Do we members of the
Council come to express the opinion of the
nation in this Council? I shall be glad
if this Council is approved by the nation.
Anxious to reproduce themselves, and conceivably also bent on
replacing the colonial administration in Lesotho, the bahlalefi
additionally sponsored a motion on education at that Session which, had
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it carried, would have had far reaching implications for its own future
in the affairs of the Nation. Labane F. Chokobane rose on a motion
that 100 scholarships be provided, from Government funds, to send young
Basotho to England for higher education. The children of the
bahlalefi were then the ones ready for the opportunity. To wit, the
first Mosotho medical doctor, Dr. W. M. T. Sebeta, who completed his
medical studies at Edinburgh in 1921, was the son of Reverend Cranmer
Sebeta, the first President of the B.P.A.32 While all of the ten
Basotho students at Fort Hare University College in 1939 were frcm this
group. One of the ten, who completed a B.A. in English with distinction
QO
that year, was J.M. Mohapeioa, Reverend John Mohapeloa's son. That
motion was defeated, not by the chiefs, but by the President, Sir Herbert
Sloley - on his sole discretion. As he explained it to the High
Commissioner when he submitted his report on the Session: "I refused
this request owing to the excessive cost involoved and because the
,.34
time was not opportune.
Sir Herbert Sloley's defence that the scheme would involve
"excessive cost" was, however, a poor excuse: In 1903 Lesotho had a
balance in Assets of £90,000.35 In 1919 the balance in Assets was
£.131,599,33 of which £ 11,000 was on deposit with Crown Agents,
£20,000 was invested in Treasury Bills, and £72,500 was on loan to
36
Swaziland. Meantime, by September of 1917 Basotho had raised
£ 52,000, through sethabathaba (a national collection), toward the War
37
Fund. As Sir Herbert Sioley's successor, R. T. Coryndon, pointed
out that year (1917): "The tribe(sic) is probably the wealthiest in
OO
South Africa." From this account it can be inferred, therefore,
that in 1916 the Nation was sufficiently solvent to sponsor a substantial
part of the B.P.A. educational training scheme over a short peiod of
time. And this would lead to the conclusion that the substantive reason
for turning the scheme down was the one that "the time was not
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opportune." For, had the scheme been adopted, it might easily have
meant that within a decade the number of bahlalefi with degrees would
be so high as to make it imperative to grant Lesotho a Legislative
Council. The colonial administration was not ready for such a
constitutional advance.
Bahlalefi Assail Chiefs on
Their Abuses of Conrooners
As it was pointed out in the previous Chapter, as early as in
1908, only five years after the writing of The Laws of Lerotholi,
chiefs in the National Council were themselves admitting their gross
violation of the "Laws", and their Morena e Moholo, Letsie II, was
admitting his political impotence in the situation. With time, the
situation took a turn for the worse. On his visit to Lesotho in 1911,
the new High Conmissioner, Lord Gladstone, felt the need to rebuke the
chiefs at the Sixth Session of the National Council for a number of
transgressions. Chief among these were the flourishing of guns,
injustices In -the courts, and "eating up" eotnnoners' property. In an
effort to lend authority to Law 6(against the practice of "eating up")
<
he reminded the chiefs that "no man ^lould be deprived of his property
unless by sentence of the court after a careful trial."3^ But his
words of admonishment did not produce desirable effects. Time and
time again the subject of these abuses came before the National Council.
The responsibility over motions on the subject fell on the bahlalefi
councillors. They would attempt within the controlled framework of the
National Council to make the chiefs responsible. When that attempt
failed, the bahlalefi would resume the struggle through the newspapers
and wage it venomously, to a point of direct confrontation with the
chiefs.
In so far as the bahlalefi's efforts within the framework of
the National Council was concerned, the year 1916 must be taken as an
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eventful year. The focus of bahlalefi's criticisms was on three
major areas of chiefly abuses. The first was on the chiefs' misuse of
commoners' free labour in agricultural work (matsema). They viewed
these matsam in the chiefs' fields by their numerous wives (without
remuneration, and often without food) as exploitive, and they suggested
that they should be reduced and kept within customary expectation: that
is, commoners should contribute free labour only in the fields of the
first wives of the twenty odd principal chiefs (and not the fields of
junior sons of these chiefs as well). Further, they suggested a
reduction in "the numerous occasions when work, generally agricultural
work, is avoided or postponed for superstitious reasons and upon
occasions of the death of chiefs."^® The second was that chiefs
deliberately delayed in settling land disputes until affected parties
were compelled to take the law into their own hands, the final result
being that what had begun as civil cases ended as criminal cases, for
which chiefs could then exact fines for their own personal enrichment.
The criticism attempted to explain at once the primary Teason for
violence in the Territory - land disputes, as well as the chiefs'
i
contribution to it by way of greed.
The third criticism went to the heart of the chieftaincy abuses
in the indigenous court system. It was, in a nut-shell, that chiefs
blocked the common people from appealing against their judgments: If
a chief passed a judgment against a person, and that person appealed
and the Morena e Moholo overturned the chief's judgment, the
chief still went ahead to implement his own judgment as if it had never
been appealed. "The chiefs", so the criticism went,' "make haste to
send to collect fines when they have judged common people, they do not
do the same in the case of chiefs."^" (As it would further be
pointed out the following year when the subject came up again in the
National Council, a commoner who appealed against a chief's judgment
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might in the end have his house pulled down, while he himself was
42
ordered away "without reasonable cause."
The bahlalefi's view of chiefs at that Session of the National
Council was summarized by Councilor Tsoloane Liphoto, not a member of
45?
the B.P.A., who intoned:
Does the law apply to cotrmon people only
or does it apply to chiefs as well? I see
the sons of Moshesh break the laws, there
is not one of them which they observe, I
see no respect. The nation is being ruined
through the chiefs. Should we be scattered
we will blame the sons of Moshesh, you sons
of Moshesh like to rule us camion people, and
yet you do not like to be ruled by the Paramount
Chief....The reason why I say the sons of Moshesh
wish to rule us camion people is because when
you judge us you want us to carry out judgments
quickly but chiefs do not do the same....I say
you are selfish, you want us to respect you and
yet you do not respect your seniors. As you do
not respect the Paramount Chief we will not
respect you also.
Liphoto
CouncillorTaoloaneAconcluded his scathing statement with an observation
that the most lawless and abusive chiefs in Lesotho were Jonathan and
his brother Joel in "the District of Leribe.
The Bahlalefi Fall Out With Morena e Moholo
Over an Issue of Constitutional Morality
So far, the bahlalefi were only critical of the abuses of
chiefs, but the nature of their criticisms suggested a degree of hope
that chiefs could mend their ways on their own initiative. Moreover,
explicitly or by inference, they made it clear that their criticisms
were not levelled at their Morena e Moholo, Griffith Lerothoii,
himself. In fact, they sought to establish the point that the chiefs
were rendering it impossible for the Monarch to govern, thus they were
%
coming to his rescue. Yet, when the rupture did cane, it was with him
in particular.
The immediate cause of this rupture, ironically, was the one event
on which chiefs and bahialefi had otherwise initially been amicably
united. It was Griffith's trip to London in 1919. And the colonial
- 219 -
administration was the inmediate cause of the misunderstanding that
snapped the relations.
On May 24, four days before the Petition to King George V was to
be discussed in the National Council, the High Commissioner, Lord Buxton
was in Lesotho and he had arranged a private interview with the Morena
e Moholo. The latter was already by then in possession of the
Petition and, whether in keeping with protocol or simply as a gesture
of goodwill, he had given the Resident Commissioner, R. T. Coryndon, a
copy, which in turn had been put in the hands of the High Conmissioner.
The Petition had presumably been drawn up by the members of the B.P.A.
For reasons known to himself, however, Lord Buxton maintained that it
was "evidently the language" and it had been "drawn up by someone
outside Basutoland;" and he was bent on anbarrassing the Morena e
Moholo with that accusation."^ The primary reason for the private
interview, however, was to attempt to browbeat the Morena e Moholo
into dropping one Section of the Petition, in particular, which it was
feared could be of great embarrassment to the British King, and one which
certainly had serious political consequences. Section 12, as it came
(
to be popularly known, was a request that the Imperial Government should
use its power and exercise its political morality to aid Lesotho in
recovering the pieces of land since lost to the Orange Free State by use
of the Aliwal Convention of 1869 (negotiated by Sir Philip Wodehouse
45
with Boers.) The Section lucidly supplied its own rationale:
Finally(,) we humbly pray and beseech
your Majesty to give his gracious and
generous consideration to our prayer for
the restoration of our rights of which
we have been deprived, that is, large
tracts of our land which lie to the North¬
west, West and South-East of Basutoiand
of to-day. Our reason for submitting this
prayer to Your Majesty is on account of the
understanding made by Your Majesty's
Government and those of Your Majesty's Allies
that all nations, great and snail, which had
had their rights violated by those more
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powerful than they, are to have those rights
restored, and being in the same category we
therefore humbly pray that Your Majesty may
graciously accord us the same recognition.
Griffith, as much as the bahlalefi, was keen on the question.
The ultimate cause of land disputes in the Territory was that land had
shrunk, in relationship to expansion in population. Meantime, the
relative prosperity of the Nation had led to a rapid increase in
population since Lesotho had become a British dependency. If "the
conquered territory" could be restored, the problem might greatly be
alleviated. Then too, Basotho had proved their loyalty to the
Imperial Government by contributing liberally to the cause of the war,
financially and with manpower.46 South African newspapers carried
the good tidings that Alsace and Lorraine were being returned to France.
So, there appeared to be no sound moral ground on which Lesotho should
not as well be favoured by the general justice of the Western
Democracies by presenting its case before the League of Nations.
Lord Buxton, however, thought otherwise. As he told Morena e
47
Moholo Griffith, at the private interview:
I can say at once that there is no question
of any of the British colonies coming before
the League of Nations. This League will not
be allowed to deal with any of His Majesty's
Colonies, and therefore, whether it be a
Nationalist [South African] Petition or a
Petition of the Basuto, neither of them will
be heard by the League of Nations.
Buxton wished both that Griffith should admit to having been
put up to the idea of the Petition by an outsider, as well as that he
should drop the embarrassing Section 12 from it. Griffith did neither.
Instead, he insisted that the Petition was the property of the Drafting
Committee of the National Council, to which Buxton was free to make his
representation when the Fourteenth Session convened.
His tenacity notwithstanding, the Morena e Moholo seems then
to have begun to worry that the question of "the conquered territory"
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might jeopardize his trip to London, the centre of power, and he began to
weigh the merits of the two probable options - dropping Section 12 of the
Petition and risk the loss of confidence from his bahlalefi, or
maintain solidarity with them and risk the journey to the centre of
power and forging friendly, personal, relations with King George V. By
the time the National Council met, he had clearly made up his mind: It
was going to be the former.
That the Fourteenth Session of the National Council would be a
crucial and delicate one, was marked by a proposal, by Councillor
Bernard Matete, a close courtier of the Morena e Moholo, that the
Council Room be cleared of visitors and the proceedings be regarded as
AQ
"private and only intended to be read to the Councillors alone."
The debate centred on Section 12 of the Petition.
Those, such as Councillor Mokhethi Moshesh, who expressed
Griffith's new fears, counselled that by presenting King George V with
two major requests - the one against "incorporation" and the other on
"the conquered territory", "you are shooting this animal before it has
shown its -whole body because you are tempted by the nice words about
t
the "restoration of countries!" That is, you are likely to miss your
main target, the question of incorporation. Additionally, there was
the embarrassing issue that kept coming up from some councillors that
Lesotho too had robbed other people of their lands, specific reference
being made to the dispossessed Chief of the Baphuthi chiefdom, Mocheko
L. Moorosi. Griffith of course refuted the allegation on the Baphuthi
49
chiefdom stoutly, stating his understanding as the one that:
[Moorosi] brought himself under Moshesh,
he was taken after he had fought for his
independence, he was taken prisoner
together with sane of his sons. He came
to Thaba Bosiu, following Mohale [Moshesh1
half-brother] who had been sent by Moshesh
to call him, he was driving an ox....
And, except for the fact that it was Moorosi's father, Mokuoane, who
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had actually given himself up, Moorosi being then in his minority,
Griffith's understanding was historically accurate.
Others, such as Councillor Alexander Mopeli, who evidently began
to feel that their Monarch had abandoned his original stand on the
question of "the conquered territory" and were nauseated by the
realization that he was increasingly more anxious to go to England
for adventure than for diplomatic work, insisted that he diould make
so
the trip worth the money:
The nation is quite justified in asking
him to do something....while he is in
England. He is going to see 'The Big
Doctor' and it is right that he should
tell him of our complaints.
Simon Majakathata Phamotse, a member of the Drafting Committee, and
the man who was soon to be Griffith's bitter enemy, probably formed his
negative view of him at that Session, and on the basis of that question.
For, Griffith finally made his fear on Section 12 explicit, stating:
"I cannot take it Heme [London] with me." Angered by this attitude,
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Phamotse then cynically retorted:
I certainly agree with those who say this
paragraph ^ould be taken out of this
Petition, not because it is an unreasonable
request but because the Paramount Chief is
afraid, he has told us the truth. I do
not agree with those who say it should be
brought forward at seme future time, those
who say this are cowards....Let us speak
the truth to each other, Chiefs...do not
deceive us....
The worst thing that the Morena e Moholo would do in the
circumstances would be that, although the ayes had it when the question
was eventually put to a vote, and the National Council therefore
%
expected him to take it "Heme", he would undermine the constitutional
process and drop it, on his own authority. In so doing, however,
Griffith was responding to the Resident Commissioner's veiled threat
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in his comments right after the vote:
the council that said that you were hunting
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two animals and that you would probably
lose both is mine. I am interested in this
in that I hope to be able to take the
Paramount Chief Heme, and would be sorry
that anything that could spoil the object
of the visit should be contained in the
Petition.
What the Resident Coamissioner had done, in essence, was to
impress the view on the councillors that, although the National Council
was as much of a parliamentary institution as the colonial administration
deemed fit for Basotho at that stage, and considering the fact that as of
1910 (Proclamation No. 7,5.8 and 9) all questions affecting the Nation
were within its jurisdiction, for discussion, suggestions and amendments,
in the final analysis the President could use his authority to frustrate
its wishes.
To Griffith, at any rate, the message was clear: If he wanted to
to go London, he had to drop the offensive Section 12 of the Petition.
Consequently, he wrote the Resident Commissioner a letter on June 13
stating that since the matter was concluded in the National Council he
bad come bo "the conclusion that "it would not be right" tor Mm to
"take it 'Hone' with me." He asked for permission to drop it, as well
as two other Sections,' in his own name, "as Paramount and Chief
Adviser of the Basuto Nation."5^
That the formulation had been suggested to the Monarch by the
Resident Commissioner, who did not himself want to appear to have
violated constitutional morality, was revealed in Ms own telegram to
the High Commissioner: "I have informed Paramount that I consider
alterations desirable but that it must be done on his own
Cyl
responsibility." And equally anxious as the Resident Commissioner
to keep his head above the cloud that they had both made for the
Monarch, the High Coamissioner responded: "While I feel that it would
not be right for me to instruct him to omit them, I think that he would
be well advised in leaving them out if he can do so on his own
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authority".
Griffith did not have the executive authority to do what he was
being pressured to do. Under the indigenous institutions, with regard
to both the pitso as well as the Lekhotla la Mahosana (grand council), he
was in principle not free to go against a decision once it had been
declared. Similarly Proclamation No. 1 of 1910, which gave the National
Council statutory force, did not reserve such power to him, either in
his capacity as "Paramount Chief" or as "Chief Adviser". Yet, in the
end he did use his personal authority critically to amend the decision of
the National Council, following consultations with councillors who were
sympathetic to his point of view.
Although the bahlalefi did not make a specific reference to the way
the Petition had been handled, they obviously lost hope that anything
worthwhile could any longer be achieved by the trip to London.
The Bahlalefi Vent Their
Frustration through the Press
They vented their frustration and loss of respect for authority
through the press. On November 26, shortly after Griffith arrived in
London, an editorial appeared in Mochochonono, with a Parthian shot
to the Petition to the effect that the door to "the'Great White Queen'
or King rather, is closed forever and anon." It accepted the outcome
as "a bitter pill... to swallow but, bon gre mal gre," one that had
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to be swallowed. It lamented the fact that:
From being a Protectorate simply and
purely Basutoland has gradually been
turned into a subject state which the
sovereign of the British Empire can deal
with without reference to or consultation
with a native Potentate. In other words
Basutoland is to-day regarded as private
property of the King of England to deal
with as he may choose, the same way as
the Duke of Westminster is the owner of
the Westminster Estates... which he can
either sell or make over to whoever he
pleases.
The general theme begun by the editorial was continued in the
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Mochochonono issue of December 3, which accused the King of England
of having "departed from the solemn understanding made by his illustrous
mother [i.e. grandmother] Queen Victoria," and concluded with the
conment that Griffith's humble effort to "remind him of the compact"
was futile.^7
So far, the political diatribes were overtly directed at the
Imperial Government, and covertly at the colonial administration (which
was the one that made reccranendations to the Colonial Office and the
British King). Morena e Moholo Griffith was awaited to return
from "the centre of the Empire", as he called it,*'® to collect his
share.
Meantime, a start was made, by way of scathing criticises of the
administration of justice by chiefs in the Territory. As an
alternative to the local press, these were funnelled through the Cape
Times in South Africa.
On December 5, 1919, the Times carried an editorial with the
title: "A serious indictment of the native administration of Justice
in Basutoland is made <by a prominent native resident." Just who the
"prominent", but obviously not "chiefly" Mosotho was, it is difficult
to establish and, worthwhile as it might be to know the answer, not
crucial to do so in this connection. Except, perhaps, to note that
textual examination rules out Simon Phamotse as the person in question.
Who ever it was, he was purported to have specifically stated that his
indictment was not meant to impugn the European Commissioners in
Lesotho, whan he described as "full of justice". Ra.ther, he asserted
that "the native chiefs have turned Basutoland into a nation of slaves".
They compelled the conmon people "to work the lands belonging to the many
wives of the chiefs."^ The conmon people who had occasion to use
courts, he said, were "kept hanging on for weeks", with the result that
by the time they returned to their homes "their stock and goods have
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been stolen." In the likely event that a complainant left the court to
attend to his affairs, when his name was called and he was found to be
absent, "judgment is given against him, or he is fined for contempt."
Woe betide a commoner who appealed a chief's judgment "without the
chief's consent, which is seldom given." The chief sought revenge "by
confiscating his stock.
The "prominent" Mbsotho, oddly enough, appealed, either to the
Union of South Africa, or to the Imperial Government, to appoint a
Commission of Enquiry to examine the national complaints on the
"maladministration of justice" in Lesotho and that the Commission
should be responsible to the Colonial Office. Why the Union of South
Africa was considered to have a role to play in the affairs of Lesotho,
especially at a time that Lesotho's Monarch was in England to appeal
against "incorporation", is puzzling.
Nevertheless, the general theme of the anonymous Mosotho was
acknowledged in Lesotho- On December 19, 1919, the Times carried
an article based on an interview with Simon Majakathata Phamotse
i
entitled: "The Complaints Against Native Court." The Times cited
Phamotse, "whose knowledge and experience entitles his opinion to
respect," as having endorsed the allegations made in its issue of
Decanber 5. Phamotse was confirmed to have said that "the country is
seething with discontent at the want of justice and sympathy shown
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both by the native chiefs and the Government." (my emphasis)
He certainly did not share the "prominent" Mosotho's view "that white
men are full of justice...." He rather saw the colonial officials
in Lesotho as "individuals under native influence," but his chief
complaint was against the system. Additionally, he thought it was folly
to involve the Union of South Africa as the matter was "one for the
Imperial authorities...."
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Phamotse's focus was on the conduct of chiefs in the courts. He
alleged that when a court convened to consider a case, "the members are
already divided according to their likes and dislikes of the accused or
disputants." As such, litigants could not expect justice before the
indigenous courts. "No amount of evidence or argument," he alleged,
"has the slightest influence on the verdict."
Unlike the "prominent" Mosotho, who had proposed a Commission of
fr?
Enquiry, he had a specific solution to the problem:
Phamotse suggests the establishment of a
new Department of Justice, under the
direction of a fully qualified and
experienced Judge, and staffed by magistrates
learned in the law instead of native
assessors, chiefs, and police oficials....
Morena e Moholo Griffith Lerotholi returned to Lesotho early
in December, a few days before the Times published Phamotse's views,
to be greeted by unfriendly sentiments frcm the bahlalefi. But he
did not immediately attend to the newspaper criticisms, understandably
because he was anxious initially to give a report of his journey to
"the centre of the Empire". Obviously anxious to keep the report
confidential, as the National Council had set the guidelines when it
discussed the Petition in secrecy, he instructed his entourage not to
disclose any part of it to the public. Meantime, he requested the
Resident Commissioner to convene a Special Session of the National
Council to report to. But, the Resident Commissioner, who conveyed the
the request to the High Commissioner on December 19 (the date of the
Times' article on Phamotse), recommended to the latter that in view of
financial constraints, a Special Session could not be arranged. And
the High Commissioner, in turn, much preferred that, in the
circumstances, the report should be put in the agenda for the ordinary
meeting of the National Council.63 That meeting would not be held
until July, 1920.
Unfortunately for Griffith, as he thus waited for the National
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Council to convene, South African newspapers leaked the entire report.
Picking it up, the Sesotho newspapers opened it to the Nation. But
then it was with vengeance against the Morena e Moholo, who was
suspected of having turned the report into personal property. Issuing
its version of the report on January 14, Mochochonono criticized the
entire journey, frcm the start to the conclusion. The Editor charged
that the Nation "did not know what the deputation was out for." Yet
the Nation had borne the financial burden for the trip. Although the
draft of the Petition had been discussed in the National Council, the
Editor queried, the final version had not been published: "How the
members of the deputation knew that they had the confidence of the
people they were working for, nobody can say."®^
The composition of the Deputation itself came under fire.
Griffith had gone to "the centre of the Empire" with an entourage of
14 people. Twelve of than were principal chiefs. The Resident
Commissioner, E. C. F. Garraway, and his Assistant, F. L. Ford, had
esco Tted them. Obviously with the menory of the sinking of the
Mendi in February 1917} with 615 Africans, he had dreaded the prospect
of braving the Atlantic and so, additionally, he had insisted, against
the strong advice of the Resident Commissioner and the High Commissioner,
to take his white Catholic priest with him, in case the Sacrament of
65Absolution was needed. The bahlalefi were evidently dismayed
by the choice of the entourage, and they were disappointed that none of
their number was included in such a mission, where they viewed their
sophistication as particularly needed. Yet, in the light of Simon
Phamotse's indictment of chiefs as "cowards", it is fair to assume that
Griffith had intended their exclusion as a lesson for them to remember
their place.
The chicken now came home to roost: The Editor of Mochochonono
reminded the Morena e Moholo of "our conment on the departure of
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the deputation" by which "we pointed out that [the Deputation] was not
elected by the Council, as it is the custom of such institutions,
but it was picked "solely" by himself "for reasons known only to
himself... ."(My emphasis) The outcome was that he had chosen only
principal chiefs, "most of whom were of little use as advisers... and
left behind men who had all the qualifications so to say,... who had
confidence of the nation."
Turning to the question of the secrecy with which the report had
so far been handled, the Editor went for the Monarch's character:
It should not be wondered(sic) that this
has happened, our Paramount Chief is a
strict observer of the primitive customs
of his predecessors and nothing better
could have been expected from a backward
and illiterate man like him. He still
believes in making public affairs
confidential but we hope he has had a
lesson today, of the uselessness of
keeping private what ought to be published
at once.
(Griffith, who was raised by his uncle, Chief Bereng Letsie, had
attended an Anglican missionary school for less than a year but found it
not to be to his liking. So that, his uncle sent him to lebollo
(initiation school), which he rather preferred.)
Griffith's Response to the Press Attacks
The Morena e Moholo did not inmediately react against the
general press attacks on his journey, his chieftaincy, and his person.
But, it is apparent that he felt threatened by the ascendancy of the
bahialefi in the political affairs of Lesotho and that he thought of a
strategy for counteracting its effects by strengthening his own position.
That strategy, it appears, comprised of an educational scheme for the
children of those chiefs whom he perceived as being supportive of his
authority. For, on January 14, and February 6, 1920, he wrote the
Resident Conmissioner expressing "my intention and wish - if means could
satisfy the heart that the Government should "initiate my children."
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His wish was to pick two children of royalty from each of the Southern
Districts of Quthing, Qacha's Nek, Mohales' Hoek, Mafeteng, up to Berea
in the centre of Lesotho, in addition to four of his own children, to be
sent to the best schools that could be found. With the impressions of
England still fresh in his mind, he was precise in that he wished his
request to be brought to the attention of the High Commissioner, who
should "kindly send my sons to a school overseas which he knows to be
a true good and perfect school."^7(My emphasis) Notably missing
in the choice of the Morena e Moholo's Districts was Leribe, Chief
Jonathan's jurisdiction.
Unfortunately for Griffith, the Resident Conmisioner and the High
Commissioner did not think it was feasible to send his sons to any "true
and perfect school" in England, which is where he obviously preferred.
Of his four sons, all of whom were receiving instructions under the
Marist Brothers at the spiritual and educational centre of the Catholic
Church at Roma, one was 20 and two were 18 years of age all three reading
Standard V. The fourth, 15 years of age, was reading Standard 4.
One of these four children was the heir apparent, Seeiso Griffith. The
Resident Conmissioner advised the High Commissioner that the Monarch's
sons were, as such, too old to pursue higher education overseas.
However, he felt that an effort should be made to find them a place in
one of the schools in the Union of South Africa. As to the children of
the other chiefs culled from Districts, the Resident Commissioner and the
Director of Education in Lesotho were totally negative. They thought
that such money as might be spent on them was better spent on the
education of commoners' children.
The Monarch's scheme thus suffered the same fate as that of the
bahlalefi in 1916: It was frustrated. Except, in this instance the
motivating factor on the part of the colonial administration was perhaps
not that the time was not "opportune", but rather that the scheme was
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perceived as undesirable - in the short run as well as in the long run.
In the short run, it might not only have enhanced the prestige of the
chieftaincy and improved its calibre, to the political disadvantage of
the bahlalefi; it might also have created a core of intellectuals
among the royalty less easy for the colonial administration to
manipulate. While in the long run, and in the event that Lesotho was
granted a Legislative Council, that core of intellectuals might be
clumsy to fit in: It would, for all intents and purposes, be a part of
the bahlalefi; at the same time, it would be deriving its political
legitimacy from "birth". The final outcome, so to speak, might be that
to establish a constitutional monarchy - the form of government with
which the colonial administration was familiar and to which it was
t
comnited - would be problematic. That is, of course, assuming that
events took a turn in the direction of self-government.
Beyond that effort, the Morena e Moholo did nothing to mend
his prestige against the bahlalefi. The Fifteenth Session of the
National Council (1920), where one would have expected sound and fury
between chiefs and bahlalefi was uneventful. Perhaps both sides had
had sufficient cooling time. Or perhaps some informal discussions had
taken place which, if they had, would be proven to have only forged a
truce. The Morena e Moholo's report was received passively, as
if to say: he has had his trip, and so be it.
The Colonial Administration's Attitude
Toward the Bahlalefi's Use of the Press
The bahlalefi took to the press and sustained the momentum of
their criticisms through it, not because the colonial' administration was
favourable to freedom of the press, but inspite of its repression of it.
That repression took two forms: The one was the "subtle" tactic of
intimidation. The other was legislation. As the bahlalefi would,
beginning in 1920, employ the press to push their political contest with
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the chieftaincy to a head-on collision, it will be helpful at this point
to give a brief review of those tactics and the piece of legislation
under which action could be brought to bear.
When Naledi was first published in 1904, and subsequently
Mochochonono appeared in 1910, the colonial administration was not
alarmed. And, certainly it was not threatened. That these papers
would, within a short time, become effective, if offensive, political
organs against all authority was anticipated, but the degree of their
efficiency could not be foreseen. In 1916, however, one of the two
newspapers put freedom of the press to the test. On August 23, a few
days before the National Council held its Eleventh Session that same
month, Mochochonono published an editorial in which it criticized
the colonial administration generally, and tacitly it accused the new
High Commissioner, Lord Buxton (since Lord Gladstone's departure from
South Africa in 1914), in particular, of identifying more with the
Union of South Africa than he did with Lesotho. The High Commissioner,
whose office was combined with that of Governor-General for South Africa
since 1909, was accused of having first visited Boers of the Orange
Free State, Basotho's'traditional enemies, people who had rebelled
against the Imperial Government, before he could ever consider visiting
Basotho. Consequently, the editorial concluded that to give the
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Imperial Government loyalty was of no use.
When the National Council convened, the Resident Commissioner
tabled the matter for discussion, and he wanted the councillors to take
a stand on it. Speaking his own views, he pointed out that while
"English people as a rule have always been a very free people and as a
general rule they let people say what they like and speak what they
like," there were things written in Mochochonono "which do a lot of
harm." He was more particularly perturbed in that the long article,
"which I think it is very disrespectful," was published in English. The
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greater harm in that regard was that, although he did not think that
Mochochonono had such a large circulation, "at the same time other
papers in South Africa look through these papers and take little bits
and publish them in their papers, so that a disrespectful or a disloyal
and seditious thing published here may be taken over at King William's
Town, Durban or Johannesburg...." While he was mindful of the fact
that there were several "disrespectful" conments made about him in
Mochochonono, he said, he was particularly concerned with remarks made
about the High Conmissioner, and he wondered if the councillors were
aware that "you can do a man a lot of harm without calling him a
thief....
The bahlalefi councillors maintained solidarity against the
onslaught, except for one - the Reverend Edward Motsamai. The
Reverend Motsamai, who had recently been gored by the paper regarding
his being given the Maseru parish, but whose proprietor he nevertheless
still affectionately referred to as "my friend Monyakoane,"
understandably wished xts editor to be held in a leash. He had already
spoken with the proprietor and the Editor "and pointed out to then that
t
I had a right to bring an action against then." He certainly thought
that the issue of Mochochonono under discussion treaded dangerously on
the verge of defamation against the High Conmissioner. He could not
understand, he said, why Mochochonono, and by inference Naledi,
could not "be at peace" with authority, which virtue he attributed to
his owm mission's paper, Leselinyana. In his view: "The native
papers are always fighting against people who have positions in the
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country."
Aside from being an expression of a personal grievance, the
Reverend Motsamai's speech suggested the existence of subtle but real
divisions with the bahiaiefi themselves. In this case it probably
illustrated a case of a man who was susceptible to missionary control
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and who, therefore, could ill afford associating with a cause on which
his superiors were not keen. The Paris Evangelical Missionary Society,
which Motsamai served, was generally not disposed to risking a
confrontation with the colonial administration, except where its own
irrmediate interests were threatened.
Be that as it may, as the discussion had tended quite at length
to deal with the two papers, and not on the section of Basotho whose
views they represented, Chief Motsoene, probably mischievously - as
sometimes he relished controversy for its own sake, decided to point the
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finger at the collective culprits:
We know nothing of these newspapers, it
seems as if these newpapers go together
with the Basutoland Progressive Association.
Seme of you members of the Association do
not know how to control yourselves.... I
advise the 'Mochochonono' to give the names
of the people who write in it.
Chief Motsoene's blunt approach apparently caught the bahlalefi
councillors by surprise, and it almost threw them into disarray.
Labane Chokobane, notably., decided to disassociate the -B.P.A. as a body
from the Editor of Mochochonono in his capacity as a journalist. He
was sorry that Chief Motsoene had pointed the finger at the B.P.A.
"The Association is of the Basuto," he said. Otherwise:^
Every paper does its work, so does the
Association. We cannot be wrong because
one of our members is wrong; the 'Mochochonono'
does not consult the Association in managing
its affairs. If 'Mochochonono' is wrong do
not blame our Association.
In the interests of the B.P.A., whose members in the National
Council stood much to lose by associating themselves with an issue
over which the Resident Conmisioner was so cross, Chokobane's response
was probably prudent, and politic. Yet, it did not address the
principle behind the discussion: freedom of the press. That was to




How are we to regard a newspaper, as a
white man or [as] a native?....The Resident
Commissioner has said this paper has spoken
badly of the High Commissioner and the
Assistant Commissioner. Our advice is that
the courts are open, this newspaper should be
charged. There may be only one word which has
offended the Resident Commissioner and about
his government; if such is the case let the
case be tried according to the law.(My emphasis)
That certainly went to the heart of the matter: The Resident
Commissioner was being counselled against using his political office,
under the cloak of the President of the National Council, to muzzle the
press, and shown the proper recourse - the courts. He was accordingly
compelled to drop the discussion, which he had pursued passionately.
Except, he did so only after he had threatened independent action:75
The point is not a legal one. I have said
if there is anything to do I will do it. I
am not asking the chiefs whether they
understand our law about newspapers, I am
asking them to say whether it is right for a
Basuto paper to publish something disrespectful
or not....I have asked you the question and I
have not got an answer.
Here, then, would be one of those instances that illustrated the
intolerance of the colonial administration to freedom of speech. There
i
was seemingly nothing in the Mochochonono that could readily be
construed as a libel against any member of the colonial administration.
As the Reverend Motsamai's wound-licking speech revealed, what was
objectionable about independent Basotho newspapers was the pluck of
their Editors to criticize all authority. The colonial administration
could not bear such criticism from "a Basuto paper".
Having lost the battle in the National Council, the Resident
Commisioner went ahead to carry out his threat. He made a
recommendation to the High Commisioner to promulgate a law for dealing
with the problem. And that law came into force on February 23, 1917,
as Proclamation 3, 1917: Newspaper Registration and Regulation
/"7£>
Proclamation. The declared purpose of the Proclamation was:
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"To regulate the publication of newspapers, and to provide penalties in
respect of the publication of seditious libels." The heart of the
Proclamation was expressed in Sections 9 and 11, cited below:
S. 9. "Whenever a libel, including a seditious
libel as hereunder defined, is published in any
newspaper published in the Territory, criminal
proceedings may be taken against all or any of
the persons mentioned in sections three and four
of this Proclamation: Provided that it shall be
a defence to such proceedings on behalf of any such
person as aforesaid to prove that the libel complained
of was published in such newspaper without his
knowledge,consent, or connivance and without
negligence on his part."
S.ll.(3) "A seditious intention is an intention -
( i) to bring His Majesty, or the High Commissioner
or the Resident Commissioner or a District Officer
or other Government Official in person into hatred
or contempt; or
( ii) to excite disaffection against His Majesty or the
High Commissioner or the Resident Commissioner in
person or the Government and Constitution of the
United Kingdom or the Territory or the administration
of justice therein; or
(iii) to Incite His Majesty's subjects to contempt to
produce otherwise than by lawful means alteration
of any matter in the Territory by law established;
or ,
( iv) to incite any person to commit any crime in
disturbance of the public peace; or
( v) to raise discontent and disaffection amongst
His Majesty's subjects or promote violence or
ill will and hostility between different classes
of His Majesty's subjects.
Provided that no one shall be deemed to have a
seditious intention if he is able to prove to the
satisfaction of the Court that he intends in good
faith only
(a) to show that His Majesty or the High Cormiissioner
or the Resident Commissioner has been misled
or mistaken in his measures; or
(b) to point out errors or defects in the
Government or Constitution of the United Kingdom
or the Territory as by law established or in
the administration of justice therein with
a view to the reformation of such alleged
errors or defects or to urge His Majesty's
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subjects to attempt to procure by lawful means
the alteration of any matter in the Territory
by law established.
The Proclamation lend itself to a broad interpretation. It was
obviously aimed at instilling more fear than merely caution on all
classes of people who had lately come to use the newpaper for political
ends. So introduced in a society that had never formally been given
parameters for freedom of speech, beyond which sanctions might be
imposed, it was probably hoped that it would have the necessary effect
of silencing the Basotho newspapers.
Otherwise, the Proclamation was evidently a borrowing. For, in
1886, when Socialist leaders in the United Kingdom had been tried for
speeches made in the course of a demonstration in Travalgar Square,
which had ended in disorder, seditious intention had been defined in
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identical terms, mutatis mutandis.
Proclamation 3, 1917, may have temporarily restrained the zeal of
the independent Basotho newspapers in their criticisms of the colonial
administration, but ±n the long run it did not achieve its political
objective, viz.: instilling habitual obedience. As it has been shown,
by late 1919 and early 1920 Mochochonono was back in its old form,
accusing the King of England of having "departed from the solemn
understanding made by his illustrous [grandmother] Queen Victoria," and
blasting the Basotho Potentate as "a backward and illiterate man."
Further, at that juncture the bahlalefi forged links with the South
African English newspapers, through which they funnelled their truculent
criticisms. Within just a matter of months they would launch a
political biitz against missionaries, the colonial administration and
the chieftaincy, combining the local with the South African press, and
introducing pseudonyms as a new feature for frustrating an easy
application of the Newspaper Registration and Regulation Proclamation.
The blitz, in the case of the chieftaincy, would lead to a head-on
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collision.
"How Shall We Do Away With The Black Race?"
Commoners Cross the Political Rubicon
On September 3, 1920, Naledi featured an article that must
have mortified missionaries in Lesotho, and which certainly shocked the
colonial administration. The article was entitled: "How Shall We Do
Away With The Black Race?" It described the Young Women's Association
established for Black people in Johannesburg as an institution created
for Christian whores for propagating miscegenation - the white man's
ultimate weapon of conquest. The author was Josiel Lefela, one of the
members of the National Council appointed by the Resident Commissioner.
Josiel Lefela, who resided in Mapoteng, in the District of Berea,
had for sometime been a borderline case in the National Council between
the bahlalefi and the peasant-migrant labour sector of commoners. He
c
had not gone beyond Standard IV in eduation, although he was an avid
A
reader and he could perform incredible stunts with his mind, quoting
pages on end from George McCali Theal's documentary history,
Basutoland Records, from memory. For want of political company he
had been consorting with the bahlalefi. But he was not of the same
ilk. His relationship with then was an uneasy one. He was certainly
overshadowed by then, and his contribution in the National Council was
meagre. Finally, while not resigning, he had fired his Parthian shot
at the closing of the Session in 1919, saying to his fellow councillors:
"This is the fourteenth session of the Council and yet nothing has been
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done for the nation,...why are you Councillors paid £15." And on
September 27, the same year, he founded his own association,
appropriately named Lekhotla la Bafo, literally, "The Conmoner's
Council". His article on the Young Women's Association was essentially
his political debut.
Aggressive in its style, the article charged that a number of
plans in the Union of South Africa had been devised to do away with the
- 239 -
Black race- As one of their contributions, and with a "deep design",
missionaries were encouraging everywhere "women and girls" to collect
money "for building a home for Christian whores, young and old, to whore
in. That is the way that our people will be put an end to." Life
in this "home" would be made "pleasenter(sic) than in their own
homes...," from which, purportedly, they were being protected "against
those customs which they say are sinful." Yet, he said, the ultimate
goal was to produce half-castes, "so that in ten years time the black
races would diminish and half-castes increase." "Have European whores
ever had houses built for them? Why this kindness to our women and
girls." Reflecting on his knowledge of history, Lefela pointed out
that wherever they had been, missionaries had destroyed the "tribes"
among which they had worked; "many governments in difficulties had had
79
their path made easy by missionaries.
Following consultations with the Imperial Secretary, the Resident
Commissioner, E. C. F. Garraway, took two courses of action. The most
immediate one was to call the Editor of Naledi, Edwin Tlale, to be
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"brought up with a round turn...." At the "round turn", in the
presence of his own staff of officers and a representative of the
Morena e Moholo, Garraway thoroughly rebuked Edwin Tiale and even
threatened that "I have power to do more than talk to you in this
manner...." Tlale kept his composure during the "round turn". But once
he was back in his office he wrote Garraway a caustic letter. He told
him that he resented the way the Resident Comnissioner had tried to
"bully" him in the fashion of "a mining boy compound foreman" in the
presence of his staff and Griffith's representative. He was not going
to permit freedom of the press to be muzzled, he said, albeit the
bullying had given the chiefs the confidence that he could be gagged,
81
and therefore his task as Editor would be difficult in future.
Garraway's second course of action might have been to bring a
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court case against Josiel Lefela; and, indeed, he discussed this
possibility with the Imperial Secretary. But, while he felt that both
the Editor as well as the writer of the article deserved a "telling
off," the latter was doubtful "whether the article could be regarded as
a 'libel expressive of seditious intention"' within the meaning of
Section 10(3), (V), of the Newspaper Registration and Regulation
Proclamation No. 3 of 1917. He therefore advised him to seek legal
on
advice before taking legal action.
The legal advice that Garraway received was that a libel suit
would not stick and that, besides, it might have the effect of turning
Lefela into a martin*. The Legal Adviser reconmended, instead, that he
should use his powers as the President of the National Council (but
certainly not as Resident Corrmissioner) to suspend Lefela from the
National Council: The powers conferred on the Resident Commissioner as
Resident Commissioner, as provided in Section 14, Proclamation No. 7 of
1910 (establishing the National Council), could only be exercised on
the High Corrmissioner' s instructions. Whereas, as the President,
according to Section 3,(3) of the Proclamation, he had the power to
suspend any member of the Council "for such period as he may determine
and no member so suspended shall be permitted to attend any meeting of
the Council during such period." (See Appendix 11). The Legal Adviser
further proposed the modality for effecting the suspension: As Lefela's
conduct under scrutiny had been manifested in an interval between
Sessions, Lefela could not be debarred from attending the next Session
of the National Council, "and would have to be allowed to attend, and
%
then be ejected in accordance with the President's sentence of
suspension." Nonetheless, the Legal Adviser felt that that procedure
"would be very inconvenient." (Presumably that meant that the
procedure might result in a hubbub in Council, which would complicate the
execution of the suspension.) So, Garraway was led to conclude that it
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would be more efficacious, if constitutionally dubious, to suspend Lefela
QO
before the next Session. And he did; with Griffith's unremitting
support.
On March 9, 1921, Edwin Tlale gave both Garraway and the
chieftaincy a tempestuous review, using Lefela's suspension as his
CM
causus bellum:
Be the arbitrary powers of the Resident
Commissioner what they may in regard to
the suspension of councillors, the reasons
which have prompted him to take so drastic
a step against Cr. Lefela are puerile and
unreasonable as to warrant anyone saying
that it is simply scandalous...I shall
not go over the ground that has been gone
by other writers in this connection but
all I can say is that the impetuosity of
the President of the Council in taking
action will one day be the cause of his
ruing the day on which he took so rash an
action. If the President desired to exercise
his authority over the Council which has lain
dormant for many years why in all goodness did
he not start by suspending thiefs, murderers
and law-breakers who constitute a majority of
the Council? He is pleased to listen to the
advice of such outcasts and confer with them in
matters of theft, murder and lawbreaking, but
shuns the society of a man who fights tooth and
nail against such barbarities.(My emphasis.)
The editorial ended with a forecast to the effect that, since the
Resident Conmissioner had commenced "on this game on which angels
before him have feared to tread," it was certain that he would go on
with it until he had purged the National Council of "every Councillor
who dares to criticise in public doings of those of his 'tool' or
'master'."
The High Conmissioner Counsels Patience
Quite clearly, the Newspaper Proclamation had not had a deterrent
effect on the Basotho newspapers. Nor had the Resident Conmissioner's
resort to intimidation. So, in 1921, the High Commissioner, Prince
Arthur Frederick, Queen Victoria's grandson, decided to make a personal
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intervention. He had reason to hope for success: Basotho held his
grandmother in great admiration, invariably addressing her as "Queen
Victoria The Good", in contrast to their own "Moshoeshoe The Wise".
This may explain why that visit, his first to Lesotho, attracted some
60,000 people, who came to receive him at a national pitso held on
May 18 that year. This was probably the largest pitso in the century
to date.
As with other parties who wished to impress him with their bona
fides and accede to his good books, the Basutoland Progressive
Association took the opportunity, through its President, Zakea Mangoaela,
to introduce itself. The Association, Mangoaela explained, "was the
outcome of a desire on the part of a certain section of the conmoners"
who were convinced that "the time had ccme when the masses of the people"
ought to be given a say in the administration of the country. Obviously
anxious to allay Prince Frederick's understandable fears over the recent
press attacks on the Resident Commissioner and the chiefs, Mangoaela
pointed out that it was not the intention of the B.P.A. members "to
look down upon, nor to be in conflict with hereditary chieftainship."
To the contrary, they looked upon it with "great gratitude", mindful
of Moshoeshoe's achievements and those of his successors to preserve
"the integrity of this nation through times." Nonetheless it was their
earnest desire that the common people should have "substantial
representation" in the National Council; because they believed that
conmoners would contribute "in a great measure" in combating "the two
great evils which are convulsing the country," namely, faction fights
OC
between chiefs, and stock theft.
It was in response to this Address that Prince Arthur Frederick
took the opportunity to address the press question. First of all, he
was not convinced that there was a need for increased conmoners'
representation in the National Council. He felt that the number then
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appointed by the Resident Conmissioner served the purpose. Secondly,
he disagreed with the bahlalefi's methods and questioned their
readiness for representative institutions. He admonished them:^
In order to be useful [the B.P.A.] must
of course be reasonable in the views
which it expresses and considerate on the
feelings of others....A tree does not grow
in a day, and wisdom in public affairs cannot
be acquired without many years of experience
and much patient thought. A young
Association, like a young man, must be prepared
to learn from those who have longer and riper
experience, and must be respectful to then. It
must not be in too much of a hurry. (My emphasis.)
The B.P.A. Motion For A
Partially Elective Council
On neither of his two points - the one on respect for the feelings
of other, the other on patience - was the High Commissioner heeded. The
point for increased conmoners' representation in the National Council
would come up again at the Sixteenth Session on July 2, only a month
and a half after the High Conmissioner's pitso. It came in two
forms. The first was a motion by Simon Majakathata Phamotse that the
constitution of the National Council be amended and that the body should
become a partially elective Council. The motion stated that with the
exception of 24 principal chiefs, all the rest (76 councillors) should
be elected by the Nation. The motion was defeated. The second, also
a motion by Simon Phamotse, was that the B.P.A. should be given 10 seats
87
in the National Council. That motion too was defeated.
The bahlalefi were understandably frustrated and angered by
their general defeat in all their aims that year. The High Conmissioner
%
had so much as told them that they were still children - tyros in
politics, "too much in a hurry" for big things. He did not appreciate
the magnitude of the problan because of which they felt that increased
conmoner representation in the National Council had become imperative,
namely, the problem of chiefly abuses - faction fights, injustices in
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the courts, misuse of privileges. The President of the National
Council, for his part, had come to view the bahlaiefi with suspicion
and distrust, and so he was not ready to throw his weight on their side.
In the circumstances, to expect the chiefs in the National Council to
cure themselves at that stage, was overly optimistic. They needed
someone else to douse them in medicine. The bahlalefi then decided
to arrogate that role to themselves, once again through the press, but
this time it was a blitz.
Josiel Lefela's Attack on Imperialian
As would be the case constantly thereafter, the commoners'
voice broke out in two discordant notes - one note by Josiel Lefela,
the President of Lekhotla la Bafo, the other note by members of the
B.P.A. and their sympathizers. The former took the lead.
Between March 19 and November 25, 1921, Josiel Lefela contributed
at least half a dozen intemperate articles in Naledi. They were all
on the same theme - an attack on imperialian and its "setinel", the
missionary. Two of -these summarized the author's view of the problem.
In the September 30 issue, Lefela attacked the British Government for
i
duplicity on the question of Lesotho's constitutional status. He
accused the British Government, inter alia, of breaking the compact
between Queen Victoria and Morena e Moholo Moshoeshoe, whereby
Lesotho was to be given protection, and of doing to Africans the
88
opposite of what it was prepared to do to Europeans:
The Government of England only does away
with Basutoland. You should remember
why the Government of England went out to
fight Germany and why Germany has been
deprived of her colonies, and what England
published as the reason for her fight, or
did she fight meaning to take anall nations
back to bondage and deprive them of its rights?
...Does the protection of the Government of
England mean deprivation of the rights and
the swallowing-up of it?
The article concluded by condemning the British Government of conduct
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in international affairs "unbecoming of her fame as [a] Christian
Government," and of projecting good appearances "with the tongue,"
while the deeds betrayed the contrary.
In the Novanber 18th issue of Naledi Josiel Lefela particularized
his analysis on the role of missionaries to the Paris Evangelical
Missionary Society. Describing its members as "fellowmen of conspirators
whose plans congeal.. .blood," he charged that when they came to Lesotho
originally (1833), they came with cynical plans, which the chiefs of
Lesotho never became cognizant of, as the missionaries were always giving
them the '"outer part of the hand"'. The P.E.M.S. missionaries, he
said, "have been brought here to be used as dynamite so that the
Government may complete the career, through them, of "divide and rule."
He advised Basotho, as an alternative, to accept "the American Negroes",
(who were then making their presence in South Africa felt), "and let us
look forward to His Excellency Marcus Garvey the President of Africa...
89
with anticipation." Josiel Lefela was a great admirer of Marcus
Garvey and supporter of his Universal Negro Improvement Association.
Josiel Lefela was quickly and effectively squeezed out of the
i
Lesotho newspapers, however. On December 20, 1921, the High
Commissioner, Prince Arthur Frederick, authorized Resident Conmissioner
Garraway to call Edwin Tlale, the Editor of Naledi again "to warn
him against the publication of objectionable letters and articles" of
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the Josiel Lefela type. This time Edwin Tlale evidently obliged.
For, thereafter Lefela's publications in Lesotho virtually ceased. He
turned to the coirmunist and African controlled South African newspapers,
%
especially Inkululeko (Freedom), and Umsebenzi (The Worker) -
edited by his friend and member of Lekhotla la Bafo, the Russian
educated Mosotho, Edwin Mofutsanyana.
The reason for Edwin Tlale's change of heart is not far to find.
According to the bahlalefi, among whom he was in the vanguard, two
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issues demanded the attention of conmoners at that point. The first
was the indigenous court system and chieftaincy administration. The
second was power sharing between chiefs and coomoners within the
framework of the National Council. Josiel Lefela's priorities, on the
other hand, were: A) Advocacy for the view that Lesotho was a
"Protectorate", and not a "Crown Colony", and therefore fighting against
all tendencies inconsistent with that view as manifestations of
imperialism. B) A relentless fight for the establishment of a House
of Connioners, to operate alongside a Council of Chiefs, in the fashion of
the Westminster model. Aside from that Lefela seemed to have his irons
in too many fires: In addition to his onslaught against missionaries, he
had joined hands with South African nationalists. He subscribed to
Garveyisn. He was forging links with the Coomunist Party of Russia and
the Conmunist Party International. He was fighting the battles of
Indians, in Lesotho as well as abroad. In short, the bahlalefi would
have seen him as someone who had taken too many battles at the same
time, and therefore likely to generate too many enemies. He had to be
dropped because he was becoming a political liability. By dropping him,
t
however, the bahlalefi lost Lefela's respect. As so often afterwards
he would say of them:^
...It is not exaggeration that defective
education is worse than illiteracy because
of its misleading effects, and diseased
knowledge is poison to every healthy mind
and brain, that is why our so-called
educated in Basutoland are not able to
distinguish bread coated with political
poison from bread without poison.
Thus, at critical points in their political battles, ^the bahlalefi
could often count on Josiei Lefela to take the opposite side.
The Bahlalefi Precipitate a Head-on
Collision with the Chiftaincy
At the same time that Josiel Lefela attacked imperialisn and
missionaries, the bahlalefi launched their own onslaught against
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the abuses of the chieftaincy. On November 25, 1921 Naiedi published
two letters that set the tone and tempo of the onslaught. Two of them
came from Basotho then working in Cape Town. One letter, by Sephatsi
Marung, began by denouncing the role of chiefs in the National Council,
charging that as a consequence of their decisions in the Council
the people's eyes "have been pierced and they are being dragged to
ruin...." Sephatsi Marung charged that generally speaking the Basotho
"have been turned into an inheritance of the chiefs and Europeans also
harvest from here." If there could be correspondence to heaven, he
said, "we would write to Chief Moshesh on our cries which fill the
country and he would judge for us with justice." As with Lefeia (but
not the rest of the chiefs' critics), Marung saw missionaries as
collaborators in a general plot to dispossess Basotho of their political
rights in the country. Since Moshoeshoe's death, he said, they had
abandoned their originally proclaimed mission of "salvation" and, instead,
"today they have turned [Lesotho] into trade, they cooperate with our
enemies the English in the ill—treatment meted out to us-" Missionaries
will "rob you", he said, and when you tell the truth about their robbery
they say, "my child, the Evil One has entered your heart, let us kneel
down and pray for him." And those who attempted to protest through
92"the butchery" called the National Council were rusticated.
The other letter, by James N. Phalatse, was significant in that,
while sharing Marung's view of chiefs (but not that of missionaries),
it went further to suggest what kind of government Lesotho needed to
93
replace the chieftaincy:
I shall only speak about the 'iron bar',
which is birth chieftainship, which is
useless to us people in Africa. I think
it is more than hundred years we have been
supporting this rock which is useless.
Now I advise that we should do away with
birth chieftainship, we should set up a
Republic and see if we cannot make progress.
The following month, in December, the Bioemfontein Friend
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carried two aggresive articles against the court system. Both articles
A
basically restated charges made in The Friend in 1919. One writer,
under the pseudonym "Mosotho" charged in general that chiefs had in
effect "turned the Basotho into a nation of slaves." They made than
work in the fields of their "several wives without food or payment or
even a drink of water." "Mosotho" alleged that some people had been
killed by frolicking "young chiefs" in a spate of violence perpetrated
by indigenous rulers. As a rule, he said, court cases were awaited to
stockpile before trial began. Yet, in the event a litigant lost heart
and disappeared from the court, judgment was brought against him and he
was fined for contempt of court. People could not even have their
cases allowed on appeal to higher courts. When they attempted to
appeal, higher chiefs' courts returned them to the courts whose judgjnent
they appealed. "Mosotho" let it be known that his article was aimed at
the white public in general and colonial authorities in Lesotho in
particular, as a strategy to expose "the great misuse of justice carried
out" by chiefs in Lesotho, from whom "we groan under a burden of
oppression." And he hoped that as a result of his agitation a
94
Conmission of Enquiry into his allegations might be established.
A fortnight later, Simon Majakathata Phamotse followed. He said
indeed any Mosotho "would be wanting in patriotisn were he to fail to
endorse" the anonymous "Mosotho" on the question of the "uneven balance
of justice" in the Territory. Chiefs, he said, ran their courts with
extreme subjectivity and vindictiveness, and that they each had a
"black list" of conmoners in their jurisdictions. In reaction to such
a state of affairs, Basotho throughout the Territory were "clamouring
for reform of some kind or other." He hoped to "gain the ear of high
officials and to draw attention to this woeful state of affairs in this
our fair little country." Finally, he reiterated a proposal that he
had made back in 1919, namely, that the first step to be taken in
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dealing with the situation was to establish a Department of Justice,
which should be presided over by an "experienced and qualified judge",
qc
and which should "have nothing to do with political affairs."
Thai a barrage of newspaper charges followed in Naledi and
Mochochonono through February of 1922. At one time it was Simon
Phamotse once again. At another, somebody who called himself "Another
Mosotho." And at yet another time it was an anonymous "Mohiouoa" -
"The-Hated-One". The punch line from these critics, following which
chiefs felt compelled to fight back, was carried in a leading article in
Naledi on February 24:^®
I am sure neither of our Paramount Chiefs
....know anything of the Proclamation No. 2B.
To their knowledge and belief every male
child born of a woman whose dowry was
paid with cattle belonging to Moshesh's
estate is ipso facto a chief with the right
to adjudicate upon and try any case, criminal
or civil, and to exercise jurisdiction within
such limits as may be indefinitely defined by
his superior.... The condition of affairs in
the country are(sic) going to the dogs all
because the Resident Commissioner will not
make use of this power....[Yet], in order to
save the Basuto chieftainship from sure
destruction to which it is now speeding
headlong, and to have freedom in the country,
seme way must be found out of the deadlock.
As the Resident Commissioner learned when a B.P.A. deputation approached
him on the subject, on January 17, the newspaper barrage was a
coordinated strategy by the bahlalefi. The B.P.A. deputation, said
£
the Resident Conmi^ioner, was "entirely agreed as to the correctness of
97
the statements."
Exposed and driven to the wall, chiefs reacted against the
%
newspaper charges with vigour and venom. Morena e Moholo Griffith
convened a huge pitso at the royal capital in Matsieng at which "the
Sons of Moshoeshoe" were practically all present, and he sunmoned Simon
Majakathata Phamotse and his followers to come and speak to their
various charges against his government. Probably the longest in the
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century to date, the pitso lasted for 8 days, from April 18th to the
25th. Plenty of food was provided. The B.P.A. members were given a
whole cow to themselves.
According to The Bloemfontein Friend, which covered the event,
the spokesmen of the B.P.A. - Simon Phamotse, C. H. Mofokeng, Bernard
Matete and the novelists - Thomas Mofolo and Zakea D. Mangoaela
underwent "a severe cross-examination as to which Chiefs were
accused...." It was a hazardous procedure. The spokesmen declined the
bait, saying it would not be prudent to give names as the accused were
in the audience (and apparently they feared victimization). They said
they could name names only in a proper trial court, and not at a pitso.
Meantime, they referred their Morena e Moholo to the Proceedings
of the National Council for the years from 1912 to 1921, the relevant
parts of which they duly read out to him. Significantly, individuals
began to approach the B.P.A. spokesmen with their personal grievances,
and volunteered to give evidence of bad treatment received from the
chiefs. "Seme fearless men, not members of the Association, who were
present had the temerity to stand up and tell the Chiefs that it was
true they ill-treated the nation. Many voices... vociferated their
support of this.
Backed up by 150 members of the Association alone, Phamotse and
his men were obviously feeling triumphant throughout the duration of
the pitso. "The meeting was constantly interrupted by voices from
the crowd, which formed a ring supporting the Association's spokesmen,
and deriding the Chiefs," although the owners of the voices could not
be identified. And at the end of the pitso:
Women of the Paramount Chief's village
came to shake hands with the President
of the Association [Simon Phamotse], whom
they called their Moses and to whom they
turned their eyes for their salvation and
the salvation of the country. Many women
sat at the approaches of the village, just
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to see 'the one who had come to deliver
them' and newly born infants there were
named after him.
Just as the pitso concluded, however, that triumph was coamingled
with trepidation. For, as Simon Phamotse and Thomas Mofolo informed
the Resident Commissioner, to whcm they repaired for sanctuary soon
thereafter, the Morena e Moholo, speaking through his chief
councillor, Chief Leloko Lerotholi, concluded the pitso by warning
them "that we must never organise in the villages of the chiefs and
headmen, for we shall meet with accidents which will cause him
trouble."00
A threat of that kind made through Chief Leloko Lerotholi, which
might very well have come from his own chest, and not that of the
Morena e Moholo, was very likely to be carried out. Chief Leloko
Lerotholi was volatile. By 1928, according to one of the many reports
of his conduct made to the Resident Conmissioner, he had physically
assaulted all members of the royal Court at Matsieng, including the
President of "the Court, Chief Goliath Mohaie, and no one was able to
bring him under harness."'"00 Hence, spokesmen of the B.P.A. had
i
good reason to fear for their lives. And the Resident Conmissioner
moved fast to advise the Morena e Moholo that "such words are
dangerous and might be taken as an order to the chiefs who heard them"
that they should accordingly arrange accidents for the members of the
B.P.A.101
Summarizing the views of the Association on the role of chiefs
in government in Naledi (picked up by the Times on May 3) Simon
102
Phamotse stated, in an evident display of bravado and learning:
To their habitual indifference, born
of years of unlimited authority and
indulgent luxury, [Chiefs] very soon got
over the shock they had received when
their incorporation [to the Union of South
Africa]...was first mooted...For over ten
years, the Basutoland Chiefs have been
callous to the cries and grievances of the
- 252 -
people...History is truly repeating itself
in Basutoland. All the incidents which
happened in the reign of King John and King
Charles in connection with the trampling
down of the people's rights [in England],
by both Kings, have taken place in the
reign of the present King of Basutoiand
....Like the English of old, the Basuto
love their kings and will think twice
before they declare against them. But the
love is only on one side. The King and his
barons show no reciprocity of that love, all
they do is maltreat then, dispense uneven
justice and make them slaves for then,
without any recompense. (My emphasis)
The Measure of Morena e Mbholo's Authority
Morena e Moholo' s Griffith's authority in Lesotho in 1922
was at a very low ebb. As proof of the decline in his authority, the
Resident Commissioner received confidential information through the
Assistant Commissioner of Mafeteng in July that there was "a scheme
afoot" to depose him and place his half brother, Chief Makhaola
10°
Lerotholi, in his place. The Resident Commissioner, apparently,
had reason to suspect the involvement of both Chief Maama, who had on
more than one occasion accused Griffith of trying to "kill" him (that
is, "eat him up"), as well as Chief Jonathan, on account of his own long
standing feud with the Monarch. Nevertheless, both chiefs totally
denied complicity in the scheme, and the Resident Commissioner was left
to believe that it was simply a malicious piece of gossip.
Even so, the gossip (if that is all that it was) seems to have
been efficiently put into circulation. For, it is significant that
at this very time - in July, a "Criminal Investigation" made in
Johannesburg and sent to the Police Headquarters in Lesotho stated
that it had been "ascertained" that ail Basotho who -had then just
completed or were about to complete their contracts in the South African
mines were anxious to return home; there was "the general talk... of
coming trouble between Chief Jonathan and the Paramount Chief
Griffith."104
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The least that it seems can be drawn from this otherwise confused
state of affairs is that sane monbers of the public suspected collusion
between Simon Phamotse and Chief Jonathan to depose Griffith: Such a
suspicion would have rested on the knowledge that the two were brothers-
in-law, having both married two sisters, significantly high ranking
grand-nieces of Moshoeshoe. It must have seemed a logical thing to
those members of the public that if Griffith lost his throne, consequent
upon the historic Matsieng pitso, Chief Makhaola would be the
undisputed candidate for the high office. Chief Makhaola, who together
with Jonathan was conspicuously absent frcm the Matsieng pitso, was the
most level-headed of "the Sons of Moshoeshoe" at the time. He was
frankly the most critical principal chief of the abuses of the
chieftaincy. And it is even plausible that he had absented himself
from the pitso as an indication of his disagreement with the principle
on which it had been convened.
The rumour of his de-stooling notwithstanding, Griffith had two
serious political liabilities, one of which set him against a part,
while the other set him against practically all of his subjects. The
t
latter was his half-brother and chief coun....lior, Chief Leloko Lerotholi.
Besides physically assaulting other chiefs and coun. .llors of the royal
court in Matsieng, the Chief was inflexible to any change in the
structure and functions of the chieftaincy. Any proposals for change
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in this connection he described as "forced progress". He
effectively shielded The Morena e Moholo against his own people,
while giving him a voice that was at once autocratic as well as
belligerent. To wit, at the recent historic pitso-at Matsieng, it
was his voice that created the political climate. Not once did
Griffith speak to his own people with his own voice, keeping in-doors
or aloof from them for the entire 8 days. Even the chairman's voice,
Chief Sekhonyana (presuming he spoke at ail) was drowned under that of
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Leloko Lerothoii and his threatening gestures against the Progressive
Association. The Resident Commissioner was hence accurate when he
observed to the High Commissioner on July 14: "[Griffith] has some
very bad advisers, amongst the worst being, in my opinion, his younger
half-brother Leloko, whom I distrust greatly and who is detested by
the people."106
The other political liability of the Morena e Moholo was •
his faith: Since his conversion in 1912, the Catholic Church wielded
immense control over him. From the point of view of the Catholic
Church it was the numbers' game against the rival protestant Paris
Evangelical Missionary Society. By bringing the Monarch under its
influence, the Church hoped to create an impact on the rest of the
Nation, as a result of which its adherents would increase and overwhelm
the P.E.M.S.
As evidence of the techniques used by the Catholic Church to work
on his sentiments (and unwittingly perhaps to present an alternative
authority in his mind from the colonial administration), His Grace J.
Genez, the Bishop of Lesotho, had earlier, on his visit to Rome in 1914
t
carried a personal letter from the Monarch to Pope Pius X.
Unfortunately the Pope had died that year before he could respond.
Nevertheless, it would be one of the Monarch's treasured achievements
that The Pope's successor, Benedict XV, would respond to the letter,
praising him for his gesture, and acknowledging it as "true evidence of
your faith, of your love to the Messenger of Jesus Christ, and your
loyalty to the Catholic Church, for which it is now four years that you
107 %
have had the blessing of being its child."
On the occasion of his visit to London in 1919, Griffith would
have received an even greater honour than that one, had the jealousy
and fear of the colonial administration not destroyed his hopes. The
Fathers of Roma Jesuit Mission, of whom he was an adherent, had
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apparently urged him to take the opportunity of the trip and visit both
the Grotto of Massabielle in Lourdes, in the South West of France, where
the Blessed Lady appeared to St. Bernadette in 1858, as well as the
Vatican to meet the Pope. The visit failed when the High Conmissioner
had the Monarch informed that, so soon after the War, continental Europe
was still unsafe to visit. That was not the real reason, however.
The real reason, as the High Conmissioner's confidential telegram to the
10R
Colonial Secretary pointed out, was that:
I think it undesirable visit should be
extended to Rome and Lourdes Griffith might
be unduly impressed by pomp and state of
reception at Vatican and might form
conclusion that Pope was more important
than His Majesty the King...
As the colonial administration had feared in 1919 that the
Morena e Moholo's loyalty was in danger of diminishing in favour
of the Catholic Church, the bahlalefi were convinced by the early
1920s that he had already abdicated his responsibilities to the Nation
in its favour. The impression needed not, of course, be true. But
the political core of the bahlalefi belonged to the P.E.M.S. And
while they themselves ,were critical of their white clergy, in so far
as they saw it as monopolizing key posts of leadership and occasionally
supporting the colonial administration on issues inimical to their
vested interests, they were part and parcel of denominational rivalries.
Hence they feared the tilt in the balance of numbers, which was moving
at a remarkable rate. To illustrate the point, in 1904 there were
about 5,700 Catholics to 40,000 P.E.M.S. members in Lesotho. In 1924,
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the Catholic congregation was about 50,000. And by 1929 the
•.
Colonial Report on Lesotho estimated the numbers at 80,000 P.E.M.S. to
60,402 Roman Catholic members, out of a population of approximately
half a million.110
e
The Evident Commissioner's Initial Response
To the Bahlalefi's Call For Reforms
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The picture emerges quite clearly that until the B.P.A. launched
its coordinated press attacks calculated to produce action in 1921 and
1922, the colonial administration was aware that something had gone
wrong in the indigenous government of Lesotho, but it had no idea as
to how to go about putting it right. Indeed, it can even be suggested
that the colonial administration had no answer to the problem precisely
because it had still not conceived a policy for administering the
Territory. This much, at least, would tacitly be admitted by one
Resident Conmisioner, R. C. Sturrock (E.C.F. Garraway's successor) in
1928.
As the colonial administration was not clear on its own policy,
therefore, when the B.P.A. press attacks errupted it could not
initially do more than being circumspect about the situation and, from
the embarrasanent of its own helplessness, make a few feeble suggestions.
Garraway's initial response, communicated to his High Corrmissioner on
December 24, 1921, was to send the first two aggressive articles by
Simon Phamotse and the anonymous "Mosotho" to the Morena e Moholo
with a brief, non-conmittal note: "I have been asked by R. H. for
t
remarks." (As a matter of fact, His Royal Highness, the High
Commissioner, had given no instructions to that effect.) Beyond that
timid step, and while admitting both the accuracy of the newspapers
charges as well as need for reform, Garraway refrained from involvement
on the grounds that:"'""'""'"
I am of opinion that such reform can only
emanate from the natives themselves, and
I have no doubt that this will ultimately
eventuate. Every session the subject is-
vigorously discussed in the council and
these grievances openly ventilated there,
but so far without result.
Toward the end of January, 1922, however, the Resident Conmissioner
was beginning to see his way through the situation and his conmunication
to the High Conmissioner began to reflect a tangible suggestion. He
- 257 -
had just received a deputation of 30 B.P.A. members who had come to ask
him what positive action he intended to take consequent to its agitation
for reform. In the course of the audience, so he admitted to the High
Commissioner, the deputation had convinced him that Simon Phamotse's
proposal for a Department of Justice, which took the more precise
description of "special Court of Appeal" at that audience, "expressed
112
the unanimous feeling of the whole nation." Hence, he recommended
the idea to His Royal Highness, having taken the effort to give it an
organizational framework. He recommended the idea of a "Special Court
of Appeal" to deal with "purely native cases" tried by chiefs' court
and from appeals of judgments in those courts.
As the situation then stood, such appeals lay to the royal Court
at Matsieng. The establishment of the "Special Court of Appeal" would
thus critically alter that arrangement. Hence, the Resident
Commisioner noted that "strong opposition from the Paramount Chief and
113
his immediate followers may be expected." Opposition could be
expected all the more because of the proposed structure of the Special
Court of Appeal, which was as follows: The President was to be the
Assistant Commissioner of the District of parties in dispute. He
presided over 7 members, one from each of the seven Districts in the
Territory. The President and 3 members were to form a quorum. The
provision making an Assistant Commissioner the President of the Court
was a contribution frcm the B.P.A., which had advised the Resident
Commissioner that it was the general wish of the Nation.
As the B.P.A. pressed him to take a stand on the general question
of reforms, and as he was obviously awake to the fact that failure to
do so might have immediate political repercussions on him, he opted to
offer it his support. As he recounted to His Royal Highness:
I told them that I considered they were
taking the right steps in the right way
in beginning to move in the matter, and
that any proposed change in the present
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procedure as regards the chief's courts
should come from the nation, and on behalf
of the administration I assured them that
all such suggestions would receive full
and sympathetic consideration.
By February 18 the Resident Ccximissioner had become creative of
his own accord. In a search for a general solution for reforming the
indigenous government, he had dug out Proclamation 2B 1884, only to
discover, to his amazement, that after all, all chiefs' courts and
rules for their guidance in the Territory ought to be laid down by
the Resident Cormiissioner. Yet, as he remarked to the High Commissioner,
during the entire 37 years of the existence of the Proclamation, "in no
case have the conditions laid down therein been enforced." Of the rules
mentioned in the Proclamation, "none appear to have ever been issued
from the Resident Conmissioner's Office."144 As a step toward
rectifying the situation, therefore, he asked the High Commi ssioner "to
instruct me" to write to the Morena e Moholo to submit a full list
of chiefs who hold courts and explain by whose authority they did so.
Although it could be argued that chiefs derived their authority and the
right to hold court from the custom of "placing", the Resident
(
Conmlssioner felt that, even the custom notwithstanding, "many of these
younger chiefs have never been given authority, and should not be allowed
to hold court of any description." His prescription was that as soon
as he received the names, it should be possible to issue "instructions
for a considerable reduction in the number of courts, and to forbid a
large number."
In none of his initiatives did the Resident Commissioner make
headway. Morena e Moholo Griffith soon found himself so besieged
by the press that his mind was apparently not clear enough to give an
argued defense to the chieftaincy. The Resident Cannissioner was soon
also to find out in October 1922 at the Seventeenth Session of the
National Council, that the idea of a Special Court of Appeal was as then
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only an attractive dream in his own mind and in the minds of the
bahlalefi. The chiefs in general, and the Morena e Moholo
in particular, would hear nothing of it.
A Statement of Policy
By the High Conmissioner
Between May 1921, when His Royal Highness, Prince Arthur Frederick,
tried without success to talk the B.P.A. into being "considerate on the
feelings of others", to September 1924, no policy statement issued from
the High Conmission in Cape Town, either publicly or confidentially.
And, from the foregoing background it may be assumed that the silence
derived more from the lack of clarity on policy, than from judicious
reticence in the wake of the bewildering political situation in the
Territory. By September 1924, however, when the Earl of Athlone, the
successor to Prince Arthur Frederick, paid a visit to Lesotho, he
deemed it desirable to break the silence. Nevertheless, he spoke as a
man who was seeking to use his authority and power to repress the
political agitation of the bahlalefi, and not as a chief executive
simply attempting to provide direction. And in this regard his speech
bore a striking resemblance in tone and content, to the one given by the
abrasive Governor of Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford, against the Nigerian
educated elite in 1920 (earlier cited in Chapter I). While it was less
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acetic, it was nevertheless still overbearing:
[The] Government is patient because it
realises that a nation as a whole cannot
progress at the same rate as individuals
who may happen to be specially gifted or
who may have profited by unusual opportunities
to achieve a degree of education far in advance
of their countrymen. You must remember that
the white races have only reached their present
state of civilization after centuries of struggle
and unceasing efforts. They know from their
own experience that a nation cannot be hurried in
its development and although the Government is
composed of wiser men than yourselves they are
careful to uphold the authority of the chiefs.
They have instructed the Basuto with the assistance
of, and not in opposition to, the recognised leaders
of the people and the established laws of the land.
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Moshesh has done more for your countrymen than any
Mosuto living or dead but he succeeded on account
of his widom for he was not a learned man. I
spoke to you at length because I do not want
discontented people in Basutoland.
The High Commissioner's speech must have been particularly
disagreeable as it was made in the presence of overseas Parliamentary
delegates, including the Secretary of State, Mr. J. H. Thomas and,
t
worst, the Prime Minister of South Africa, General Herzog, who had
been dragged along: A political realist that he was, the South African
Prime Minister had confessed doubt as to whether it would be tactful
for him to attend the pitso, but the High Commissioner, who needed
his presence for its psychological effect on Basotho, had pressured him
into coming. As The High Commissioner reported to the Colonial
Office:116
t
My opinion is that General Herzog's visit
will have a very good effect. The Basuto
are mortally...afraid of being taken over
by the Union and the presence amongst them
of the Prime Minister, who is not only Dutch
but 'Free State' Dutch at that, will keep the
benefits of British rule fresh in their
memories for some time to come. It certainly
had a most stimulating effect upon their loyalty
which on "fiiis occasion was professed with more
than customary emphasis.
t
As it could have been expected General Herzog was an object of Basotho
scorn and hatred during the entire occasion. The Earl of Athlone
117
remarked, with unmistakable alacrity:
Several of the rank and file appear to
have identified General Hertzog, and I am
told that some harsh things were said as
he left the Pitso. But, fortunately, he
is profoundly ignorant of the Sesuto language,
and was therefore able to depart without any
clear idea of their sentiments. In fact I
even heard it alleged that certain most abusive
remarks were courteously acknowledged by the
General who was under the impression that they
were bidding him good-bye.
Beneath the apparent self-confidence and bravado in the High
Commissioner, however, lurked a deep sense of helplessness regarding
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the steps to be taken in the current political circumstances. And on
this he was frank to his superior, the Secretary for Colonies, to whcm
1 I O
he confessed:
One of the worst defects of the present
method of governing the country lies in
the fact that the Administration has no
effective authority over the Paramount
Chief or through him over to the subordinate
Chiefs. The Resident Commissioner seems
powerless to force than to introduce
unwelcome reforms or to check... abuses in
matters which should properly fall within
their jurisdiction.
The Stand of the National Council
On Reforms from 1922 to 1926
From 1922 to 1926 the question of chieftaincy reforms was a
permanent item in the agenda of the National Council. But also
permanent was the tension between the bahlalefi councillors and the
chiefs. Frcm the outset, when the Seventeenth Session of the National
Council convened in August 1922, the bahlalefi were pilloried by their
royal peers.
■Worthy of note when the Seventeenth Session met, was the attendance
factor on the part of certain outstanding personalities: Morena e
t
Moholo Griffith was absent, allegedly indisposed, probably from a
diplomatic illness, and Chief Makhaola Lerotholi - the half-brother
rumoured of coveting his sceptre, was acting for him. And Chief Jonathan
Molapo, the Chief of Leribe, who had not attended the National Council
since 1917, was in attendance, and he remained for a full 5 days (out of
3 weeks). He was quiet for practically the entire period of his stay,
having apparently come to witness the cross-fire and get a first hand
knowledge of the outcome, but not to offer any solutions.
Fully three days of the Session were spent discussing the
activities of the B.P.A., which were roundly condemned by the majority
of the councillors, who said the B.P.A. was out to undermine the power
of the chiefs. Speaking somewhat out of character, but understandably
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in an effort to shake off rumour and remain in Griffith's good books,
Chief Makhaola Lerothoii came down hard on Simon Phamotse. While
describing the B.P.A. as an essentially wholesome Association, he
regretted the fact that its members "are very bad people." "He
[Phamotse] says he leads the people to the right way. My views are
too strong to be expressed before your Honour [the President]." Chief
Makhaola promised to ask the Morena e Moholo to confine the
activities of the Association to the "camps" - the six administrative
centres presided over by Assistant Commissioners, and not be allowed
in the rural areas. (The instruction was subsequently duly given.)
Had Chief Leloko Lerothoii, the volatile Matsieng councillor, had his
way, the activities of the B.P.A. should have been stopped altogether.
Chief Leloko spoke for quite a long time and particularly harrassed Simon
Phamotse, consistently accusing him of "untruths". While, in a bold
admission of his advocacy for violence he said: "With reference to the
beating of the people at the 'matsema' , sane of the people gnoke 'opium'
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and have to be made to do work...."
The most scathing, if condescending speech from the chieftaincy,
i
however, came from neither the Acting Morena e Moholo nor his
chief councillor; it came from a minor chief, Makoanyane Seeiso, Chief
Maama's grand-son, who characterized the bahlalefi as the Absaloms of
the Territory:
The sons of Moshoeshoe should be aware
of the many Absaloms who wait at the
gates asking the people if they have
unsettled cases, and promise to give them
their assistance. I know for certain that
the members of the Progressive Association
are not on friendly terms with their Chiefs....
A Councillor once said that it was difficult
for educated persons to hold the plate while
the Chief eats, it is such 'collar-wearers'
who never go to their Chiefs.
The bahlalefi councillors were helplessly overpowered. Their
defence was spasnotic and feeble. But two of them were worthy of
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the record. One defence, by Labane Chokobane, was that the bahlalefi
had resorted to their recent tactics because "We did not wish to be
regarded like little boys playing outside." While the other, and the
1 90
more incisive, by the Reverend Bennett Leshota, read:
If you think that you are looking for
justice, be steadfast until the Chiefs
accept your motion [for reform]. It
appears that the Councillors who are
Courtiers are frightened that they will
lose their bread....Basutoland is the
England of the natives. Whenever they
are ill-treated, the natives of South
Africa say they will run to Basutoland.
They are all grieved when they hear about
miscarriage of justice.
The motion of reform that the Reverend Leshota was referring to
was the one of a Special Court of Appeal, earlier mooted by the Resident
Cocomissioner on the suggestion of the B.P.A., and which had been broached
in the press as a Department of Justice. The intention and the
logistics were still the same: The B.P.A. members were still strongly
in favour of setting up the Court under the Resident Commissioner,
instead of the Morena e Moholo. They wanted it as a "high court"
"whose decisions cannot be interferred with by any individual."
i
Additionally, they wished it to function as a Circuit Court to clear the
backlog of cases in the Territory, especially in the badly hit Districts,
such as Leribe. Its members would be selected by and be responsible
to the National Council. And it was envisaged that its establishment
would lead finally to a separation of powers in the indigenous
government. One councillor, an educated chief, who got the essence of
the last point and in its appreciation restated it in a clear political
context was Libopua Maama, who said:^"'"
We must consider the future if we are to
look after the interests of the future
progress and the people are complaining
against the present administration of
justice. In civilized countries affairs
are separated by their departments. The
suggested court of appeal will help the
Paramount Chief so that he may only deal
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with politics. Let us not leave problems
which are too big for our future children.
What is the good of considering our own
selves if that will ruin us in the future.
The majority of the chiefs were against the idea of the Court
of Appeal. Chief Leloko Lerotholi, who led the opposition, said it
was nothing but "forced progress" acceptance of which would lead the
country into "a peat". Concluding the subject, for which he received
loud "cheers", was the Acting Morena e Moholo, Chief Makhaola
Lerotholi, who said: "That means the Paramount Chief would have no
power....we submit to you that the Paramount Chief should not be deprived
of his powers."
In the place of reform, the chiefs preferred to amend and to add to
The Laws of Lerotholi. And in this connection, oncemore, both the
peculiar constitutional nature of the National Council, as well as the
ambivalent legal status of the "Laws" came into evidence. For, if
when the "Laws" were put together in 1903 it was only as an exercise
of codifying customary law, or if, as the then Resident Conmissioner
advised his High Conmissioner, the "Laws" were not law at all but only
"custom", "suggestions", "merely...an expression of national opinion",
what was the legal effect of "amending" and adding to those nebulous
concepts? What authority were the councillors exercising?
The problem did not, at this time, preoccupy the councillors.
They seemed clearly to labour under the impression that they were
exercising the function of legislation. But the colonial administration
saw the need, for its own purposes, to be clear as to what transpired.




It appears that when the Laws of Lerotholi
were first sutmited to the High Corrmissioner
under cover of Mr. Sloley's despatch of
31st August 1903, they were put forward
rather as a collection of existing laws
and customs which it was desirable to
formulate in definite terms, than as
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legislative enactments, but since that date
the National Council has tended to assume the
functions of a legislature in making from
time to time additions and amendments to these
native laws. This informal expansion of the
Council may serve a very useful purpose in
securing the gradual revision and development
of native law and custom, so that it may be
adapted from time to time to the changing
needs of the Territory, but there is the obvious
danger that the laws framed by the Council in
its capacity as interpreter of the native law
and custom may be found to cover the same ground
and to clash with laws made by the High
Commissioner. (My emphasis)
Here then, at last, was a straight forward answer to a question
put forward by Philip Molise at the Third Session in 1908 (cited in
Chapter IV): If the National Council is only an advisory body, what was
the legal status of the "Laws"? The answer was that they were laws,
framed by the Council "in its capacity as interpreter of the native law
and custom", on authority derived frcm its "informal expansion", by which
it had come to "assume the functions of a legislature." And thus the
Reverend C. M. Sebeta was correct on that occasion to say that "there are
two kinds of law in Basutoiand, the laws of Moshesh and "the High
Conmissioner."
<
This pragmatic approach to the development of customary law,
however, was inherently defective: No legislative authority or official
recognition had been extended to the "Laws". Under colonial rule such
authority derived neither frcm the Morena e Moholo and his
customary institutions (the lekhotla and the pitso) nor from
the National Council; it derived from the High Conmissioner. The High
Commission saw no need to extend official recognition to the Laws. Time
would come when the "unique deficiency" in the Laws, as Sebastian Poulter
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has characterized it, would be called into question in a court of
law.
Be that as it may, the intention behind the "amendments and
additions "to The Laws of Lerotholi was to impose more and tougher
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sanctions. The focus was on two Laws: Law 3, on the right of appeal,
imposed ^20 on the Morena e Moholo and equally on a chief, sub-
chief or headmen refusing any person the right to appeal. To date, no
specific fine had been stipulated. Law 19, on the lawful conduct of
cases in chiefs' courts, imposed a fine of \ 50 on principal chiefs, who
for the first time were numerated and identified by name;£20 for
lesser chiefs; f; 5 for headmen, for unlawful conduct in the courts (for
instance, threatening appeallants with reprisals). Previously the fine
was £10, without regard to the hierarchy of authority. Of the five
added Laws, Law 21 declared the selling of Sesotho beer (joala) to be
unlawful.
As in their original form of 1903, the amended Laws, with their
additions, were doomed to fail. The reason for failure was the same:
lack of enforcement. The Morena e Moholo could not control his
chiefs. At the same time, the colonial administration did not see the
administration of justice in Basotho courts as falling within its
jurisdiction and, Indeed, "the chiefs were ready to pounce on it if it
interfered or intervened.
i
The direct confrontation between the chiefs and the bahlalefi
was not, however, without any immediate, positive effect. Lf nothing
else, it convinced the Morena e Mohoio that he could not totally
ignore the bahlalefi, or "collar-wearers", as they were jeered.
Accordingly, he made a political gesture following the Session in 1922,
and quite independently, to co-opt 4 members of the B.P.A. into the
royal court at Matsieng. For at least two years the outcome was
remarkably positive. In the first place, the move temporarily dampened
criticism against his person. In the second place, it produced a net
improvement in the running of the court. As evidence, in a nine month
period between May 23, 1922 to January 30, 1923, the royal Court had
settled 168 cases. By contrast, over the first four months from
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January 30, 1923 that the B.P.A. members were co-opted, the royal Court
had cleared 198 cases. But the experiment carried the seeds of its own
undoing: Intense jealousies developed between the old and the new
courtiers, for the Morena e Moholo's patronage. In the ensuing
struggle the old courtiers wen. By the middle of 1925 the royal court
was once more fully under the control and caprice of the "sons of
Moshoeshoe".
In the National Council, as in the royal court, the bahlalefi
were the losers. For the last time in the decade, the B.P.A. tabled a
motion at The Twenty-First Session of the National Council in 1926, asking
for parity in the Council between chiefs and corrmoners. Following
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discussions lasting for a day and a half, the motion was lost.
The Colonial Administration Takes
The Initiative for Reforms
Having thus found the chieftaincy to be too cumbersome to take on,
the bahlalefi changed their focus and declared a press war on the
colonial administration. In their most trenchant attack by an anonymous
"Basutolander", which was featured by the Bloemfontein Friend on
January 15, 1926, they put the blame for the stagnation of the indigenous
government on British rule. Praising Moshoeshoe, the founder of the
Nation, for having made laws that were "almost Mosaic in their simple
justice", "Basutolander" denounced the colonial administration for its
failure to capture the essence of those laws and to get them working.
He charged that "the long list of administrators, O.B.E.'s, C.Blv.,
C.M.G.'s, K.C.M.G.'s have done next to nothing to help Basutoland
along!" He accused them of "conservatism of the worst type." He
%
castigated them for "procrastination" and for "slackness and funk, or
peace at any price." The basic flaw in the colonial administration,
as he saw it, was that the officers on the spot were "taking their cue
12ft
from the native [chiefs] they are supposed to rule." As in
1921-22, a volley of press attacks followed.
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The renewed attacks coincided with the appointment of a
resourceful Resident Commissioner. Described by the Dominions Secretary
1PQ
as "a capable and progressive administrator", J.C.R. Sturrock came
to Lesotho frcra Uganda, where he had had a great deal of involvement in
the organization of the indigenous court system. It was felt that he
could be trusted with the responsibility of shaping up the indigenous
government which had become crucial, especially in the phase of renewed
South African pressure for incorporation. The Dominions Secretary,
Mr. Amery, was in communication with General Hertzog on the question of
the transfer of the High Conmission Territories in 1927, and although he
had informed him that "there was no hope of Parliament agreeing to any
transfer" until his legislation on the "native question" had proved
satisfactory, he was hopeful that it would eventually be achieved.
Meantime, he had agreed with him "to push ahead with development" in
the Territories, "so as to make transfer an easy and natural process when
the. time for it eventually came." In Lesotho, as The Dominions
Secretary saw it, the problem of development was "purely one of
ISO
native administrationtand education."
Having studied the situation, J.C.R. Sturrock arrived at the
conclusion that the breakdown in the indigenous government was basically
of the making of the colonial administration, and that it derived
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essentially from the virtual lack of policy. As he put it:
It can, I think, be assumed that the
principle of 'Indirect Rule' is one that
had been adopted in Basutoland....It is
clear, however,... that the circumstances
of varioias territories.. .differ so greatly
as to make it impossible that this principle
can be adopted for all with the same details
of application.... I cannot help feeling that
[in Basutoland] the attitude has been negative
rather than positive - in other words we have
not so much made a positive attempt to rule
through the chiefs, as allowed conditions to
stagnate under the chiefs.... Has there been any
consistent attempt to improve and build upon the
organization - as it was - that we found? Has
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not the whole tendency been towards disintegration?
For one such as the Resident Commissioner, who had just emerged fran
Lord Lugard's second seedbed of the principle of "Indirect Rule" in
Uganda, and who probably saw himself as a chosen disciple, it is perhaps
understandable why he was not discouraged by its misapplication in
Lesotho and, instead, felt it ought to be established properly. As he
put it:
so far am I from any desire to curtail
the rights and responsibilities of the
Paramount Chief that, in spite of the
poorness of the present material, I feel
it to be essential to strengthen his
position if we are to succeed to any extent
in puting more life into the Native
Administration.
In the course of attempting to understand the difficulties of the
indigenous government, J. C. R. Sturrock took his assignment a step
further. He tried to find out how efficiently the colonial
administration itself had exercised its judicial functions. His
findings were bewildering: The colonial administration had done just
about as badly as the chieftaincy. Within its own jurisdiction, which
in criminal cases encompassed culpable homicide, murder, assault with
intent to murder, malicious injury to property, arson - for the most
part, and in civil cases mostly of divorces involving civil or Christian
marriages, the backlog was an indicting testimony. There were cases,
for instance, of people who had spent 5 months in jail without trial
(in a society that was hardly used to imprisonment as punishment), only
to find at the end that they merited no more than a fine or a month
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in jail. The Resident Commissioner's Court, which handled these
cases, was presided over by a Deputy Commissioner (at least beginning
1
in 1916). The holders of that office, however, had no more than
a smattering of legal training to go by.
Sturrock's approach to reforms in the circumstances was two-fold.
First, he made a recommendation in 1927 for the introduction of the
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office of Judicial Commissioner. A post similar in function to the one
that he desired for Lesotho was already in existence as Judge President
of the Special Courts of Swaziland and Bechuanaland Protectorate. As
of January 1928 that office was held by Patrick Duncan, who was at the
same time the Legal Adviser for the South African High Commision. That
same year his responsibilities were expanded to include the office of
Judicial Commissioner for Lesotho, with the understanding that he would
be devoting only a few months of his time in fulfilment of its
functions.
Clearing up the backlog of cases under the Resident Carmissioner's
jurisdiction and keeping the judicial machinery running properly, as
it turned out, was not all that easy. Aside from taking up the bulk
of cases, there was the problem of distances and transportation to the
various Districts, where the Court was actually held. From the
colonial capital, Maseru, due North by motor car, Patrick Duncan had
to drive 29 miles to Berea District for one and a half hours, 60 miles
to Leribe for three hours, 80 miles to Butha Buthe (Chief Joel's
caretaking) for four hours. Due South to Qacha's Nek he had to travel
two days via Pietertzburg in Natal by train, one and a half hours by
motor car, and then had to scale a steep climb, rising some 3000 feet,
135
on horseback to try a few cases at that venue alone. Contrary
to his expectation, he found out that judicial work in Lesotho was more
130
than double that of Bechuanaland and Swaziland combined. There
was so much on Patrick Duncan's plate that in 1929 an Assistant Registrar
and Assistant Master of the Court had to be appointed to relieve him of
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the majority of civil cases. In the interim, the legally
untrained Resident Commissioner had been compelled by the congestion of
cases in 1928 to try 14 criminal cases, an added responsibility which he
thoroughly detested. As he informed the Imperial Secretary, B. E.
Clifford: "I must, however, admit that it is the case that I have had
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practically no experience of Civil work [trying cases], and do not
1 *38
approach it with anything save the most lively dislike." By
December 1929 Patrick Duncan had himself to complain about his
harrassing schedule and propose: "In my own interests as well as his
[party on trial] I should be glad if the amount of travelling could be
1 OQ
reduced by the hearing of as many cases as possible in Maseru."
Sturrock's second, and more difficult, task was the effort to
reform the general administration of the indigenous government and
its court system. This task would take 12 years before it could be
accomplished.
Having gained the impression in 1926 that chiefs had at last
accepted their failure to deal with their own administrative and
judicial problems and that they would welcome intervention by the
colonial administration, the Resident Commissioner set about drafting
a lengthy set of Regulations in 1927. The Regulations defined the
responsibilities of chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen, who would be
"recognised as such by the Resident Commissioner of Basutoland." The
Regulations set out specific penalties on chiefs for "neglect to
exercise the powers" to be bestowed by a pending Proclamation. They
systematized courts into Class 1, the courts of District chiefs and
Class 2, the courts of chiefs and sub-chiefs in general. And they
established "Rules" for the conduct of those courts.
The regulations were modelled after the Uganda Native
Administration and Court Regulations. The Resident Commissioner was
making them under the authority conferred upon him by Section 4 of the
Regulations published under Proclamation No. 2B of 1884. They were
subsequently circulated throughout the Territory, as "only suggestions",
bound in the form of a booklet carrying the title: New Native Court
Regulations.
Sturrock had intended to present the Draft Regulations to the
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National Council at its 24th Session in 1929, as a last step before
passing them to the High Commissioner for proclamation. As he pointed
out to the High Corrmissioner in June 1928, chiefs were ready for
reforms: "Practically all councillors save one, who is closely connected
with the Paramount Chief' s Court, have admitted it in my hearing in
Council."141 (it could safely be deduced that the lone objector in
the Resident Commissioner's mind was Chief Leloko Lerotholi.)
Just at that point, however, the Lekhotla la Bafo reversed the
tide. The relations between the Lekhotla la Bafo and the Progressive
Association had soured and were at their worst in those years. At the
same time the latter had gained considerably in numbers, estimated at
1,900 in 1929.(As earlier shown, the B.P.A. had been estimated
at 1,500 in 1924). In great contrast to the B.P.A., the Lekhotla la
Bafo was composed of the disaffected poorer Basotho - the landless,
the spasmodic migrant labourers, small shop keepers, members of
independent African Churches, and prophets - who had been generated by
the tensions arising from rumours of incorporation to the Union of
South Africa, and who 'generally led the Lekhotla la Bafo Presidential
Addresses with prayers. There were also disgruntled (mostly uneducated)
junior chiefs with an axe to grind with their senior. There were women,
who usually livened major gatherings with Josiel Lefela's self composed
143
songs of protest. It can even be assumed that Indians, whcm
Josiel Lefela cordially referred to as "our senior brothers the Indians",
were warm, if calculating, supporters of the organization. Numbering
then at no less than 150 adults, at least 20 of whom, were married to
144
Basotho, Indians were getting increasingly bitter with the
colonial administration's restriction of their numbers in Lesotho.
Lefela championed their cause on the grounds that they "have been outsted
from their home by hunger and want of clothing which were caused by the
14^
English and all white nations of Europe...." Lekhotia la Bafo,
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in short, comprised a broad assortment of disgruntled people of lesser
means, less independently critical on issues, but suitably malleable
under Lefela's charismatic personality. At that juncture, 1927-29,
Lefela was prepared to use than against the joint aim of the colonial
administration and the B.P.A.'s bahlalefi - the aim of reforming the
chieftaincy.
So, partly to foil the reforms, as a counter political attack on
the perceived 'imperialist ploy', and partly, perhaps, from the genuine
fear that the Nation was about to be deprived of its natural leadership,
the Lekhotla la Bafo initiated a campaign a few weeks before the Draft
Regulations were to be discussed in the National Council, in defence of
the chieftaincy. Going back to the old question of the constitutional
status of the Territory, Lefela argued that Lesotho was a Protectorate.
The colonial administration, he said, had been sent only to protect his
country. In the event, he was appalled in 1929 to find that colonial
officers were bent on the "breaking down of our social fabric to bring
about the detribalisation of our political existence as a nation...
[and] the villification and pollution of our chiefs by the officers of
the Government through enmeshing them in judicial manoeuvres directed
against than to prepare for their expulsion from posts of exercising
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their duties as judges for their people...."
Largely owing to this political anmunition, and to no less a degree
because Lekhotla la Bafo obviously prepared the strategy for the chiefs
to foil the reform, when the Resident Conmisioner's Regulations were
brought for discussion in the National Council in October 1929, chiefs
torpedoed them out. The strategy was to knock down the centre pin of
the Draft Rgulations, namely, the enabling Proclamation 2B of 1884. In
a typical Josiel Lefela fashion, which had became a conmon article in
his Presidential Addresses, the chiefs argued that Proclamation 2B was a
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Cape Colony law and not one of the Imperial Government, and as such it
was null and void. The contrary was the case. But the new Resident
Cotrmissioner did not know his facts. Further, again one of Lefela's
pet arguments, chiefs asked the Resident Conmissioner if he was familiar
with what they termed the Treaty of Mokema, by which Moshoeshoe and
Wodehouse had agreed that Lesotho would be a Protectorate, and they
submitted that the Treaty had been reduced to writing. No such a
"Treaty" existed. But, ignorant of the fact, J. C. R. Sturrock admitted
confusion and virtually threw in the towel. He did so when he granted
the chiefs leave to go and consult the Nation. Five days later the
chiefs came back to say they had held pitsos throughout the country
(11,700 sq. miles) and the Nation was in agreement with them that it
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did not want his "little book" of Regulations.
Yet, that grievances existed was admitted by none other than the
148
Lekhotla la Bafo, which pointed out just a year later in 1930:
The treatment of the chiefs upon the
people Is most vexatious and — you
all see that our success in repelling
the proposed regulations for the abolition
of hereditary chieftainship is no better
than an ephemeral success.
Indeed, the success was ephemeral. Effectively beginning in
1931, the Resident Cotimissioner established a procedure of consultation
between chiefs and conmoners: Before as after each Session of the
National Council, chiefs were to hold meetings with their people in
their respective Districts, and they were to bring back motions on
subjects affecting their welfare. The procedure established a measure
of accountability between the rulers and their subjects, but it also
placed chiefs in the awkward position of having to introduce to the
Council motions from a majority of comtoners who indicted them of
maladministration and injustices in their courts.
At the same time, as a result of a study in 1934-5 of the
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financial and economic problems in Lesotho, undertaken for the Imperial
Government by Sir Alan Pim, the colonial administration gained more
confidence that by introducing a reform it was doing the right thing.
Sir Alan Pirn's report had pointed out, among other things, that:^®
The history of Basutoland presents a very
different picture and the Protectorate
policy followed with reference to it has
little in cannon with indirect rule. It
has been a policy 'of non-interference, of
proffering alliance, of leaving two parallel
Governments to work in a state of detachment
unknown in tropical Africa, while under indirect
rule native institutions are incorporated into
a single system of government and subjected to
the continuous guidance,, supervision and stimulus
of European officers.' The Nation is ruled
by its Chiefs, and the Government can merely proffer
advice; this is not asked for nor welcomed when it
is a question of how the rule should be administered,
but is clamoured for when a difficult position arises.
The Basuto received protection without control, and
not only the Chiefs or the National Council but the
mass of the people consider that their obligations
are fulfilled by paying taxes. Apart frcm this
they are obsessed by the idea of their absolute
independence, except those who have suffered
severely under the oppression of their Chiefs.
(My emphasis)
From the account of the history of the Territory so far given,
it has to be admitted that, except for a touch of exaggeration as to
receiving "protection without control", Sir Alan Pirn's perception was
quite accurate. And, in essence, his was only a more elaborate, and
probably better reasoned, statement than the one given by J.C.R.
Sturrock in 1928.
Moreover, Sir Alan Pirn's thinking had to a great extent been shaped
by the views that he had gathered when he interviewed a delegation of the
B.P.A.. The delegation had counselled him on "the need of measures of
reform by peaceful methods and persuation." But, of great significance,
while conceding that there were some benefits in "British indirect rule",
the B.P.A. had informed Pim of its view that that type of rule "hindered
or retarded" progress owing to the fact that "some of the customs are no
more suitable for the changing conditions brought about by European
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contact through which our people are passing and require some
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re-adjustment." It sumnarized its view as follows:
The British policy of non-interference
with the domestic affairs of the Basuto
is in our opinion, responsible for the
backwardness of the chiefs, for the
autocracy of most of than, as they feel
secure under this British indirect rule
which protects 'Moshesh' and leaves 'the
blanket [i.e. the country] and the lice
[i.e. the people] thereof at his mercy.'
Beginning in 1936, "motions" from the Districts calling for a
major reform of the indigenous government began to filter into the
National Council. In 1937, when the National Council held its 22nd
Session, these "motions" came frcm every major chieftancy jurisdiction
in the Territory. All principal chiefs then surviving agreed that they
had lost control of the reins of government. Chief Leloko Lerotholi
could, of course, be counted upon for a solo protest, albeit he had
some inconsequential company on that occasion. He still did not see
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anything wrong in the indigenous government. As he put it:
It is alleged that the chiefs do not make
use of the laws contained in the Lerotholi
book. I, cannot quite understand what is
meant by this, as I have been thinking over
it, I feel I will go mad.... How long will
the people expect angels to ccrne down from
heaven to try cases for them?... As far as
I can see the aim of these people is to try
to put a stop to the rights of the Paramount
Chief and his junior brothers.
Having by now emerged frcm the political liability of the rumoured
de-stooling of the Morena e Moholo to which his name had been
drafted, Chief Theko Makhaola fairly much set the tone of reason for the
majority of the chiefs as to what, in his own view, "had gone wrong in
1 53
the indigenous government:
I find that sane people are afraid of
advising their chiefs because they think
if they advise then the Chiefs will hate
them. And it is also alleged that if a
man lodges an appeal according to law his
Chief will hate him....According to Sesuto
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custom if a chief goes astray and does
not act according to law his councillors
must force him to the law, and if the
Chief does not listen to than it is their
duty to report the matter to the higher
Chief, and according to the same custom
if the Chief is found to be in the wrong
usually the Councillors are fined and they
are asked what they have been watching.
Now that this custom is dying out, the
Chiefs have no councillors to advise them.
t
Chief Theko Makhaola's philosphical, and otherwise non-conmital
approach to the solution of the problem was more directly tackled by
other chiefs who were less tramelled by blood relations and sentiments
to the Morena e Moholo than himself. The most direct of these was
Chief Lengolo Monyake of Taung - not from Moshoeshoe's royal lineage,
1 54
who stated:
The Chief and the people are equal, if the
Chief goes one way and the people go in
the oppposite direction there must be a
collision somewhere. There are seme
Councillors who seem to think that in order
to remain Councillors they must keep on
saying the Paramount Chief is good: how
long are we going to be hoodwinked! Our
position is becoming insecure. You want
us to play with matters until we are pushed
over the precipice....You should listen to
the cry of the nation: the people are crying
to you, Chief of the Basuto, they want you to
stand up on your feet to support yourself and
the people will stand by you to the end....When
the people say a certain thing is bad do you
think they are playing with matters? The people
who say they will protect you will be the first
to run away.
So, a motion for reforms raised at that Session yielded fruit,
as last. The motion came from Labane Chokobane of the B.P.A.
Essentially it was a motion to accept J.C.R. Sturrock's Draft Regulations
*
of 1929, with a few changes, mostly in form. The Reforms, promulgated
by Sir W. H. Clark as the High Conmissioner, on December 15, 1938, came
in the form of two proclamations. Proclamation No. 61, the Native
Administration Proclamation provided that the High Conmissioner,
following a consultation with the Morena e Moholo, could declare
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any person to be principal chief, ward chief, chief or headman in the
Territory. Section 3 of the Proclamation specifically gave the High
Corrmissioner the powers to revoke or vary the appointments of chiefs.
The functions of the chieftaincy were specifically defined and its
powers reduced. Chiefs were brought fully under the machinery of the
colonial administration and their numbers cut down frcm about 2,500 to
1,340. In the District of Maseru, for instance, where under the
jurisdictions of four chiefs - Sekhonyana, Seeiso, Maama, Khoabane and
the Morena e Moholo there were 108 sub-chiefs and 597 headmen in
1928, the colonial administration had proposed a reduction to 27
sub-chiefs and 87 headmen. And in Mokhotlong, the smallest District in
Lesotho, the total number of chiefs and headmen was reduced from 128 to
1 5ft
74 in 1938. Proclamation No. 62, the Native Courts Proclamation
provided for the "recognition, constitution, powers and jurisdiction of
Native Courts and generally for the administration of justice within"
the Territory. Section 2 of the Proclamation specifically gave the
Resident Conmissioner powers "to suspend, cancel or vary any warrant
recognising or establishing a Native Court or defining the jurisdiction
i
of any such Court or the limits within which such jurisdiction may be
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exercised."
In consequence of the promulgation of the Reforms, it became
necessary to classify The Laws of Lerotholi into three parts: Part 1,
being basically the Laws as passed in 1903, including additions and
amendments, was cailed "Declaration of Basuto Law and Custom". Part 2
consisted of "Rules" by the Morena e Moholo, for the making of
which he was empowered by Proclamation No. 61, Section 8. These rules
provided for the peace, good order and welfare of his people. Part 2
also included some aspect of Section 1. Part 3 consisted of the "Orders"
of the Morena e Moholo, for which his powers derived from
15ft
Proclamation No. 61, Section 15.
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The Reforms of 1938 had a shattering impact on the structure of
the chieftaincy, but especially at the lower end of the hierarchy - on
the headmen and sub-chiefs. As most of them were not recognized in
their former offices, they lost authority in society. And losing their
courts, they lost their primary source of income. The experience was
traumatic.
Because the Reforms were introduced in such a sudden fashion and
had such a devastating effect, they have attracted a lot of attention
from scholars, although none of these scholars have studied their causes
as systematically as it has been done in this Chapter. Having thus not
done so, these studies have invariably made the simplistic generalization
that the impetus for the Reforms came from externally, that is frcm the
colonial administration, and that the Reforms were ostensibly the brain¬
child of Sir Alan Pirn. The leading proponent of this
interpretation, Richard Frederick Weisfelder states, in his otherwise
illuninating study of "The Roots of Factionalism in Lesotho"
(1974),159
The British colonial administration had
accepted and rapidly sought to implement
Sir Alan Pirn's dubious conclusion that
social ills in Basutoland could be remedied
solely by a major restructuring of chiefly
administration and courts....Confronted
with this sudden determination to Impose
reform "from above", the aging Paramount
Chief, Griffith, sought to temporize and
soften the blow, by giving his consent to
the proposed measures only when he had
secured concessions delaying their full
implementation.
The length of this Chapter, and the weight of evidence and
quotations in it have all been in the effort to give a conclusive
reappraisal on this debate, and they point to the contrary. The impetus
for the Reforms came from within; it came frcm the educated coomoners.
The principal chiefs themselves became abundantly aware that they needed
some type of reform: they gave in to the Reforms in 1937 not merely
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because they had been overpowered but because they had come to accept
the fact that their own efforts to reform the indigenous government
through The Laws of Lerotholi had failed. The phrase "to impose
reform 'frem above'", in the circumstances, is quite off the mark.
Further, evidence shows clearly that by the time of Sir Alan Pirn's
arrival in 1934-35, agitation for reform had achieved its first climax
in 1921. He may have given the colonial administration and the
bahlalefi self confidence, but Sir Alan Pim was not the prime mover.
On the whole, this Chapter has attempted to establish the fact
that the first four decades of the twentieth century saw the emergence
of two major commoners' movements - the Basutoland Progressive
Association, comprising the educated elite (the bahlalefi) and the
Lekhotla la Bafo (an assortment of agrarian based, migrant labour
commoners and snail businessmen.) The aims and activities of the
former were already sufficiently ambitious, and the numbers large enough,
to suggest that the chieftaincy had a new type of leadership to contend
with. This type of leadership was conmitted more to parliamentary
institutions than it was to executive monarchy. Their wishes to this
t




The Regency And The Establishment of A
Legislative Council
The Reforms of 1938 went a long way toward paving the way for
parliamentary institutions. A) They cut down the ponderous number
of chiefs in the land and streamlined their responsibilities. B) They
restored a fair measure of accountability and justice in the indigenous
court system. The general consequences of these results were 1) the
colonial administration assumed a greater degree of control over the
chieftaincy and took up the initiative for constitutional advancement,
2) while the bahlalefi - the educated elite, emboldened by the
political victory over the chiefs, in the form of the Reforms, doubled
their efforts to gain more representation in the National Council and
to turn it into a Legislative Council. The 1940s and 1950s would thus
be characterized by rapid constitutional developments. Virtually all
that the bahlalefi had yearned for, for over a period of almost four
decades until 1938, would be achieved in just two decades by 1960.
But there was another factor, aside from that of the Reforms,
which facilitated the rapid constitutional development. That factor
was the problem of succession to the office of Morena e Moholo -
a problem that will have been seen as a sustained thane up to this
juncture, and one which, following Griffith Lerothoii's death, would
become critical and would have to be resolved with an appointment of a
female Regent. That the rapid constitutional development took place
during the period of the Regency - 1940 to 1960 - was more than a
coincidence. There was a cause and effect relationship between the
two. It should, therefore, serve a useful purpose to devote a few
pages to an appraisal of that problem (of succession) at that critical
stage.
THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION
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Polygamy and Succession: Griffith's
Puzzle to Select an Heir, And His
Abdication of Authority to the Colonial
Administration
Morena e Moholo Griffith Lerotholi's marriage arrangements
were, as with those of his predecessors, complex and convoluted. It
was clear that they might lead to a bitterly contested succession after
his death. Hence, for his peace of mind, he attempted in 1926, just
when the pressure for reforms escalated, to select an heir and present
him to the colonial administration for recognition. His persistence
notwithstanding, the colonial administration found itself so befuddled
by complications surrounding the selection that after several efforts of
attempting to determine the legitimacy of the heir-select and the
counter-claimant, it decided, for better or for worse, to await
Griffith's death before it could make its final decision.
The facts of Griffith's marriages and the legitimacy of his
heirs-presumptive were as follows. Of his 28 wives, the first,
Chieftainess 'Ma-Batho, was without a male child. And she had allegedly
died of grief about 1912 when she discovered that her husband, having
(
then resolved to convert to the Catholic Church, and under pressure from
his priests to divorce all his wives except one, could not decide
between herself and another woman named 'Ma-Bereng, whom Griffith
recognized as his second wife."1" Although her death had released
her husband's heart for 'Ma-Bereng, and his soul for the Catholic
Church, it had done nothing to simplify the succession problem. For,
'Ma Bereng's rank, as the then wife number one, was being contested by
her own full sister, 'Ma-Seeiso. Both were the daughters of Chief
Nkoebe, the Principal Chief of Qacha's Nek. Both had sons, Bereng and
Seeiso, respectively.
Of the two contending Chieftainesses, as a matter of fact,
'Ma-Seeiso had been the first to get married, her bohaii cattle had
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duly been exchanged and the concluding custom of tlhabiso (the
slaughtering of a beast to conclude marriage) had been performed long
before 'Ma-Bereng's marriage was mooted. No sooner than 'Ma-Seeiso
had been married, however, she herself had deserted Griffith and
returned to her own father, Chief Nkoebe. The couple's parents,
Morena e Moholo Lerotholi and Chief Nkoebe, were obviously unable
to get them to reconcile their differences. At the same time, the two
were not formally divorced, that is, the bohaii cattle given by
Morena e Moholo Lerotholi to Chief Nkoebe for 'Ma-Seeiso were
not returned. Instead Chief Nkoebe caused two more of his daughters
to be sent to Griffith. And of these, Tsebo had her own bohaii
cattle paid, there being no confusion as to the fact that she would
take a junior rank as the last in the hierarchy of Griffith's wifes.
While 'Ma-Bereng was specifically said to be taking the place of the
deserted 'Ma-Seeiso and, accordingly therefore, no bohaii cattle
were given to legitimize her marriage.
So far things seemed straight forward: 'Ma-Seeiso remained at
her father's place as if she was no longer Griffith's wife. She
t
conceived a daughter named Aa, whilst at her father's place, whan
Chief Nkoebe recognized as his own daughter, in keeping with the custom
2
that the child of an unwed woman becones its own mother's sibling.
She was baptized without reference either to Griffith or Morena e
Moholo Lerotholi, her would-have-been father in law. And, contrary
to the hlonepha custom (whereby it is taboo to call a father-in-law
by name), she began to call Lerotholi freely by name - as a symbolic
indication of her admission that she no longer considered herself as
Q
wife to his son.
Nonetheless, the seeming divorce was shortlived. Although it is
difficult to establish dates, it would appear that shortly after her
father's death in 1903, and not more than three years after 'Ma-Bereng
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purportedly went to take her place, 'Ma-Seeiso returned to Griffith.
It is at this point that marriage and succession were both confounded:
Quite clearly, 'Ma-Seeiso was aware when she got to Griffith's home¬
stead, then at Phamong (in the District of Mafeteng) that she had lost
her original rank. As it was worded in a subsequent judgment of the
Royal Court in 1926, "she found the talk that 'Ma-Bereng was before
her," but she did not challenge the "talk" and she did not seek formal
clarification of her rank.^ She was, as a result, assumed to have
accepted a new rank of number 3, with Chieftainess 'Ma-Batho as number
one and Chieftainess 'Ma-Bereng as number two. By the time of that
return, 'Ma-Bereng already had her son, Bereng. And shortly after her
own arrival, 'Ma-Seeiso also had her son Seeiso. The question then
arose: Who, between Bereng and Seeiso was the heir?
Several times subsequent to 'Ma-Seeiso's return and the birth
of her son, Seeiso, Morena e Moholo Griffith wished his courtiers
to take note of the fact that 'Ma-Bereng was his second wife and
therefore her son Bereng was his heir. According to Chief Makhaola,
the Morena e Moholo had once, around 1917, called Chief Sekhonyana
(
Bereng in an apparently small, informal, family gathering, stating: "I
have called you because you are my younger brother Bereng today, and not
my son, so that you may be a witness, this child [Bereng] is he who is
heir, even though I should die you should witness this statement of
mine, no change must be made." Still living in 1926, Chief Sekhonyana
5
agreed with the evidence. At least by 1917, when some issue (now
unknown to us) must have occasioned clarification of Chieftainess
'Ma-Seeiso's rank, she herself had agreed, in the presence of her own
brothers - Chiefs Sempe and Tsepo, Chief Makhaola, and Morena e
Moholo Griffith - her husband, that 'Ma-Bereng had been sent in her
place and therefore had assumed her rank, and in this she was supported
by her other sister and fellow wife, Tsebo.
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Subsequently, however, apparently when her son Seeiso grew anxious
about his political future, Chieftainess 'Ma-Seeiso had a change of
heart and wished to be recognized in her original position as wife
number 2. In so doing, as it turned out, circumstances favoured her:
The swopping of roles between herself and 'Ma-Bereng could be seen as
purely a result of mutual "understanding" between her father Chief
Nkoebe and Griffith's father Morena e Moholo Lerotholi. Beyond
that it was only tenuously, if at all, supported by Sesotho law and
custom.
Anxious about the development, Griffith then decided to settle
the question of succession before his death by involving the colonial
administration in his decisions: Without telling Seeiso his purpose
and intention, one day, on March 15, 1926, he instructed his courtiers,
headed by Chief Leloko Lerotholi, to take both Seeiso and his half
brother Bereng to appear before the Resident Commissioner at the
colonial capital at Maseru. Whereupon, to Seeiso's surprise, Bereng
7
was presented as Griffith's senior son and heir.
Seeiso challenged the selection and asked the Resident Commissioner
<
to hold his recognition in abeyance until he had consulted his father.
Meantime, he requested a council of his uncles and the Sons of
Moshoeshoe in general to decide the question of seniority between
himself and his brother Bereng. Following a lot of bickering within
the royal family, in the course of which Seeiso was sent to the
Resident Commissioner for a second time with the same purpose and result,
the Sons of Moshoeshoe sat on November 12, 1926 as a Court of Princes.
Chief Makhaoia was the President of the Court' and Chief
Sekhonyana was his "right hand". Both Chiefs had been involved in all
the previous stages of the question and they stood by their previous
understanding that Bereng was the heir. As Chief Makhaoia stated,
"I was bound to go by this same judgment....For this reason I have no
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two tongues." Chief Sekhonyana, who was instructed by the President
to pronounce the judgment, told the claimant Seeiso that "the Court ha«
found for itself good strong evidence" that his mother's original rank
had duly been forfeited and therefore his father's decision "is
reasonable and the Court confirms this explanation of your father that
Bereng is your Senior."9
Seventy chiefs and courtiers were in attendance. The majority
of those who cared to be counted were supportive of Griffith's decision,
although it was noted that a significant number preferred to abstain
from the final decision. The vote was 23 in support of Bereng and 10
in support of Seeiso. Of those who stood to be counted, Bereng's
supporters included one of Chief Jonathan's senior sons - Chief
Motsarapane Jonathan, and Chief Mosiuoa 'Mota in the North; Chief
Masopha L. Masopha in the District of Berea; Goliath Mohale in Mafeteng
in the South; and Councillor Josias Mopeli and Chief Leloko Lerotholi
in Matsieng: These were all highly influential men in the royal family.
Having -them on his side, "the Morena e Mohoio must have felt
convinced that the case was closed. It was not to be so, however,
i
Seeiso appealed the decision to the colonial administration.
While stating, as in the words of the Imperial Secretary, B.E.H.
Clifford, that "as far as the Government is concerned there is little
to choose between Seeiso and Bereng,""''9 the colonial administration
was not convinced that the decision had been decisive. It was worried
by the abstentions of certain other principal chiefs at the Matsieng
Court of Princes. Following several exchanges of letters and a caucus
of officers up through September 1927, B.E.H. Clifford summarized the
i
view of the colonial administration that "the Chiefs who actuary voted
in favour of Bereng were, for the most part, personal adherents of
Griffith." Further, Clifford had been made to understand that "in
Leribe and the North there is overwhelming opinion in favour of Seeiso
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and that even in the South the majority favour him as the next
heir."-'- Otherwise, the Legal Adviser, Patrick Duncan, had given
the opinion on December 30, 1926 that if it was in keeping with Sesotho
custom that the heir should be selected in his father's lifetime, it
would be judicious not to frustrate Griffith in his wish to settle the
matter. That way, impending trouble after his death might be
averted.^
When B.E.H. Clifford perused the High Commission's records, he
confirmed that it had virtually become the practice in Southern Africa
for African monarchs under British colonial administrations to present
their successors to the High Commissioner for recognition in their
life time. In that number were the Motswana Monarch Khama, who had
introduced his son Sekhoma to the High Commissioner as his successor.
Sekhoma in turn had presented his brother Tshekedi as prospective Regent
during the minority of his infant son, Seretse. The Lozi Lethunga
Lewanika had followed the same procedure in regard to the reigning
Lethunga Yeta.
The procedure was therefore approved for Lesotho which, strictly
t
speaking, had not followed it. As Clifford was informed, "the sons of
the Paramount Chief were referred to as the 'Children of the Grave'
because the successor to the Paramountcy was usually selected at the
grave of the Paramount Chief by the 'Sons of Moshoeshoe' assembled there
so as to avoid disputes and conspiracies during the life time of the
13
Paramount Chief.
The method that the colonial administration chose as the best to
get a decisive selection frcm the Sons of Moshoeshoe was a secret ballot.
Additionally, it stipulated that the Morena e Moholo should draw
up a list of the Sons of Moshoeshoe entitled to vote on the matter, and
that the list should be approved by the National Council.^ The
Resident Commissioner wished the Morena e Moholo to be cognizant
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of the fact that, while "the question is primarily a matter to be
decided by Basuto themselves, presumably in accordance with Law 1" of
The Laws of Lerotholi, Seeiso's appeal would have to be satisfied, by
the colonial administration if necessary, "and then we shall be able to
have that peace and quiet in the nation which you have told me you
1 S
desire and which is equally desired by me.'
Griffith was embittered by this allusion. First, he did not
understand how Seeiso could possibly be given an appeal on the matter,
especially as "Seeiso himself states that he asked for the House of
Moshesh," the highest body with jurisdiction on his complaint, "to whom
he also stated that he trusted that frcm them he would get justice,"
and justice had been given to him. "I wish to know," he asked, "whether
the good Government of His Majesty can grant an appeal in this case
which was decided by all the Basuto, by all the Courts of the House of
Moshesh. Under what customs or laws would those to whom it would go
judge it?" Second, he wished to be allowed to see the High
1
Conmissioner on the matter .
Griffith had wished, when and if the request were granted, to see
the High Commissioner' in the company of his rival uncle, Chief Jonathan,
whose knowledge on Sesotho custom and law was then presumed to be
unrivalled. But the old man found the entire idea of going to see a
white "Chief" on matters of Sesotho custom and law absurd. As he told
the Assistant Commissioner of Leribe, who had been instructed to relay
17
the message to him.
Chief, my reply is that I am not going
and I am not sending a representative on
the following grounds:- This is not the
matter for the High Commissioner. We have
our own ways and customs which we fully
understand and which His Excellency the
High Conmissioner does not know and
understand....We, the Basuto, do not elect
whom we like for the Chief; the Chieftainship
belongs to the first-born son whose mother was
married by the parents of his father after
consultation...is it not a fact that the mother
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of the boy who is in the mountain [Seeiso] is the
one who is married by Lerothoii before any other
wife of Griffith?
Aithough he had not succeeded in enlisting Jonathan in his company
Griffith did go ahead with his audience with the High Commissioner. He
was accompanied by other chiefs and courtiers, including, of course, his
principal supporters - Makhaola, Sekhonyana and Masopha L. Masopha. At
the audience, held on November 24, 1927, with the Resident Conmissioner,
J.C.R. Sturrock and the Imperial Secretary, B.E.H. Clifford, Griffith
essentially registered his protest that the colonial administration
should not intrude in the selection of his heir, as "this matter is one
of national custom of birthright." The High Conmissioner, on his part,
acknowledged the principle that "The nomination and appointment of the
Paramount Chief is entirely a State matter:" It should not be settled
in the law courts. Nevertheless, he was not satisfied that the Sons of
Moshoeshoe had decided "beyond doubt in favour of Bereng." He insisted
on a secret ballot. Griffith observed that "the ballot was not a
Basuto custom." The High Commissioner rebutted that, while it was not
the custom of Basotho to seek the approval of the Secretary of State
(
before the appointment of their monarch, "nevertheless his approval had
to be obtained." The discussion having reached a stalemate, the
audience ended with the High Corrmissioner tossing the ball in Griffith's
18
court with the words:
If you accept this advice [of the secret
ballot] the Government will formally
approve the heir selected when you present
him to the Resident Commissioner. But if
you do not wish to hold such a ballot I
can do no more than take note of your own
opinion that Bereng is your rightful heir.
If no ballot is held I fear the Government
would not at the present moment be able
formally to recognise Bereng as your
successor.
At that point, it has to be mentioned, the colonial administration
had become partial to one claimant to the throne, namely Seeiso.
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Significantly, the High Conmissioner' s brief for his audience with the
Morena e Moholo clearly stated: "Of the two sons it would appear
that Seeiso has more character and would be likely to make the better
ruler."19
The Morena e Mbholo probably sensed that feeling when he
was interviewed. Or perhaps he was merely aware that Seeiso was more
popular than Bereng (or had become popular as a result of his contest
for succession). Perhaps both considerations weighed heavily on his
mind, and he dreaded losing both the case as well as his integrity by
pushing the question of succession further. He dropped the entire
affair and left it to be dealt with after his death. The total effect
of his initial effort, however, was that 1) He had made himself
extremely vulnerable to the colonial administration: He was almost
like a political hostage. 2) He had, for all intents and purposes,
surrendered the prerogative of the Sons of Moshoeshoe to select the
heir over to the colonial administration, if only it cared to seize
the opportunity.
The Colonial Administration Takes Full Management
Of the Procedure for Selecting the Heir: Seeiso
Is Made the Morena e Mohoio of Basotho
Griffith died in 1939, a year after the Reforms that overhauled
his government, leaving the question of his succession unresolved. The
colonial administration seized the opportunity created by circumstances
to set the machinery of selecting his heir in motion. The Resident
Conmissioner convened a meeting of the Sons of Moshoeshoe in the chamber
of the National Council on August 3 that year to discuss the question of
succession. Bereng and Seeiso were present.
The Sons of Moshoeshoe this time stayed clear of the technicalities
of the alleged swopping of the chieftainesses. They also stayed clear
of an allegation of illegitimacy, with which the late Morena e
Moholo had belatedly saddled Seeiso. They stuck strictly to the
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Sesotho interpretation that offspring derive their legitimacy from the
validity of their mother's marriage: "Ngoana ke oa likhomo" (A child
belongs to the bohali cattle.) And they followed closely the
principle of succession embodied in Law 1 of The Laws of Lerotholi (as
OQclassified under part 1 of the Laws.). The decision was in favour
of Seeiso.
For one who had fought so hard for the high office and who in the
end enjoyed such popularity, it is sad that Morena e Moholo Seeiso
Griffith was fated to live but a few months. He died on December 26,
1940.
Not much had happened during that brief period, and hence he had
left little for posterity to judge him by. One dramatic episode about
him, however, is worth mentioning. Thrown into ecstasy by a gift from
the Imperial Government of The King's Medal for African Chiefs, on
October 19, 1940, at the 35th Session of the National Council, he had
reacted with extraordinary compassion to the war cause: He prevailed
over the National Council to make a donation of £ 100,000, from a surplus
of f223,000, to the British Government. The Council subsequently
1
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proposed that the money be used to buy airplanes.
Seeiso Griffith was heavily indebted to the colonial administration
for his claim to the high office and this episode may serve to
illustrate that sense of indebtedness. At the same time, the measure of
support that he had received from the nation at large, his striking
personality, and the sense of duty to preserve the vigour of his office
might have made him a powerful Morena e Moholo, under whom
tendancies toward constitutional monarchy might have been stayed. But
then, there is not much that can be built on this type of speculation.
The Regency That Was Determined By
A European Court: Chieftainess 'Mantsebo
Comes To Power And The House
Of Letsie II Is Emasculated
With Morena e Moholo Seeiso Griffith's death, the semblance
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of cohesion in the chieftaincy that had precariously been maintained
from the times of Letsie II just about ended. No chief through the
full breadth of the country would be available to serve as a rallying
point. The powerful chief of Leribe, Chief Jonathan, who might have
seized the opportunity and in the absence of a male head in Matsieng
wielded power creditably, had died in 1929. His successor, Chief
Motsoene Josefa Molapo Moshoeshoe, Senate Letsie's son, had succeeded
OO
to office amidst a dispute, involving two other claimants. At
the end of the succession trials he was enervated and suspicious of
intrigues. He was mentally unbalanced. He was no model for
leadership.
Seeiso's eldest son and heir, Khosana Constantine Bereng Seeiso,
by his second wife, was only 4 years of age. The uncle with the most
immediate claim to the Regency was none other than Chief Bereng
Griffith, who had disputed the high office with Seeiso since 1926 and,
despite his own father's wishes, lost out in the contest. Bereng
Griffith was understandably a bitter man. Understandably, also, both
the royal house of Lesotho as well as the colonial administration were
apprehensive that if he was made Regent, the coincidence of the sudden
death of Letsie II's infant son Tau in 1913, while Griffith's Regency
was being discussed, might be repeated. To use the words of Lord
Harlech, the South African High Conmissioner at the time, it was feared
that Chief Bereng might resort to "The Princes in the Tower methods of
removing the two obstacles between him and the substantive
27
Paramountcy." In the circumstances, a decision was made to select
a woman as Regent.
Shortly before Seeiso's death, when he was already critically ill,
he had instructed his principal counsellor, Chief Gabashane Masopha
(a great-grandson of Masopha, the third son of Moshoeshoe by his Great
Wife) to be the Acting Morena e Moholo until he was well enough to
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resume his duties. In the event of his death at the hospital in
Maseru, Chief Gabashane sunmoned a council of "the Sons of Letsie" -
94
sane two hundred in number, to convene in Maseru to consider the
question of the Regency during the minority of the heir. Discord
arising from the venue, the method used to convene the meeting, and the
list of the principal chiefs invited to attend, wrecked the meeting in
progress. The next meeting would be held at Matsieng on December 31,
1940.
Meantime Chief Gabashane, who was not one of the "Sons of Letsie",
had already taken full custody of the deceased's estate and he had begun
freely to slaughter his cattle and to enjoy the free use of his two
motor cars. Chief Bereng Griffith, the deceased's brother and clai.ma.nt
to the Regency objected, not only to this apparent misuse of the estate
but also, and principally, to Gabashane's authority to convene the
family council. Presumably, as it was revealed, had he had his way he
wuld have convened a meeting of only "the Sons of Lerotholi" who,
according to him, numbered "ten or more in number", but according to his
uncle Chief Theko Makhaoia were only six. The Sons of Lerothoii were
well disposed to him and they might easily have appointed him as the
nc.
rightful Regent and Acting Morena e Moholo.
The meeting of December 31 in Matsieng also ended in disarray and
almost degenerated to open violence. It was sharply divided between
two candidates: One was Chief Bereng Griffith. The other was
Chieftainess 'Matsaba, officialy known as "Mantsebo, the late Seeiso's
first wife, who had not been blessed with a male child. Matters of
%
logistics were oncemore in the fore: Principal Chiefs could not agree
on which body had the right to make a selection, "the Sons of Letsie"
or umbrella body - "the Sons of Moshoeshoe". Having failed to resolve
the impasse, the leaders of both candidates, acconpanied by their
followers, decided to return to the colonial capital Maseru, this time
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to present their respective cases to the colonial authorities.
Having initially listened to their case the Government Secretary,
on the instruction of the Resident Commissioner, set the date of January
28, 1941 for both parties to meet under the umbrella body - the Sons of
Moshoeshoe. Meantime, he authorized Chief Gabashane to continue as
the Acting Morena e Moholo.
On January 10, Chief Bereng Griffith submitted a petition to the
High Commissioner through his lawyers setting forth his conditions. He
requested that Chief Gabashane be set aside while the question of the
Regency is being resolved and he himself appointed in his place. And
he urged that the selection be left in the hands of the Sons of Letsie.
In his personal letter of January 16 to the District Commissioner of
Mohale's Hoek (his jurisdiction), which referred to the proposed meeting
26
of the Sons of Moshoeshoe, he wrote:
I humbly request you please to change this
your intention and according to prece -dents
and customs of the Basuto will you kindly
leave these affairs in my hands as "the
successor and the present head of the Sons
of Letsie to arrange the matters with them
after which we shall have arranged what
is to be done, call all the Sons of Moshoeshoe
and the nation and present before you our
arrangement for the inheritance of the Basutoland
Paramountcy. Chief, I make this request because
I notice that to-day procedure is very much
against Laws, customs and our precedents.
Chief Bereng Griffith's protest notwithstanding, the meeting of
the Sons of Moshoeshoe went ahead on January 28, with The Government
Secretary, Mr. How, chairing the meeting. 44 Chiefs spoke in favour of
Chieftainess 'Mantsebo, as against 23 in favour of Chief Bereng. With
the exception of Chief Theko Makhaoia, who had supported Bereng
Griffith since 1926, all the principal chiefs had supported the
Chieftainess. 'Mantsebo's selection was formally approved by the then
27
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Moyne, on May 10, 1941.
Late in 1941 Chief Bereng threatened through his lawyer to appeal
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the case to the courts. As his claim would not have been justifiable
in the "European courts" (Courts of general jurisdiction), however, he
set about to conmit a legally actionable offence to attain his objective:
In an act of provocation to Mofumahali 'Mantsebo' and a challenge
to her authority, he imposed a financial levy in his own ward on the
grounds that he needed the money to appeal the case to the High
Commissioner. (In this move, significantly, he was supported by Josiel
Lefeia's Lekhotla la Bafo.) Mofumahali 'Mantsebo had his
instructions quashed. He disobeyed her. She had him fined, and the
fine was upheld by the Court of the District Commissioner in Maseru.
Chief Bereng then decided to appeal to "European Courts", using the
OQ
fine as a test case. The Resident Commissioner's Court had
recently, through Proclamation 57 of 1938, been substituted and it was
29
now called the High Court of Basutoland. The case of Chief Bereng
Griffith V.'Mantsebo Seeiso, famously known as the Regency Case, came
before this Court in October 1942, under Mr. Justice Lansdown, frcm the
Union of South Africa. It was a cause celebre.
The Regency Case was significant in three major respects, the
first two of which embodied Chief Bereng's primary claims: First, he
claimed that under Sesotho law and custom a woman has no locus
standi in judicio: She cannot function as a chief, and even if
styled chieftainess, law and custom force her to rely on her husband or
male guardian. Second, he claimed that as his late brother's wife,
Mofumahali 'Mantsebo was his wife by the levirate custom, whereby he
was entitled to raise seed for the deceased. Alternatively, in the
event that she did not love him, she was at least his ward. As such -
that is, as she was either his wife or ward - the Regency devolved on
him and not on her. The third issue of significance was that it was
a test case of the validity of The Laws of Lerotholi, Law 1 of which
made specific mention of succession through a male heir and did not
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envisage a female ruler.
In tackling Chief Bereng's contention that a woman cannot function
as a chief, Mr. Justice Lansdown had a fairly easy task to perform. He
was able on the strength of evidence given by key witnesses, to establish
that a number of Chieftainesses in the land held their late husband's
chieftaincies in their own right. Nonetheless, to apply the rule to
the case at hand could not satisfactorily be done without resorting to
statutory law: While mindful of the fact that in so far as the office
of Morena e Moholo was concerned, there was no precedent for a
woman ruler, he argued, basing himself on Proclamation No. 61 of 1938
(as amended by Proclamation No. 35 of 1941), as well as on the General
Interpretation Proclamation No. 12 of 1942, that "the Acting Paramount
Chief who may be recognised as such by the High Commissioner, need not
have any precedent claim or qualification as such." And, as such, his
interpretation "puts an end to the plaintiff's contentions as to the
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legal qualifications of the defendant to hold her present office."
So that, without prejudice to Chief Bereng's claim that Mofumahali
'Mantsebo was his wife or ward, by statutory law the High Conmissioner
chose whom he pleased to be the Regent.
In order not to raise the issue of the conflict of legal systems
by implication and then leave it unresolved, Mr. Justice Lansdown then
addressed himself to the question of thelegal status of The Laws of
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Lerotholi, which he styled "the Lerotholi Code". He stated:
No legislative authority or official
recognition has been extended to this
code; nevertheless it is helpful, though
not conclusive, on any question as to the
existence or extent of any customay practice
amongst the Basuto people....[it] is in no
sense written law. Its provisions though
reduced to print, do not emanate from any
lawgiver.
Thus the High Court decision formally supported the several
ccyifidentially expressed views within the colonial administration,
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dating from 1903, that although the indigenous government of Lesotho was
allowed to view itself as making Laws, and notwithstanding the fact that
those Laws applied in the indigenous courts, they were not recognized as
part of the general law. Of additional significance, the decision
underscored the dilenma of the colonial administration that the
application of Indirect Rule in Lesotho had led to an unforseen mutation:
It had informally led to parallel government.
Mr. Justice Lansdown's judgment was therefore received with
jubilation in seme quarters of the colonial administration. It seemed
to have brought under control a situation that had gone out of hand.
nn
As Lord Harlech, the High Coimissioner, observed:
Judge Lansdown's judgment in the Bereng
case...strikes me as a masterly document of
far-reaching importance in relation to the
political and social evolution of Basutoland
and Chiefdom questions in Africa generally...
The main conclusion I draw is that while we
may have to take ancient native law and custan
into 'consideration' we must never admit that
we are bound by it hand and foot, and that
native law and custan must evolve and alter
under the impact of civilizing influences and
our rule. If Lansdown's judgment is
upset by the Privy Council on appeal there will
be the deVil to pay.
Fortunately for Lord Harlech, the case did not reach the Privy Council.
Chief Bereng lost heart and dropped it.
THE LAWS OF LEROTHOLI AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STATUS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
ARE RE-VISITED
The National Council's Reaction to Lansdown's Judgment
As it might have been expected, Mr. Justice Lansdown's ruling on
the legal status of The Laws of Lerotholi came as a rude shock to the
National Council. The National Council was left to conclude that once
Lesotho became a British dependency in 1868, at which time the Basotho
believed that their country was merely being given protection, Sesotho
customary law had ceased to be law. Further, the National Council was
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left in a daze as to what function it was deemed to have exercised when
it reduced the Laws to writing, as well as when it made amendments and
additions to them. And, in the final analysis it was left in a state
of confusion regarding the applicability of those Laws in both the
indigenous as well as the "European courts".
In November 1943 when the National Council met at its 37th Session,
councillors were quick to show their discomfort regarding the outcome of
the judgment on the legal status of customary law. And from the general
discussion of the subject, two proposals followed. One of these, by
Councillor Thabo Lechesa, was frcm the chieftaincy of Matsieng, the
immediate jurisdiction of Mofumahali 'Mantsebo. Councillor Thabo
Lechesa reported that at their pitso held in preparation for the
National Council, the people of Matsieng had charged him with the
responsibility of expressing their wish that Matalenyane - that is,
"The Little Green Book" of The Laws of Lerotholi should be recognized,
and if need be, its recognition should be done in the same manner as
Ehubelu — meaning "The Red Book" of the Reforms of 1938.
He stated:^
They say as they understand that this
book of theirs (Laws of Lerotholi) is not
protected and they fear that anybody may
alter it at any time, they request that
it be protected by being included in a
Proclamation signed by the High Commissioner
like all other new laws which have been
issued for their guidance. They make this
request in view of the decision recently given
by Mr. Justice Lansdown in which he states ...
that this is a mere code of Lerotholi and not
law.
The other Councillor who had brought a specific proposal from
his chieftaincy was Chief Goliath Malebanye, frcm the District of
Mafeteng. Goliath Malebanye was basically supportive of the Matsieng
proposal. In the main, however, his speech was aimed at accusing the
colonial administration of having made a nonsense of the legal system
CM
of Lesotho. He intoned:
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We have nowhere to turn: When we are in
Basuto courts we are tried under the
little Green Book, and if you win the
case and the other party appeals the case
goes to European Courts. When you get to
European courts you are tried under
Proclamations. We have nowhere to escape
... But since we were not consulted
about this Red Book (Proclamations) as a
Council to advise our Chief we ask you to
guide us. We request you to confirm this
little Green Book, chief. You have agreed
that this book should be used. You should
uphold it so that the laws in it may not be
looked upon merely as advice but as laws ...
Lead us to the winning post, Your Honour.
(My emphasis).
(The strange remark that "we were not consulted" about the
Proclamation of 1938 was a separate but equally contentious
subject that had been before the National Council since 1939.
It will be examined independently later in the chapter).
The discussions of the 37th Session were inconclusive. However,
as there were several other critical issues, mostly relating to major
constitutional changes in the structure of the National Council, a
Standing Committee composed of 5 outstanding Chiefs was established for
the purpose of working out composite proposals, hopefully to be
realistically drafted, for the consideration of the Council. Most of
these would be tabled'at the same Session. Of the remaining ones,
which were tabled at the 38th Session in 1944 was one on The Laws of
Lerotholi.
As a last, and apparently desperate move to get The Laws of
Lerotholi to be recognized, the Standing Committee tabled a proposal
at that Session changing the title of Part 1 of the "Laws". The
title, given in accordance with the Native Administration Proclamation
No. 61 of 1938, was Basuto Law and Custom. The Standing Committee
proposed the change to Basuto Law. Chief Khosimotse Ntaote, a
member of the Standing Committee, said: "We have altered that to read
"Natural Laws of the Basuto" because these do not include custom."
Chief Moiphepi Letsie, one of the majority who supported the proposal
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gave his reason as "because customs cannot bind anybody...I suggest
'melao'(laws) to be put in and not 'meetlo' (customs)...we have so many
OC
rites and customs. When a member of the Progressive Association,
the writer, Zakea Mangoaela demanded to know the need for the change,
Chief Gabashane Masopha, the late Seeiso Griffith's principal counsellor
and also a monber of the Standing Committee, replied:
I think the speaker will remember we had
one big case here in Basutoland in which
the Judge referred to the Laws of Lerotholi
as a code of customs. I do not think there
can be a nation which has no laws but only
customs. The Judge spoke about this code
of laws as if it is a thing which cannot have
effect in European Courts. Therefore the
Committee has found it fit, in the name
of the Council, to have these declared laws,
and we have made this draft which we submit
to the Council and ask the Council to accept.
Chief Khosimotse Ntaote, in his characteristic clarity of mind,
underscored Goliath Malebanye's statement in the form of an intriguing
37
query, which went to the core of the puzzle about the Laws.
Before Chief Moshesh asked for protection
from Queen Victoria he had laws with which
he governed his country, but now we have
no laws because I understand that Basuto
law can oply become law if it is published
by the High Corrmissioner.. .My view is that
before Moshesh was taken under the protection
of the Queen he had laws, and I do not know
when these laws were repealed.
Chief Ntaote's query, it appears, was not based on the ignorance of
what happens when one country, such as his own, loses its independence
to another, such as Britain: that is, when it loses its sovereignty,
its laws are set aside, or else require recognition fran the new,
foreign ruler. Rather, it seemed to stem from his understanding,
%
generally held by the Basotho, that, the original pact between Lesotho's
founding Father, Moshoeshoe, and Queen Victoria, was one of alliance,
whereby Lesotho had only become a junior partner to Britain. In short,
Lesotho had not lost its independence: There were two governments in the
Territory, the one headed by the Resident Caimissioner, the other headed
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by the Morena e Mohoio - as they would say, "the two oxen under the
same yoke".
The Colonial Administration
Is Confounded by the Problem
As it turned out, when Lord Harlech, the then High Commissioner,
stated in April 1943 that Mr. Justice Lansdown's judgment was a
"masterly document of far-reaching importance" and that "we must never
admit that we are bound by [customary law] hand and foot," he had
gloated too soon. When his staff of officers attempted to reconcile the
judgment with the National Council's general view that The Laws of
Lerotholi should be protected with the High Commissioner's
Proclamation, it discovered that the task was not as simple as it had
seemed on the surface.
The then Resident Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel C. N. Arden-
Clarke, initially advised the High Commissioner on December 1, 1943,
that it was "essential that there should be sane reasonably authoritative
conpilation of native law and custom and of the many rules and orders
issued by the Paramount Chief to act as a guide to the Native Courts.
"He found it "essential", equally, to provide some means "to enable
amendments to native custanary law to be raised and discussed and, once
agreed upon, to be made known and become effective in the Courts."
Finally, the Resident Commissioner felt that, subject to the opinion of
the High Comnissioner's Legal Adviser, the National Council's concern
that customary law be "protected", could be achieved by having the
expanded Laws of Lerotholi to be issued by the Mofumahali under the
authority granted to her Office by Sections 8 and 15 of the Native
Administration Proclamation No. 61 or 1938, that is, the authority to
issue "orders" and "rules".^
The High Commissioner's Office sought and received two legal
opinions on the question, one from Sir Walter Huggard, the Legal
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Adviser, and the other from Major E. R. Roper, the Attorney-Generai for
South Africa. Sir Walter was significantly uncomfortable with the
National Council's Resolution that when approved by itself, The Laws
of Lerotholi should be "printed and recognised as an authoritative
statement of Sesotho law and custom in all the Courts of Basutoland."
This appeared, particularly when read in conjunction with Arden-Clarke's
letter of December 1, to mean that "these so-called 'laws', when
approved, would form part of the general laws of the Territory and thus
be binding on the Courts." If that was the ultimate intention of the
colonial administration, he thought that "the proposal is open to serious
objection, as it would have the effect of placing these "laws" in the
same category as legislation promulgated by the High Commissioner." He
saw no objection to publishing the revised version of The Laws of
Lerotholi, yet, he did not think that the Laws should "be given
anything in the nature of 'legislative sanction'," as it appeared to have
been suggested. He was in favour, in the final analysis, of adhering
to the non-committal position adopted by the colonial administration in
1922.39
i
In 1922, it may be recalled, the Legal Adviser, Mr. Feetman, had
given the colonial administration the opinion that
the National Council has tended to assume
the functions of a legislature in making
from time to time additions and amendments
to these native laws. This informal
expansion of the Council may serve a very
useful purpose in securing the gradual
revision and development of native law and
custom, so that it may be adapted from time
to time to the changing needs of the Territory,
The result of Mr. Feetman's opinion then had been that the High
Commissioner had given his permission for the amplified Laws to be
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printed and circulated, yet, with the following cautionary remark:
but my permission to print and circulate
these Laws of Lerotholi must not be taken
as implying approval of provisions which
conflict with the general laws of the
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Territory made under the authority of His
Majesty the King, or which might be
construed as interfering with or encroaching
on the High Commissioner's authority or the
authority of the Resident Commissioner or
the other officers of the Government.
In short, the status of the Laws had been left vague: First, they
were not to be seen as the High Commissioner's piece of legislation.
Second, the National Council was allowed to think, if it was so disposed,
that its work had the force of law. Third, nonetheless, the Council
was still to understand that it was only an advisory body; it had no
legislative powers.
Major E. A. Roper, the Attorney-General, prefaced his own opinion
with a lucid and, on hindsight, instructive statement on the peculiarity
of the legal system currently obtaining in the Territory. Having held
discusions with the witnesses in the Regency Case and otherwise quite
conversant with the judicial problems of the Territory, he was in no
doubt whatsoever that Basotho chiefs, headmen and counsellors, who were
in charge of the indigenous courts, consider The Laws of Lerotholi as
having the force of law. "Whatever their theoretical status may be,"
he stated, "in practice they are treated by the members of the Native
Courts as binding upon those Courts." Further, he pointed out, when a
case involving Basotho litigants was taken on appeal to a subordinate
Court (it being a European Court), the District Commissioner generally
sat with a Mosotho assessor (under Section 30 of Proclamation No. 62
of 1938). More often than not the District Conmissioner himself had
"a somewhat sketchy knowledge" of Sesotho law and custom, "and is
dependent upon the native assessor for information as to what the law
%
is upon any point involved." The assessor, who regarded The Laws
of Lerotholi as "authoritative", advised the District Conmissioner
accordingly. "The result is that the Laws of Lerotholi are not merely
in effect binding upon the native courts, but are followed in the
Subordinate Courts as well, in so far as the latter administer native
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law." The position in the High Court was not dissimilar. There too,
a Judge was necessarily dependent for his knowledge of Sesotho law and
custom on a Mosotho assessor, "who in turn regards the Laws of Lerotholi
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as having the force of law.'
Major Roper's considered opinion in the circumstances, therefore,
was that, first, The Laws of Lerotholi should be accepted as having
the force of law in all the courts in the land. Second, that, in
passing amendments and making additions to them, the National Council
ought to be deemed as exercising a legislative function. To put it in
his own words:
Any additions to, or amendments of, the
Laws of Lerothoii which may be made in
future will, in my opinion, inevitably
be regarded in the same way as the existing
edition of those laws. It would be well
therefore to realise that whatever
reservations the Government may make as
to the extent of its recognition of
amendments which may be adopted in the
future by the Basuto National Council,
as soon as those amendments became
generally known (whether by printing or
otherwise) to the menbers of the Native
Courts, they will in practice have the
force of law in those Courts. This again
will mean that the European Courts when
administering Native law must recognise
them, because otherwise there will be two
conflicting bodies of native law administered
respectively by the Native Courts and the
European Courts - an obviously impossible
situation....All this means that in effect,
and notwithstanding any reservations by the
Government, if the Basuto National Council
devotes itself to considering and passing
amendments and additions to the Laws of
Lerotholi, or amendments of Native custom
generally, it will be exercising legislative
powers.
Major Roper offered two suggestions for rendering the current
situation more satisfactory, in the event that his opinion were accepted.
First, he suggested that the National Council should be given expert
guidance in the formulation and drafting of its recommendations, and
that its results should be controlled by adopting a rule that no
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resolution should have the force of law "unless approved by the
Government". By the phrase, "unless approved", Major Roper seemed
clearly not to be suggesting that the Council's resolutions should be
promulgated by the High Commissioner. Rather, he seemed merely to be
suggesting that there diould be a mechanism of influencing the results.
He reasoned (in Sir Arthur Maine's familiar view) that the Basotho were
at that juncture "in a stage of transition from a primitive state of
society, where rights are mainly regulated by status, to a more civilised
and complex state, where rights will be increasingly governed by
contract." He thought that it was important that amendments and
additions to Sesotho law "should not be dealt with at haphazard and
without consideration of their possible effect upon the body of native
law, as a whole, and possibilities of its future development" - along the
lines favoured by the colonial administration.
Following upon the first, his second suggestion was that there
was a need in Lesotho for "sane written statement of the principles of
the whole body of Basuto law," such as Professor I. Schapera had
recently undertaken with regard to "Tswana Law and Custom" (1938). He,
in fact, specifically recomnended that Professor Schapera should be
induced to cone to Lesotho to undertake the study.
The Resident Commissioner agreed with Major Roper's description of
the peculiar status of The Laws of Lerotholi in the legal system of
Lesotho. Beyond that, however, he found both Huggard's and Roper's
opinions "somewhat conflicting and confusing". And, having made the
observation, he went on to reveal his own confusion: As he understood
it, in so far as Proclamation No. 61 of 1938 had empowered the Office
of Morena e Moholo to make "rules" and to issue "orders', it had
thereby conferred legislative functions on that office. And on the
basis of that understanding, he stated his own views on the legal status
of The Laws of Lerotholi as follows:^
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The so-called 'Laws of Lerotholi' appear
to me to be no more than orders and rules
issued by the Paramount Chief. The Basuto-
land Council or its Standing Ccmmitee
advises the Paramount Chief regarding the
issue or amendment of orders and rules.
I have never been very clear in my mind as
to when an edict of a Native Authority should
be an order or when it should be a rule, but
it is obviously desirable that in every case
the prior approval of Government should be
obtained to ensure that the edict complies
with the proviso in the law that it does not
conflict with any proclamation or other law
for the time being in force and to make sure
that the Resident Caimisioner or High Caimissioner,
as the case may be, will not exercise his powers
of revocation.
Just as he had never been clear as to the distinction between
an "order" and a "rule", in terms of Proclamation No. 61 of 1938, the
Resident Conmissioner confessed that he was at a loss as to how the
new and amplified 1943 edition of The Laws of Lerotholi was to be
categorized: Was it to be regarded as "orders and rules" issued by the
Mofumahali? If so, he thought, then it required the approval of the
High Commissioner in terms of Section 15 of Proclamation 61 of 1938.
If it did not fall under orders and rules in that sense, he thought,
<
then perhaps Major Roper's proposal of adopting the vague formula
followed in 1922 was unavoidable. The end result of the latter course
of action, as Major Roper had pointed out, would be that, regardless of
whether or not the colonial administration was willing to recognize the
edition, it would "in practice have the force of law" throughout the
Territory's court system.
The Resident Commissioner was in agreement with Major Roper that
there was a need for a written statement of the principles of the whole
body of Sesotho law similar to Professor Schapera's
"Tswana Law and Custom". He thought that such an undertaking would be
valuable and helpful and he had no objection in principle, to the
proposal that Professor Schapera could be invited for the task. He
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feared, however, that currently the Mofumahali and her chiefs, "many
of whom are already suspicious and hostile to the reforms we are
undertaking," would get agitated: "I think it would be more politic
to leave the Standing Committee to do the work of compiling and
revising the customary laws of the Basuto to the best of its ability
under the guidance of the Judicial Caimissioner, as the Council has
proposed, even though better results could be achieved with the aid
of a trained anthropologist."
Sir Walter Huggard in the end had the last word. Having
previously consulted with the Attorney-General, Major E. R. Roper, and
having enlisted his support, on January 29, 1944 he submitted the
following views to the High Commissioner's Office. Firstly, while
agreeing with the Attorney-General's original view that The Laws of
Lerotholi were recognized and normally followed, in cases where they
might be relevant, in the Subordinate Courts of District Commissioners
as well as in the High Court, he would not go as far as to suggest that,
therefore, "the Laws were binding on those Courts- Rather, lie suggested
that those Courts normally accepted the Laws of Lerotholi as correctly
i
representing the native law or custom on a particular issue, and not
because those 'laws' are in any way binding on the Courts."
Secondly, he did not agree with the Resident Commissioner's view
that Proclamation No. 61 of 1938 had conferred legislative powers on the
office of Morena e Moholo. His interpretation was that the
relevant Sections - 8 and 15 - of the Proclamation had only given
"certain limited powers to issue orders and make rules, but those orders
and rules are not 'legislation' in its ordinarily accepted meaning."
They were orders and rules "of an administrative or executive nature,"
and they were "of limited, and not of general application." In the
final analysis they could be questioned in the Courts "as to whether
or not they are intra vires." Consequently, he did not think that,
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as suggested by the Resident Ccximissioner, the position in regard to
The Laws of Lerotholi had been in any way altered by the enactment of
Proclamation No. 61 of 1938.
Thirdly, Sir Walter did not think that the revised edition of
The Laws of Lerotholi could appropriately be issued as "orders"
and "rules". (Nor did he, for the benefit of the Resident Commissioner,
attempt to draw the distinction between the two terms.) His view in
this regard was that if the Laws were issued as "orders" and "rules"
under Proclamation No. 61 of 1938, they would become the High
Comnissioner's legislation. And in that case, logically, it would be
a misnomer to continue to call them The Laws of Lerotholi. On the
other hand, if, as he believed, the desire was to produce a revised
version of The Laws of Lerotholi, under that title, as a compilation
of Sesotho law and custom, "then I again suggest that they should be
'for the guidance of the Native Courts'". If the revised edition were
issued in that manner, he pointed out, "it will not form part of the
statutory law of the country and will not be formally binding upon the
European Courts, which will consequently have the power, as they have
i
at present, of declaring that any particular law does not correctly set
out Basuto law and custom, or is not in harmony with the principles
44
thereof, or that it is ultra vires."
The Final Outcome on The Laws of Lerotholi
Sir Walter Huggard's last opinion was the one in the end that
was followed. By accepting that opinion, however, the far-reaching
plan of action devised by the National Council was frustrated: The
opportunity to resolve, or at least minimize, the conflict of legal
systems, which was to continue to bedevil judges in the Territory, was
lost. Of the resolutions that the Standing Conmitee eventually tabled
before the National Council in 1944, only one was implemented: The
"rules" and "orders" issued by the Mofumahali, together with the
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various amendments and additions which had been from time to time
recommended by the National Council since 1922, were incorporated in
the new edition of The Laws of Lerotholi. Two resolutions of
far-reaching importance were not implemented. The two read:
1) The Laws of Lerotholi as revised and
amplified by the Committee should be
submitted for the consideration of
Council and of the Paramount Chief and
Resident Commissioner and when approved
should be printed and recognised as an
authoritative statement of Basuto law and
custom in all the Courts of Basutoland.
2) The Council recommends that every year
thereafter a printed volume incorporating
all the amendments and additions to the
Laws of Lerotholi recommended by Council
and approved by the Paramount Chief, all
new rules and orders issued by the
Paramount Chief and all decisions of the
High Court affecting these laws should be
issued in the same way as is done in the
case of Proclamations and notices issued
each year by the High Commissioner.
Also neutralized by the colonial administration was the Standing
Committee's resolution, tabled at the 39rh Session in 1944, that the
title to Part 1 of The Laws of Lerotholi (as provided under
Proclamation No. 61 of 1938) be changed from "Declaration of Basuto Law
and Custom" to "Declaration of Basuto Law". As earlier alluded to,
the Standing Committee had hoped that by removing the term "custom" from
the title, and retaining the term "law", it would have conferred the
legal validity on Sesotho law which Lansdown had questioned. The
apparent reasoning behind this recommended change was that the white
Judge and the white colonial administration had erred in their non-
recognition of Sesotho law as a consequence of a language problem:
that they were not aware that Basotho did make a distinction between
"law" as a command backed by a sanction from a political authority, and
is therefore binding, and "custom", which, as Chief Moiphepi Letsie had
pointed out, "cannot bind anybody". The President of the National
Council, however, disabused the Standing Committee of its view. He
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pointed out:^®
Altering the title as suggested will make
no difference at all to the validity of
this in a Court of law....If the Resident
Conmissioner finds himself unable to issue
such Proclamation, then it will make no
difference to the validity of these
declarations in a Court of law whether you
call them Basuto laws or customs. The words
"law and custom" a;2used in the Proclamation
and in my mind it is purely(sic) academic
point whether you use the term "law" or
"Basuto law and custom."
General Observations on the
Stand of the Colonial Administration
As it has been drown, the colonial administration was remarkably
confused in its general policy of governing Lesotho. In consequence,
it was unclear as to what functions the National Council should be
permitted to undertake and confused as to what status to accord Sesotho
customary law. The confusion surrounding the status of Sesotho
customary law necessarily made the rationalization of the Territory's
judicial system difficult. That being the case, it retarded an early
separation of the judiciary frcm the executive functions of government,
which the Basutoland Progressive Association had proposed as early as
in 1919, and to which the colonial administration itself was coirmitted.
There is, of course, something to be said for Sir Walter Huggard's
view that if Sesotho customary law were kept from forming a part of
statutory law, the European courts would reserve the authority to
dictate what does and what does not correctly set out customary law.
Viewed frcm the point of view of the colonial administration, the
advantage could be said to be the one that Sesotho customary law would
be allowed to grow, and not be petrified under statutes. For, as the
substantial amendments and additions of 1922 and 1943 illustrated, it
was still in the process of development: Discussions of "Laws" in the
National Council during both of these periods reflected uncertainties as
to which was and which was not law. Viewed sceptically, however,
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from the point of view of the contemporary Basotho, two disadvantages
could readily be anticipated: One was that the non-recognition of
Sesotho law was done not so much on the grounds of legal theory - that
T
is, in this case, the nuturing of customary law - as it was on politicalA
grounds. To wit, Lord Harlech, the High Commissioner, was excited by
Mr. Justice Lansdown's decision because it afforded the colonial
administration the opportunity to "never admit that we are bound hand
and foot" by "native law and custom". The second, which would have
been more distasteful to chiefs in general than to the educated elite,
was that customary law would be allowed to grow provided it was along the
lines favoured by the British staff of officers who presided over the
Subordinate Courts, and by the South African judges, who generally
presided over the High Court of Lesotho. As, again, Lord Harlech had
said on this point, his wish was "that native law and custom must evolve
and alter under the impact of civilizing influences and our rule".
The bahlalefi - the educated elite, on the other hand, were generally
infatuated with Western civilization. They associated customary law
with backwardness. Hence, they would have echoed Lord Harlech's view.
A brief look at some other parts of the African Continent under
British rule suggests, however, that the colonial administration of
Lesotho did have a more constructive alternative to the resolution of
the problem of Sesotho customary law than the one that it took. In the
Gold Coast, for instance, and at a much earlier period, in 1927, an
effort was made to give customary law legal force, and yet at the same
time without arresting its growth with a statute. The approach taken
%
was at least to define, albeit imprecisely, what customary law should be
regarded to be. The Gold Coast Native Administration Ordinance 1927,
S. 2, in a quotation that was earlier but partially cited (in Chapter 2),
47defined customary law as follows:
'Native customary law' means a rule or a
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body of rules regulating rights and imposing
correlative duties, being a rule or a body
of rules which obtains and is fortified by
established native usage and which is
appropriate and applicable to any particular
cause, action, suit, matter, dispute, issue,
or question, and includes also any customary
law recorded as such in a statement which shall
have been declared under section 123 to be a true
and accurate statement of such native customary
law.
As Antony Allott, who cites this Ordinance, points out, this definition
neither defined what was included in nor what was excluded frcm the
40
law, and therefore, to that extent, it could be problematic.
On the other hand, it is here being argued that for that very reason,
legislation of that type in the Lesotho context might have eased the
conflict between the colonial administration and the indigenous
government in their cherished but divergent aims - the former, to
influence the growth of customary law through court judgments, and the
latter to enjoy the assurance that it administers a generally recognized
and respectable body of "Laws".
It is, indeed significant that even Bechuanaiand, Lesotho's
neighbour under the same High Commission - a Territory that was far
1
more heterogeneous in its political organization than Lesotho, and far
less politically assertive - did similarly have its customary law
recognized by means of this technique. Its own was, of course, as
Allott describes it, a "very unilluminating definition". Nonetheless,
it was probably still more satisfactory to the Batswana than the
contemporary Basotho were in their own predicament. Coined in 1942
(a year before the National Council of Lesotho sought to resolve its own
dillenma), under the Native Courts Proclamation, S. 1(2), the definition
stated:^
'Native law and custom', 'Native law or
custom' and 'Native custom' mean in
relation to a particular tribe or in
relation to any native coranunity outside
any tribal area the general law or custom
of such tribe or community except so far as
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the same may be incompatible with the due
exercise of His Majesty's power and jurisdiction
or repugnant to morality, humanity, or natural
justice, or injurious to the welfare of the
natives.
In both the Gold Coast arid Bechuanaland the relevant Ordinance and
Proclamation, respectively, which defined customary law and thus
formally recognized its application in the courts, where relevant, had
been preceded by studies which the colonial administrations had
accepted as authoritative. In the Gold Coast John Mensah Sarbah, a
barrister, had written Fanti Customary Laws: A Brief Introduction to
the Principles of the Native Laws and Customs of the Fanti and Akan
Sections of the Gold Coast in 1897, In Bechuanaland I.
Schapera, a legal anthropologist, had written A Handbook of Tswana Law
and Custom in 1938. It is likely that these studies influenced
the trend in these two British dependencies toward the kind of
recognition of customary law referred to.
All the same, it is argued here that in Lesotho there was little
justification, aside frcm that of lack of clarity in policy, buttressed
with an unexamined view that Sesotho customary law needed to be guided
t
by "the impact of civilizing influences and our rule", for the impasse
on The Laws of Lerotholi following Lansdown's judgment. The absence
of "authoritative" studies on the principles of Sesotho customary law
appears to have been only marginally, if at all, a determinant factor
of the general outcome.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE REFORMS OF 1938:
THE CHIEFTAINCY LOSES PRESTIGE AND RESORTS
TO RITUAL MURDERS
The Abortive Attempt to Have the Reforms Repealed
The late Stimela Jason Jingoes, the grandson of Ngolozani - a
headman and iron-monger (mothula-tsepe) under Chief Ramanehella
Lesaoana (Moshoeshoe*s most favourite nephew) has left us the following
comment on the Reforms of 1938:^
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[The British] acted in good faith. Reform
was wanted and needed at that time; wanted
by the people and the Chiefs alike and
needed because of the conditions in sane
Chieftainships. I do not quarrel with
that. What I do quarrel with is that the
reforms came too suddenly, and altered,
before we were ready for it, the customs of
trust and reciprocity between Chiefs and
people.
From his position as a counsellor in Chief Boshoane's court
at Mapoteng (or Matsekheng), in the District of Berea, Stimela Jason
Jingoes snelled trouble: "Many Principal Chiefs saw to it that their
favourites were gazetted," he said, "while many efficient and respected
men went unrecognized." Jingoes recalled that at a local pitso
convened at Mapoteng, shortly after the promulgation of the Reforms,
CO
Chief Boshoane pointed out, ominously:
We are not gazetting everyone who is a
Chief or headman ruling a large village.
We are gazetting only people who have
proved their worth, men who can set a
good example to others. Having many
tax-payers is not an automatic qualification
for being gazetted.
Criteria for screening "people who have proved their worth, men who
can set a good example to others" were not anywhere written, except in
Chief's chest. While, as a principal chief, Boshoane was not subject
to the screening process; he had little or nothing to lose from the
impIt.mentation of the Reforms. Subordinate chiefs and headmen, people
like Jingoes himself, stood to lose position, prestige and money. They
felt insecure. They were scared. They were bitter. The same
situation prevailed throughout the Territory.
Mapoteng, however, was distinctive in one respect of immense
political significance: It was the seed-bed of the Lekhotla la Bafo,
its headquarters, and the residence of its charismatic and irrepressible
leader and founder, Josiel Lefela. The politics of this organization
in regard to the chieftaincy - its harsh criticisms of chiefly abuses
and its contradictory tendency of allying with chiefs against reforms
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in opposition to the plans of the Progressive Association - has already-
been told. It would be one of Lekhotla la Bafo's startling
performances, and an indication of Josiel Lefela's political genius,
that when the principal chiefs in the land had thus accepted the
implementation of the Reforms, it succeeded in mobilizing then in favour
of having those Reforms repealed.
Stimela Jingoes informs us that at the conclusion of Chief
Boshoane's pitso, the Mapoteng conmoners under the Chief elected a
committee "on the spot" to draft a letter to Morena e Moholo
Griffith Lerotholi. A deputation was duly appointed and having secured
the approval of Chief Boshoane, as required by protocol, it proceeded
to Matsieng to deliver the letter to the Morena e Moholo. Josiel
Lefela had drafted the letter. Stimela Jingoes was in the
deputation. The purpose of the mission was to appeal on the Morena
e Moholo to reverse the decision of the National Council on the
Reforms.
According to the Russian trained journalist and editor of
Umsebenzi, Edwin Mofutsanyana (now 88 years of age) - Josiel Lefela's
staunch supporter and confidant, who monitored this development -
Josiel Lefela had been actuated by the conviction that the Monarch,
Griffith Lerotholi, was "deliberately throwing the chieftaincy over the
precipice, as a usurper to the throne who had failed to get the full
support of the Nation, and as a tool of the white man, the first
Morena e Moholo to sell his soul to a white priest." Moreover,
says Edwin Mofutsanyana, Lefela held the view that although the National
%
Council had already agreed to the Reforms, Griffith should be able to
reverse its decisions, in the same way as he had done in 1919, when the
Council then had agreed that part of his mission to London should be to
request Britain to restore Lesotho's "conquered territory", and then
Griffith, in collusion with the colonial administration, had unilaterally
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and arbitrarily deleted the critical clause of the London Petition.^5
(The significance of that particular episode was related in the previous
Chapter.)
Griffith Lerotholi's initial reaction to the deputation was
negative and hostile: "'I can blow you out!' he said. 'I can have you
expelled from Lesotho NOW!He demanded to know: "'Is it your
intention to alter what I have done, I and the Government?'" Jingoes,
the author of these details, was told that later, when the deputation
had scurried away from the royal brow-beating, Griffith had remarked to
his courtiers:
Among all the Chiefs in Lesotho, there
is no Chief who has as hard a time in his
administration as Chief Boshoane. His
people are all politicians. I do not
know how these people of Mats'ekheng
[Mapoteng] became so spoiled!
The Matsieng set-back notwithstanding, Lekhotla la Bafo
eventually succeeded in rallying a substantial number of principal
chiefs to its point of view. Chief Boshoane's disaffected sub-chiefs
and headmen deputed two members of the National Council, Josiel Lefela
i
and Matseketseke 'Neko, the latter being also a member of Lekhotla
la Bafo, to lobby fellow conmoners in the National Council against the
57
Reforms and it was coached:
Do not appeal to conmoners alone, either:
try to gain the ear of the Chiefs on the
Council as well, and warn them that they
are also in danger. As we see these
matters; this will not end among headmen
only; at last we might find that there
are no more sub-chiefs; even Chiefs
themselves might disappear as a result of
these laws. So plead before the Council
as strongly as you can that these two
Proclamations be abolished. They are an
ulcer on the body of the Basotho nation.
One of those principal chiefs that Lefela and 'Neko enlisted to their
cause was the vocal Chief Goliath Malebanye of Mohales' Hoek. The
other was Chief Gabashane Masopha of the Berea District.
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When the 33rd Session of the National Council met in 1939, these
chiefs had agreed on a strategy, probably suggested by Josiel Lefela,
that the Proclamations of 1938, by then signed by the Morena e
Moholo and promulgated by the High Commissioner, should be rejected
on the grounds of procedure. The Chiefs built their arguments around
the principle of "consultation", putting the case to the President of
the Council that legislation of the type so binding on the entire
indigenous government should have been tabled before the National Council
in the form of a draft before being proclaimed, and that Griffith
Lerotholi had had no just cause to sign the chiefs' rights away without
the final approval of the National Council. More to the point, the
reneging Chiefs complained that the Proclamations served only to
affect Sesotho customary law, and they claimed that all that the country
needed to resolve the current problems of the indigenous government was
CQ
to amend The Laws of Lerotholi
The general strategy did not work. The President of the Council
was on solid ground in pointing out that, following a long history of
intransigence on the part of the chiefs, agreement had finally been
reached to introduce the Reforms embodied in the two Proclamations:
"The Paramount Chief worked for many months on this proclamation with
his advisers and the Government, and this is the result." He denied
the allegation that The Laws of Lerotholi were thereby adversely
affected. And, not anticipating Lansdown's decision, he pointed out
that: "Actually all through this book [the red book of the two
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Proclamations] it tends to uphold Native Law and Custom."
The President of the National Council was, of course, not alone
in defending the implementation of the Reforms. There were a few other
principal chiefs who stood solidly behind him. Of these, the most
60
forceful was Chief Bolokoe Potsane, who stated:
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I am grateful for these proclamations.
We always say that our people do not obey
us. Should we say the people do not obey
us while we have no full power over them?
Today we have full power and we have been
joined up with Government Courts to show
that our courts are looked upon as true
courts. Therefore, Your Honour, I say
you listened to our cry because with
those who do not respect us you will help
us with your authority.
Chief Bolokoe Potsane's statement tacitly underscored one crucial
point on the chieftaincy's view of the Proclamations: Principal chiefs,
uninfluenced by the politics of the Lekhotla la Bafo, saw themselves
as the primary benefactors of the Reforms. The pruning of the
chieftaincy, as the principal chiefs saw it, could only lead to a
permanent preservation of their positions, a consolidation of their
authority, and the enhancement of their material well-being. As a
corollary to that development, the sub-chiefs and headmen stood to lose
power, to be subjected to a greater degree of control from their
superiors, and, worst, to be levelled to the status of coomoners.
Be that as it may, the campaign to repeal the Proclamations was
conducted for five years, until 1943, when the principal chiefs who were
sympathetic to it finally abandoned it. But this was not until a motion
had been brought forward at the Sessions for that year of the National
Council, by Chief Harebatho Letsie, purportedly as coming from "the
people" of Likhoele, in the Mafeteng District, that the Proclamations
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should be repealed. As Chief Harebatho Letsie put it:
The people of Likhoele ask that the two
Proclamations of 1938 should cease to
function. The first reason is, they say
they have their own little Green Book of
laws, the Laws of Lerotholi. They say -that
book was made and accepted by the Basutoland
Council and the Basutoland Government, that
that book has been used for many years by
previous Chiefs, and that the book was amended
and endorsed by the late Paramount Chief
Nathanaei Griffith in 1922. This was done
by agreement with the National Council....
Further they say this Red Book contains
Proclamations which hurt the Nation. It is
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clear that the people do not like the book,
they have been talking about it from 1939 until
today. It is because there is no foundation
about it. For that reason the people ask that
the book be abolished.
That the motion came from Mafeteng is not surprising. The
District of Mafeteng was the Lekhotla la Bafo's second stronghold in
the country, second only to Mapoteng. Josiel Lefela had built the
roots of the organization there between 1919 and 1922, at the time that
he still relied on the Mafeteng published Naledi ea Lesotho to
disseminate his views. Later, after 1922, when he had fallen out with
the Basutoland Progressive Association, he had left an active branch
there, which served the useful purpose of counteracting the influence
of the B.P.A. There is, therefore, a strong possibility that that
branch was behind Chief Harebatho Letsie's motion, although the personal
interests of the chiefs cannot be discounted.
C. N. Arden-Clarke, the new Resident Conmissioner of Lesotho since
1942, was completely nonplussed by the bold volte-face of the chiefs in
general, who associated themselves with the motion at that Session of
the National Council. He expressed his reaction as follows:®^
I think I'should explain the position as
I see it to the Council. Apparently [the]
motion is that these laws, the Red Book,
should be abolished because this Council
was not consulted. Now, these laws were
made in 1938 and there was very full and
detailed consultation between the then
Resident Conmissioner and the then Paramount
Chief. Now five years later you come to
a new Resident Commissioner and a new
Paramount Chief and ask them to repeal a
law which their predecessors made, on the
ground that their predecessors did not consult
this Council. I do not know what decided the
Paramount Chief, Chief Griffith at that time, and
the then Resident Conmissioner not to put this
before the Council. The fact remains that they
did so decide. You cannot ask their successors
on this ground to repeal the Proclamations....The
Red Book is protecting this Green Book. That is
the legal position.
Councillor Labane Chokobane, who had moved the motion for the
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Reforms in 1937, was the Resident Commissioner's strongest supporter on
that occasion. Essentially, he was amazed by the amnesia, as it were,
of the proponents of the new motion calling for the repeal of the
Reforms. As he pointed out, the "little Green Book" had been tried
and abandoned because "it served no useful purpose;" it had been made
"by these Chiefs here." The people like it; but the chiefs did not.
Because of the outcry of the people, "there was a little yellow book
made by the late Sir John Sturrock," - the Draft Reforms of 1929. The
people accepted the "little yellow book"; "but the Chiefs rejected
it." Finally, he said, the Nation had cane under the Red Book:
The Chiefs made use of the Red Book as
soon as it was used and they have been
punishing people under its provisions.
Now today because they find that they
also must be punished according to the
provisions of that book, they say the
book should be abandoned and we should
revert to the little Green Book which
they despised. Therefore I say, if we
keep following the Chiefs, how are our
people going to live? I do not think that
nowadays the little Green Book would be of
any help. That would mean this Council
has been constituted for the mere purpose
of rejecting good laws, and not for
keeping and maintaining the laws of the
Nation.
Councillor Chokobane, quite clearly, was going beyond the
constitutional issue at hand, that is, the question as to whether the
Proclamations of 1938 had been promulgated in agreement and
consultation with the National Council - presuming that it was
constitutionally so required, which presumption was arguable. He was
going further to advance the politics of B.P.A. - his organization.
And in doing so, he was revealing the organization's'cherished set of
values: the belief that the leadership of the chieftaincy had become
questionable and presumably, the bahlalefi (the educated elite) ought
to take over that leadership; the conviction that customary law is
backward and that it had fallen into disuse; the general feeling of
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closeness with the colonial administration, which was the major cause
of conflict with the Lekhotla la Bafo.
Efforts to repeal the Reforms of 1938 ended with the 37th Session
of the National Council in 1943. And with it went the semblance of
solidarity between the principal chiefs, on the one extreme, and the
headmen and sub-chiefs, on the other. As it has been shown, the
solidarity had never been genuine. In the main, it was the brain-child
of the Lekhotla la Bafo. Beyond that, in 1943 at any rate, the
reaction of the principal chiefs was to a great extent influenced by
Lansdown's decision.
Yet, the break between the principal chiefs and the headmen and
sub-chiefs had catastrophic effects on both rungs of the chieftaincy.
Principal chiefs were polarized. Each began to fight for his own
economic welfare and political fate. As already alluded to, the headmen
and sub-chiefs felt further and further alienated. In the final
analysis both rungs of the chieftaincy would become equally insecure.
And "they would resort to a desperate conmon solution — ritual murders.
The Establishment of the National Treasury:
Its Constitutional Significance; And Its
Net Effects On The Chieftaincy
The single most devastating event on the chieftaincy of Lesotho
during the Regency was the establishment, in 1946, of an institution
called the Basuto National Treasury, more popularly known as the
National Treasury. The idea had been conceived by the colonial
administration, and it was supposed to be beneficial to the chieftaincy.
In the final analysis, however, instead of strengthening the chieftaincy,
it actually crippled it.
The idea of establishing the National Treasury was first
introduced in the National Council by C. N. Arden-Clarke, the Resident
Conmissioner, on October 20, 1942. His introductory speech was long
but significant. Purporting to be fulfilling a long standing wish of
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the Basotho, Arden-Clarke referred the National Council to that part
of the Lesotho Petition to London in 1919 which read:
That in Your Majestey's own good time
Your Majesty will extend still further
steps in the direction of self-government
to the Chiefs, Headmen and people of the
Basuto Nation, in terms of the expressed
wish of the late Chief Moshesh when he
sought the protection of the Government
of Great Britain.
Arden-Clarke drew a connection between that part of the Petition, made
twenty-three years back, with his own current proposal: He wished the
Council to note that it was about to consider "a most important step
forward in the direction of that self-government, for which the Basuto
Nation then prayed - that is the establishment of a Basuto National
Treasury."
The Resident Conmissioner then went on to make an interesting
classification of the functions of government, within the context of
which the National Treasury was to be established: "Every government
has three sets of functions to fulfil and needs to be given by law the
powers necessary to fulfil then." The first, he pointed out, was the
executive, "which includes the making of laws, regulations or rules and
the issuing of orders which people are compelled to obey...." In
Lesotho, as he saw it, "powers to carry out certain of these functions
have been delegated by the Central Government to the Naxive
Administration, i.e. to the Paramount Chief, Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs and
Headmen," by the Native Administration Proclamation of 1938.
The second function, he pointed out, was the judicial: "to ensure
the peaceable and just settlement of disputes and the punishment after
fair trial of those who have offended against law or ruled or disobeyed
lawful orders." Here powers to carry out those functions "have been
delegated to the Native Courts established and working under the Native
Proclamation of 1938."
Finally, the third function was financial, and it included "the
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imposition and collection of taxes, fees and levies and the wise and
proper expenditure of the revenue so collected." To date, he pointed
out, "practically no powers" had been delegated to the "Basuto Native
Administration" in this regard. Practically all the functions related
to finance had been undertaken by the "central Government and its
Treasury."
To drive his message home, the Resident Commissioner spun the
following metaphor:
The structure of any government, whether
it be of the central Government or of a
local government body like a Native
Administration, may well be compared to
a three legged stool. The Basuto stool
of self-government has got two legs, the
executive and judicial, but it lacks the
third, the financial, and a three legged
stool with one leg missing cannot stand
by itself: it is high time we fitted your
stool with its own third leg instead of
using the Treasury of the central Government
as a prop to keep it upright.
C. N. A. Arden-Clarke, quite clearly, believed that the establish¬
ment of the National Treasury would be a crucial constitutional
development. It was his view that: "Probably the best form of
education in the art and practice of government is in the exercise of
financial responsibility." He wished the National Council to believe
that the British Government was interested in promoting self-government
throughout its dependencies, Lesotho included. As he put it: "It is
the policy of His Majesty's Government to develop and improve the
institutions of self-government among all the people of the Empire, to
teach than to stand on their own feet." This was the first, explicit
and unequivocal statement from the colonial administration on the
existence of a policy for preparing Lesotho for self-government.
Anticipating as he did sane opposition from the National Council
on the idea, C. N. A. Arden-Clarke had thought it would be tactically
useful to illustrate his point by reference to specific countries.
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Shining examples in Africa were Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. Close
by, in the Beehuanaland Protectorate, a Native Teasury system was also
in operation. (In fact, a few weeks back, before the opening of the
current Session of the National Council, a delegation of Basotho chiefs
had visited Bechuanaland on a fact finding mission on the system, a
report on which had been submitted to Mofumahali 'Mantsebo and
Arden-Clarke himself.) Arden-Clarke should, perhaps, have stopped
with the mention of these four examples. Quite unwisely, however, he
went on to include sane European settler colonies, even the detested and
feared Union of South Africa, whose model "Bantu-stan", the Transkei, was
regarded by the colonial administration of Lesotho as a success story in
"Native Government".
Initially, a few prominent chiefs were suspicious of the idea of
a National Treasury. In the main, they could not understand the need
in one and the same Territory for two treasuries. Chief Thabatsoeu
Lebona - a sub-chief in the Mohale's Hock District, for instance, did
not think that Arden-Clarke had built a convincing argument by citing
countries under the British Empire such as Australia to support the
an
notion of a dual treasury system in Lesotho. Chief Leloko
Lerotholi, the controversial Matsieng courtier, an otherwise insecure
sub-chief, provided the strongest opposition to him: "His Honour has
told us of a petition made by our fathers," he said, "but they did not
ask for a division of the country's money. Why this division now?
Is the money going to desert us?" Chief Leloko argued that what was
needed was not a dual treasury system, but rather that Basotho children
should be sent overseas for higher education so that they could ccme back
and fully man the Central Treasury. And when Arden-Clarke suggested
that such education of Basotho children as might be needed for the
purpose could be gained through the on-the-job training within the Civil
Service in Lesotho, Chief Leloko protested the tacit suggestion that
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he saw himself as "our schoolmaster". He felt that a better option
in that event was "that we should have universities in Basutoland where
we could have our children trained...."
Finally, in so far as Arden-Clarke had used the Union of South
Africa as an example, Chief Lerotholi maintained "that the example
quoted by His Honour is entirely wrong." It was wrong "because in this
case it is inferred that there is colour bar in this matter." "To whom
will this other money belong if it is taken away from us? I would ask
His Honour to teach us, train us and then let us have all our
money.
The majority of the members of the Council, however, were
completely in favour of the establishment of the NationalTVea&UTy. To
principal chiefs it meant an assurance for their positions and prestige.
They were anxious to be seen as being of the same mind as
£»Q
Arden-Clarke. Chief Goliath Malebanye, for instance, stated:
If we do a thing let us do it at once.
Give us this thing: give us the Treasurey
....You and the Paramount Chief are oxen
under the same yoke, and what becomes you
will becorpe him .... Let us have the
Treasury, Your Honour, and you should be
with us and watch so that you can reduce
the work if it appears to be too heavy
for us. We love you, and may God keep
His Majesty and maintain Him through all
difficulties.
Although he was not one of the twenty odd members of the royal house
whcm the Sons of Moshoeshoe had specifically named as "principal chiefs"
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when they amended The Laws of Lerotholi in 1922, Goliath
Maiebanye's position under Bereng Griffith, the Principal Chief of
Mohale's Hoek, was quite secure. Bereng Griffith trusted him, and
with just cause. He had been one of those chiefs who had supported his
71
candidacy for the Regency in 1941.
Chief Theko Makhaola, the capable Principal Chief of Qacha's Nek,
went even further to express anxiety that the Basotho (actually,
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principal chiefs) should be given great powers of control over the
National Treasury, once it could be established:72
I want to state that this Basuto Treasury
should be entirely in the hands of Basuto
and the people administering it must be
Basuto, leaving the supervision and inspection
to our Chief, the Resident Ccranissioner, for
if the Treasury is for the Nation it would be
difficult and unworkable thing to have Europeans
in it.
The bahlalefi councillors were for the most part also
supportive, although, of course, from the point of view of their own
interests. It was their sons who were going to man the professional
aspect of the running of the National Treasury. A number of than had
already gained useful education in Natal and in the Cape Province in the
Union of South Africa by this time, and some of them had even become
7*3
teachers of comnercial subjects in the same country. The
bahlalefi councillors were very blunt in their expressions of anxiety
in this regard. The Reverend Leonard Polisa, who summarised their
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views on the boldest fashion, stated:
More than this [general utility of the National
Treasury to the Nation], for many years now
this Council has been asking to be given more
responsibility for the services of this country.
They have always said that the bread for their
children is taken away and given to dogs: by
that they meant certain Europeans from the Union
who were anpioyed in the service of Basutoland.
They say that such posts, held by such Europeans,
could adequately be filled by their sons in
Basutoland. Now the answer to the request of
the Paramount Chief and the Council has arrived,
that we should have our own Treasury where we should
be able to employ our own sons.
Even before the National Council met in 1942, a meeting had
already taken place between Mofumahali 'Mantsebo and the Resident
Cofimissioner (and their respective advisers and staff of officers) to
discuss the idea of the National Treasury, and a Conmittee had been
set up to draft appropriate proposals to implement it. The Resident
Corrmisioner had appointed his Government Secretary, the Financial
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Secretary, two District Commissioners, and an Assistant District
Commissioner - who would serve as Secretary to the Committee. The
Mofumahali had nominated eight chiefs - Chiefs Letsie Motsoene,
Gabashane Masopha, Soko Letsie, Lerotholi Mojela, Mahabe Makhaola,
Khosimotse Ntaote, Maama Lechesa, and Leloko Lerotholi. (As pointed
out, Leloko Lerotholi attempted to undermine the idea when it came
before the National Council.) After sane bickering, in which some
councillors challenged the procedure of setting up the Committee and
nominating its members without proper consultations, the National Council
added to this number Chiefs Theko Makhaola, Makhobalo Theko, Mopeli
Jonathan, and Councillor Z. D. Mangoaela. Beginning in January 1943,
the Committee began to meet, under the Chairmanship of the Resident
Ccximisioner, to discuss proposals. And on June 23, 1944, it submitted
its report to the National Council, signed by Mbfumahali 'Mantsebo
Seeiso.
The Committee's proposals, as finally accepted, were briefly as
follows: The National Treasury would be established at Matsieng, under
the control of the Regent, who would be advised and assisted
by a Finance Committee representative of all the Districts and sub-
Districts of Lesotho. Its work would bb facilitated by a Treasurer
with a staff of officials and clerks at Matsieng, with a sub-accountant
and a number of other clerks in each District. The Treasury would
be responsible for all expenditure involved in the acquittal of its
duties and responsibilities which had been delegated to the "Basuto
Native Administration" - which meant the executive and administrative
work formerly undertaken by the chieftainship, including the work of
the Basotho courts. In addition, it would take over frcm the "Central
Government" (that is, the colonial administration) the responsibility
for collecting "Native Tax" (that is, "hut tax"), the maintenance of
anti-soil-erosion works, village tree planting, the construction of
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bridie-paths, eradication of burr-weed (which destroyed the quality
of wool, one of Lesotho's main exports at the time), and the payment of
allowances and rations to members of the National Council. "Other
duties," it was stated, "could be assumed as the Native Administration
proved its capacity to take than over from Government."75
The most injurious paragraphs of the Report to the welfare of the
chiefs in general, and lesser chiefs and headmen in particular, were the
HC\
following three: Paragraph 28: The Committee felt that the
existing system, whereby the chieftaincy was "fed" by "eating" fines
imposed by the indigenous courts, and "eating" the proceeds of the sale
of stray stock, was pernicious. Under this type of system the numerous
chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen who had been "placed", as well as,
correspondingly, the number of indigenous courts in existence, were "far
in excess of the numbers required by the Nation in the interests of
efficient administration and of justice." The Committee believed that
the. time had cane when the Nation should associate itself with the
practice in other countries by paying "allowances of salaries to those
engaged on the work oj; the Basuto Native Administration" and ensuring
that "all public moneys collected by its public servants are brought
properly to account and paid into the revenues of the Native
Administration...."
Accordingly, the Conmitee recommended, in Paragraph 29, that
allowances should be paid to the Regent and to 24 principal chiefs, who
were to be re-styled "ward chiefs", and that provision should be made for
the remuneration of those other chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen "whose
work and responsibilities justify" financial reward. Following the
implementation of the new system as recommended, no chief, sub-chief or
headman would be recognized as such "until he has received a Certificate
of Appointment setting out his duties, powers and jurisdiction as an
executive and administrative official of the Native administration...."
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Paragraph 30, on the number of indigenous courts in the Territory,
expressed the critical view that the existing 1,340 "Basuto Courts were
grossly excessive...." The Committee recommended a reduction of these
courts to 117, "which would be sufficient for the administration of
justice and would adequately meet the needs of the people."
As the number of courts corresponded to the number of chiefs
and headmen in the Territory, it in essence meant that these officials
should be scaled down from 1,340, where the number stood as at 1938,
to 117. The victims would be exclusively in the categories of headmen
and sub-chiefs.
In the final analysis, however, when the National Treasury began
to function in 1946, warrants were issued to 121 Basotho courts. Yet,
still, that number would be further reduced to 106 in 1949. The rest of
the courts in excess of the ones recognized were allowed to function as
"courts of arbitration": Their decisions could not be reinforced. And
those who presided over them got no financial recognition.
The Committee recommended that the holder of the Office of
Morena e Moholo should receive "an allowance commensurate with the
dignity and standing of the Head of the Basuto Nation and the
responsibility of his office." That meant, in essence the doubling of
the net income of \1,800 per annum that the Mofumahali was receiving
from the "Central Government" to ^3,600. This was a substantial sum of
money as the Mofumahali, unlike her predecessors in the Office, did
not have several wives to support: Some 22 surviving widows of former
monarchs were to get their own allowances as a personal right.
The 24 principal chiefs recommended for annual allowances were to
be paid on the basis of a combination of two factors: (1) The status
of the Chief. (2) The work and responsibilities of the Chief as
measured by the number of taxpayers in his ward. The highest paid chiefs
according to this formula would be Bereng Griffith, at Mohale's Hoek, at
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f1,700. His emolument included a "special allowance" of £l52 in lieu of
being "the senior Chief in Basutoland next to the Paramount Chief."
(This was, no doubt, an appea. ement measure for his loss of the
Regency.) Letsie Motsoene, the then head of the District of Leribe
received J^l,680. Gabashane Masopha, the head of the District of Berea
(Teyateyaneng), received f1,548. Theko Makhaoia, due to the small size
of his tax payers more than for his status, received f1,296. And
Qefate Sempe of Quthing got £1,308.^
In contrast, such sub-chiefs and headmen as qualified for
certificates of appointment would be paid only 5% of the Hut Tax (Native
Tax) collected in respect of each "ward", after deducting the salaries
of Tax Collectors employed in the "ward". On the average such
allowances were in the region of 50 per annum. Sub-chiefs and headmen
with not more than 350 taxpayers under than were not "normally" to be
paid allowances.
The disparity in allowances between ward chiefs, on the one hand,
and sub-chiefs and headmen with certificates of appointment, on the other
hand, was wide, and it led to intense jealousies from below. Those who
lost out altogether in the formulae for allowances were bitter.
The revenues of the National Treasury from court fines and fees
and stray stock would not be that much, initially. They were estimated
at f22,000 per annum. The expenditure reconmended by the Conmittee was
£ 85,000. The "Central Government", therefore, would be making a grant
of f63,000 per annum to the National Treasury to enable it to meet its
expenditure.
The Basuto National Treasury began its operations on January 1,
1946, under Mr. Thabiso Mohapeloa, the Rev. John Mohapeloa's son, as
Treasurer, at a salary off480 per annum. By 1960, when it wound up, it




The Outbreak of Ritual Murders:
The Consequence of Reforms of 1938
And the Establishment of the
National Treasury
Both Hugh Ashton and Gwilyn I. Jones, who published their
anthropologial studies on Basotho in 1952 and 1951, respectively, offer
convincing evidence that there was a cause and effect relationship
between the spate of ritual murders that broke out in Lesotho in the
1940s and the Reforms of 1938 and, to use Arden-Clark's terminology,
their "third leg" - the National Treasury. Completed in 1949 (although
published in 1952), Hugh Ashton's The Basuto was a comprehensive
anthropological study of the Basotho, but it devoted a chapter on
"Medicine, Magic and Sorcery" with a focus on a problem of ritual
murders. G. I. Jones, on the other hand, a Cambridge anthropologist,
was specifically commissioned in 1949 to do a study of the causes of
ritual murders. Hence, his official report, Basutoland Medicine
Murder; A Report on the Recent Outbreak of "diretlo" Murders was to
be regarded as an authoritative statement on the basis of which that
social malady could be treated.
<
To facilitate an understanding of the problem, a brief statement
on the meaning of a ritual murder, and its place in the Basotho
79
society, is necessary. On the term "ritual murder", Jones writes:
This term 'ritual', which implies the
taking of a human life for religious
purposes or in accordance with a religious
or magic rite, is not a particularly
happy one for there is no such element of
human sacrifice in these Basutoland murders.
They are not committed from any religious
motives but for the purely material
objective of cutting from the body of the
victim strips of flesh or portions of
particular organs, called by the general
term diretlo ...and used in the making of
certain magical compounds usually called
'protective medicines'.
The origins of diretlo, or liretlo - in the current Sesotho
orthography, are uncertain. But both Ashton and Jones gave two
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explanations based on their research. The first and commonly accepted
view was that liretlo was not an ancient and genuine Basotho practice.
It was a new phenomenon introduced by the Amazulu doctors. The flesh
used originally in the manaka (medicine horns) was procured frcm
animals, usually associated with ferocity or strength, to which human
flesh, normally that of an enemy slain in battle, was added. The second
view was that Basotho had always used human flesh in the manaka, but
that invariably it was the flesh from an enemy slain in battle. When,
after the turn of the century, Basotho became more settled, they ran out
of battle-felled enemies. Consequently, those who felt an acute need
for "protective medicine" were advised by their traditional doctors - the
experts on these matters - to secure human ingredients for their manaka
from any person in the conmunity whom the doctors described as "a
suitable" quarry. "The truth" says Jones, "appears to lie between these
two extremes": In settled times the manaka came to be undoubtedly
"fortified" with parts of a human body of "a definite person who is
thought to possess specific attributes considered essential for the
particular medicine being made. Such a person is usually a member of the
same conmunity and is frequently a relative of some of the killers. He
is killed specifically for this diretlo which has to be cut from his
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body while he is still alive."
It is nonetheless significant that the total number of suspected
liretlo in colonial Lesotho before 1938 was only twenty-three. Yet,
between 1938 and 1949, the period of the great Reforms and the
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establishment of the National Treasury, the number was seventy.
This suggests that there was a relationship between the increase of
liretlo and the Reforms.
The colonial administration reacted to the spate of these ritual
murders aggressively. Cases were brought before the courts, and those
who were found guilty of the crime were generally hanged. In the course
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of these trials it was found that in the majority of cases the general
causes of the ritual murders were the "placing" and the official
recognition of headmen and sub-chiefs.
In this regard it is indeed, instructive that when the Conroittee
for the establishment of the National Treasury wrote its Report in
1944, it had noted that one ward, namely Chief Gabashane's ward in the
District of Berea, was densely staffed with sub-chiefs and headmen: It
had 14 sub-chiefs and 147 headmen, for a population of 15,660 taxpayers.
While, by comparison, one ward in Leribe, Chief Mathealira Johnathan's
ward, which was slightly larger, whth 16,214 taxpayers, had 9 sub-chiefs
and 14 headmen. This unevenness of the sub-chiefs and headmen is the
one that inclined the Conmittee toward a fixed percentage of the Native
Op
Tax to recognise them. The result was that Chief Gabashane's ward
was hit hard, and probably the hardest, by the 1946 cuts. A corollary
to these cuts was that the ward sustained the highest number of ritual
murders in the Territory: Of the seventy suspected ritual murders
reported in the Territory during the critical period - 1948 to 1949,
OO
twenty took place in the Chief's District of Berea.
Chief Bereng Griffith's ward in the District of Mohale's Hoek is
another good example of the effects of the Reforms and the establishment
of the National Treasury on the chieftaincy. As told by the High
Comnissioner, Sir Evelyn Baring in a report of his visit to Lesotho in
November 1943, Chief Bereng Griffith's ward had "no less than one
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hundred and fifty-one sub-ordinate courts" (serving 15,342 tax
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payers.) According to Sir Evelyn, Chief Bereng Griffith had
himseif proposed that the number be reduced to eight. (In the final
88
analysis it was reduced to sixteen.) Sir Evelyn was aware, at the
same time, that the suggested reduction was provoking recrimination from
some quarters. As he said: "It is perhaps inevitable that the Sub-
Chiefs and Headmen oppose such reductions as involving for them both
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loss of income and of prestige." What the High Coomisioner could
not have been aware of at the time, however, was that Chief Bereng
Griffith's ward would soon be one of the vortexes of ritual murders in the
Territory, and that the Chief would himself be found guilty of the crime
and have to be hanged for it.
At least by 1948 it had become clear to the colonial administration
that chiefs were largely responsible for ritual murders in Lesotho. The
social sickness held that entire Nation in a grip of fear, and it was an
embarrasanent to the staff of Officers in charge of the administration.
The High Coimisioner, Sir Evelyn Baring, for his part, made it clear to
the National Council at its 44th Session in 1948 that "the increase of
this evil and degrading practice" which had become "a curse" in the
Territory had to be stamped out. In his boldest ever attack on the
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Chieftaincy, Sir Evelyn stated:
I thought the time had arrived when
I should cone in person to speak in the
~
. plainest possible terms to the Council,
whose members represent the Nation. The
Council is composed principally of chiefs
who are, or should be, leaders of the
people. ,And yet, of the nineteen cases
of ritual murder which the Police have
taken to court since 1942, headmen or
chiefs of one grade or another have been
involved in every case but one. It is
known too that they are involved in seme
cases still undergoing investigation or
examination. (My emphasis.)
The High Ccximissioner' s concern sterrmed only in part from his
embarrassment that the Territory over which he was the chief
executive manifested a predilection for this awkward device for securing
personal power. It stenmed equally frcm the fear, remarkably, that
ritual murders might tarnish the image of chiefs to a point of their
oq
destruction. As he said:
If you Chiefs pause to think over this
matter you will realise that if these
crimes continue the chieftainship will be
utterly discredited and undermined. People
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will cease to respect the Chiefs and the
present system of indirect government
through the Chiefs will break down entirely.
This statement, it appears, was not made simply to produce
salutary effects on the chiefs in the National Council, although, of
course, that was its primary aim at the time. It stenmed from
conviction. In a confidential memorandum made in January 1949, the High
QQCommissioner would restate it with greater anphasis:
The practice of ritual murder must be
broken, but efforts must also be made to
avoid breaking the chieftaincy in the
process. Chiefs found guilty of murder
should suffer as commoners have suffered.
At the same time, the hand of the present
Regent will be strengthened by three
permanent councillors selected for her by
the National Council....
The High Commissioner still needed the Chieftaincy to rule the country.
When Sir Evelyn Baring addressed the National Council on the
subject of ritual murders - in September 1948 - the Nation was already
under a crisis. Two senior principal chiefs in the land had already
been arraigned for the crime. These were Chiefs Gabashane Masopha and
Bereng Griffith. Chiefs in the Council were nervous about the outcome
of their trial, and so was the entire Nation. In the circumstances
it would appear, on hindsight, that it was politically unwise for
Sir Evelyn to have threatened, as he did, to take collective action
against chiefs if they did not assist him to eradicate the murders.
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The unfortunate words of desperation were:
So determined am I that ritual murders
must come to an end that I am already
considering legislation to enable collective
punishments to be imposed on the chiefs
and people of areas in which these murders
have occurred if prompt steps are not
taken to furnish information to the Government
which will enable the culprits to be brought
to book. The measures contemplated are most
drastic and I sincerely hope that it will prove
unnecessary to impose them. I warn the Coucil
most solemnly, however, that the measures,
drastic as they are, will be imposed if the
murders continue.
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The statement left the impression in the minds of the chiefs and
the Nation that the colonial administration was out to destroy
chieftaincy rule - the very opposite of the High Commissioner's intention.
Additionally, it is highly conceivable that Police Officers interpreted
the statement to mean that they were licenced to extract evidence from
witnesses and persons accused of these murders through unconvential
means, including bribery and coaching Crown witnesses to give false
evidence. In the end, at any rate, this was to be the campaign that the
Lekhotla la Bafo waged against the colonial administration. The most
unremitting critic of the colonial administration along these lines would
be Ntsu Mokhehle, a disciple of Josiel Lefela, who would later found the
Basutoland African Congress in 1952. According to B. M. Khaketla, his
political mate from the early 1950s: "He spoke openly and vehemently
against the murders which he regarded as a 'trick intended to discredit
the Chiefs and pave the way for the eventual incorporation of Lesotho
Q9
into the Union of South Africa."
In November 1948 Chiefs Gabashane Masopha and Bereng Griffith were
found guilty by the High Court of Lesotho of the ritual murder of a
commoner named 'Meleke Ntai, and they were sentenced to death by
hanging. The case was appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
t
Council. But on July 25 the Lords of the Judicial Commitee dismissed
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it. On August 4, 1949, Gabashane Masopha and Bereng Griffith
were hanged.
The Scotsman, whose "Special Corespondent" for South Africa
gave a comprehensive and enlightening report of the hangings as well
as the malady of ritual murders in Lesotho in general, revealed the
the fact that the colonial administration was aware that the ritual
murders had something to do with its Reforms on 'r.he chieftaincy. First
the Scotsman noted that there was no history of ritual murders in
Lesotho, "nor, in fact, in any of the Bantu" peoples of Southern
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Africa: "Basutos are an intelligent, law abiding people. They have
a tradition of independence and nationhood greater than any other native
territory; there is far less external interference in their affairs...."
Second, while acknowledging the existence of the "ordinary, if
increasingly acute economic and moral pressures to which all impoverished
ignorant n,ti*'e races contiguous to civilisation are exposed," it
dismissed this as the cause of the ritual murders. The cause, it
pointed out, was to be found in the political sphere:94
The theory now being put forward is that
the growing inroads on their powers and
influence are seriously preying on the minds
of many of these snail authoritarians [that is,
chiefs and headmen]. In their ignorance and
superstition, these men are apparently resorting
to witchcraft doctors - conscious of their own
diminishing influence - who deceive them with
stories of how their medicine will bring about
a return of their prestige. It is an indication
of their desp ration that they should resort to
such extreme and dangerous methods as ritual murder.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
Discussions Leading to the Adoption
of the Elective Principle
The first and most important constitutional development during
the Regency was the introduction of the elective principle in the
choice of the members of the National Council. The discussions leading
to that development however, and the ones which evidently supplied the
theoretical framework for it, had taken place at the 32nd Session of
National Council, in 1937. Significantly, as it will be recalled, that
was the Session at which the Reforms of 1938 were agreed to. Over¬
whelmed by the spirit of change that brought about those Reforms, the
Chiefs had come very close to accepting the several motions calling
for an elective Council. The discussions of those motions reveal the
counsellors' insights on principles of government.
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The first of these motions, submitted by Councillor Peete Molapo,
was purported to be coming fran "the people of Leribe". (More
accurately, it came from a section of the District of Leribe
represented by the Councillor.) Its formulation was striking:^5
Your people chief [President] propose that
the members be elected by the nation,
and the chiefs should not make the laws
as they are judges. That is the request
from the people of Leribe. They cry that
the chiefs who rule the people are also
the makers of the law through the council
which may be called the chiefs' council.
The people request that as the chiefs are
judges who use the laws, it would be better
if the makers of the law should be the
National Council composed of commoners and
not the chiefs. This will increase justice
as the people will make laws for their own
government and the chiefs will judge in
accordance with the laws made by the people
and there will be no canplaints such as are
caused by the laws of the chiefs. The people
request that the laws should be above everything
and the chief should have no authority to do as
he likes.
Over and above proposing the introduction of the elective
principle, Covin llor Peete Molapo1 s motion was striking in three
different respects. First, it alluded to the doctrine of separation
i
of powers: "the chiefs should not make the laws as they are judges."
Second, as a logical outcome of the first, it emphasized the need for
the National Council to be "composed of comnoners and not the chiefs."
In other words, it underscored the view that laws made for "the people"
(commoners) ought to be made by "the people". Third, it postulated,
or rather restated, the doctrine of the Rule of Law: "the laws should
be above everything and the chief should have no authority to do as
he likes." (My emphasis).
Councilor Thabo Lechesa, representing the people of Matsieng,
sponsored a motion along the same lines, but probably a bit more
radical. His motion overlapped with that of Councilor Peete Molapo
in so far as it proposed that "members be elected by the people."
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But then it went further: The people of Matsieng wished the National
Council to be converted to a Legislative Council, "with authority to
make laws for the people of Basutoland and the laws to be confirmed
by the Paramount Chief and the Resident Comnissioner, and these laws
should rule this nation." Additionally, the people of Matsieng
requested that the Legislative Cou-ncil "be divided into two chambers."
The first chamber would be composed of the chiefs, being fifty.in
number. The second chamber would be composed of "ordinary people",
Q(2
also numbering fifty:
They suggest that whatever motions
are brought up for discussion they should
first of all be discussed in the lower
chamber, and then they should be passed
on the the chiefs' chamber, and the decision
made by the chiefs' chamber will be regarded
as final.
Another motion worthy of attention was from Counsellor Labane
Chokobane, representing the Basutoland Progressive Association. In
comparison with the other two, the motion was not radical. But it was
practical and politic. Tt was its version, in the final analysis, that
the National Council would adopt six years later, during the Regency.
t
Counsellor Labane proposed thatthe National Council, being still
an advisory body., "should be divided into three parts...." The first
"part" would be nominated by the Morena e Moholo and it would
rep..'.sent the chiefs. The second "part" would be nominated by "the
Government" and it would represent "the Government". And "the third
part should be elected by the people and should represent the people."
The B.P.A., on whose instructions Counsellor Labane acted, had "thought
it best that there should be smaller councils below the National Council
and these should be established in every district and be presided over
by the District Commissioners. Each district chief should be a member
of such a council." Two members would be nominated by the chief and
the other two by "the people", such that each District Council would
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consist of five members. Each District Council would "investigate
into matters pertaining to its district before the General Council
mets." Then, in preparation for the annual Session of the "General
Council", the Morena e Moholo would "nominate the chief of the
district as well as the members of such snail councils, and some of
the members nominated by the Morena e Moholo would "have
originaly been elected by the people." The motion did not stipulate
the number to be chosen by the Resident Conmissioner. Nor did it
stipulate the total number of the members of the "General Council".
But it could be surmised that both were going to be small: The total
number of the people's representatives and those of the Morena e
Moholo, at any rate, would have been forty five - calculated on the
basis of the then 9 Districts in the Territory.
Although these motions generally received a warm reception in
National Council, almost at par with the proposals for the Reforms of
1938, they suffered a defeat. In part this was so because the Resident
Conmissioner, J. C. Sturrock, was not sympathetic "to the idea of an
elective Council. He felt that "the time has not yet arrived for any
t
alteration in the constitution of the Council." Additionally, the
number of chiefs and courtiers against the idea were still dominant.
Afraid to lose their appointments and privileges, these chiefs and
courtiers argued, in the words of Councillor Thompson Mothea - one of
their number, that: "The Paramount Chief has been given these [present]
counsellors by God in order that they should advise him in all
97matters." More substantially, Chief Tlhakaneio Moshoeshoe
stated:^
At Matsieng the people who are appointed
to the Council have been working since the
time of the late Chief Lerotholi. I knew
their fathers when they were working for
the chiefs. Therefore I find they are the
foals of those horses which used to run
and they run like their fathers. If the
Paramount Chief were to elect different
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people how could he tame such wild horses
which do not know how to conduct cases?
I fight against such a motion.
This resist.nee notwithstanding, it remained quite clear that
chiefs were not far frcm accepting the idea. The most significant
indication for this came from the then leading member of the royal
house, Chief Theko Makhaola. Theko Makhaola, of course, differed
from those who said that chiefs should not be eligible as coun.vllors.
Other than that, however, he was fully in favour of the introduction
of the elective principle. What was more, he felt that time was ripe
for substituting the advisory National Council with a Legislative
Council. His reasoning on this last point was that, after all, the
National Council was already performing the function of legislation
since its resolutions, "if accepted, are usually made laws to govern
this nation, that is, if accepted by the Chief Counsellor and the
QQ
Resident Commissioner."
It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1942 when the National
Council picked up "the subject of introducing the elective principle
once again, it was the chiefs themselves, more so than the conmoners -
<
or even the educated junior sons of chiefs, who led the discussion.
Chiefs Tumane Matela - the Principal Chief of the Makhoakhoa, Theko
Makhaola, Goliath Malebanye and his brother Bolokoe Malebanye, Nkoebe
Mitchel of Berea, Khethisa Tau of Pitseng in the District of Leribe,
and Taiimo Joel - a descendent of the "rebel" Chief Joel Molapo of the
Gun War, all forcefully spoke in favour of the National Council being
elective. As Chief Taiimo Joel said, several years had passed
since the National Council had first asked the High Commissioner,
Lord Selborne, in 1910 that the Council should be "elected by the
nation". It would, hence be ludicrous for anyone to be still arguing,
33 years later, that the Nation was not ready for that constitutional
development. He stated:100
- 342 -
This Council which has been likened to
a child must have grown to be a man of
ripe age, and no child will crawl for 33
years. I say now the time which was
mentioned by our fathers has arrived
....I am in agreement with those Counsellors
who say that 100 per cent of the members
should be elected by the nation.
In that same session, as in 1937, Chief Theko Makhaola played
the role of a statesman. He spoke as a disinterested leader who was
hoping that his fellow chiefs could do likewise. As usual, his
vision was clear. He was concise. His speech was historic:"^
I know that the people are not satisfied.
If therefore we do not satisfy the people,
what are we ruling for?...We have our
people who are not chiefs but agriculturists;
they want to be protected and ask that they
should have a voice in the Council. Say,
for instance, they ask me to bring up their
Matters in the Council and I am not an
agriculturist, shall I be in a position to
place their matters? We have traders and they
can improve matters of trade because they must be
arranged in this Council[.] [T]hough I [am]
sometimes here...there is a Chamber of Commerce.
Then we have another section of our people,
teachers and ministers of religion and parents
of school children, and they may give me messages
to bring to Council, but I do not know much about
school matters. As the nomination is left in the
hands of the Chiefs, they choose as they like.
There is not one who will deny that when we make
our selections we select frcm those who are on our
side. We must always remember that the people are
looking to us, Chiefs, not to retard their progress,
all I can say is that Basuto should march to catch
time because time does not seem to cane to then.
I agree with the speaker who said that half of the
members should be elected by the people and half
nominated by the Chief. This is not a new thing:
it is done all over the world. It is said that we
should always liken ourselves to our British
Government.... I speak from the bottom of my heart
that the people must be given the right to express
their views.
It is quite clear from the discussions at that Session that a
major constitutional advance might have been achieved. Besides being
ready for the elective principle, the National Council might, with a
little encouragement from the colonial administration, have been induced
to accept the establishment of ajLegislative Council. Further, it was
- 343 -
not strenuously against bicameralism. Even the idea of having a full
parliament as such attracted seme discussion. Nonetheless, the colonial
administration was not at that point ready to concede a major
constitutional development in the country.
In 1943 when the 38th Session of the National Council met to
decide the fate of the previous year's motions, the Resident Commissioner
brought his views into the open. "It appears to me," he said, "that
the general feeling of the Council is not that it wishes to commit
suicide and abolish itself altogehter but that it wants to alter its
constitution and its machinery so that it becomes more effective." He
admonished members of the Councl "not to try to go todfast or too far
at once." He was very doubtful of the wisdom, at that stage, of
"suggesting an alteration in the constitution or the method of
government" of the country. Patronizingly, perhaps, he informed the
counsellors that "in every dependency of the British Crown in Africa
where there is a Legislative Council that Council has to this day still
got an official majority," and yet those countries "are further advanced
politically than Basutoland is today." ^ At the back of his
mind, no doubt, were the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Uganda -
Britain's political showpieces in Africa.
The councillors were left in no doubt as to the extent to which
the colonial administration might permit a change in the constitution
of the National Council. Firstly, there could be no Legislative
Council. Secondly, the issue of a bicameral National Council was out
of the question. Thirdly, there could be no parity.between the
appointed and the elected members of the National Council.
These points having been made clear, a Committee was set up on
October 26, 1943 to reconsider the proposals and, in effect, present
a version which the colonial administration might find fit to approve.
The Committee was composed of the following influential chiefs:
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Leioko Lerotholi, Talimo Joel, Gabashane Masopha, Lerotholi Mojela
Goliath Malebanye, Solomon Nkoebe, and Matiere Lerotholi. The lone
commoner included in the Conmittee was the Reverend L. Polisa.
The National Council Becomes Partially
And Indirectly Elective. District
Councils Are Established And Associations
Are Formally Represented
The Committee submitted its Report to the full Council on November
3. The Committee recommended that the National Council should adopt
the following Resolutions. Resolution 1 stated that all Proclamations
"closely affecting the administration of the Basuto Nation or the life
and welfare of the people should not be enacted until both the Paramount
Chief and the Basutoland Council have been consulted." So as to enable
the Council to be so consulted "and to fulfill efficiently its functions
of advising" the Paramountcy and the Resident Conmissioner, Resolution 2
called for certain alterations in the constitution and procedure to be
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made. These alterations were:
(a) to bring Councillors into closer touch
and to provide machinery to enable the
people to make their wishes known to
Councillors; (b) to make the Council more
representative; (c) to provide means
whereby the Council can be consulted when
it is not in Session.
Resolution 3 provided that, as regards (a) of Resolution 2 - "to
bring Councillors into closer touch and to provide machinery to enable the
people to make their wishes known to Councillors" - District Councils
should be established. It was recotimended that these District councils
should meet at least three months prior to the sitting of the annual
Session of the National Council, at the headquarters, of each of the
nine Districts, under the chairmanship of the District Conmissioner.
All principal chiefs (who would soon be reclassified as "ward chiefs",
with the establishment of the National Treasury in 1946) as well as
members of the National Council from each District, would be members of
their respective District Councils.
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At the lipitso to be held in each ward, delegates would be
nominated to attend the District Councils and represent the people of
their wards. Details for establishing these District Councils were to
be entrusted to the District Commissioners, "in consultation with the
district chiefs" (that is, the nine chiefs each of whcm was in charge
of a District, as opposed to the twenty four "ward chiefs") "and
submitted for the approval of the Paramount Chief and the Resident
Connissioner." In any event, the functions of the District Councils
would be "to prepare motions for consideration by the Basutoland Council
and to elect one member from the district for nomination as a member of
the Basutoland Council."
As regard (b) of Resolution 2 - to make the National Council "more
representative", the Conmittee recorrmended in its Resolution 4 "that the
Paramount Chief nominate as a member of the Basutoland Council one person
from each district who has been recaimended for nomination by the
District Council of each district." This would mean, in effect, that
of the 94 councillors nominated by the Paramountcy, 9 would be elected
by District Councils.t
The Conmittee further recommended that the Mofumahali and the
Resident Commissioner would, "by arrangement between them nominate as
members" of the National Council "one or more" representatives of the
Agricultural Associations, the School Teachers Association, the Basuto
Traders Association, Leper Settlement (based at Botsabelo in Maseru)
after the War, the Basuto Ex-Servicemen Association, and the Basutoiand
Progressive Association. The Lekhotla la Bafo, whose campaign
%
against the establishment of the National Treasury was already evident
during the Session and which was launched promptly at its
conclusion, was not recognized even at this juncture.
C
There was sane problem as to whether or not the leprosy stricken
patients ought to be represented in the National Council. But the
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problem was merely one of logistics impelled by the morbid fear that
some councillors had of their unfortunate countrymen and women when
it was not clear who was going to represent than - an independent
spokesman or themselves. Otherwise, it would rather have been
impractical not to have them represented. Having been interned for the
first time in 1913, when the National Council decided to isolate them
from society, and having once before mutinied (as they were being treated
like prisoners) and several times after that broken out of their
settlement, to the horror of the entire country, their militancy had
10^
left its record in the minds of councillors. ^ There was real fear
that if they were not represented when other Associations were, they
might, one day, break out and descend on the National Council. Chief
Bolokoe Malebanye may have had that fact in mind, more so than his
manifest reason, when he said on their defence: "I agree a thousand
times that lepers should be represented....They are our people who have
been unfortunate, and if they are not to be represented we might as well
close this council."
The councillors <who opposed the representation of the leprosy
striken patients did, nevertheless, also have a point. Cynically put
i Q7
by Chief Leloko Lerotholi, this point was that:
There are people in Government hospitals
who are not represented. And I have never
heard that in any parliament there are
representatives of lepers. Why should we
do what is not done in other countries.
This was the only aspect of the four Resolutions which in the end
had to be put to the vote, and it was decided in favour of the Leper
Settlement: a representative would be a chief 'who enjoyed their esteem.
Arrangements were made to implement these Resolutions during the
second half of 1944. But it was not until 1948 that they were
1 QQ
promulgated into law - as Proclamation No. 48 of that year. By
then the National Council had made further reconmendations to the
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arrangement: the members of the National Council to be elected by the
District Councils had been increased to two for each District. By 1950
this number had been increased to four,^-®® thus making for a total
of 36 councillors returned by the District Councils.
The composition of the National council by 1958 was as follows:
(a) the Resident Commissioner was still there as the President; (b)
the Regent remained as the Chief Adviser; (c) there were still 5
members nominated by the Resident Commissioner; (d) of the 94 members
nominated by the Regent, however, 36 were indirectly elected by District
Councils. Six were elected by the six recognized Associations -
formally known as the Basutoland Agricultural Union, the Basutoland
Progressive Association, the Basuto Traders' Association, the Basuto
ex-Servicemen, and the Basuto Leper Settlement, whose representative
was chosen by the Regent.
Within a short span of time developments had moved more rapidly
on the question of broadening representation than they had in the
previous decades since the establishment of the National Council. But,
until 1958 when in principle the establishment of a Legislative Council
was accepted, the colonial adminstration was still most reluctant to
move any further. The existing legislation by 1958, in fact, still
gave the Resident Commissioner a wide latitude in the appointment of the
members of District councils. Section 19 of Proclamation No. 48
provided that:^®
The District Council of each district
shall consist of the following members
who shall be appointed as such by the
Resident Commissioner: (a) as many may
be decided by the Resident Commissioner
after consultation with the Paramount
Chief. Such members shall be nominated
by the Paramount Chief to the Resident
Commissioner for his approval; (b) one
representative nominated to the Adminis¬
trative Officer in charge of the District
by each of the bodies enumerated [viz., the
six Associations] as are, in the opinion of
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the Resident Conmissioner, of such standing
in the District as to warrant represen tation
in the District Council, (c) as many elected
representatives of the residents of the district
as may be decided by the Resident Commissioner
after consultation with the Paramo runt Chief.
The practice followed for appointments in the District Councils by
1958 was as follows. One member was elected by secret ballot to around
one thousand taxpayers. For purposes of illustration this meant, for
instance, that Mokhotlong - the smallest District in the Territory -
might have about nine members, while Maseru, the largest District might
have about thirty-nine members. Ward chiefs in each District, as well
as members of the National Council nominated from time to time and such
other members of the National Council as the Regent might nominate, were
also members of District Councils. There were always about four
representatives from Associations. The District Commissioner was
Chairman, although a Mosotho acted as Chairman for the major part of a
District Council meeting.111
The Regent is Brought Firmly
Under the Control of the
National Council. The High
Cormiissioner is Asked to Declare
A Policy of Consulting The Regent
And the Council
The National Council's ad hoc Conmittee on constitutional reforms
established at the 38th Session in 1943 prepared two other Resolutions
of far reaching importance. Their effect, generally, was to bring the
office of Morena e Moholo under control of the National Council.
Once begun, that trend would further be buttressed by other arrangements
between 1949 and 1958. The net effect was to lay down the formal
groundwork for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.
This trend began with the establishment, based on Resolution 5, of
the Standing Comnittee of the National Council. The Standing Conmittee
was supposed to satisfy point (c) of Resolution 2, namely, to provide
means whereby the Council could be consulted when it was not in Session.
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It was composed of five members elected by the Council, of whom three
constituted a quorum. The Standing Ccmnittee met at least once every
two months, and more often if necessary to transact its business of
advising the Regent and the Resident Commissioner on any issues that did
not require the decision of the full Council. It presented its report
at each Session. Its life was one year, but its members were eligible
for re-election. As it was alluded to earlier, it was dominated by
chiefs.
At least one logical outcome of the establishment of the Standing
Committee was that it encroached on the sphere of the Matsieng courtiers.
It overshadowed them in the name of the National Council. In turn,
during the periods that it sat, it became important for the Regent to
extend her influence over it. Very early upon its establishment,
however, the Standing Committee felt it had to assert its own
independence and make it clear to the powers that be that it would not
be manipulated. The opportunity presented itself late in 1944 when the
Standing Committee sat to screen a representative of the Teachers
Association to the National Council. Present through her own
i
representative in the Standing Commitee, the Regent threw in her weight
with the minority, thus making the appointment quite awkward. On
November 22, 1944, the Standing Committee felt compelled to write a
letter to the Resident Commissioner to point out that: "This is an
indication that if the Paramount Chief can be present such acts as these
can often occur." Its general stand in the final analysis was as
follows:"^
We, the Standing Committee, to-day (22.11.44)
humbly but with firai feelings request that
our Paramount Chief who is the head of the
Basuto nation, would not be acting with justice
if she attended meetings of the Standing
Committee, because she has her senior advisers
who are the House of Moshesh and the other
Basuto who have such right have been so
recognised.... Chief, we are the offspring of
a nation which is accustomed to speak and
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express its views in freedom.
1
The signatories to the letter, ironicaly, Chiefs Leloko
A
Lerotholi, Gabashane Masopha, Matlere Lerotholi, Talimo Joel and
Khosimotse Ntaote, were themselves all the Sons of Moshoeshoe. The
first two, it will be noticed, had been intimate courtiers with previous
Monarchs - Leloko Lerotholi with Griffith Lerotholi, and Gabashane
Masopha with Seeiso Griffith. Matlere Lerotholi would dominate, the
1950s as the senior uncle to the royal house. In the circumstances it
appeared as if senior chiefs were doing as much to maintain the
independence of the Standing Conmittee as further to divest the Regent
of the old style of exercising authority, while they themselves shifted
their allegiance to the National Council. In short, the conflict
between the indigenous royal court at Matsieng and the colonial National
g
Council was being rsolved at the cost of emasculating the Office of
Morena e Moholo.
Resolution 7 of the ad hoc Ccranitee on constitutional reforms
sought, explicitly, to bring both "the Regent as well as the High
Commissioner under the control of the National Council. As regards the
(
latter, it stated that:^^
The Council...asks for a declaration by
the High Commissioner on behalf of His
Majesty's Government that it is the policy
of His Majesty's Government to consult
the Paramount Chief and the Basutoland
Council before Proclamations closely
affecting the administration of the
country and the life and welfare of the
people are enacted until the time comes
for Basutoland to have its own Legislative
Council.
As regards the former, it stated:
Council also asked for a declaration by
the Paramount Chief that it is the policy
of the Paramo untcy to consult the Council
before isuing orders or making rules
closely affecting the administration of
the country and the life and welfare of
the Basuto Nation.
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The Resident Commissioner, it is significant to point out, was
generally pleased with the entire package of the 1943 Resolutions,
including Resolution 7, its tacit challenge to the High Commissioner's
e
powers notwithstanding. The Resolutions had not ben radical, yet they
A
had gone in a direction evisaged by the colonial administration. As
he put it, in a letter to the High Commissioner, dated May 13,
1944:114
In my opinion these resolutions, if
implemented will be an important step
to the gradual conversion of the
Paramountcy from an autocracy to a
constitutional monarchy and will tend to
place the Basuto Native Administration on
a more representative and democratic basis
and better suited to modern conditions.
In the same letter, the Resident Commisioner advised the
High Commissioner on a suitable response to the part of Reso 'lution 7
in so far as it affected him. And having secured approval on his own
advice, he read it back to the National Council at its 39th Session, on
Jun'e 1, 1944, as the High Ccurmi ssioner' s response
I can assure Council that it is the policy
of his Majesty's Government to consult the
Paramount'Chief and the Basutoland Council
before proclamations closely affecting the
domestic affairs and welfare of the Basuto
native administration are enacted. To avoid
misunderstanding I must make it clear that
there are proclamations dealing with matters
which do not fall within this definition, such,
for example, as proclamations imposing income
or other taxes on Europeans only, or making
changes in customs and excise duties in
accordance with the customs agreement with the
Union Government, or dealing with the conditions
of service of officials, or with certain technical
and legal matters, and that in the case of such
proclamations it is left to the discretion of the
Resident Conmissioner as President of the Council
whether Council is consulted or not.
In one sense, the statement was a clear and concise exposition
of the High Commissioner's role in Lesotho's dual government. In
another sense, it was a clear play on words: essentialy, while the
evolved style of government impelled the colonial administration to
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"consult" the Regent and the National Council, the discretion for
consultation was left exclusively to the High Commissioner and the
Resident Commissioner. Most of the time they consulted. But when it
suited them, they claimed that they were not obliged to do so. So,
the National Council had not made any real gains in this direction:
the Order-in-Council of 1884, on which the powers of the High
Commissioner and the Resident Commissioner vested, was not formally
amended.
The Regent's own response to Resolution 7, addressed to the
President of the National Council (May 10, 1944), was as follows:"'""'"®
Chief, regarding these recommendations
which were made and approved by Council
I beg to state that with reference to
resolution 7 asking for a declaration by
the Paramount Chief I request His Honour
the Resident Commissioner as President
of the Basutoland Council to inform the
Council that I, as Paramount Chief of the
Basuto nation, confirm that it is the
policy of the Paramountcy to consult the
Basutoland' Council before issuing orders
or making rules especially affecting the
life or welfare of the Basuto people and
the administration of the Basuto.
Although, as in the case above (involving the High Commissioner),
no Proclamation was promulgated to establish this policy of consultation
vouched for by the Regent, the National Council's authority on her
powers as stipulated was effective. It may be said in constitutional
terms that a convention in this regard had been established. From the
%
point of view of the National Council, however, it was probably construed
as the result of a legislative exercise - in the same way as The Laws
of Lerotholi continued to be regarded, official advice notwithstanding.
In 1948 the National Council made a "suggestion" to the Regent
"that three advisers should be chosen by her from a panel elected by
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Council," composed of 12 councillors. A delegation, interestingly-
headed by Chief Lerotholi - a former Matsieng courtier, was sent to
put the "suggestion" to the Regent. Aithough the Regent was reported
to have "fallen in with Council's suggestion", it was unmistakable
that the question of power was wrapped in the apparently simple language.
Proof of this was manifested in the Regent's own suggestions. First,
she suggested that the panel from which she was to choose her Advisers
should be expanded to 18. Her suggestion was granted, but only
following an impasse which, in the end, was resolved by voting. Second,
as if to say she was not alone going to be subjected to the Council's
influence and control, she suggested that "a similar provision should be
made for the ward Chiefs;" "their advisers should also be nominated by
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Council." That suggestion too was granted.
Two years later, in 1950, the National Council took yet another
step in the direction of bringing the Regent under its control. It
succeeded in ensuring that no Local Rate or Levy imposed by her Office
under the Native Administration Proclamation of 1938 should be deemed
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valid unless the Council concurred.
i
The 49th Session of the National Council, in 1953, can be viewed
as the peak in the trend during the Regency for the Matsieng house to
be subjugated under the National Council. This was signified by two
related developments. One was that, quite significantly, the Regent,
in consultation with, and at the instigation of the Resident
Commissioner, E. P. Arrowsmith, requested the National Council to aid her
with a fourth Adviser. The other was that, arising from a motion from
the District of Mohale's Hoek, something akin to a "cabinet" was
formalized at Matsieng: each of the four Advisers was given a portfolio,
so to speak, responsibilities being divided into Administration, Judicial
Matters, Finance, and Agriculture. Before that, as Chief Kelebone
Nkoebe observed:
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The position has been that these Advisers
of the Paramount Chief were merely put
there and it was not decided what particular
work each of them would be responsible for.
At the present time they only know themselves
as the Paramount Chief's Advisers but they
do not know what work each one is responsible
for.
With the formalization of the functions of these Advisers, the
indigenous royal court of Matsieng was, for all intents and purposes,
dead. For the subsequent period, until 1960, when the Legislative
Council sat for the first time, and when Prince Bereng Seeiso was given
the sceptre, Matsieng was dominated by five chiefs. These were, Chief
Matlere Lerotholi, the late Griffith Lerotholi's half-brother, who was
the de facto Acting Regent whenever Mofumahali 'Mantsebo could
not, for one reason or another, fulfil the responsibilities of her
Office. Matlere Lerotholi, it may be added, had been one staunch
supporter for an additonal Adviser as well as for the division of the
A*
Advisers' responsibilities at the 49th Session in 1953. The other
four were the Regent's Advisers: Chiefs Nkoebe Mitchel, Leabua Jonathan
(a junior son of the late Jonathan of Leribe), Leshoboro Majara, and
Patrick 'Mota. <
All the five Chiefs fell under that ill-defined banner termed the
Sons of Moshoeshoe. In the case of Nkoebe Mitchel, he was the
descendent of Makhabane, the more famous of Moshoeshoe's two full
brothers. Leabua Jonathan and Leshoboro Majara were the descendents
of Molapo and Majara, Moshoeshoe's second and fourth sons, respectively,
by his Great Wife 'Mamohato. Patrick 'Mota was a descendent of
Moshoeshoe by his second house, under the charge of '..Manneko. All the
four Advisers were frcm the North. None of the five Chiefs owed their
allegiance to Matsieng: they derived their authority either from the
National Council or from their individual caretakings or wards. In
other words, the Office of Morena e Moholo had become ceremonial.
The Question of Lesotho's Constitutional Status
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Under the British Government Becomes an Issue
Beginning in 1947, with the 43rd Session of the National Council,
both the Council as well as the Regent began to raise and to assert
the point that Lesotho was not a Crown Colony, that it was a
Protectorate, and as such it was constitutionally anomalous that xhe
colonial administration was exercising so much power over it. Motion
No. 2, from the Mafeteng District Council, represented by Councillor
MacDonald Phasumane, on the question, had to be posponed to the 44th
Session in 1944, to give the Resident Ccmnissioner, A. D. Forsyth
Thompson the opportunity to undertake research and enlighten the
Council accordingly.
In his introduction of the motion - "that Basutoland should be
declared to be a Protectorate and not a Colony," - Councillor
Phasumane expressed the Mafeteng District Council's wish to know
"whether Basutoland is a Colony or whether it is a Protectorate." In
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the view of the District Council, it was the latter.
The motion had the maximum support of the Council. Best
expressed by Chief Leloko Lerothoii, the view of the Council was that
<
"Chief Moshesh, the founder of this Nation, thought we were a
Protectorate." The National Council, Chief Leloko Lerothoii revealed,
had only recently been made anxious when the Resident Commissioner,
A. A. Forsyth Thompson, kept throwing the suggestion when he was giving
War veterans medals, to the effect "that this was a Crown Colony,"
although in the same breath "he stated, publicly, that in 1868 when
Basutoland was accepted it was taken as a Protectorate." (The Resident
%
Commissioner interjected that on the second point he was being
1 91
misinterpreted.) Further, the Chief disclosed, "recently"
one of the Officers in the colonial administration, a man named
Mackenzie, had written a pamphlet "that really roused our feelings"
in which he stated that "Basutoland is a Crown Colony; it is a King's
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possession....' "Nobody had ever told us before then," Chief
Leloko said, "that we were taken under the British Crown in any other
1 22
manner than being protected from the Boers."
An irrmediate issue at stake at that point, which stood to be
affected by Lesotho being a Crown Colony, as opposed to being a
Protectorate, was land. Europeans, for the most part the colonial
Officers, were concentrated in each of the nine administrative centres
in the Districts, styled "Camps". With time these Camps had cane to
be associated with European authority. They were expanding, and as
they expanded, more by usage than by law the colonial administration was
beginning to define them as "Government Reserves". The Basotho were
being forbidden to encroach into them - either for grazing, building, or
agricultural purposes. The end result was that animosity between the
Basotho in general and the colonial Officers was building up. This
issue had been the subject of debate earlier at the 44th Session of
the Council, where the Resident Commissioner had alleged that "the
Government" had been given sites on the Reserves by Moshoeshoe and his
successors. Besides the query, as Chief Leloko also indicated, that
t
104"the country did not belong" to any Mosotho Monarch to give,
there was the natural fear that if, as Mackenzie was said to have stated,
Lesotho was "a King's possession", those Reserves might be lost for
ever, and possibly the entire country together with them.
Chief Leloko, in step with other councillors and quite discerning
at that Session, insisted that it was about time the President of the
Council distinguished the English terms "Crown Coiony", "Protectorate",
and "Territory".-'"25
From the lengthy and heavily documented exposition that the
President of the National Council gave in response to the motion, it
was clear that he had made effective use of the Government Archives in
Maseru over the past year. His speech traced Lesotho's relations with
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the British Government frcm the 1840s to the present. It was beaded
with appropriate quotations. But it was not convincing.
He admitted at the outset that it was "not altogether an easy
question to understand." There was, he admitted, "considerable
confusion in the minds of many people, both the Europeans and the
Africans, as to what the status is of the three High Conmission
Territories" - Lesotho, Bechuanaland and Swaziland - "even when people
know what the difference is, for convenience they continue to use the
word 'Protectorate'." He confessed his own lack of confidence in
attempting to settle the question; he would deal with it only "in so
far as my limited abilities allow." Those abilities, it had to be
concluded at the end, did not encompass the knowledge to distinguish
the terms "Crown Colony", "Protectorate", and "Territory", which was at
1
the centre of the discussion. He did not even attempt it.
In a nut-shell, his explanation was the following:
....Basutoland was in a pe culiar position.
In 1862 Moshesh asked that the Queen should rule
his people through him. "'The man whom I ask
from the Queen to live with me will guide and
direct me' he said. That is why, that is to
say he stipulated that there should not be
direct administration by the Government but
that the country should be ruled through him.
That was before Basutoiand was annexed to the
Crown. But in spite of annexation the British
Government has ever since administered the
country through the Paramount Chief, and has
tried as much as possible to draw the people
into the process of administration. In other
words it has paid constant attention to Moshesh's
request made before the Territory was annexed....
The important thing to remember is that the
system of indirect rule which has of recent
years received recognition in Africa has been
in force for many years in Basutoland. .. That
is to say the Government does not normally give
its orders direct to the people and enforce them;
it leaves that to the Paramount Chief and his Chiefs.
But it does give constant encouragement and guidance
to the Chiefs and people to adapt themselves to
changing conditions and to learn to govern themselves
on modern lines.
The National Council quite clearly did not think that the Resident
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Commissioner had said anything of value. The Mover of the motion,
MacDonald Phasumane asked that ail correspondence cited in the speech
should be made available to the Council. Beyond that he was very
1 07
cynical:
I say we should not be in the Government
of Pharaoh; who knows Joseph? Because it
may happen that hereafter there will be
another Pharaoh who will not know Joseph.
In other words, as Councillor Phasumane saw it, the only thing that the
Resident Coranissioner had convinced the Council of was that the answer
to the question was as elusive as finding the Biblical Joseph, who could
only be found by those who knew the colour of his blanket - in this
case, His Majesty King George VI's Officers.
1 9ft
Chief Malebanye also reacted in the same vein:
[W]e have been told a very long story, an
important story, but if you listened very
carefully you will find that sane letters
say there is really nothing in this matter,
and others say there is really something.
Now Chiefs, look lest the water has grown
•
. very much behind your hut, and the water
is now percolating into your houses, and
let us scrape away the dirt from behind
our huts. Everything will not be visible.
(
The statement, it appears, meant that the Resident Commissioner's
exposition had served only to camouflage the truth, and if the Council
was still interested in it, it had to do the assignment for itself.
The assignment was, of course, never done. But the issue was not
dropped. It was picked up again with rigour early in 1951. When the
colonial administration had continued to assert its authority on the
administrative "Camps", the Sons of Moshoeshoe and the Advisers to the
Regent held a meeting at Matsieng on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of January,
195.1, in which they decided that the Resident Commissioner, he being
still Mr. Forsyth Thompson, should be put in his place. Consequent
upon that meeting, Mofumahali addressed a bold letter to the Resident
Commissioner reminding him that he was only "His Majesty's Representative
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who has ccme to work and to advise one another with the Paramount Chief
who is herself the caretaker of this country in administrative matters
concerning this Nation, to bring about its advancement and to see to the
prosperity of the country." She expressed the kernel of her message
as follows:
Your Honour, the undistinguished action pursued
in general by the Government Officers in
Basutoland indicates that Government autho¬
rities on reasons known to themselves alone
have taken upon themselves powers which are not
laid down in the Convenant between Queen Victoria
the Good and Mosfaesh the Wise, Chief of the Basuto,
and that it is attempting to separate administration
of the Basuto living out of the Reserve.
...Basutoland as a whole is an integrated State
inhabited by Basuto ruled by the Paramount Chief
of Basutoland and the Basuto Chiefs under him....May
the Government please hold in abeyance any action
which might tend to indicate the taking upon itself
powers which are not included in the Convenant of
the alliance and protection between the late Moshesh
the Wise and Victoria the Good....
Forsyth Thompson was infuriated by the tone and content of the
letter. And in his venomous response he did much to confirm the
suspicions of the likes of Councillor MacDonald Phasumane who had
tacitly suggested in 1948 that perhaps he (Forsyth Thompson) could
I
discover Joseph's body because he seemed to know the colour of his
blanket. He lashed out:
I was placed here to govern this country
and I mean just that. The fact that Her
Majesty, Queen Victoria, in her greatness
of heart consented to govern through the
Paramount Chief and Chiefs, and that her
successors have done so, and will probably
continue to do so, appears to have blinded
you to the fact that His Majesty can rule
His Basuto subjects exactly as he pleases.
You have forgotten that Moshesh was at his
gasp, he was on the point of being overwhelmed
by the Boers, and with a last despairing cry
he begged the Queen to save him. She did so
but without terms. Drowning men are in no
position to dictate terms....And the result?
Not gratitude, as you might expect, but growing
arrogance on the part of the Sons of Moshesh....
Forsyth Thompson might have thought that he had put the Regent
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and the Sons of Moshoeshoe in their place. But he did not succeed in
removing the subject of their letter frcm the Nation's political agenda.
It would resurface again under E. P. Arrowsnith, his successor, in 1953.
At the 49th Session of the National Council, held that year, the District
of Mokhotlong presented a motion (Motion No. 34) to the effect that the
Order-in-Council of 1884, which Forsyth Thompson had previously, in
1948, said was the one that had made Lesotho a Crown Colony, should be
amended: "before His Excellency the High Commisioner can make a
Proclamation he should consult the Paramount Chief or the Basutoland
National Council or the Standing Committee." Speaking to the motion,
Councillor Joshua Khali, the District Council representative from
Mokhotlong, reiterated the national view on the constitutional status of
1 31
the country:
This is by no means new, in fact it is
the foundation on which we have founded
Basutoland. When Moshoeshoe placed himself
under Her Majesty the Queen amongst other
things he made a request that Her Majesty
might be pleased in making laws when these
laws are made he himself should be consulted
and he in turn would consult his Council and
then he would send word to Her Majesty to say
that my Council is in agreement with this
proposed law....It was only around 1871 that
matters changed....The Paramount Chief of
Basutoland was forgotten and as a whole the
Nation of the Basuto were forgotten. The
wishes of the Nation also became forgotten in
that the Nation should be satisfied they
should be governed to their own wishes.
The Establishment of the Basutoiand African
Congress: Its Objectives and Its Agitation
For Seif-Government "Now"
The agitation for constitutional advance in the 1950s which
culminated in the establishment of a Legislative Council by 1959 owed
a great deal of its drive to the founding in 1952 of the Basutoland
African Congress. A great deal of the vision and the vitality of the
B.A.C. was itself owing to its founder, Clement Ntsu Sejabanana Mokhehle.
He was the son of Cicerone Mokhehle, one of the early Basotho Inspector
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of Schools, or more accurately, Supervisor of Schools, as the former
title was reserved for European counterparts.
Ntsu Mokhehle had been awarded a Bachelor of Science degree and a
Masters in Science in Zoology at Fort Hare, submitting a thesis entitled
"Parasitology of Birds", for which he got a distinction, in the mid-
19403. Already, whilst he was at Fort Hare, in the company of Oliver
Tambo (now Caretaker President of the African National Congress), he had
taken active interest in politics. In South Africa he was a member of
the Youth League of the South African National Congress (A.N.C.). On
the home front, in Lesotho, he later became one of Josiel Lefela's
disciples in the Lekhotla la Bafo. His efforts to start an early
teaching career in his own country were frustrated by race prejudice
and fear of his radicalism at Lesotho High School (founded in 1939)
where he was not allowed to teach his subject, science, and so for a
while he took a teaching job in the Union of South Africa. Later he
came hone to become the Headmaster of the Higher Primary School in
Maseru. He joined the Basutoland African National Teachers'
Association (B.A.N.T.A.), of which he soon became the President, before
founding the B.A.C. in 1952.
The B.A.C.'s Manifesto, published on October 7, 1952, emphasized
three general objectives. First, "that the incorporation of Basutoland
within the Union of South Africa would both be impolitic and repugnant
to the best wishes of every Mbsotho." The B.A.C. believed "that
Basutoiand must never, at any time in the present, in future, as it has
not been in the past, be incorporated within the Union of South Africa,
except by consent of two thirds majority of the Basotho." Second, it
declared that "Discrimination Must Quit Basutoland." It called for
the total removal of "all discriminatory laws" and practices in the
Territory, which had come into vogue with almost the same virulence as
in the Union of South Africa, and it demanded that any European who
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practiced colour discrimination should "be caused to leave the country."
Third, it stated, "We want Self-Government for the Basotho in Basutoland
NOW." The substance of this objective is worth quoting:
Whereas Basutoland is sometimes referred
to as a democracy, we of the Basutoland
African Congress hold that there is no
democracy in Basutoland - the High
Commissioner in Pretoria and the High
Conmissioner at Matsieng, rule this territory
with such powers as amount to open dictatorship,
in practice though not by law. The Basotho,
who in fact own the land have, through the
National Council, been reduced to mere
advisors on vital matters that fundamentally
affect their own political, social, economic and
educational matters. ...We of the Basutoland
African Congress, therefore, without a desire
to create any impression whatsoever that Basotho
desire or have intentions of any sort to break
away from the British Government, do demand
self-government in Basutoland by the Basotho NOW.
The B.A.C.'s reluctance to demand full independence can, no doubt,
be attributed to the fear, even in the unlikely event that such
independence might be granted, of incorporation to the Union of South
Africa.
Consequent upon the founding of the B.A.C., all resist nee to the
t
attainment of self-government was forced to give way. Agitation
intensified both in and outside the National Council. In the latter
arena the agitation was sharpened by the founding of the press organ
Mohlabani (the warrior) in 1954. Mohlabani was a political paper
founded specifically "to shake the British administration out of its
snug complacency," as its Editor, Bennet Makalo Khaketia stated in his
political treatise, Lesotho 1970. The first appearance of the paper
on November 22, 1954, according to Bennet Khaketia, heralded change and
124
Basotho greeted it with longing: J
Maseru buzzed with talk about Mohlabani;
but in sane quarters there was general
apprehension that we have overstepped our
mark and would get into trouble. Among
the whites who had been so comfortable
and were monarchs of all they surveyed,
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the appearance of the paper signalled the
dawn of a new era, and it became clear
to them that unless something was done
to stop it, Lesotho would never be the
same again, and would cease to be the
"White Man's Paradise", as Mohlabani
said in one of its articles.
At the time, in 1954, that Bennet Khaketla joined Lesotho
politics, he was not yet a member of Mokhehle's B.A.C. He would join
later. But as with many other educated Basotho of the breed with.
university degrees such as, for instance, Dr. Maile Emsley Maema (a
medical doctor who had made a financial contribution toward the founding
of Mohlabani, but was otherwise a member of the Progressive
Association), he simply felt that the pernicious aspects of colonial
administration must be brought to an end. The Basotho must take full
charge of the internal affairs of Lesotho, under British protection
(from the Union of South Africa). Racial discrimination must cone to
an end. Basotho who qualified for employment in the public service
must be employed on ranks commensurate with their qualifications and be
paid the salaries that their European counterparts were getting.
This new breed of the educated elite was a healthy political
t
hybrid between the Progressive Association and the Lekhotla la Bafo:
It had all of the Lekhotla la Bafo's sentiments of nationalise, but
none of its scattered sense of purpose. It had all of the B.P.A.'s
sense of focus, but none of its compromising spirit with the colonial
administration. Above all else, it was quite clear that they were
interested not so much in participating in the political sphere of
their country but in controlling its destiny.
The B.A.C.'s attitude toward the chieftaincy was basically that
"the nation could progress very well without Chiefs...." As B. M.
Khaketla stated it in Mohlabani in 1957, if the chieftaincy continued
to be unresponsive to the needs of the Nation, it would be "superceded
and sent to join the mesozoic reptiles upon the evolutionary
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scrap-heap of discarded political experiments."1^ His definition
1 S7
of the role of the chieftaincy was basically as follows:
In Sesotho we have a saying that a Chief
is a Chief because of the people. In
other words it means that he remains Chief
so long as he protects the interests of his
people, and rules them according to their
wishes and not his own whims and idiosyn-
cracies. This saying expresses a very
great fundamental truth, and explains the
nature of Chieftainship in a manner that
is accepted by all democratic countries
the world over. It means that Chieftainship
is the product of the wills, the desires, the
sympathies and the thoughts of men over which
it rules. It is constituted by comradeship
in work, by fellowship in purpose and in hope,
by a general desire for and a general
willingness to sutmit to constituted authority
that will be the protector of the interests
of the ruled and not of a privileged section.
Take away this desire, this willingness, this
sympathy, and there is no Chieftainship.
B. M. Khaketla was of course aware of the fact that the type of
constitution he was so ably describing was a thing of the past. As
a reality it had waned and virtually ceased to exist. His statement
was a virtual epitaph on its grave. The chieftaincy continued, but
with neither a respect for the old principles of government, nor a
i
commitment to the novel parliamentary institutions. Whichever
direction it went - to the past or to the future - it went for
convenience or for survival.
Concurrent with these developments - the founding of the B.A.C.
and the launching of the explicitly political Mohlabani, was a
concerted effort in the National Council for an immediate constitutional
advance. In two successive years, 1952 - a month before the B.A.C.
would publish its Manifesto in September - and 1953, "motions had been
introduced which had bearing on legislative and executive powers. On
the second occasion, at the 49th Session, two such motions, by Councillor
Kaizer Jubilee of Butha Buthe and Councillor N. M. Tlale, had been
passionately presented. N. M. Tlale, whose Motion No. 83, sponsored
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by the Progressive Association, was the better argued, read:188
In short what could only be emphasized
is that this country should be given the
right of Legislating in regard to matters
which affect the country. The laws which
were made by Lerotholi and used to great
benefit in this country have been so done
for the last fifty years. The Courts
whenever they make their decisions refer
to this law. It is strange that we are
not recognised as a legislative council.
What we now request is that this working
should be approved and confirmed by law
that this is a legislative council.
....I would like to point out the rights
which we are now claiming are not strange.
Other African races in Africa have already
been given the right to make laws, it should
be remembered that some of these countries are
those which fell under the British Government
after Basutoland, although by progress and
education they are behind the Basuto.
Against this background, the High Conmissioner authorized the
establishment in April 1954 of the Administrative Reforms Ccranittee,
chaired by Sir Henry Moore, for the purpose of examining "the structure
of Native Administration.. .and to make reccranendations regarding the
lines of xts "future development...." Particular reference was made to
the following areas: "(1) Existing system of Native Authority. (2) The
t
need for more effective instruments of Local Government at the District
level. (3) The relationship of the local government structure which
they recommend with the Central Government and its offices, and (4)
139
the financial implications of their reconmendations."
The great expectation of all the predominantly corrmoner-ied
t
organizations - the Progessive Association, the Lekhotia la Bafo, but
A
mostly the B.A.C., was that the establishment of a Legislative Council
%
would be at the centre of Sir Henry Moore's Conmittee considerations.
But in this they would be sorely disappointed, the Progessive Association
much less than the other two. Sir Henry totally excluded the question
as falling outside his mandate. In its Memorandum to the Secretary
for the Commonwealth Relations, Lord Swinton, dated June 20, 1954, the
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B.A.C. expressed its disppointment as follows:"^
A
The Basutoland National Council had, on
behalf of the nation requested that the
High Commissioner enter into reforms to
effect the establishment of a legislative
council; hence the nation was surprised
when Sir Henry Moore baulked the recomnen-
dations in this respect. If the Basutoland
people had known that the commission's
terms of reference number three did not
cover the legislative council they would
not have accepted the commission - for
without that the 4 terms of reference are
made to establish an administrative
machinery that has been telescoped in our
administrative development and we have
long passed that stage.
A number of influential chiefs, however, were supportive of
Sir Henry Moore's exclusion of a Legislative Council in his Report.
This, Weisfelder correctly points out, was owing to "their fears that
the more far reaching demands for self-government under a legislative
council would ultimately lead to the subordination and destruction of
141
the chieftainship by an elected majority." But the time when
chiefs alone could forestall constitutional developments in the
country had passed. Political leadership was shifting to the side of
the more radical educated commoners represented by Ntsu Mokhehle and
Bennet Khaketla. The colonial administration could not ignore their
existence and their demands.
Report on Constitutional Reform
And Chieftainship Affairs: A
Legislative Council is Established
In 1955, only a year following the controversial Moore Report,
the question of a Legislative Council was back on the agenda of the
%
National Council. This time virtually all the chiefs fell in line -
hoping, perhaps, to avoid the Mohlabani's indictment that their
reluctance to fight against the Moore Report stemmed frcm their desire
140
to establish "an oligarchy of autocratic chiefs." but mostly
because they were losing the leadership.
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On September 21, 1955, the National Council passed motion 90,
which requested "that the Basutoland Council be given power to make
laws in all internal matters, such laws to be confirmed by the Paramount
Chief." Further, the motion proposed that the Resident Commissioner
and Departmental heads of his Staff of Officers should guide and advise
the Council in policy. It concluded by stating that "the Resident
Commissioner, Heads of Departments and District Commissioners should
deal with external affairs on behalf of Her Majesty's Government."
The motion proved acceptable to the colonial administration, and on
May 5, 1956, the Secretary of State replied:"*"^
I am prepared to consider proposals whereby
the Basutoland Council should be given
power to make laws in regard to internal
matters affecting the Basuto alone, but
not in regard to matters affecting people
other than the Basuto or countries other
than Basutoland. But before the Basutoland
Council are given powers to pass laws, however,
they will have to think how they should go
about law-making, and who is going to put
the laws they pass into effect....The Basutoland
Council must, therefore, submit its considered
recommendations on "these matters at "the same
time as it submits detailed proposals with
regard to the scope of its law-making powers.
(
In terms of Motion 90, nine councillors were appointed to form
what came to be known as the Constitutional Reform Comnitee. Of these
nine, only two were commoners, and these were Councillors Gabriel C.
Manyeli of Roma and Edwin Leanya of Mafeteng. Of the chiefs, Leabua
Jonathan was an Adviser to the Regent, destined in a few years time to
be Prime Minister of an Independent Lesotho. Chief George Bereng, who
had attempted a Bachelors Degree at the University of South Africa, was
made Chairman of the Committee. The Government Secretary, Gordon
M. Hector, was the Secretary. And D. V. Cowen, a Professor of
Comparative Law at the University of Cape Town, was invited to be the
Committee's Constitutional Adviser.
The Committee's recommendations were brought for discussions in
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London, where the Delegations of Lesotho and the United Kingdom sat in
November and December 1958 to agree on a constitution for a Legislative
Council. Two developments at those discussions would be of interest
for the purpose of this study. First, as Professor Cowen was minuted
on November 21: 144
Professor Cowen said that the Basutoland
Delegation were agreed that the Paramount
Chief should not be a menber of the
Executive Council. But if she was not to
be a member, she would need advice in
exercising their (sic) functions - and not
least in connection with reconmendations of
the Executive Council. The Paramount Chief
had herself said that she wished to be a
constitutional ruler and to act in accordance
with the wishes of the Nation....The Delegation
did not suggest removing her right to consult
anyone whom she pleased but wished to protect
her position by providing that she must consult
the Resident Cotimissioner, the member of the
Executive Council nominated by the Paramount
Chief.
The significance of this statement, besides its indication for the
establishment of an Executive Council at the same time as the Legislative
Council was being established, is that the Regent, on the counsel of
her Advisers, had agreed to be a constitutional Monarch. That meant
i
that when Prince Bereng Seeiso would succeed to Office in 1960, he would
find himself already bound by that decision.
Second, it is significant to note that those discussions almost
broke down completely on one contentious issue - the issue of whether
Lesotho was a Protectorate or a Crown Colony. The constitutional point
that had sparked the issue was that the U.K. Delegation had insisted,
basing itself on the British colonial experience, that the High
Cotimissioner would be a member of the Executive Council with the power
of veto over it, exercised on his behalf by the Resident Coimissioner.
Holding the contrary view, the Lesotho Delegation insisted that the
High Cotimissioner ought not to be a member of the Executive Council at
all. Challenging the U.K. Delegation145
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Professor Cowen said that the United Kingdom's
proposals in regard to the Executive Council
rested on their assumption that they were
the only proposals compatible with Basutoiand
having the status of an ordinary colony. The
Basutoiand Delegation might however wish to
challenge both the assumption that Basutoiand
was in fact a colony and the assertion that an
Executive Council of this kind which the United
Kingdom were proposing was the only one
consistent with the contention that Basutoiand
was a Crown colony.
Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, on whose authority (together with
e
Berridale Keith) "Basutoiand" is accepted in Conmonwealth constitutional
A
law as a Crown Colony, was a member of the U.K. Delegation.-^®
The issue of whether Lesotho was a Protectorate or a Crown Colony
was in the final analysis not faced up to. Purely in the interests
of sportananship, following a recess necessitated by rising tempers,
and because it was close to Christmas - of which the Lesotho Delegation
was subtly reminded that it might be allowed to interrupt discussions
indefinitely - the U.K. formula was followed.
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED
In 1959 Lesotho received a constitution giving it a Legislative
147Council and an Executive Council. The Constitution necessarily
bore the heavy print of Professor Cowen, who, although as the National
Council's own invitee he enjoyed its confidence, had, nevertheless, his
own convictions on the making of constitutions. Professor Cowen was
then developing his views for The Foundations of Freedom (1961), on the
conditions under which "true democracy is to survive...." He believed
in parliamentary institutions. He generally subscribed to the British
model of government. The Lesotho situation, difficult as it was to fit
within Western historical development of political institutions,
presented a special challenge for him to test his stock
in trade.
Under his guiding hand, the Constitutional Reform Committee of
1958 had provided a theoretical background for the new Constitution
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which it had described in the following words
It has been said that constitutional
progress in the British dependencies lies
broadly in the direction of giving the
peoples of the territories (i) a more
representative share in government; and
(ii) a more responsible share in government.
This is a useful distinction; though the
two ideas are related and cannot be kept
entirely separate....In speaking of responsible
government we have in mind, primarily, the
relationship between the executive arm and the
legislative arm. There are varying degrees
of responsible government; but full responsible
government may be said to exist when the executive
is entirely drawn from the legislature and is
collectively responsible or accountable to the
legislature, and through the legislature to the
people. Looking at the matter from a slightly
different point of view, full responsible
government may be said to involve the transfer
of the ultimate power of decision in all
matters of government from the British
authorities to the territorial electorate.
Viewing Lesotho against this theoretical background, the
Constitutional Reform Conmittee had recognized that "it might take
years before the idea of responsible government" could be Implemented
in Lesotho, even if it meant only that matters should fall within
the competence of the'National Council. The question before it, it
felt, was "how to associate the Basuto more closely with the
legislative (law-making) and executive (policy-making and administrative)
side of government in a satisfactory way...." In that regard the
Conmittee accepted the fact that "during the inmediate future the control
of policy-making will have to rest primarily in the hands of the British
authorities." At the same time, "Africanisation of the public service"
would be "allowed to develop as much as possible....-" Members of the
National Council "capable of exercising administrative responsibility"
in high positions of the colonial administration would be encouraged
"to develop their talents."
The Conmittee had then given the following specific constitutional
1 10
framework for the Lesotho situation:
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We have...sought to find a technique of
government which, on the one hand, will
make official control at the executive
level both effective and acceptable during
the inmediately forseeable future, and,
on the other hand, will provide sufficient
scope for the exercise and development of
the political energies of a people imbued
with ideas of self-government.... If one
had to put a descriptive label on the kind
of constitutional machinery which we have
devised, it could appropriately be called
a form of 'representative government";
that is to say, we are recommending a
legislative assembly of whom one half are
to be elected by the inhabitants..., and
an executive body which will not be
'responsible' to the legislature...Now
this is a system which may be said to
confer power without 'responsibility'.
It is probably an inevitable stage in the
progress of a British dependency towards
self-government; and it has its own
familiar difficulties....The situation
which gives rise to these difficulties
has been described in a familiar metaphor:
'We have made the fire but we have stopped
the chimney'. The smoke, which cannot
escape up the chimney is, of course, the
feeling which is engendered when a
legislature containing an unofficial majority
is able to pass or reject legislation and to
refuse supplies, but is not able to control or
dismiss the executive.
(
The special feature of the 1959 Constitution was that it was a
diarchy of representative government, with a unicameral Legislative
Council consisting of 80 members, half of whcm were elected. The 40
elected members were to be "elected from among the members of
predominantly elected District Council, by the District Councils"
which would serve as electoral colleges. These District Councils
would also become the main instruments of local government. Of the
40 non-elected members 22 were ex-officio principal chiefs, 14 were
nominated by the Regent/Morena e Moholo. And there were 4
"official" members - the Government Secretary, the Financial Secretary,
the Legal Secretary and the Commissioner for Local Government.
The reason why the Legislative Council was unicameral, instead
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of being bicameral, as sane councillors had demanded, was noteworthy.
The Constitutional Reform Conmitee, quite simply, had reasoned that:
"A single chamber... is what the Basuto are used to." The Committee
had felt that "the interaction of thought between chiefs and commoners
in a single body is in consonance with national traditions which long
antedate the establishment of Basutoland Council." While recognizing
the usefulness of a second chamber, the Conmittee felt that in the
1
case of Lesotho:
The main function of a second chamber, which
is to serve as a check on hasty legislation,
may be carried out in a dignified and, it
is hoped, efficient way by according
certain powers of delay to the Paramount
Chief.
This type of rationale, of course, no longer accorded with the
realities of a modern Lesotho. Over a period of over fifty years
since the establishment of the National Council, during which the
political bond between the educated commoners and the chiefs had
worn very thin, the divergent interests of the two had sharpened.
Indeed, in just three years frcm the first sitting of the Legislative
Council it would seem;judicious, in the light of recent experience,
and in preparation for Independence, to opt for bicameralism A
bicameral legislature seemed to have been recognized as the better suited,
to keep at least the principal Chiefs separate frcm conmoners.
The Basutoland National Council, as the legislature would continue
to be officially called, would legislate for all persons in the
Territory on ail matters except on external affairs and defence, internal
security, currency, public loans, customs and excise, posts and
telegraphs, broadcasting, public service, copyright, trademarks,
patents and designs. These subjects remained the responsibility of
the High Commissioner, although the Council had the right to discuss
all matters which fell in the High Comnisioner's field. The rest
of the powers, the most important being the financial powers, remained
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with the Legislative Council and the Executive Council, the latter
being closely associated with the Resident Commissioner and loosely
associated with the Office of Morena e Moholo.
The Constitution provided for an Executive Council with 4 official
members - the Resident Commissioner, who was the Chairman and who had
a casting vote, the Government Secretary, the Financial Secretary and
the Assistant Attorney General. In addition it had 4 "unofficial"
(that is, Basotho) members, three of whcm were elected by the Legislative
Council and one was to be nominated by the Morena e Moholo from
amongst the members of the Legislative Council. The official members
were to hold office on the Executive Council at the High Commissioner' s
pleasure. The seat of an unofficial member could becane vacant if the
High Commissioner terminated his appointment, on the recomnendation of
the Morena e Moholo; if he accepted permanent appointment in the
public service; if he resigned from the Executive Council; when his
membership in the Legislative Council ceased (except, on the
dissolution of the Legislative Council he might remain in office until
a new Executive Council was formed, when he would be eligible for
re-appointment if his membership in the Legislative Council continued).
Broadly speaking, the qualifications of elected members were to be
the same as the qualifications for being a voter. The qualifications
were to be: (a) membership to the Basotho Nation, (b) a minimum age of
21, (c) literacy in Sesotho (which was not a requirement for a voter),
(d) residence in the Territory for a minimum period of 6 months
immediately preceding election, (e) payment of tax (for men), and (f)
all persons qualified, without prejudice on the grounds of race,
religion or sex.
Strictly speaking, the 1959 Constitution did not address the
question of the Judiciary. This question had been dealt with
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separately and with a different purpose for the most part from that
for which the Constitutional Reform Corimittee of 1958 had been charged.
Consequently it had been considered by a special Committee of the
National Council, namely the Court Reforms Committee.
Nonetheless, in so far as the Constitutional Reform Corimittee
had found it relevant to relate it to its proposals (which would be
the way in the final analysis in which it would be understood under
1 ^9
the Constitutiuon of 1959), it had treated it loosely as follows.
In regard to judicial appointments and
promotion we are clear that the Judiciary
must be safeguarded against political
influence and controversy; and see no
reason, at present, to recommend any
change in the existing system. In regard,
however, to the jurisdiction of courts,
which may well be regulated by the legislative
action, we are anxious to avoid a division
of the field of competence in a way which
involves discrimination between white persons
and non-white persons; or in a way which implies
that different systems of law must necessarily
continue to be administered in two different sets
of Courts. We have not found this an easy
problem to solve, but believe that the best
solution lies in giving the High Conmissioner
and the Basutoland Council concurrent legislative
powers in'this field with a repugnancy test
in favour of the High Caimissioner.
The National Treasury, which had become a symbol of Indirect
Rule was abolished. No longer essential to the colonial administration
as an instrument for ruling the Territory, but for the most part still
essential to retain, in particular for purposes of local government,
the chieftaincy was recognized by establishing a College of Chiefs.
The College was concerned with the recognition of chiefs, settling
%
disputes concerning succession, and generally for the settlement of all
cases in the Territory which did not fall under courts of general
jurisdiction. The College of Chiefs was designed to adapt the
chieftaincy "to fit more comfortably into the emerging pattern of modern
Basuto society."1^
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The first meeting and the First Session of the Legislative Council
was held from March 11 to June 6, 1960. Khosana Constantine Bereng
Seeiso had interrupted his studies at Oxford, obviously anxious that
too many crucial decisions had already been taken in his minority which
affected the Office of Morena e Moholo, and he had been installed
to his father's stool early in February 1960, with the new title of
Motlotlehi.
Thus the old National Council ran its course. Having begun as a
body of chiefs in 1903, it had gradually undergone change. It had
infused principles and practices of a parliamentary government in the
process, adjusted the political views of the chiefs, and challenged
coirmoners to join politics, inspite of its originally conservative
aims. In the end there was no doubt that the path toward a
parliamentary form of government which Lesotho had taken was the one in
which the leaders of an Independent Lesotho, chiefs and commoners alike,
generally believed was the correct one for their country. The role of
the colonial administration in charting the path was of course evident.
At the same time, the Basotho leaders were not passive. They took an
i
active part in determining the final outcome. The history of political
institutions in the Territory had not been merely the history of British
Basutoland; it had been as much the history of Lesotho which the
Basotho had helped to shape, even though during a colonial era. Now,
whether or not the final outcome was what the Nation of Basotho needed -
whether it was suitable for the country - is another problem altogether
t
which, it has to be admited, is tempting to stick a finger into, but
A
A
which would require a separate study.
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SUMMARY
This thesis covers a long period, from the pre-colonial era
(that is, before 1868) through the colonial era until 1960, just six
years before Independence. It is, however, a specific study of the
development of political institutions: it attempts to diow what
institutions of government the Basotho of the pre-colonial era used,
how efficiently they worked then, and what became of them during the
colonial era. Finally, the thesis focuses on the Basutoland National
Council - a colonial institution, its functions, and its role in the
constitutional development of Lesotho. The findings of the thesis
can be sunmarized under four headings as follows:
A. On the Efficacy of the Institutions of
Government Before the Colonial Period
By the 1830s, when Lesotho had become a state, comprising several
small chiefdoms (and in some cases only fragments of chiefdoms), its
founder, Moshoeshoe 1, effectively adapted the pre-lifaqane
institutions of government to cement his political achievement.
Inspired by his political tutor, Mohlomi, the son of Monyane, he made
peace and justice the foundations of his Kingdom. He made use of a
hierarchy of chiefs, all of whom had their makhotla (courts or
councils), settled disputes of his subjects under their respective
territorial jurisdictions according to the laws and customs of the land.
These chiefs were under obligation to attend Moshoeshoe's pitso and
makhotia, cultivate the lands of his principal wives, and fight in the
wars declared by himself - using their own arms and resources (only
suppl'.mented by his own when the occasion called for it), and generally
recognized his sovereignty. In turn he held himself accountable to
these chiefs for his public actions and policies; he allowed himself
to be ruled by law (with only a few notable instances when he acted
contrary to his own maxim and hence suffered the displeasure of his
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subjects); and he was sensitive to the popular will and made the
pitso the hallmark of freedom of speech.
From the headman - the anal lest authority in the Kingdom - to the
Morena e Moholo there were counsellors with varying
responsibilities and areas of specialization, such as, for instance,
the maqosa (ambassadors or errants), and the liqeko (confidants).
These officials facilitated comnunication, kept relations between
authorities functional, and generally kept the hierarchy of chiefs
efficient and responsible.
The pitso and the makhotla were institutions both of policy
formulation and legislation. The makhotla, additionally, exercised
the function of adjudication.
These institutions of government and control of power served the
kingdom efficiently. In their adaptation to the kingdom, however,
they depended more on Moshoeshoe's genius than on the force of tradition.
B.' The General Effects of Colonization
on the Indigenous Institutions of
Government in the Nineteenth Century
Lesotho became <a. British dependency in 1868 amidst confusion from
the point of view of the Imperial Government as to the purpose for
extending jurisdiction over it. It was not clear as to whether the
aim was to colonize or whether it was to protect it. Although the
British authorities of Cormonwealth Constitutional Law would later
assert that it was a Crown Colony, the High Corrmisioner, Sir Philip
Wodehouse, who had initially initiated the relationship with Moshoeshoe 1,
the founding Monarch, had intended to honour the Kingdom's request that
%
land should not be alienated. That understanding had been interpreted
by the Basotho and some colonial administrators to mean that
land had not been ceded to the British Crown, and hence Lesotho was only
n
a Protectorate. In Lesotho that distinction was of political
significance. It meant that the indigenous government would continue
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to rule and the colonial administration would take charge of external
affairs: it was expected to protect and not control.
The confusion over the Territory's constitutional status thus
led, haphazardly and without clear considerations of policy, to parallel
rule. The Basotho Monarch, or Morena e Moholo and the Resident
Commissioner (who was termed Governor's Agent until 1884), ruled as the
virtual equals, at least in practice, although constitutionally the
latter had reserved powers which he might, and sometimes did use to
subject the former. It was a relationship of convenience whereby
constitutional questions were interpreted by each in any manner that
suited the occasion and often inconsistently.
During the period from 1868 to 1871, when the colonial
administration had not yet established itself and even the
constitutionality of proclaiming Lesotho a British Territory was being
questioned by the Crown Law Officers, the indigenous government ruled as
though the Kingdom was still independent. Institutions of government
worked without marked deterioration from the past, despite the fact that
for the last two years Moshoeshoe 1 was no longer on the scene. He
had spent the latter half of 1869 critically ill and no longer in control
of the affairs of state, and he had died on March 11, 1870.
The period during which Lesotho was under the Cape of Good Hope
rule, 1871 to 1884, was significant in two respects. One, the Cape of
Good Hope bore hard on the indigenous government. Bent on destroying
the chieftaincy, it sought to disrupt Sesotho customary law and custom,
in collaboration with the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, whose
constructive achievements are otherwise a matter of record. Colonial
Officers turned the pitso into a forum for dictatorially announcing
unpopular measures and Regulations, thereby contributing to its
deterioration as an institution of policy formulation and expression
of the popular will. Put under allowances, in lieu of collecting tax
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for the colonial administration, the chieftaincy generally turned its
sense of accountability upwards from the subjects to colonial Officers.
The agrarian boom of the 1870s, and its corollary factor - migrant
labour into the white settler colonies of South Africa generally eroded
conmunal bonds: fathers lost grip over their sons, and chiefs over
commoners. Social institutions loosened and began to break down. Two,
Cape rule led to a rebellion, or more popularly, the Gun War, by which
it seemed that the Basotho questioned the entire constitutional
arrangement between their Territory and the Cape of Good Hope Colony.
The question of whether Lesotho was a Crown Colony or a Protectorate was
brought to the surface. The Imperial Government, following consultations
with chiefs, resumed its rule through the South African High Commission.
But that War also unleased the heretofore masked factionalism within the
chieftaincy. More than any other internal factor, that factionalism
would destroy the credibility of the chieftaincy in the eyes of the
commoners and bring its leadership under scrutiny.
C. The Role of the Basutoland National
Council in the Preparation of a Political
Leadership For Self Government
I
1. External Factors: The Colonial Administration.
The Question of Incorporation to the Union of South Africa
From the point of view of the Imperial Government and the colonial
administration, the National Council was established initially to take
the place of the Basotho pitso: It was hoped that it would facilitate
the formulation of policy pertaining to the internal affairs of the
Territory; to effect a two way communication between the colonial Staff
and the people; and generally to provide a forum where the Resident
Commissioner and the Morena e Moholo and his chiefs exchanged
views and shared the responsibility for decision making. Although
initially there was no stated aim to use the National Council as a
prototype of a Legislative Council, its conduct betrayed that aim.
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And by the early 1920s, at least, the South African High Cotrmission
had begun to concede, however cautiously, that it saw the Council as
a mid-wife of new ideas and a school for preparing the Basotho for
self-government along parliamentary lines. But it favoured gradualism
to attain that end.
Generally speaking, the colonial administration failed to attain
the major professed objectives regarding the functions of the National
Council. The National Council never took the place of the pitso, as
envisaged. Firstly, the one major characteristic of a pitso, namely,
the chieftaincy's responsiveness and accountability to coarooners, was
virtually non-existent in the National Council. Chiefs attended the
National Council mainly to further their own interests and to pander
to the interests of the colonial administration. The interests
of the Nation at large concerned them mostly when there was a crisis,
and where, therefore, the position of the chieftaincy was under threat.
Secondly, the pitso continued to function, in its degenerant form,
to a point where sometimes both the colonial administration and "the
chieftaincy preferred it frcm the National Council to meet seme
<
immediate problems.
As the National Council began, at its First Session in 1903, to
draft or re-state customary law, and periodically thereafter to amend it
and to add to it, its constitutional status became anomalous. There
was no doubt in the minds of the members of the Council that in drafting,
amending and adding to those "Laws" they were legislating. While the
colonial administration was split in its opinion, a Resident Comnissioner
and a Legal Adviser saying in one instance that the Council had merely
declared customary law, another Resident Conmissioner and another Legai
Adviser saying at another instance that it had legislated "informally".
The constitutional status of the National Council was thus paradoxical
to its members, while the "Laws" issuing from it were a legal travesty
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which culminated in a High Court judgment four decades later which
declared that they had no force of law.
The parallel rule of the colonial administration and the chiefs,
which was arrived at accidentally and was implemented haphazardly,
militated against the consideration of an early increased involvanent
of the bahlalefi (the educated), who as a rule were commoners, in
the National Council. Yet, a need for that development had become
evident by 1917, and urgent by 1922. Consequently, the introduction
of the elective principle, which was more of an issue to the bahlalefi,
had to be postponed until the 1940s, when it was accepted in the form
of an indirect election. Parallel Rule itself which came to be viewed
as Indirect Rule, did not produce an efficient and responsible
chieftaincy. The chieftaincy continued to degenerate in qualities of
leadership. It did not lead to either an improvement or a rebuilding,
as the case might be, of indigenous institutions. When these general
failures had to be admitted, in the late 1920s, the colonial
administration was unsure of the extent of its responsibility to reform
the chieftaincy, so that even after the pressure of the Progressive
Association to precipitate a major reform, that development had to be
postponed for ten years. And then, at that point, in 1938, by
attempting to achieve in one year what might gradually have been achieved
over almost four decades, the Reforms shocked the chieftaincy and
produced the outbreak of ritual murders.
More critical than the policy of Parallel or Indirect Rule in
retarding constitutional developments in Lesotho was the question of
"incorporation" in the Union of South Africa. Fran the beginning
when the National Council was established in 1903, the Imperial
Government felt the need to reconcile any constitutional developments
that might be contemplated for Lesotho with their effects on the white
British settler colonies of South Africa. Beginning in 1908, when ideas
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on the establishment of a Union of those colonies began to take a firmer
shape, the Imperial Government had the greatest difficulty in
conceptualizing the contrary of incorporating the High Conmission
Territories, of which Lesotho was a part, to such a Union. The
political folly of the Boers on the African franchise, which led to the
policy of racial segregation, so frightened the Basotho as to cause
than to protest vehemently against incorporation. But the net. effect
of their protests was only to defer the topic, and not to
persuade the British Government to abandon it altogether. From 1910 up
until 1960, when a Legislative Council sat in Lesotho for the first
time, the colonial administration felt the need to retard any
constitutional progress in the Territory which might
be viewed by the Union of South Africa as pre-empting the
eventuality of incorporation.
The net result of these two external factors - the colonial
administration and the question of incorporation - was that whatever
constitutional progress was achieved reflected the Tact, by and large,
that the colonial administration feared that deferring it further was
t
likely to produce a disruptive confrontation.
When, in any event, the colonial administration considered it
convenient to conce d to internal pressures for constitutional
developments, its conceived view of a type of government that was
desirable for the future was always clear: it was a parliamentary type
of government. At such instances its wishes were invariably explicit,
in confidential memoranda at least, that constitutional monarchy would
be preferred to executive monarchy.
Further, the type of colonial policy pursued in Lesotho, and
the question of incorporation, explain why the colonial administration
was practically unaffected by parallel trends of constitutional
developments elsewhere in British controlled territories of Africa.
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The upsurge for African representation in the Legislative Councils of
West and East Africa in the 1920s went unheeded. And the call for
responsible government in the 1940s which was evident in both regions
did not in Lesotho create even as much of an impression on the colonial
administration as to cause it to consider parity in representation
between the appointed and the elected members of the National Council,
and much less to grant the Territory a Legislative Council.
Internal Factors: Chiefs and Commoners
Having resisted the suggestion of two colonial administrations
(under Cape rule and subsequently under Crown rule) for the establishment
of "a Council of Advice" for two decades, from 1883 to 1903, the
chieftaincy of Lesotho finally accepted the idea for two reasons: (i)
It was failing to cope with its primary responsibility of political
leadership, having broken down into dynastic factions, and its
institutions of government as well as customary law having virtually
broken down. (ii) It saw the opportunity of resuming its leadership
under a modern institution — the National Council, which it generally
c
styled a "Parliament", and which was so desribed by its critics, the
t
bahlalefi (educated coomoners).
As with the colonial administration, however, the chieftaincy
generally failed in its aims regarding the use of the National Council,
(i) It was unable through the National Council to cure itself of the
malaise of dynastic disputes. (ii) While working asiduously to
%
adapt certain customary "Laws" to the times (and in that regard
preserving a positive legacy for future), for its part it remained above
those "Laws". The contrary had been the case under Moshoeshoe's
rule in the pre-colonial era, and the chieftaincy generally bemoaned
that fact. (iii) By failing to settle its problems of succession, the
- 384 -
Office of Morena e Moholo began effectively from 1905 to lose
control over mechanisms for effecting succession. Increasingly the
colonial administration took over the management of this critical
constitutional feature and exploited it whenever it became convenient.
The National Council, and no longer solely the Royal Court of Princes,
began to have a major involvement in the choice of an heir. The final
outcome of succession problems was the choice of a female Regent who
served the Nation for two decades, from 1941 and 1960. While all
indications based on the Regent's personality suggest that she might
have ruled as ably as any male Monarch before her, and certainly better
than one (Letsie II - 1905-13), the combined considerations of her
gender and the aftermath of the High Court case that secured her
appointment weakened her administration considerably. It was felt
necessary by the chiefs themselves, more so than by conmoners, in the
National Council, to give her Advisers, beginning in 1948, who would
be responsible to the Council. She was required to consult the
National Council before she could make any "Rules" or "Orders".
Ultimately, in 1958, pressure was brought to bear on her to agree to
be a constitutional Monarch.
Initiatives for constitutional development in the Territory were
owed initially to the Basutoland Progressive Association which began
from 1908 onward to fight for increased commoner representation in
the Council. The Lekhotla la Bafo began frcm the date of its
founding in 1919 to share this aim, but its focus, ostensibly, was that
a separate "Council of Conmoners" should be formed. That approach
failed utterly. Both the Progressive Association and the Lekhotla
la Bafo were critical of the abuses of chiefs. But they differed
in that, while the Lekhotla la Bafo expected the chieftaincy to reform
itself, the Progressive Association began in 1922 - having satisfied
itself that the chiefly National Council was unresponsive - to urge the
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colonial administration to take the initiative. The timing for
the Reforms of 1938 was decided by the colonial administration, which
simply waited until the chieftaincy had lost its momentum of resistence.
But the initiative came from the Progressive Association, which also
pointed provided the focus for the Reforms.
The point, in 1937, at which the chieftaincy generally lost the
momentum for resistence on the question of reforms marked the beginning
of the successes of both the Progessive Association and the Lekhotia
la Bafo in their drive for constitutional advance. The major
constitutional stages that were achieved in the 1940s, mainly the
granting of indirect election to the National Council through the
establishment of District Councils, had been spearheaded by the
Progressive Association in 1937. The colonial administration gave in
to pressure because the chieftaincy had begun to show signs of losing
political leadership. From that point on, both the colonial
administration and the commoner dominated organizations reserved
political leadership to chiefs because they were still deemed as the
"natural leaders", and not because they had retained anything close to
(
the calibre of leadership that even the chiefs of the early twentieth
century had shown.
The last heave for constitutional advance which begun in the early
1950s was owed to a great measure to the founding by Ntsu Mokhehle in
1952 of the Basutoland African Congress (strengthened in 1954 by the
founding of the political paper Mohlabani, edited by B. M. Khaketla),
which called for "self-government Now!" The Basutoland African Congress
was uncompromising on the question of incorporation, which still loaned
over the country. It was to be fought against at all cost. It
demanded the removal of race discrimination in the country. It held
the view that there was enough skilled Basotho manpower in the country
to man the colonial bureaucracy.
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D. On the Commitment of National
Leaders to a Parliamentary Government
Since the establishment of the National Council in 1903 chiefs
and some segments of coomoners were vying for the leadership of the
country. Chiefs were committed to preserving their power, along the
lines of the old monarchy, if they might, along any other lines if
necessary. The politically minded commoners were invariably
unequivocally committed to a parliamentary form of government. Nor did
they need the encouragement of the colonial administration in their
commitment. In an era when chiefs had begun to fear talented courtiers
and were even content to surround themselves with dunces, if only they
were certain of their loyalty, the politically minded commoners were
well aware that their political participation and protection of their
interests were better ensured in a parliamentary form of government than
in an executive monarchy built around a nonresponsive chieftaincy.
Their credentials to power were their talents, and not
membership in royal families.
As early as in 1907 the members of the Progressive Association
were clear that education, not "birth", ought to be the major
qualification for participation in public affairs. By 1917 they were
calling for an elective National Council. By 1926 they felt that they
were ready for a Legislative Council. From its founding in 1919 the
Lekhotla la Bafo fought for the establishment of a Council of
Commoners. Having lost faith in a government of chiefs, it advocated a
bicameral National Council with legislative powers. And the Basutoiand
National Congress was founded in 1952 with a manifesto tHat called for
self-government under parliamentary institutions.
While on the whole chiefs dreaded the prospect of a parliamentary
government, whereby they might ultimately be dominated by commoners,
certain leading individuals among them wanted to be seen as being in
favour of a parliamentary government. Those, in the main, were the
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chiefs who served in the various conmittees of the National Council -
the Standing Conmittee, Constitutional Reforms Committee (1958),
Constitutional Discussions Delegation (London, 1958), and the Regent's
Advisers. But whether they were really conmitted to a parliamentary
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APPENDIX 1.
Draft Constitution for Basutoland, 1883.
"Proposed Terms for the Future Government of Basutoland"
I. "Basutoland as annexed to the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope by the
Act No.12, 1871, shall remain intact for the Basuto people.
Basutoland, as described in the said Act, includes Quithing (sic).
II. The Governor of the Cape of Good Hope will, from time to time, appoint
a Resident Officer, to be styled the Governor's Agent, and such other
officers as may be necessary for the administration of the affairs of
Basutoland.
III. The Governor's Agent, or any other person appointed by the Governor,
shall have the sole cognizance of the following cases.
1. All civil cases wherein European, or persons not being
Basutos, alone are parties.
2. All criminal cases wherein Europeans or persons not being
Basutos are accused of the Commission of any crime or offence,
except when the Governor shall order the trial of the offender
before some competent Court in the Colony.
<
IV. All civil cases wherein Europeans and Basutos are parties as plaintiffs
or defendants shall be heard and determined by the Governor's Agent or
by one of the other officers appointed by the Governor; advised or
assisted by the principal chief of that part of Basutoland in which the
Mosuto party shall reside, and by such other chief(,) headman or person
as the Paramount Chief shall appoint for that purpose, if such
principal Chief shall think fit to attend, or if the Paramount Chief
shall think fit to appoint any person to attend, and any such Chiefs,
Headmen, or others who shall attend, shall be 'at liberty to express
their opinions upon the matters in dispute. The decision of the Court
shall be the decision of the Governor's Agent or other officer
presiding. The Paramount Chief engages for himself and on behalf of
the tribe that the judgment in every case against any Mosuto shall be
observed and satisfied in full, or to the extent that the dependent
shall be possessed of property wherewith to satisfy the same.
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V. All cases of treason or sedition shall be tried before one of the
Supreme Courts of the Colony.
VI. All cases wherein any Mosuto shall be charged with murder or culpable
homicide, or wherein any Mosuto shall be charged with the Commission of
any crime against or in respect of any person not being a Mosuto, shall
be tried before the Governor's Agent or one of the other officers
appointed by the Governor, advised or assisted by two or more chiefs,
nominated by the Paramount Chief, if they see fit to attend. The
decision of the Court shall be the decision of the Governor's Agent or
other officer presiding, but in the case of murder or homicide, if the
person killed shall not be a Mosuto, it shall be competent for the
Governor to order the trial of the offender before a Superior Court of
the Colony.
VII The Paramount Chief engages for himself and on behalf of the tribe that
every possible effort will be made to prevent Basutos from committing
thefts beyond the borders of Basutoland.
VIII.. The Paramount Chief premises, when thereto required by -the Governor's
Agent, to cause to be arrested and handed over to justice any person
within Basutoland against whom a warrant may be issued for the
commission of any crime or offence for which such a person is liable to
be tried.
IX. When the spoor of any animal stolen beyond the boundries of Basutoland
is traced to any kraal or village within Basutoland, the Chief of that
part of Basutoland, in which such kraal or village is situated, shall
be responsible for delivery of the stolen animals or payment of the
value thereof to the owner.
X. A Council of Advice shall be constituted to -consist of Chiefs and
Headmen. The names of the Chiefs to be submitted by the Paramount
Chief for consideration. The number of Headmen to be determined after
the names of the Chiefs have been submitted and approved and when
determined one-half of the number shall be nominated by the Paramount
Chief and the other half by the Governor's Agent. Every Headman
appointed to a seat in the Council shall hold office for three years,
unless his seat shall become vacant by death or his removal from office
by the joint act of the Governor's Agent and Paramount Chief.
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XI. A meeting of the Council shall be convened by the Governor's Agent at
least once a year for the discussion of public business, and at every
annual meeting an account shall be submitted shewing the revenue and
expenditure for the past financial year. The Paramount Chief promises
to give notice to members of any meeting of Council whenever required
to do so by the Governor's Agent.
XII. It shall be competent, at any meeting of the Council duly convened at
the request of the Governor's Agent, to adopt resolutions suggesting
alterations in the laws of Basutoland. All such resolutions will be
considered by the Governor of the Colony, and, if approved, the
necessary proclamation will be issued for giving effect thereto.
XIII. The revenue of Basutoland shall be expended exclusively for the
government of the people.
XIV. The term Mosuto or Basuto shall include persons of the other tribes,
who not being Basutos are resident in Basutoland, and subject to the
control of the Paramount Chief or any subordinate Chief.
XV. Except in so far as may be necessary to amend the laws of Basutoland
for the purpose of giving effect to the altered system of Government,
such laws shall femain in force until repealed or amended.
XVI. Except where otherwise provided, the Paramount Chief shall by himself
and through his subordinate Chiefs have the management of the internal
affairs of Basutoland. And the Paramount Chief promises that the laws
the laws of the country shall be observed, and nothing allowed to be
done contrary to the principles of justice and humanity.
XVII. Appeals will be allowed from the decisions from the Chiefs in cases
between Basutos, subject to conditions to be considered by the Council,
and approved by the Governor.
XVIII. Hut-tax shall be paid for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the
expenses of the Government of Basutoland. Arrears at the present rate
of one pound shall be paid up.
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XIX. The subjects of all persons in Basutoland shall be respected without
distinction. No Mosuto shall be molested, dispossessed, or interfered
with, merely on the ground that he took part on either side during the
hostilities.
XX. The Paramount Chief promises to inform the Governor's Agent promptly of
all matters of importance which may transpire in the country, coming to
his notice, and to report upon any matter upon which the Governor's
Agent may require information."
British Parliamentary Papers, 1883, XLVIII, (Cmd.3708). P. 122.
APPENDIX II
[PROCLAMATION No. 7 of 1910.1
PROCLAMATION BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER.
Whereas in the year 1903 there was established in Basutoland under the
authority of the High Commissioner a Council consisting of representatives of
the inhabitants of the territory for the purpose of discussing the domestic
affairs thereof:
And whereas the High Commissioner has from time to time issued
instructions and regulations determining the constitution powers and procedure
of the said Council:
And whereas it is expedient to revise such regulations and instructions
and to embody the same in a Proclamation:
Now therefore under and by virtue of the powers in me vested I do
hereby declare proclaim and make known as follows:-
1. There shall be in Basutoland a Council for the discussion of the
domestic affairs of the territory to be styled the Basutoland Council
consisting of a president and not more than one hundred members.
2.—(1) The Resident Commissioner or in his absence the officer
performing the duties of Resident Commissioner shall be President of the
Council.
(2) The Paramount Chief for the time being shall be a member of the
Council.
(3) The Paramount Chief shall nominate to the Resident Commissioner not
more than ninety-four persons belonging to the Basuto tribe and such persons
shall if approved by the Resident Commissioner be appointed by him to be
members of the Council.
(4) Such appointments shall include the principal persons exercising
authority as chiefs of the Basuto tribe provided that such persons are not in
the opinion of the Resident Commissioner for any reason unfitted for membership
of -the Council and shall further so far as practicable be representative of the
different interests and opinions of the members of the tribe.
(5) The Resident Commissioner shall have power to appoint not more than
five persons to be members of the Council.
. 3.-(1) Persons appointed under sub-sections (3) and (5) of the
preceding section or under section four shall continue to be members of the
Council until the thirty first day of December in the year in which they are
appointed and shall after that day cease to be members but shall be eligible
for reappointment.
(2) Appointments of members of the Council shall be made as soon as may
be after the first day of January in each year.
(3) The President shall have power to suspend any member of the Council
for such period as he may determine and no member so suspended shall be
permitted to attend any meeting of the Council during such period.
4. Where any casual vacancy occurs in the Council through the death or
resignation of any member the Resident Commissioner may appoint a person to
fill such vacancy provided that if such vacancy occurs among the members
appointed by the Resident Commissioner on the nomination of the Paramount Chief
the Resident Commissioner shall before appointing any person to fill such
vacancy invite the Paramount Chief to nominate a person for such vacancy and if
the Resident Commissioner approves such nomination he shall appoint the person
so nominated.
5. It shall be lawful for the President to appoint an officer of the





15. This Proclamation may be cited for all purposes as The Basutoland
Council Proclamation 1910 and shall have force and effect from the date of its
publication in the Gazette.
GOD SAVE THE KING.
Given under my Hand and Seal at Johannesburg this Thirty-first day of
March One thousand Nine hundred and Ten.
SELBORNE,
High Commissioner.
By Command of His Excellency the High Commissioner.
C.H. RODWELL,
Imperial Secretary
Basutoland Annual Report, 1911, Llll, (Cmd. 5582).
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APPENDIX III
"Puso Ea Lesotho." By F.Seele
Theang Lekhotla la Bafo
Benghali puso ea Lesotho kea lekhotla la marena kea lumela, 'me ke tsoanelo. Ke
se ke utloile hangata ba bang ba ntse ba bua ka hore hoja le batho ba
hlalefileng ba teng khotleng leo ke hona lekhotla le ne le tla tseba ho sebetsa
litaba. Ba bang ba re esale le kena hang lea kena neng hape? 'Na ke re moo
ho tsoa ho bona beng ba lona. Khotla lena ke la marena ruri, ke bona ba le
kopileng 'me ba ba ba le fuua 'me le tsoanetse ho kenoa ke bona fee la le ho le
tsamaisa. Haeba sechaba se rata hore se utloe tabeng tsa puso se tsoanetse ho
kopa lekhotla le tla kenoa ke bana ho thoeng ke bahlalefi ba tla khethoa ke
sechaba literekeng tsa Lesotho, ba tla etsa liphutheho literekeng tseo ba li
khethetsoeng ba amohele le mangolo a tsoang ho batho ba setereke sa hae ba
hlahisang tseo ba ratang hore a tie a li hlahise lekhotleng la sechaba mohla le
kopaneng, li tie li talingoe ke lekhotla la sechaba pele li ntano fetisetsoa
khotleng la marena mohlang le kopaneng. Le bona le Engelane moo re busoang ho
na le lekhotla la marena le lekhotla la sechaba a emeng ka ona mokhoa ona ke
tsoang ho o bolela e le hore le sechaba se be le puo tabeng ea puso e tie e
kholise sechaba e le hore taba e kang ea Russia e fele. Sechaba se nahane tsa
ho ntsetsa lefatse la sona pele.
Joale ke re na mohai kajeno o khutselitseng. Kopang lekhotla le joalo la
sechaba hoba lekhotla le teng joale ke leo marena a ikopetseng lona. Taba tse
kang tsena tsa mesebetsi'e fuoang balichaba empa Basotho ba le teng ke tse
tsoanetseng ho hlaisoa. ke lekhotla la sechaba ha e le la marena ke batla ke sa
bone hore na ho lona li ka hlaisoa ke mang ka ha e le marena feela bona ba sena
pelaelo ena rona mafutsana re nang le eona. E ka khathatso kotleng leo (sic)
ea motho a le mong ka hoba ha e hlahisoe ke lekhotla. Joale lona ba
hlalefileng le sitoa keng ho etsa phutheho ea lona le bue ka tsa ho kopa
lekhotla leo. Ha ho thuse letho ha le ntse le belaela empa pelaelo tsa lona li
sa fihle tse beng tsa ba tsoanetseng ho le lokisetsa litaba. Joale ka ha le
boletse hoba marena a lekhotla ke batho ba sa hlalefang le thusang ho bua
"Naleding" empa marena a sa tlo utloa. Kopang 'Musisi hore a le kopele ho
Morena e Moholo le lekhotla la hae. Ha lekhotla la Morena e Moholo le lumela
le tie le laele 'Musisi ho hlahisa taba tsa lona ho Leqosa le Phahameng la
Morena Edweard. Ho seng joalo re se ke ra 'na ra nyefola lekhotla la marena.
Hoba taba tseo khotla la marena le tla li sebetsa ke life ha sechaba se sena
lentsoe pusong ea lona.
F. Seele. Naledi. Volume IV, No.85, Phuptjoane 4, 1907.
| The emphasis is mine and it coincides with my own translations in
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